

# Minority Glottopolitics in the European Context of Governance


A Case Study of French-Corsican  
Glottopolitical Relations

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## List of Acronyms

ADECEC	Association pour le Développement des Etudes Archéologiques, Historiques, Linguistiques et Naturalistes du Centre-Est de la Corse
AER	Association of European Regions
ARC	Action Régionaliste Corse
BELMR	Bureau Européen pour les Langues les Moins Répandues (see also EBLUL)
CAPES	Certificat d'Aptitude Professionnelle à l'Enseignement Secondaire (see PGCE)
CCECV	Conseil de la Culture, de l'Education et du Cadre de Vie (de l'Assemblée de Corse)
CCU	Centre Culturel Universitaire (de l'Université de Corse)
CDDP	Centre Départemental de Documentation Pédagogique
CIEMEN	Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Etniques i les Nacions
CoE	Council of Europe
CoR	Committee of the Regions (of the EU)
CPMRE	Conference for Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe
CRC	Centre de Recherches Corses
CRDP	Centre Régional de Documentation Pédagogique
CTC	Collectivité Territoriale de Corse
DEUG	Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales
DGLF	Délégation Générale de la Langue Française
DLF	Défense de la Langue Française
EBLUL	European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (see also BELMR)



EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European parliament
EU	European Union
EYL 2001	European Year of Languages (2001)
FLNC	Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale
FR3	France Région 3 (French public TV channel)
FRC	Front Régionaliste Corse
IMEDOC	Iles de la Méditerranée Occidentale
INED	Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques
INSEE	Institut National de Statistiques et d'Etudes Economiques
INTERREG	(EU) Interregional Cooperation Programme
IUFM	Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres
IUT	Institut Universitaire de Technologie
JDC	Journal de la Corse (weekly Corsican newspaper)
JO	Journal Officiel (de la République Française)
LCC	Langue et Culture Corses
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
OJ(EC)	Official Journal (of the European Community)
PGCE	Post Graduate Certificate of Education (see CAPES)
PULA	Publications Universitaires de Linguistique et d'Anthropologie (Centre de Recherches Corses de l'Université de Corse)
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
RCFM	Radio Corsica Frequenza Mora
RML	Regional and/or Minority Language

TEU Treaty of the European Union

UN United Nations

## Abstract

Various scholarly traditions have contributed to document the multifaceted relations between language planning and the distribution of political power in conflict-laden nation-building processes. With the construction of the European Union (EU), these relations are re-contextualised because the EU project aims to create a supra-national polity by integrating nation-states. This involves deciding on an approach to the constitutive linguistic diversity resulting from gathering many polities and languages. This dissertation looks at sociolinguistic issues of Regional and/or Minority Language (RML) status and planning in this European context. It explores the links between competing political and linguistic ideologies and RML policy making in the EU at supranational, national, and regional levels, concentrating on how political and/or linguistic ideologies are enshrined and operationalized in various legal/institutional and policy frameworks. Its ultimate objective is to examine whether the EU glottopolitical construction has affected one particular case of RML planning: the conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica, and, if so, whether this happened in ways that may contribute to reversing French-Corsican diglossic hierarchies and language shift.

Language policy formation is examined at three different levels and the analysis takes account of the fact that, at all levels, actual policy outcomes result from the complex negotiations between actors possessing varying discursive and/or legal and/or institutional powers. Since each level has been historically constructed *sui generis* and involves a specific pattern of distribution of policy powers amongst varying numbers of actors, each level interacts with other levels in specific ways. Consequently, different theoretical and methodological frameworks are used to identify what players - with what respective powers - interact at each and/or across levels, and how.

At supranational level, the theoretical/methodological tools used to analyse language policies are governance theory and power dependency theory, the concept of policy networks and the critical discourse analysis method. The analyses ultimately show that, on RML-related decisions, it is nation-states that remain largely sovereign. At

national level, RML policy-making processes vary according to the brand of linguistic nationalism that prevailed during nation-building processes. I explore these through competing theories of linguistic nationalism and their respective conceptions of the nation and of language, focusing in particular on the complex ways in which these notions interrelate in French linguistic essentialism. I show how French 'traditional' linguistic nationalism and its constitutive ideology of monolingualism have been historically translated into legal/institutional provisions and then why and how, in recent years, a more liberal, national RML policy has emerged that has altered France's diglossic profile, albeit minimally. In Corsica, this has coincided with an experimental devolution plan through which a new RML policy network could surface. The dominant actors in that network have since attempted to reverse diglossic hierarchies through language-in-education planning, but in such very unorthodox and contested ways as to sign away language revitalisation.

In that connection, this dissertation shows that whilst legal issues of language status predominate in negotiations at, with and between other levels, in Corsican regional-local interactions, disputes between policy makers and their addressees largely revolve around corpus management issues. In turn, the strong emphasis on corpus issues means that language policies devised at the other levels, with their main focus on status issues, have less relevance to Corsica's RML policy developments and elite and popular attitudes to language plans at grassroots level.

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## Introduction

This dissertation investigates the extent to which the advent and functioning of a supranational polity like the European Union (hereafter EU) has modified the relations of power underlying Regional and/or Minority Language (hereafter RML) politics and policy making in Western Europe in general and glottopolitical<sup>1</sup> relations between France and Corsica in particular. I examine the extent to which change in RML glottopolitics results from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions, and institutional practice at and across supranational, national and sub-national levels of society. In that respect, the discourses on language, identity and the language-identity link produced at and across these three levels, and the complex ways in which these discourses interact in language policy formation, are central themes of investigation.

The construction of the EU supranational framework of reference has re-configured the context of ideological, legal and institutional bargaining on RML issues, from a formerly bi-lateral model of political bargaining over (often conflict-laden) issues of RML recognition and rights between individual nation states and their respective, territorialized sub-national entities (the regions), into a tri-dimensional space characterised by patterns of multi-level, multi-actor governance. In this study, I investigate how the interaction of dominant and resistant discourses on language, identity and language planning, which occurs at but also transcends all three levels of this space, affects RML politics and planning.

Within the aforementioned new ideological/political, legal/institutional and sociolinguistic space, I argue that patterns of power distribution over issues of RML rights and policy are negotiated in various supranational, national and sub-national fora, and involve, at each and all levels, a variety of actors with various ideological motivations and unequal bargaining resources. Put otherwise, considering that

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<sup>1</sup> The term *glottopolitics* is synonymous with the expression 'language politics'. It appeared in French sociolinguistic literature in the 1970s/1980s (i.e. *la glottopolitique*; etymologically from Greek *Glotto-* which means *language*) to denote an approach to language politics from a conflict perspective. Since this dissertation advocates such a conflict-based perspective, I use it throughout this study as shorthand for 'conflict-laden language politics'.

ideological changes are constitutive of broad social and cultural change, I examine the extent to which European construction has both established a new arena and perhaps also modified pre-existing arenas for discursive struggle and changes on RML issues. My ultimate objective is to explore how political and/or linguistic ideologies are enshrined and operationalized in various legal/institutional and policy frameworks. To this end, I consider how the EU glottopolitical construction has affected one particular case: the conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica.

This study thus examines the distribution of glottopolitical power between the participants in these arenas, diachronically and synchronically, and both at and across European (or supranational), national and sub-national levels. Language policy formation is scrutinised both at and across levels because, not only does each level possess its own, historically-shaped internal dynamic, thus requiring a specific theoretical frame of analysis, but it also interacts with the other two in specific ways.

Several frameworks of analysis are therefore drawn upon, bringing together theoretical and/or methodological contributions from political theory, social theory and sociolinguistics. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to contribute to the field of language planning in particular and sociolinguistics in general, both in its detail and by extending the social theoretical framework of sociolinguistics.

I take the case of language policy formation in Corsica because it is exemplary in at least three respects. Firstly, as a Mediterranean, mountainous island whose acculturation to France has never been fully achieved, Corsica has maintained a cultural and linguistic specificity that could be capitalized on in its recent political history. The Corsican case thus offers a telling example of persistent conflict-ridden relations between a periphery and its core. Secondly, being within the political sphere of France, Corsica has dialogued with what has long been considered by many experts as one of the most conservative and RML-unfriendly polities in Western Europe, which has led to particularly acute political tensions. At the same time, because of these very tensions, Corsica has served as a testing ground for France's devolution policy from the 1980s, and this has reinforced the specific context of the island's glottopolitics. Thirdly, despite sociolinguistic devolution and a thorough process of language institutionalisation (albeit within the limits of France's sociolinguistic

tolerance), Corsican language revitalization efforts have obtained limited success, for reasons I will endeavour to analyze.

Chapter 1 constructs the theoretical frames. I begin at the supranational level. I show that by using a governance approach articulated on power dependency theory and the methodological tools of policy network and Critical Discourse Analysis, it is possible to overcome the weaknesses of more traditional sociolinguistic approaches to language status looking exclusively at legal provisions and paying too little attention to the actual process of policy formation. Ultimately, the governance framework explains how language policy is *made* in the EU, accounting more satisfactorily for the intricacies of policy formation by investigating which actors can have an input in policy making, with what bargaining resources, and according to what norms, values and motivations. In more traditional sociolinguistic account, this process of bargaining is often invisible or unaccounted for. In the rest of this study, this analytical framework is then transposed to the national and sub-national levels.

Moreover, as this dissertation later demonstrates, at supranational level, member states remain core players in many policy areas, including language, because they remain largely hegemonic in producing and interpreting legal texts. To understand what the sources of dominant powers and the ideology underpinning them are, and ultimately how they inform language policy formation, one must address issues of language and political power as they first emerged and became prominent at national levels.

The second part of chapter 1 therefore critically outlines several approaches to the dynamics of multilingual situations from various academic disciplines. I begin with a review of central contribution to the link between language, nationalism and nation-building processes, showing that approaches with that focus bring useful insights into the origins of the language status asymmetries currently observable in modern nation-states, and how these asymmetries have been historically shaped, during nation-building processes, both by political rhetoric about the relationship between language and identity, and by processes of modernisation. Similarly, the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia constitutes a useful snapshot of language status asymmetries, and of the distribution of language functions amongst languages, in multilingual contexts.

Yet, I argue that these approaches suffer from similar, severe limitations on two related points. First, they assume that the processes whereby sociolinguistic situations changed during nation-building processes - according to various patterns of language maintenance and/or language shift - were conflict-free and fully endorsed by the social groups amongst whom these changes took place. Second, they promote a conception of language - as objectified (reified) and given iconic status (totemized) - which reflects these conflict-free perspectives and says little about the dynamics of change in language repertoires and about actual language practices.

I then claim that Bourdieu's sociology of language and power - in particular his concepts of linguistic habitus and linguistic markets - is more satisfactory in that it integrates the notion of social conflict and resistance to acculturation into descriptions of nation-building processes, *inter alia* by acknowledging that processes of language reification and totemization themselves serve to construct social inequalities (Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu, however, argues that such inequalities can be and are resisted and that the social body is not unified and conflict-free. This implies that the contexts, meanings and nature of actual language uses themselves are not as clearly delineated as the above perspectives suggest, and that the complex ways in which actual language uses reflect and enact patterns of identity formation and related conceptions of political allegiance must be accounted for. This is where Bourdieu's approach has limited value because Bourdieu's theoretical contribution indicates no methodology to collect data on political and language ideologies and their relations to language use.

As a result, to understand language policy formation at local levels, more information is needed on: 1. the diachronic and synchronic dynamics of compliance with and resistance to political change through which sociolinguistic change took place in France and Corsica during nation-building processes and is currently taking place in France and Corsica and through the construction of the EU; 2. the various political and linguistic ideologies shaped during those processes, which inform both language policy actors negotiating policy designs and implementation at and across the aforementioned levels of analysis and the people for whom such policies are being designed (see Thiers, 1989 and Jaffe, 1999); 3. information on the extent to which the various ideologies of policy makers are congruent, or not, with those of the recipients

of language policies, which will determine the latter's attitudes to language plans and eventually condition the acceptance of such plans.

Chapters 2 to 4 examine the development of language policies in the EU and the emergence of a RML policy network, and assess the latter's success in promoting RMLs at EU level. Chapter 2 explores the ideological and legal foundations of the EU's sociolinguistic regime through an analysis of fundamental legal texts regulating the use of languages in the EEC and argues that the original 1958 design was articulated around discourses of multilingualism and language equality between national-state languages but originally devoted no political space to RML protection and promotion. Chapters 3 and 4 then bring evidence that, since the 1970s, the legal and institutional construction of the EU has then facilitated the emergence of a RML policy network that gave institutional representation and/or access to the advocates of a more inclusive EU approach to cultural/linguistic diversity. Chapter 3 shows that EU education and cultural policies (which were introduced as new sectors of EU competence in 1992), although they contain no explicit reference to RMLs, have been a constant site and stake of ideological struggle for RML activists to obtain a durable legal basis for RMLs. I assess the success of that struggle, contrasting EU legal experts' and RML activists' contradictory interpretations of both treaty articles on education and culture and a variety of legal texts and implementation provisions, as well as on various Opinion texts produced by RML activists, and I show that pro-RML discourses of resistance to the exclusive protection of national-state language have not, in fact, been actualised in EU law.

Chapter 4 then demonstrates that the EU system of multilevel governance however sets up certain contradictions that can allow spaces to be created for RMLs. As a result, the RML policy network could succeed in bypassing certain EU legal blockages and prompt an actual RML policy. After describing the processes whereby this could happen - drawing on historical accounts of the evolving role and powers of the European Parliament [hereafter EP] (e.g. Corbett *et al*, 2000), as well as my own data collected through interviews with members of the EP - I argue that, beyond financial support, RML activists have nevertheless obtained only limited political success in their attempt to obtain some recognition for RMLs at EU level. I then claim that, although future RML promotion may benefit from new changes in political

environment - following the 2004 Enlargement and/or if the Draft Constitution for Europe is eventually ratified - in today's EU it is still nation-states that retain the greatest glottopolitical powers because they monopolise legal hegemony.

As was indicated above, to understand whether the current exclusion of RMLs from the EU legal corpus may be overcome in the future, it becomes necessary to explore the ideologies hegemonic at national levels to see if such ideologies can be effectively challenged internally by RML activists.

Chapter 5 therefore examines the history of French language policy-making, relating it to the language ideologies that inform both French nation-building processes and the perceived role of French beyond the boundaries of the nation. The first part reviews the literature on early language planning measures in pre-Revolution France, outlining the historical salience of the ideological foundations of French linguistic nationalism, and shows that the reification of French and its totemization as the embodiment of formal clarity, rationalism and universal humane values predate the Revolution. The second part first analyses the reification and totemization of the nation during the Revolution through a variety of texts produced by revolutionaries, scrutinising the complex relationship between language, the nation and the state that revolutionaries theorised in essentialist terms and sought to actualise. It goes on to chart corollary institutional and policy developments and to explore actual sociolinguistic change in France between the Revolution and WWII, underlining how uneven this was across regions.

In the third part, spanning from WWII till today, I first illustrate how, from the 1960s, traditional French linguistic nationalism has been increasingly challenged both by growing language competition from English and by regionalist political and cultural demands largely motivated by uneven economic development amongst regions. As a response to the former, France developed more active strategies of language institutionalisation and of status and corpus management. As for regionalist demands, central authorities have been compelled to accommodate them, notably through regionally-differentiated political devolution and greater flexibility towards RML education rights. As both forms of pressure intensified in the 1990s, France responded to each form of pressure *ad hoc*, creating a situation in which its discourses and actual

language policies have become more inconsistent and contradictory both on the international scene and domestically, as the analysis of the contrast between French domestic language legislation (in 1992 and 1994) and France's sociolinguistic discourses in supranational arenas clearly demonstrates. In the final sections, I scrutinise how such contradictions and inconsistencies have eventually culminated during the debates around the ratification of the Council of Europe (hereafter CoE)'s *European Charter for RMLs* (1999), showing that political and linguistic ideologies inherited from the Revolution remain deeply entrenched.

Chapters 6 to 9 relate the aforementioned contradictions to the (glotto-)political struggle between France and Corsica since the island's annexation (1769). I scrutinize the relationships between language ideologies and language planning on Corsica within two frameworks: that of Corsica's conflict-laden glottopolitical relationships with France and that of internal socio-political and sociolinguistic developments on Corsica itself. Drawing on various monographs on Corsica's political, socio-anthropological and sociolinguistic evolution since 1769 (e.g. respectively, Andréani, 1999; Gil, 1971; Marchetti, 1989), Chapters 6 and 7 outline the political and sociolinguistic history of the island, describing how French nationalism altered patterns of political allegiance, nation and identity building, and language use on Corsica between 1769 and the late 1960s when France's traditional political-ideological centralism came under challenge. I show how processes of French nation-building in Corsica - the imposition of French political and language ideologies - have failed completely to eradicate traditional patterns of political loyalty and actual Corsican language use. I show that socioeconomic inequalities and correlated incomplete acculturation to France have cyclically entailed the rise of sentiments of Corsican nationhood, and fostered competing discourses on language, identity and the nation, and I relate this to massive language shift. In the context of the economic, demographic, political and cultural crisis of the 1960s, these discourses have gained new political currency, attracted popular support and eventually led to political and sociolinguistic devolution.

Chapters 8 and 9 examine the emergence of Corsican language planning in this new devolved context from the 1970s and the concomitant, constitutive rise of a Corsican language policy network from the early 1980s. Chapter 8 examines various (regional)

institutional texts, as well as policy documents issued by a number of political and sociocultural lobbying groups, and describes the phases and domains of institutionalisation of the language, showing that acquisition planning has become the main domain of RML promotion. Analysing various texts on Corsica's patterns of supranational institutionalisation, I then look at the extent to which Corsican language planners have attempted to find support for Corsican at the European level and argue that the EU has had only embryonic spin-offs in Corsica, perhaps unsurprisingly given the above history. In the final section, the analysis of quantitative data on school attendance and sociolinguistic census data illustrates that, despite substantial progress in status planning and institutional developments, especially on the island, language shift has not been reversed and Corsican language use continues to decline.

In chapter 9, I argue that this apparent contradiction results from the belief that language institutionalisation alone can suffice to reverse language shift and from the correlated failure to measure the weight in language revitalisation plans of essentialist folk political and language ideologies. I argue that these ideologies have been so ingrained in people's normative approaches to the relations between language, identity and the nation during nation-building processes in Western Europe, (as demonstrated in chapters 1 and 5 and to some extent chapter 6), that they largely determine popular attitudes and behaviours to political and sociolinguistic plans. Drawing largely on monographs on Corsican glottopolitics (e.g. Thiers, 1989 and Jaffe, 1999), and on my own interview data with various language policy actors and/or language activists collected during my fieldwork in Corsica in 2000-2001, I analyse how the deeprootedness of ideological forms of political and linguistic essentialism, in their various manifestations, explain and enact various resistant discourses to the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and to the various modalities of corpus planning.

Analysing a number of newspapers' articles, I finally examine how widely these various language ideological trends circulated in the Corsican press between 2000 and 2001, and claim that language-related discursive struggles have now shifted from a focus on status planning to issues of corpus planning. My ultimate contention is that such disputes significantly account for the limited success of both Corsican language revitalisation and the 'Europeanization' of Corsican glottopolitics.



In that connection, although the construction of the EU as a system of multilevel governance can open new spaces for RML promotion, one must bear in mind that RML situations largely differ from one another for a variety of reasons, and that such differences at local levels need to be understood. Indeed, they largely determine the extent to which particular RMLs can exploit the opportunities which the addition of a new political level of society beyond that of nation-states - the EU - can create. Conversely, by documenting the particulars of individual RML communities, comparative analysis should, in the long run, help devise better adapted language policies at supranational levels.

## Chapter 1: Theoretical frameworks and Methodological Implications

### Regional and Minority Language Politics and Policy-making in the EU

#### *Introduction*

The broad theoretical aim of this dissertation is to expand the social theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics in continuation of a process begun *inter alia* by Williams (1992), Cameron (1990) and Jaffe (1999). My own contribution to expanding such foundations consists in exploring what political-theoretical and social-theoretical frameworks developed in various scholarly traditions can contribute to reinforce the theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics, and ultimately in providing a better understanding of glottopolitics and language policy formation in general and minority language policy-making processes in the EU in particular.

This chapter establishes a research framework to study the variety of language issues linked to EU integration processes, to questions of political and cultural/linguistic identities in national/sub-national relations and to the interaction between supranational developments and national/subnational relations. Its ultimate aim is to establish a sound theoretical and methodological framework first to measure the impact of EU integration processes on Regional and Minority Language (RML) politics and policy-making (hereafter RML glottopolitics) at EU level, second to map out the politico-ideological framework against which RML legal/institutional and policy developments take place in France and Corsica, and third to examine ways in which supranational, national and sub-national levels may each interact with the others. The actual impact of integration processes at national and sub-national levels will then be further explored in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. My initial hypothesis, which this thesis will test, is that change in RML glottopolitics results from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions, and institutional practice at and across all these social levels. Methodologically, this implies that this interplay must be studied at each level *per se* - because the dynamics of each level is *sui generis* and has been historically shaped in specific ways - and across levels because it may be the case that none of the levels is impervious to the others.

In the first part of this chapter, I therefore establish a multi-theoretical framework to explore the political economy of languages in the EU at the supranational level. I begin by outlining the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU, broadly sketching the ideological assumptions and legal measures that shaped it. In doing so, I argue that broad structural models of analysis focusing exclusively on legal provisions fail to capture both the causality and the nature of change in the current sociolinguistic regimes of the EU. The causes of change include *inter alia* practical considerations - financial and technical - that have come to challenge the original 'macro-' design and provisions, and the institutional game that eventually led to creating an actual RML policy despite the absence of a formal EU competence in that domain. In the following sections, I then go on to establish a multi-theoretical and multi-methodological framework that draws on various social-theoretical contributions and language/textual analytical traditions to explain the discrepancy between the macro-structural visions of the legal order and actual institutional practices and policy outcomes.

At the end of the 'supranational' sections, I argue that despite policy developments favourable to RML promotion and possible changes to come, which can already be traced in EU glottopolitical discourses and/or anticipated from ongoing political and institutional developments, the makeup and control of the EU sociolinguistic regime today remains largely in the hands of member states. To see whether the retention of glottopolitical powers by member states may result in future, more pro-active measures for RML promotion, it is therefore necessary to examine the political and linguistic ideologies, norms and values that have prevailed during nation-building processes and see if these are and/or can be challenged at domestic levels. To the extent that member states remain dominant players in establishing supranational frameworks for RML promotion, it is arguable that binding RML international legislation is unlikely to emerge if changes do not first occur at national levels.

Consequently, the second part of this chapter establishes a theoretical framework to scrutinise the dynamics of RML glottopolitics at national and sub-national levels. I critically review several approaches to linguistic diversity (including dialectal variety) in nation-state contexts: 1. political theoretical approaches to the relationship between language and nationalism; 2. the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia; 3. Bourdieu's

sociology of language and power (Bourdieu, 1991) and I point to more recently developed ethnographic approaches to language ideologies (Jaffe, 1999). My ultimate aim is to examine the context and intricacies of RML policy making at national levels by investigating the historical origins and contemporary purchase of the political and linguistic ideologies currently dominant in national (and sub-national contexts), in particular the hegemonic approaches to the language-identity link underpinning dominant political economies of languages.

I begin with a critical exploration of political approaches to linguistic nationalism and the role of language in nation-building processes. I show that these offer useful insights into how the relationships between language, identity and power were durably shaped during nation-building processes but that, because of their epistemological biases, they fall short of accounting exhaustively for language ideologies and actual language uses. I then look at the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia and argue that it suffers from the same epistemological limitations. The critique of both these perspectives illustrates the necessity to transcend structuralist and essentialist approaches to issues of language status and language use in multilingual contexts. In that respect, Bourdieu's sociology of language and power, and in particular the central concepts of his approach to political economies of language - linguistic *habitus* and linguistic markets - illustrate how language ideologies and language uses vary across linguistic marketplaces. As he shows, dominant ideologies and dominant patterns of identity and attitude prevailing in the dominant markets can sometimes yield to alternative ideologies and approaches to identity making in alternative markets. In turn, such alternative ideologies can enact resistance to language shift. Paradoxically, though, they may also sign away RML revitalisation efforts either because those efforts are embedded in dominant, essentialist approaches to language planning or, conversely, because they challenge such essentialist premises, as the Corsican case shows. To go beyond these apparent paradoxes, then, what is needed, as the last section claims, is ethnographic information on the wide array of actual language ideologies and language practices and how they interrelate. Such information ultimately provides better information on the pre-conditions of acceptance of language revitalisation plans by those for whom they are designed (Rubin, 1971). Put otherwise, following Cameron (1995) and Jaffe

(1999), RML revitalisation plans must acknowledge dominant folk ideologies if they are to be successful.

### *Language Issues in the EC - Official and Working Languages, and RMLs*

In the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU set up in 1958, legal provisions were made that established official and working languages within the EU institutional apparatus. From its inception, the EU opted for a multilingual language policy that granted the status of official and institutional working language to all member states' national/state languages.

In 1958, language diversity and multilingualism – the equal respect for and treatment of national/state official languages at the supranational level (see chapter 2) – did not have the scope they have come to acquire following the various EU enlargement waves. Four languages were originally concerned and, in that respect, the EC was hardly different from other international organisations with official and working languages, e.g. the UN.

The Community's stance for multilingualism had predominantly symbolic, ideological determinants. Multilingualism was understandably regarded as a highly symbolic and necessary feature within a supranational organisation intent on constructing long-lasting peace through supra-national economic collaboration and, in the longer term, a politico-ideological commitment to liberal democracy: what legitimacy could the EC have indeed gained had it not treated its founding members equally? In the aftermath of WWII, the idea of national discrimination - the question of national preferences and hierarchies was loathed whatever forms it might take. The reconstruction of Europe was to be anchored in the principles of reconciliation and mutual respect between nation-states. The principles of equality and respect for diversity governing the granting of language status participated in that effort: the sociolinguistic regime of the EU was characterised by (the construction of supranational) unity in (the respect of intergovernmental) diversity. These principles had constitutive force and were thus logically inscribed in Community law. Insofar as rules concerning the languages of the Community were determined by member states' representatives acting unanimously, they first seemed to assure member states that

official multilingualism and equal working language status were coterminous and unchallengeable. Second, the law guaranteed linguistic democracy for European citizens who could henceforth access the new body of Community laws to which they were subjected in their own state/national language. For their political representatives within the Community institutions, in theory, it also meant the possibility to fulfil their political mandates in their own respective state/national language (see chapter 2). Finally, at a more 'down-to-earth' level, the financial cost of official multilingualism within the young Community was proportional to the amount of its activity and therefore relatively insignificant in relation to the political and economic benefits that co-operation was expected to generate.

Throughout the years, however, this cost increased as the Community enlarged and as its domains of activity multiplied, but the Community's language law based on the discourse of unity in diversity remained significantly unchanged until the early 2000s. Today, especially since the 2004 enlargement, the cost of sustaining supranational multilingualism puts tremendous pressure on the EU through the astronomic sums it draws on its total budget, so much so that it defies the original economic logic of integration. Notwithstanding, the financial burden of multilingualism has sometimes been contradictorily assessed (e.g. Knox, 1998). In the post-May 2004 EU, it is seen as one of the greatest practical challenges the EU will have to confront. In the very short term, the question of sustainability of the EU's sociolinguistic regime is posed: the conflict between pragmatic - financial and technical - and politico-symbolic considerations can indeed only sharpen as ever more voices call for a solution to the costly language *problem* of the EU<sup>2</sup>. Hitherto, the law has prevailed in a sense that has reinforced the initial sociolinguistic design and intergovernmental ideological make-up of the Community, at least in theory. In the implementation of the law through institutional practice, as empirical analysis will show, this *de jure* sociolinguistic order of discourse has been considerably undermined *de facto*, due to the practical considerations mentioned above. This is for example largely illustrated by the widening of the gap between the persisting symbolic equality in language official-

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<sup>2</sup> In that respect, as early as December 1994 French Minister for European Affairs Lamassoure suggested replacing the eleven official languages with five working languages: French, German, English, Italian and Spanish (see chapter 5). For a recent assessment of sociolinguistic problems in the EU and the various solutions proposed see Phillipson (2003) and Wright (2004b: 219-242).

ness and the growing hierarchisation of institutional working language use (in which English, and to a lesser extent French, have become dominant).

The question of how the EU regime might approach RML policy-making only became salient in the early 1980s, particularly under the impetus of the *Intergroup for Regional and Minority Languages* of the European Parliament (EP) and through a variety of EP-induced political and budgetary measures. Interestingly, promoters of EU actions in favour of RMLs summoned up the same principles of unity in diversity as nation-states did during the initial negotiations to establish the sociolinguistic regime of the EC. Yet, the translation of these principles into concrete legal outcomes and concomitant financial measures - the sociolinguistic treatment of RMLs - has been very different from that of national/state languages (chapter 4). Differences have pertained to both the symbolic and practical levels of language planning. First, no symbolic recognition of RMLs has been inscribed in Community law. To date RML policy-making is not based upon primary or secondary legislation *per se* (chapter 3) and it remains devised - and budgeted - *ad hoc*, on a yearly basis. We will see throughout the 'supranational' chapters (chapters 2 to 4) that the issue of a legal basis - that conditions budgetary support for RMLs - has been both a site of and a stake in the struggle for the RML cause. Second, although it has been uninterrupted, the financial support allotted within the institutional framework of the EU has remained extremely modest, and the budgetary limits imposed on actions for RML defence and promotion are nowadays clearly established (chapter 4). Both the lack of a clear or explicit EU legal competence on the issue and the limited scope of financial support have concurred to underline the reluctance and resistance of nation-states to transfer their domestic competence on issues of RML defence and promotion to the supranational level. The rationales for that resistance will be further explored through the case study of France in chapter 5.

From a strictly legal perspective, however, in the absence of an explicit EU competence on the issue, the fact that the EU should play a role *at all* in European RML politics through budgetary provisions in particular may appear paradoxical. As will be shown in chapter 4, the very existence of an EU RML policy can only be attributed to twenty years of parliamentary lobbying efforts at supranational institutional level and to a legal void in the EC's budgetary laws until 1998. The

purpose of chapters 2 to 4 will be to show the nature, the extent to which, and the channels through which such efforts have been successful at the supranational level of decision-making and, importantly, the reasons for that state of affairs.

This first section has broadly sketched the variety of issues linked to language planning in the EU. I claimed that questions of ideological motivation and politico-legal power distribution are central to the practicalities of EU language policy-making. Moreover, I have argued, the case of RML policy suggests that there is more to policy-making than the formal/legal aspects of the allocation of power to the EU through primary and secondary legislation and that the legal framework alone cannot satisfactorily account for institutional practices and fails to overcome certain apparent paradoxes. As I have indicated, language planning in the EU does involve ideological choices and a framing legal order. However, the relationship between ideological choices and preferences and their translation into legal norms must be made more explicit. Relatedly, the failure of RML defenders to fully actualise the primordial discourse of unity in diversity, on the one hand, and their capacity, on the other, to supersede certain legal constraints, must also be explained. Such an explanation calls for a more elaborate theoretical model and methodological approach to the *modus operandi* of ideologies and the legal order in shaping institutional practices and determining policy outcomes (Ager, 2001). Such a model must also be able to account for the success of pro-RML lobbying efforts despite an ideological environment where nation-states remain the primary locus of glottopolitical hegemony and the concomitant absence of a legal basis *per se* for RMLs.

#### *Levels of Analysis in European Integration Theory: Governance and Policy Networks.*

To transcend the aforementioned apparent paradoxes regarding actual RML promotion, I use a *governance* organising perspective to approach RML politics and policy making. This perspective constitutes a critical response to previous structural-legal attempts to write grand narratives of integration processes, i.e. the *intergovernmental* versus *supranational* views of the EU. To put it simply, exponents of the former approach claim that integration enhances, rather than undermines, the member states' power (Hoffman, 1966; Moravcsik, 1994). By contrast, their interlocutors in that debate retort that integration progressively builds the EU as a



hegemonic super-state on the European scene (Haas, 1964; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989 quoted in Cram *et al.*, 1999: 12-13).

Applied to the EU, a fundamental premise of governance approaches<sup>3</sup> is that more 'macro-' approaches to integration phenomena like the above, that focus essentially on the broad structural - legal/institutional - context of policy making to encapsulate the whole of the integration processes, have failed to capture the dynamic character of the day-to-day functioning of the EU in specific policy areas. One of the underlying critical tenets of the *governance* perspective is indeed that a strictly formal-legal perspective on decision-making processes fails to account for the crucial weight of unofficial, informal relations, unwritten rules, and individual and interest group preferences and agency in political practices (Greenwood, Rote and Gronit, 1992; Greenwood, 1997). In the field of public policy studies, the *policy networks* approach has thrived on such initial criticisms (see below).

Since its inception, integration theory building has suffered from the overarching dichotomisation between structure and agency so familiar to social and political scientists. The theoretical and methodological problems linked to focusing on either end of the structure/agency continuum have been substantially documented, and much recent social theorising has sought to overcome such divisions by focusing on the dialectics of structure and action (Giddens, 1990; Walsh, 1998: 8-33; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 30-31). These problems have been largely perceived as linked to the level of analysis - either 'too macro-' or 'too micro-' - so that meso-level approaches nowadays gain wider acceptance amongst social scientists. Initially developed to account for policy processes at national levels, the *Policy Network* approach, within the 'socio-cybernetic' *governance* perspective, is increasingly adopted in EU integration studies, as it provides a meso-level methodological response to the aforementioned problematic dichotomisation.

Two major tenets of the 'socio-cybernetic' *governance* approach are that, since the 1980s, decision-making processes in Western polities can be increasingly

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<sup>3</sup> Of the various conceptualisations and uses of the term *governance*, the one I am using here is closest to that which Rhodes describes as 'governance as a socio-cybernetic system.' (Rhodes, 1997: chapter 3) It rests substantially on Kooiman (1993) and Rosenau (1992) (both quoted by Rhodes, *ibid.*: 50-51; see below).

characterised as: 1. *polycentric* (or *centre-less*) (Luhman, 1982: xv, 253-255; Kenis and Schneider, 1991: 34-36; Kooiman, 1993: 258) and (*a fortiori* in the EU) *multi-level* (Marks, 1992, 1993 and 1996); and 2. *functionally differentiated* (Rhodes, 1988; Mayntz *et al.*, 1988, quoted by Jachtenfuchs, 1997: 2). The *polycentric* characterisation postulates that decision-making takes place less and less within a strong centralized political core (Rhodes, 2001: 47-53). Rather, as a response to problems of democratic deficit and cost-effectiveness<sup>4</sup>, policy outputs result from the repeated interactions of a variety of consensus-seeking, public and private social actors (Rosenau, 1992: 3-6). These come from and interact at a variety of social levels, from the supranational down to local levels, via national and regional strata: governance is *multi-level* (Marks, 1993: 392; Richardson, 2001: 4-7). Additionally, each stage of the policy process - from agenda setting and consultation to implementation and evaluation - may also involve different and/or new actors: the *network* of policy actors may be rather fluid and open-ended (Bomberg, 1998: 172-173). *Functional differentiation*, on the other hand, implies that, despite broad formal-legal structures, policy-making processes are largely sector-specific and involve sector-dependent sets of actors: policy networks (Wallace and Wallace, 2000).<sup>5</sup> In chapter 4, however, we will see that RML policy-making now tends to be more cross-sectoral than sector-specific.

In terms of level of analysis, one of the perceived assets of meso-level perspectives is thus their ability to include macro-structural elements – like the constraints and powers derived from the legal framework and/or institutional procedures – whilst not ignoring the importance of the ideas, norms and values of the plurality of individuals actually participating in decision-making. The latter's participation occurs in various ways and at various levels and times (Kooiman, 1993; cited in Rhodes, 1997: chapter 2; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: chapter 2). The advantage of looking at RML policy making through a *policy network* lens is that it allows analysts to operationalize informal relations and individual and/or collective non-dominant preferences.

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<sup>4</sup> Networks thus constitute '... une réponse aux problèmes d'efficacité des politiques publiques.' (Le Galès, 1995: 17; quoted by Börzel, 1997: 4; see also Jachtenfuchs, 1997).

<sup>5</sup> In early network studies, the functionally differentiated character was seen as synonymous with the sector-specificity feature. Today, empirical observations of the *modus operandi* of networks increasingly pinpoint cross-sectoral relations and patterns of mutual influence between various policy networks (Marsh, 1998: 191-192).

For all these reasons, this study considers the area of RML policy making as *sui generis* here, even though the aforementioned broad structural framework of decision-making processes cannot be ignored nor should be underestimated. The particulars of decision-making processes within area-specific policy sectors are thus viewed as dialectical relations between broad structural constraints and opportunities and the actual practices of a variety of policy participants themselves determined in various ways or, to put it otherwise, acting according to various, often contradictory, norms and preferences. Analysis has therefore to explore such norms and preferences and the way they are operationalized in decision-making processes. In that respect, building consensus amongst the policy participants implies giving political weight to the plurality of norms and preferences. Finally, these broad characteristics of governance-based political functioning are not specific to the EU and, as I will argue in chapters 5 and 8, political devolution can be seen as progress towards a more governance-oriented framework of political bargaining in that more actors can participate in fora where an emphasis is put on consensus-seeking.

#### *Power Dependency Theory and Network and Policy Change*

Given the emphasis on the consensus-seeking characteristic of governance politics, power dependence is thus an essential feature of policy networks. The *resource/power dependency theory* indeed stipulates that policies result from the interaction of a variety of public and private actors because all enjoy various resources necessary to one another for policies to be devised and implemented successfully (Rhodes, 1981; quoted in Rhodes, 1997: 8). Such resources can be material or immaterial, legal/institutional or discursive, formal or symbolic, and can be deployed at various stages of the policy process. In this study, I therefore use 'resources' in the broadest sense to refer to any bargaining chip that can be thrown into negotiation processes. Such resources include *inter alia*:

1. Legal prerogatives (patterns of distribution of political powers amongst policy actors as sanctioned by hierarchized legal texts);
2. Public legitimacy and discourse representation (socio-political and/or discursive representativity);

3. Information and expertise (a command of theoretical and/or technical/empirical knowledge);
4. 'Behind-the-scenes' bargains or 'Knowing-someone-who-can-have-an-input-in-actual-decision-making';
5. Material and/or human local resources necessary for implementation purposes, etc (adapted from Greenwood, 1997: 18-20; see also Rhodes, 1997: 8-9)<sup>6</sup>.

From a theoretical perspective, looking broadly at resource dependencies thus helps integrate different levels of analysis, ranging from broad structural resources down to inter-personal factors in decision-making.

Finally, as indicated above, another related, defining feature of meso-level approaches is that they endeavour to account for relations between structures and agents as dialectical relations. These can be (simplistically) summarized as follows: structures constrain agents (Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth, 1992: 12-13) but agents' practices can modify structures (Marsh, 1998: 185-197). In this context, structure is understood in terms of legal-institutional constraints and opportunities but also in the connected Bourdieu-ian sense of *system of habits*, a sort of institutional *habitus* based upon preferences and resource dependencies as defined above (Bourdieu, 1991; see also Giddens, 1990). This institutional *habitus* can change under various impetuses. Hence, it becomes relevant to examine the nature and causality of change. We will see that RML policy-making provides an example of drastic and sudden exogenous change in decision-making processes and that RML network and policy change has substantially been a correlate of change in patterns of resource dependency (chapter 4).

The relationship between network and policy change, however, is multi-faceted. Marsh and Rhodes (1992) identify four broad categories of environment change that can affect this relationship: economic/market, ideological, knowledge/technical and institutional. Ideological and institutional environment change, in particular, as determinants of network and policy change will be crucial issues for this study since

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<sup>6</sup>This representation of resources as clear-cut is an oversimplification as information and expertise for instance also belong to the second category of discursive powers (see chapters 3 and 4).

its focus is on the dynamic interaction between change in (political and language) ideologies, (legal) change in institutional designs that affect power distribution amongst policy actors, and subsequent change in (regional and/or minority language) policy outcomes.

As was suggested with the outline of power dependency theory, and as is further asserted below, ideology is itself a powerful catalyst of change at the societal level, and a policy resource at the institutional level. At the broad societal level, discourses constitute a structural order wherein patterns of power distribution can be reproduced and/or transformed. In turn, the extent to which the evolving order of discourse shapes and can potentially transform the social order in general and institutional practices in particular must be measured. For that purpose, Critical Discourse Analysis [hereafter CDA] is a useful analytical method, resting upon the idea that power structures and relations, *a fortiori* legal-institutional structures, are text-mediated, and that power *inter alia* resides in privileged patterns of text production and reception/interpretation. CDA is useful in that it provides actual tools of language analysis at text level that make it possible to decipher power struggles for discursive hegemony as inscribed within texts, and thus to detect traces of change.

In the next section I scrutinise the multi-theoretical and methodological tenets of CDA and in the following sections, I explore how some of these tenets can be applied to the analysis of legal texts.

### *CDA: Discourse in a Social Theory of Language and Social Change*

Drawing largely on Foucault's social theory of discourse and change (Foucault, 1971, 1972, 1979 and 1981), CDA focuses on the production and/or reproduction or transformation of relations of domination/subjection, and on the role and *modus operandi* of discourse in such processes (Fairclough, 1989 and 2001; 1992). Further, critical discourse analysts argue that the possibility that, and ways in which, relations of domination/subjection can be transformed, in particular through competition between dominant and resistant discourses, can and must be linguistically analysed, through the linguistic analysis of textual and discursive practices. Thus CDA attempts to synthesise language studies and social theory. For instance, Fairclough's starting

premise is that '[...] *changes in language use are linked to wider social and cultural processes, [...] [so that] language analysis can be used as a method for studying social change.*' (1992: 1). He thus links language use to a theory of social and political change. Central to this endeavour is the social-constructionist thesis that language and language use do not merely *reflect* but essentially *construct* the social order from particular ideological positions (see also Cameron, 1990). As Stubbs put it: '[...] *language is never neutral and texts are never innocent [...] all language choices are political*' (Stubbs, 1996: 235). This implies that all linguistic choices, down to those at the lowest levels of language organisation, are relevant to an understanding of the constitution of the social order. CDA thus seeks to decipher ideological credentials and assumptions intrinsic to language use, and thus to reveal the ways in which language and language users construct and reproduce or transform the social world. Fairclough's theoretical stance summons up and elaborates on various social theoretical frameworks and different traditions of language analysis, wherein this social-constructionist view of language and language use is salient.

Regarding the social theoretical frameworks, in addition to Foucault's aforementioned works, Fairclough largely borrows from Neo-Marxist theorists of ideology and in particular from Gramsci's concept of hegemony (Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 1971; Bourdieu, 1991). Regarding the language and textual analytical methods, he resorts to the 'systemic' functional linguistics [SFL] of Halliday and his followers<sup>7</sup>, to Bakhtin's theory of genres and Kristeva's discussions of the concept of *intertextuality* (Halliday, 1973, 1978, and 1985; Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986; Kristeva 1986). In his model, Fairclough thus draws together social-theoretical concepts of ideology, power, hegemony and discourse and methods of language analysis. In the remainder of this section I deal with the former and will explore the latter in the next section.

Fairclough's conception of ideology rests on Gramsci's concepts of *hegemony*, *power* and *consent* (Gramsci, 1971). For Gramsci, hegemonies - the manifestation of the unequal social distribution of power through coercion and consensus building - are products of ideology, but it is important to acknowledge that social hegemonies are neither unchallengeable nor unchallenged. On the contrary, by emphasising *consent* as

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<sup>7</sup> See for instance Kress and Hodge (1979) and Kress (1985).

a determinant factor in social organisation, Gramsci underlines the fragility of social consensus, refutes the immutability of the distribution of power, and thereby opens the door to understanding the potential transformation of social structures and the social order. Gramsci proposes a dynamic and unstable view of sociopolitical equilibrium. Gramsci, and later Althusser, indeed claims that political equilibrium is achieved by manufacturing/winning the consent of dominated classes/groups, and that consent largely obtains through the naturalization of dominant ideologies in and by the Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 1971). What he negates is the deterministic approach to social reproduction and power relations which seems characteristic of structuralism and cannot easily account for social change, promoting instead a dynamic understanding of the relationship between social structures and power distribution (Gramsci, *ibid*). Likewise, while taking discourse as the surface part of ideology and therefore as the manifestation of social power, Fairclough privileges the dynamics of discourse, and sees discourse as a motor of social change. Thence he seeks to analyse linguistically the work of ideology. Further, his approach also rests on the assumption that language uses are not always critically weighed and analysed, i.e. there is a large part of routine in patterns of language use, so that ideologies can be unnoticeably reproduced (see the discussion of intentionality in legal interpretation patterns below).

Moreover, Fairclough sees ideology as inherently hierarchical so that 'grand' discourses are themselves constituted by several 'sub-discourses', possibly in contradictory and conflict-ridden relations with one another, in ways that can trigger social change by altering social organisation and the distribution of power. Hence the role of the interaction of these various discourses has to be analytically accounted for. Crucial to this driving force of discourse relations is therefore the centrality of *orders of discourse*. Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify what *discourse* and *orders of discourse* in this context mean. The notion of *discourse* is one that has been repeatedly used in various disciplines and with very different meanings (for a review, see Fairclough, 1992: chapter 1; Mills, 1997). For example, language studies have defined discourse sometimes as spoken dialogue, sometimes in reference to both written and spoken 'texts', and other times as synonymous with *register* (e.g. 'journalistic' discourse, 'academic' discourse, etc). In contrast to these, discourse

encompasses different meanings in the work of social theorists like Foucault, where it refers to '[...] *different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice.*' (Fairclough, 1992: 3) In Fairclough's perspective (which is largely based on Foucault's), besides, discourses do not merely mirror social relations, they *constitute* them; social relations are *constructed* by and in discourse. As a result, different discourses produced by different social actors will construct different conflict-laden social realities and, conversely, the 'same' discourse will have different meanings depending on what order of discourses it is constitutive of (e.g. *multilingualism* has different 'meanings' in Jacobinist and regionalist discourses)<sup>8</sup>.

Furthermore, one particular discourse may itself be constituted by elements of various other discourses (e.g. regionalist discourses in France in the 1960s drew upon decolonisation discourses, discourses on multicultural richness, discourses on minority protection and rights, etc). Since discourses are not necessarily homogeneous, their analysis entails the deconstruction of their constitutive features, i.e. the (sub-) discourses they are made of. The composite character of discourses relates to what Fairclough refers to as *orders of discourse*, a comprehensive definition of which could therefore be: a set of discursive practices combined to form a new discursive practice at a higher level of discursive organisation. In turn this implies the existence of a hierarchization of discourses resulting from the mode of configuration of specific discursive practices. To use an analogy, orders of discourse are to discourses what texts are to the sentences they consist of: a higher and more complex form of organisation with specific properties and calling for specific analytical methods and techniques. In other words, the existence of a hierarchical structure of discourses is comparable to that which organises texts out of sentences and words, so that orders of discourse are inherently heterogeneous.

Hence the usefulness of the concepts of *intertextuality* and *interdiscursivity* that account for the textual and discursive traces of the various constitutive (sub-) discourses of a larger (order of) discourse (Kristeva, 1986) (see also the concept of *genre memory* in the next section). In this connection, *orders of discourse* has also to

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<sup>8</sup> This points to a crucial issue of CDA, namely the issue of interpretation: from what perspective is a particular discourse decoded? I will come back to this in the next section and in greater detail later in the analysis of my data.



be understood in terms of a hierarchy of discourses wherein some discourses are hegemonic, and therefore socially dominant, whilst others are less powerful but resistant. Thence social change potentially results from the struggle for hegemony between and within dominant and dominated, or resistant, orders of discourses.

In his endeavour to synthesise methods developed in language studies and social theory in order to understand the dynamics of social change, Fairclough proposes a methodological model consisting of three interconnected dimensions. Specifically, he suggests seeing every 'text' as the actualisation of a discursive practice and as an instance of social practice, where 'text' refers to instances of both spoken and written language use and therefore includes all types of interaction involving language use between social actors, ranging from conversations to interviews to letters to newspapers to books, to legal texts, etc. (Halliday, 1978) In other words, like Stubbs above, he claims that any communicative event, any 'text' production, is also ideology-laden, and can be seen and deciphered as an instance of discursive practice which actualises broader social and political practices and hierarchies, in the sense of power relations. The ideological and sociopolitical constructed-ness of text can be revealed with the conceptual tools developed in Halliday's SFL which distinguishes three functions of language, ideational, interpersonal and textual (Halliday, 1978 and 1985). Halliday thus sees texts as simultaneously referring to reality (the ideational function), enacting social relations and establishing social identities (the interpersonal function), and organising the cohesion and coherence of information (the textual function). This approach to texts' functions is also characteristic of a politicised version of generic analysis most often associated with Bakhtin's work, which constitutes a theory of text production and interpretation/reception and power, and which Halliday's analytical methods can serve to operationalize.

*The Politics of Generic Interpretation - Reading Legal Texts: Patterns of Meaning-Making in Legal Production and Interpretation*

The literature on genre theory has long taken literary genres as its unique objects of study, focusing predominantly on generic forms. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and significantly under the impetus of Neo-Marxist writer Mikhail Bakhtin, the socio-political nature and functions of many non-literary genres and their ideological dimension have been underlined. Whilst reasserting the inseparability of function and form, Bakhtin indeed

placed strong emphasis on the problematic of generic *content*, which he predominantly defined in ideological terms. Thus, a central tenet of Bakhtin's approach is the representational function of genres: '[...] *genres are not simply sets of devices and conventions, but forms of seeing and interpreting particular aspects of the world, ways of conceptualising reality that are stored within the genre memory [...]*' (Quoted by Duff, 2000: 6-11) (Emphases added) Such devices and conventions effectively serve to convey a particular worldview by way of excluding competing visions<sup>9</sup>, and the resulting hegemonic worldview endorses particular power relationships. Generic analysis must relate the structure/morphology of genres to their (socio-political) function of power distribution.

Underlying this conceptualisation of the relationship between genres and the social order are the claims made above that '*social institutions and text types are mutually defining*' (Stubbs, 1996: 12), and broadly that the whole social order is textually mediated (Fairclough, 2000: 164-165). This is where SFL proves useful in that it can help convey the actual ways in which language functions in texts for institutional texts to fulfil their social functions of power attribution and reproduction.

Halliday's functional analysis of text-in-context(s), which CDA has largely built upon, itself developed drawing on Firth's approach to social semantics and especially his theory of the context-dependency of meaning (Firth, 1935) and on Hill's institutional linguistics (Hill, 1958). SFL allows primary importance to the functions of language in the construction and/or reproduction of the social order through social/institutional practice (i.e. the ideational and interpersonal functions of language). The approach is systemic: special emphasis is put on the ideological and social implications of language *choices* in texts. Texts must be analysed for both what they say and what they omit. SFL explores how textual features at lower (e.g. lexical and grammatical choices) and higher textual levels (e.g. cohesion and coherence) operate in determining a particular configuration of the social order, and in seeking to exclude alternative configurations.

In that connection, Halliday and his followers have coined the concept of *social semiotics*, which conflates structural/formal conceptualisations of genre with

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<sup>9</sup> See also Burke's similar concepts of 'frames of acceptance' and 'frames of rejection' (Burke, 1937; quoted by Duff, 2000: 11).

reception – or reader response – theory (Iser, 1974; Fish, 1980; both quoted by Stubbs, 1996: 7). Reception theory claims that particular interpretations of texts are contingent and therefore negotiable: although topics and reader positions are ideologically determined by what was called above ‘genre memory’ - which in effect naturalises particular readings within a genre through particular linguistic choices - various readerships can read the same texts in various ways. I do not embrace post-modern claims of an absolute contingency of interpretation patterns since, in institutional practice, there are still constraints limiting the institutional validity of alternative interpretations. However, the analysis of language-based issues in the EU will illustrate that the critical interpretation of texts becomes a site of power struggle between expert readerships and their challengers. The latter contest conventionalised reading positions by proposing alternative, resistant readings and call upon different ideology-laden patterns of meaning making that entail changes in the power-distributing constitutive schemes of the EU’s order of discourse on language as enshrined in EU law.

As in other social sciences, the question of meaning making/interpreting is fundamental in legal theory. Indeed, the location of power struggles within patterns of interpretation of texts is *a fortiori* relevant for legal texts because their primary function - or communicative purpose - is overtly to distribute political power in a directive manner:

[...] *the general function of [legislative] writing is directive, to impose obligations and to confer rights... [legal draftsmen attempt to] ... define their model world of obligations and rights, [...] as precisely, clearly and unambiguously as linguistic resources permit... they attempt to refer to every conceivable contingency within their model world and this gives their writing its second key characteristic of being all-inclusive.* (Bhatia, 1993: 102)

Legal draftsmen can use a number of qualifications to be clear and precise in constructing their ‘model world’: beside *action rules* that are mainly meant to impose duties and obligations, legislative provisions typically include *stipulation rules* (defining the domain of application of a particular act) and *definition rules* (meant to

provide further terminological explanations) (Bhatia, 1993: 104-105). Yet, the more detailed the provision, the narrower its scope of application and the less likely to incorporate every conceivable contingency that may arise during the application of the provision (Bhatia, 1982 and 1983). At production level, draftsmen are somehow compelled to choose a strategy between clarity and precision (which tend towards more details), and all-inclusiveness (tending towards generalisation). The resulting need for more or less interpretation at reception then varies along a continuum delimited by clarity/precision at one end and all inclusiveness at the other.

Each production mode is then likely to call upon different interpretive principles. Two main theories of legal interpretation prevail: the *cognitive* - or *formalistic* - theory of legal interpretation and the *sceptical* theory<sup>10</sup>, which is similar to the reception theory sketched above. The former views interpretation as:

*[...] a matter of empirical knowledge of either the objective meaning of statutory texts or the subjective intention of the legislature...the aim of legal interpretation is ... the discovering of this pre-existing meaning or intention, already in legal texts. (Guastini, 1984: 1739)*

By contrast, the latter considers that:

*[...] words have no proper meaning, since every word may bear the meaning put upon it by the user, or the meaning put upon it by the recipient, and no coincidence between the former and the latter is granted... each statutory text is likely to be interpreted in different ways depending on the different evaluative attitudes of interpreters. (Guastini, ibid)*

The cognitive/formalistic theory thus privileges a conceptualisation of meaning wherein interpreters retrieve meaning from the text itself - the literal, positivistic meaning - and/or from the author's intention - the so-called 'spirit of the law'. It follows that meanings are more easily perceived as 'true' and 'false', and expert interpreters claim to have the capacity to retrieve the original intended meaning and to

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<sup>10</sup> The following account is adapted from Guastini (1984: 1738-1744) and Luzzati (1984: 2086-2091).

do so objectively. In the sceptical or reception theory, this objective capacity is denied: meaning making is always contingent and ultimately located in the recipient's reading, rather than reflective of the text's essential meaning and/or author's perceived intentions. Ultimately, although legal meanings can be and are disputed in socio-political practice, some meanings become dominant whilst others are discarded. Analysis must then explain the rationale for certain interpretations to be privileged.

*Law as a Discourse on Society: Formal and Pragmatic Institutional Constraints and Intentionality*

Following Austin's and Wiggstein's theory of legal interpretation (Austin, 1962; Wiggstein, 1953), I endorse the view that:

*[...] legal interpretation has no independent starting point but is entirely determined by pragmatic considerations...one cannot understand legal language outside the context of non-linguistic activities in which its use is interwoven. A legal interpreter, therefore, must participate in the form of life in which the social practice of legal interpretation is embedded. In short, nobody can understand laws without being trained to be a skilled jurist. Interpretation thus becomes the game of the interpreter's discretion.*  
(Summarised by Luzzati, 1984: 2088)

I therefore see the *sceptical* approach as largely unsatisfactory as it underplays the extent to which legal experts' readings do prevail and also plainly disregards existing objective institutional constraints upon both producers' and interpreters' choices, e.g. actual usages within a given discourse community and previously accepted interpretations (constraints intrinsic to the *genre memory*). As suggested above, one of the central explanatory powers of genre theory lies in its foregrounding of the conventions and constraints underlying processes of generic production and interpretation. Bhatia emphasizes that:

*From the point of view of applied genre analysis, our primary concern is twofold: first to characterize typical or conventional textual features of any genre-specific text [...] and second to explain such a characterization in the*

*context of the socio-cultural as well as the cognitive constraints operating in the relevant area of specialization, whether professional or academic.* (Bhatia, 1993: 16)

Constraints/conventions determine the structural/formal organisation of legal texts, ranging from lexico-grammatical choices to higher patterns of textual organisation like structural and cognitive patterning (see Bhatia, 1993: chapter 5) and they specify the functional role of legal texts, i.e. to construct worlds of rights and obligations. In that connection, action rules in legal texts typically establish the legitimacy of authorship and/or authority (i.e. who can legitimately draft texts and how such legitimacy is constructed)<sup>11</sup> and the correlative distribution of various power positions (i.e. the distribution of obligations and rights to various recipients), and they specify policy outcomes.

Bhatia underlines that cognitive constraints - the way knowledge is constructed, transmitted and shared - are area specific. This implies that experts of a given area of specialisation - discourse communities - share area-specific knowledge and/or regimes of truth making up the discursive formation they belong to, but they may not necessarily be critically aware of it: interpretation is then un-problematically described as positivistic and/or cognitive (the foundations of Bhatia's *model* world and Luzzati's *non-linguistic activities* in the quotes above). However, in line with Foucault's idea that the articulation of 'regimes of truth' is a means of social control, legal practice also catalyses the reproduction (and/or transformation) of society writ large (the law is an Ideological State Apparatus in Althusserian terms) (see also Geertz, 1973; Kress, 1985: 19). In turn, as will be amply illustrated in the analyses below, different discourse communities, such as RML activists, are characterised by different, competing 'regimes of truth', on the basis of which they challenge legal experts' certainties in order to gain a better power share in the social order.

Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the more area-specific knowledge-determined context of expertise, which presides over the selection/construction of objects and categories such as 'official and working languages' in EU language policy

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<sup>11</sup> I will show in chapter 4 that production rules can to some extent be 'bent', for instance as far as authorship is concerned when decision-making results from open-ended networks of policy actors.

(Foucault, 1972; quoted in Fairclough, 1992: chapter 2 and p. 128). Yet, this meso-level approach must be considered within the 'macro-' historical/socio-political context of meaning making - the order of discourse - which determines the array of norms governing the construction of legal meanings. This calls for several remarks.

Regarding interpretive norms, these can be manifest or unwritten. Manifest norms - stipulation rules and/or legal intertextuality - are typically constitutive of legal texts and serve to reinforce the coherence and legitimacy of given texts and ultimately of the whole legal system. However, lawyers, judges and jurists also acknowledge the existence of implicit or unwritten principles: rules not expressly inscribed in legal texts but endorsed by legal interpreters, e.g. the necessary preservation and self-reproduction of the institution itself.

Claiming that certain interpretive principles are unwritten equates with saying that they are sometimes naturalised (in their *model* world) through training, so that practitioners' interpretation patterns can become largely unconscious of the ideological choices prefiguring norm and text production, which in turn reinforces the positivist illusion of semantic univocity and all-inclusiveness. In other cases, unwritten rules relate to the *perceived* intention of the legislator that only emerges when expert interpretation is questioned and when experts are required to explain or justify a ruling. We will see below that when such challenges have been produced by parliamentary written questions on sociolinguistic issues for instance, the sometimes elusive response of the Commission's legal experts could be construed as reluctance to actually make explicit such unwritten rules as a means of self-preservation (see chapter 4).

This leads to the question of intentionality both in the production and interpretation of legal texts. When meaning making is naturalised during periods of professional training, one cannot evoke the interpreter's intentionality as a conscious device to construct hegemony, since the very process of naturalisation makes rule production and interpretation unconscious of pre-existing ideological motives. However, intentionality in the sense of the strategic back-grounding of ideological motives can be identified in other textual devices, e.g. the construction of objects by one given discourse community whereby language choices result in maintaining the vagueness

of the meaning of objects or categories. In that connection, I will show that the constitutive categorisation of objects like *language* and *diversity* is purposefully vague in the EU's legal discourse community and that its vagueness constitutes an effective means for legal interpreters to reinforce their meaning ascription powers.

In turn, critical readers like CDA practitioners endeavour to de-naturalise or de-familiarise these motives. Methodologically, CDA is an approach that encompasses a theory of generic typicality but attempts to analyse a given generic text as an instance of social and discursive practice - as a social discourse - at the macro-political rather than meso-institutional level, i.e. in relation to the broad ideological context of texts. This discourse can be deciphered by looking at how authority, power positions and legal outcomes are textually constructed by dominant players (legal/political readings) and at how texts also constitute the site and stake of ideological and political struggle for dominated interests (sociolinguistic readings, in this dissertation).

Considering discourse as socially constitutive, CDA seeks to underline the aforementioned discursive and linguistic processes of semantic inclusion/exclusion, and to explain such processes as the result of ideological struggle. In this dissertation, CDA is applied as an interpretative analytical tool with critical reference to legal genres in particular. Moreover, the central focus on language status, use and promotion in the texts analysed here also suggests grounding critical analysis in sociolinguistic analysis. In the following chapters, I contrast the aforementioned two interpretative positions and show that, even on sociolinguistic issues of language status and/or language definition, legal/political readings curtail sociolinguistic readings in ways which have indubitable intergovernmentalist overtones.

In chapters 2 and 3, I show that the EU legal order results from past discursive struggle and that the advent of the sociolinguistic regimes of the EU results from the order of discourse on glottopolitical hierarchy. In chapter 4, I show that this order of discourse is potentially subject to change under the pressures of dominated discourses and through their representation in institutional practice. However, as was said above, member states currently remain hegemonic in language-based decision-making processes. Consequently, as was argued above, to see if RML status change can be



induced at supranational level, the ideological foundations of member states' attitudes to linguistic diversity must be explored at national and sub-national levels.

I therefore now turn to the theoretical framework relevant to the analysis of RML issues at national and sub-national levels. I begin by critically examining two frequently used models for analysing societal multilingualism: those of linguistic nationalism and diglossia. I then discuss Bourdieu's sociology of language and power as an attempt to overcome some of their disadvantages. I conclude, however, that Bourdieu's framework suffers from not being sufficiently embedded in empirical analysis of actual language uses which themselves enact particular political and/or language ideologies. In turn, it is essential that, if language planners want to secure popular and elite acceptance, these ideologies be understood and integrated into language plans.

### *Linguistic Nationalism, Nation-building and Language Ideologies*

Many commentators have argued that the radical politicisation of language dates back to the beginning of nation-building processes, which they often locate at the time of the French Revolution and the ensuing wake of mass nationalism (e.g. Fishman, 1972b; Thiesse, 1999; May, 2000 and 2001).<sup>12</sup>

Students of nationalism and nation-building processes have analyzed how language uniformisation policies were both a catalyst and a consequence of modernisation processes, treating language as a necessary constitutive feature of political, social and economic change (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). The central roles of a common 'national' language have also been acknowledged by the multiple architects of nation-states: revolutionaries, nationalists, political activists and leaders of all trends. In all nationalist discourses, the promotion and/or adoption of a national language is closely linked to the modernisation of society, to progress, and ultimately to the emancipation of the individual. This shift is legitimised by an evolutionary discourse that unproblematically depicts the 'modernisation' of society as an evolution or progress towards a harmonious, more egalitarian society (May, 2001:

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<sup>12</sup> Depending on the definition of a *nation*, nation-building processes can be traced back to early modern times though (Anderson, 1983: 9-46; see chapter 5).

chapters 1 and 4; see also chapter 5). Besides, in the nineteenth century, the nation-state modelled by the American and French revolutions was perceived as the ideal political system that could make such emancipation possible. Inasmuch as it was based upon the sovereignty of the nation, it assumed that nation and state should be congruent.

Three fundamental roles of language are put forward by historians of nation-building processes and students of nationalism: 1. language as a constitutive element of state-building processes in terms of the construction of political/institutional and bureaucratic structures; 2. language as a factor of economic development and growth and concomitantly of social change linked to industrialisation processes and exodus, and 3. language as a symbol and cement of national identity. The former two refer to the instrumental, communicative function of language in modernisation processes whereas the latter has to do with its symbolic role in identity formation. The latter role is largely illustrated in the literature on nationalism where a distinction is established between French and German ideal-types of the nation and their concomitant political discourses on the relation between language and national identity. France is seen as the cradle of 'civic' nationalism and Germany of 'ethnic' nationalism (reviewed by Blommaert, 1996: 235-237; see also Edwards, 1985; Schwartzmantel, 1991: chapter 2, and Crowley, 1994). It is therefore important to distinguish between: 1. language as an objective feature of nation-building processes enabling increased communication between various social groups (Deutsch, 1966) and 2. language as a discursive object in ideal-typical nationalist discourses on language, identity and the nation<sup>13</sup>. In this section, I focus mainly on the latter symbolic role of language and its instrumentalisation in nationalist discourses.

In the German nation-building context, the equation between language and identity was used as a rallying point in the process of uniting the German nation. Language was presented by German intellectuals (e.g. Herder, Von Humboldt) and nationalists (e.g. Fichte) as the manifestation of the very soul of the German nation: *'The soul is not only reflected and protected by the mother tongue but, in a sense, the mother tongue is itself an aspect of the soul, if not the soul made manifest.'* (Fishman, 1972b:

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<sup>13</sup> This distinction is however largely made for analytical convenience since, as chapter 5 illustrates, actual language-based policy development is of course ideologically informed.

46)<sup>14</sup> In other words, in the German nationalist tradition, language was the tangible proof of the historicity of ethnicity, the living link with the past (naturally, family-transmitted), which in turn legitimised the access to statehood of language-defined ethnic/*nation*-al groups without states, e.g. Germany, Italy. This 'biological' essentialist view of the relation between language and identity: 'one language = one culture = one nation' has subsequently given rise to a large body of critical literature on the strategic uses of linguistic essentialism by nationalist movements (see *inter alia* Gellner, 1964 and 1983; Smith, 1971 and 1986; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). Numerous studies show that late twentieth-century (sub-national) nationalist rhetoric largely resorted to the same linguistic essentialism, which, as a political discourse on the relationship between language, political identity and political legitimacy, retains enormous purchase although it is now also widely deconstructed as strategic by academics writing on this topic (Jaffe, 1999; May, 2000, 2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004). Nevertheless, this dissertation aims to show that the discourse of linguistic essentialism today remains a core component of the order of discourse on language at both supra-national, national and sub-national levels.

Language was also seen as a cornerstone of nation-state building at an early stage of French socio-political history. The language question was approached as equally fundamental in the economic, administrative and ideological construction of the French monarchic and then republican states (Achard, 1987, in Vermès, 1987; Poignant, 1998 and 2000). From the 16<sup>th</sup> century, it became clear to various elites that language uniformisation was a pre-requisite to economic development, and the building of state institutions and administrative structures (see chapter 5). From the Revolution language unity also served an ideological function in as far as it was a pre-requisite to 'invent' the French nation, on which the legitimacy of the revolutionaries' power rested.

Interestingly, in the French tradition, the link between language and political identity was presented along ideological and political lines of civic equality rather than along lines of ethnic essentialism as in the German model. Put otherwise, in the German

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<sup>14</sup> The Herderian link between language and identity and culture has also been influential on anthropo- and ethno-linguistic works (Sapir, 1929; Whorf, in Carroll, 1956; both quoted in Wardaugh, 1992: chapter 9 and Baylon, 1996: chapter 6).

tradition, language served to identify the existence and the members of the nation, in a way that excluded non-members of the 'language community', and in order to legitimise their collective access to state independence. In France, state structures already largely existed and French language use was presented both as a condition to socio-economic mobility and, at the ideological level, as the endorsement of rationalism as the catalyst of progress and, most importantly, of the 'universal' values inherited from the Enlightenment and embodied in the Jacobin Republic *one and indivisible* (Fenet, 2002: 35-36). Those conceptions were flagged up by the Revolution and later under the Third Republic (1870-1939) and the national language was legitimised - enshrined in the law - and progressively institutionalised - embedded in state/institutional building processes and promoted in civil society (see chapters 5 and 7). In those discourses, importantly, shift towards the national language was deemed a sign of political loyalty. And, besides this, in that model of nationalist mobilization, group-membership was inclusive and regardless of the citizens' origins, unlike in the German model. As May (2001: 53) argues, such a dichotomisation rests on the often hegemonic valorisation of civic over ethnic ties and:

*[...] this position suits well the interests of majority (or dominant) ethnic groups in nation-states since it ends up representing their ethnic affiliations, particularly their language and cultural traditions, as those of the nation-state. [...] the ethnic interests of the majority group are legitimated and naturalised as civic ones which, in turn, are equated directly with modernity.*<sup>15</sup>

Because they rest on the same essentialist assumptions (i.e. one language = one (political) identity) they stand exclusive and antagonistic. Yet, because they are *perceived* as antithetic, one can be summoned as an alternative to the other (see chapter 5) as happened with Corsican cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth century serving to mobilise against the negative aspects of so-called French 'civic' nationalism (see also Herder and Fichte's anti-French discourses summarised by Mar-

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<sup>15</sup> I will argue in chapter 5 however that this representation of French nationalism as 'civic' rather than 'ethnic' should not conceal the fact that the 'civic' model to which it seeks to confer some universal value *beyond* and *in opposition to* ethnic particularism, is itself still largely defined in essentialist terms: a language 'corresponds to' a given worldview. Therefore, these allegedly antithetical approaches to identity and national loyalty are not as divergent as nationalist rhetoric claims.

Molinero (2000: 8), May (2001: 58); and chapters 6 and 7 in this dissertation for Corsica).

These approaches hinging around the desirability of nation-state congruence (Smith, 1995) thus all assume language is essential to the definition of political identities, whether these are conceived as ethnic and exclusive, and therefore biological and inherited, or as civic and inclusive and therefore constructed and a matter of choice. Moreover, this identity-language link is intrinsic so that the uniqueness of language guarantees the uniqueness of identity, and in turn the uniqueness of identity guarantees the unity and stability of the nation-state. Put otherwise, the nation must be culturally and linguistically homogeneous. This has a number of implications for both language and identity and their interrelations. Any corruption of one of the elements of the equation necessarily corrupts and/or endangers the other ones. For instance, if one language = one nation, giving official recognition to other (minority) languages within the nation-state challenges the fundamental congruence of the nation with state and undermines its integrity (see the debates around the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* in France in chapter 5). In that context, linguistic diversity is represented as synonymous with political instability. Likewise, introducing foreign elements into the language constitutes a threat to a perceived pure identity: language purism thus becomes a legitimate defence of the purity of identity (see the discussion of *franglais* in chapter 5 and the stigmatisation of mixed codes in Corsica in chapter 9). As a consequence of this political instrumentalisation of language, the construction of nation-states implies the construction and ongoing protection of national-state languages, both in terms of their status and corpus. Status planning ensures that they become fully protected, promoted and diffused and corpus planning that they are standardised, which creates the illusion that languages are monolithic, variation-less, bounded and autonomous.

In nationalist discourses, the variability of language uses is ignored and/or rejected and language is '[...] reified and totemized [...] it is made into an object and given iconic status.' (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985: 236)<sup>16</sup> What remains unsaid is that

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<sup>16</sup> As Rushdie (1990) puts it: '[...] language, not territory, [is] the prime cause of aggression, because once language reaches the level of sophistication at which it [can] express abstract concepts, it

language, just like the nation, is engineered: it is not a reified linguistic system defined by its unity and boundedness *ex nihilo*. Rather, as was said above, these taken-for-granted qualities are engineered through corpus and status language plans (Billig, 1995: 32) during standardisation processes (Haugen, 1966). Then the notions of boundedness and autonomy imply that linguistic boundaries are clear-cut so that interference from other linguistic systems is seen as impurities to be proscribed. This is what literary and/or prescriptive tools do: define what 'the' language is, both in oppositional terms of style and/or correctness within the same system (e.g. good/bad usage<sup>17</sup> or grammaticality/a-grammaticality) and in cordoning it off from other systems, however similar, by creating dictionaries and grammars. As a result, there emerge inequalities between languages but it is a truism to any linguist that languages and dialects cannot be hierarchized in linguistic terms (at least *before* standardisation processes). Status distinctions and hierarchisation are political, not linguistic.<sup>18</sup> As noted above and as will be further illustrated in chapters 5 and 9, one aspect of the totemization and idealization of the corpus as the main garment of identity is that this entails language purism.

### *Diglossia - Structural-Functional Models for the Analysis of Societal Multilingualism: Strengths and Limitations*

The study and characterisation of situations of bi-/multilingualism has been a central concern in sociolinguistic studies. Early scientific attempts to establish an analytical framework for the study of societal plurilingualism were constitutive of the discipline and can be traced back to Weinreich (1953). However, the earlier literature largely focused on Ferguson's subsequent definition of the concept of *diglossia* (1959) and its subsequent elaborations by Fishman (1967 and 1972a) as starting points for a discussion of patterns of societal bilingualism and these concepts are still widely used.

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*acquire[s] the power of totemization; and once peoples ha[ve] erected totems, they [will] go to war to defend them.'*

<sup>17</sup> In that connection, minority language activists have distinguished between the *sur-norme*, that implies value judgements on language production (e.g. good/bad usage), and the *norme*, that fixes basic norms so that communication in the linguistic system can function (Garmady, 1982: 64; quoted by DiMeglio, 1997: 142).

<sup>18</sup> The formula every manual of sociolinguistics summons to emphasize the political rather than linguistic criteria to distinguish between a *language* and a *dialect* is that: '*A language is a dialect with an army and a navy.*' (Fasold, 1984: 261)

In subsequent critical overviews of the evolution and development of the concept, Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992) illustrate some of the limitations of these initial typological approaches, pointing to their Durkheimian structural-functional 'macro-'orientation. Both also underline the weaknesses inherent in ethnographic reactions against macro-structural approaches, showing that the focus on micro-interactions in bilingual contexts, although it accounts better for variation in use and change in practices, falls short of revealing the linkage between large-scale social processes and individual language use in micro-interactions (e.g. Gal, 1979; Gumperz, 1982). Finally, both advocate a multidisciplinary perspective introducing a (Neo-Marxist) conflict perspective into the study of patterns of language maintenance and shift in situations of language contact. In this section, I selectively draw on these three traditions to emphasize some of the strengths and limitations of structural/functional approaches to situations of language contact.

-Ferguson originally described diglossia as:

*[...] a relatively stable situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation.*  
(Ferguson, 1959:325)

-In this model, a status distinction is made within a given community between two language varieties – High and Low – of the same language, in complementary functional distribution determined by social norms of appropriacy. The core emphasis is on functional distribution and status: the High variety is appropriate in formal and/or official contexts of use (e.g. school, administration, justice, the media, etc) and enjoys social prestige, whilst the Low variety mediates informal relations, essentially in the private sphere and is less prestigious (e.g. *ordinary conversation*).

Fishman (1972a: 92) placed less emphasis on the reference to societies with only two language varieties and his main criterion was on complementary functional distribution but without the proviso of linguistic kinship.<sup>19</sup> To enlarge the model, Fishman overlooks the importance of kinship between the varieties in terms of linguistic empowerment and thus, indirectly, socio-political cohesion: the more linguistically close varieties are, the more (at least passive) bilingual individuals there are, and the least discernible language-based inequalities may be. The Corsican case illustrates the importance, but also the limitations, of the relation between linguistic kinship and language empowerment (see respectively chapters 7 and 9). As a result, Fishman's modification of the original concept did augment its explanatory power in scope and scale and found immediate application in post-colonial case studies. However, it also altered Ferguson's scope and scale qualitatively. In chapter 7, I will show that applied to a Western European regional language situation like Corsica Ferguson's emphasis on linguistic kinship retains substantial analytical power and is useful in explaining situations that predate the time of nation building and/or situations where language features centrally in cultural definitions of the nation.

The notion of unequal linguistic power is central in both Ferguson's and Fishman's approaches through the uneven distribution of prestige. However, the ideological and socio-political origins of power asymmetries are insufficiently pursued. For Williams (1992: 122), Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967 and 1972c) *'[...] express an evolutionary continuum which depends upon highly questionable assumptions about the nature of modernity, tradition and progress.'*

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<sup>19</sup> For a more detailed presentation of Fishman's approach, see Fasold (1984: 40-42) and Williams (1992: 97-109)



Amongst the 'questionable assumptions', one of the main weaknesses of the structural/functional bias underpinning diglossia, is that the diglossic model identifies language-based power asymmetries based on prestige but does not ground language shift processes in historic conflict and injustice between language groups (as social groups).

In his critical overview, Williams shows that such structural/functional approaches assume a historiography of nation-building processes predicated on the 'modernisation thesis' (see Edwards, 1985 and May's critique of that thesis as linguistic social Darwinism in May, 2001: chapters 1 and 4). As was outlined in the section on linguistic nationalism, this thesis hinges around an evolutionary discourse. It is assumed that socio-political change and language shift occur through the aggregation of individual rational choices and that individuals freely endorse new sets of values to participate in the 'modernisation' of society. In the process, a series of dichotomies is established, creating hierarchies of values and norms, in which traditional values become obsolete and/or suspiciously irrational. Inasmuch as modernity is synonymous with progress, modern, urban, universal values are lauded and confer prestige whilst, conversely, traditional, rural, parochial values are stigmatised.<sup>20</sup>

For both Ferguson and Fishman, the resulting social norms of linguistic appropriacy rest on the notion of prestige, which itself is seen as natural and largely resulting from the degree of codification - oral and written or just oral - of the respective varieties.

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<sup>20</sup> See also Hobsbawm, (1995: chapter 13) and for a more recent formulation of 'modernisation' reworded 'globalisation' see Bourdieu:

*[Globalization] a pseudo-concept that is both descriptive and prescriptive, which has replaced 'modernization' that was long used in the social sciences in the USA as a euphemistic way of imposing a naively ethnocentric evolutionary model by means of which different societies were classified according to their distance from the economically most advanced society, i.e. American society [...] the word (and the model it expresses) incarnates the most accomplished form of the imperialism of the universal, which consists of one society universalizing its own particularity covertly as a universal model (like French society did for a long time, as the presumed incarnation of the Rights of Man and the inheritance of the French revolution [...])* (2001: 96-97; quoted by Phillipson, 2003: 75)

The socio-political origins of such norms thus remain un-discussed and the superimposition of a language is justified in terms of linguistic resources rather than with a political theory of language. The high variety is simply better equipped to do the job: it is a 'language'. Its high status reflects its high level of codification acquired first through its canonisation by a body of written literature and then its spread through various formal and/or official domains of use, including education.

Like in studies of nationalism, language is conceptualised as a reified linguistic system defined by its unity and boundedness, and consecrated by literary models<sup>21</sup>. The unity of the language pre-conditions its suitability for the fulfilment of the High social communication purposes of modern society and this unity is conceived of as unity of form - uniformity - achieved through standardisation processes. Besides, once a set of prescriptive tools exists, any variation - dialectal and/or social - becomes stigmatised as the corruption of some ideal state of the language. The standard form thus embodies modernity and progress. The Low variety lacks prestige due to the very lack of such codification and its confinement to, and oral transmission within, the private sphere is perceived as justified and natural. Individuals come to endorse these values, and their unproblematic internalisation becomes part of their *communicative competence* which is defined in static, apolitical terms of 'cultural knowledge', as a system of shared beliefs, values and attitudes (Gal, 1979: 9).

"In this framework, then, the national language is presented by architects of modern societies - the nation-states - as a symbol of progress and individual emancipation, and dialects as reactionary stigmata of the past: '[...] *the evolutionary process assumes an element of inevitability and bilingualism becomes merely a transitional phase, prior to the inevitable progress towards monolingualism.*' (Williams, 1992: 105) For nationalist leaders, language shift is thus a goal, and even in ethnographic studies like Gal's in Austria (1979), Williams (1992) claims, language shift is often implicitly presented as a matter of individual rational choice so that, ultimately, minority language maintenance can only be a deviance or an aberration.

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<sup>21</sup> This conception of language as discrete is also characteristic of representations of language at the supranational level among RML institutional supporters (see chapter 4, p. 131).

The implicit emphasis on social consensus is channelled through individual rather than collective choices so that the fact that social/language groups can be discriminated against is hidden<sup>22</sup>. Ultimately, the neat complementary functional distribution between varieties assumes the unproblematic awakening of a new social and linguistic order in which the emphasis on stability leaves little room for explaining phenomena of variation in use and change except as deviance. Actual patterns of language behaviour are conceived of as the mere endorsement of this order, which they contribute to maintain and reproduce. This approach assumes a homogeneous, conflict-free social body from which divergent and competing interests would be absent and in which patterns of use are determined contextually (e.g. at work, at home, etc) rather than sociologically (e.g. age, gender, level of education, etc). It leaves no room for strategic, individual choice.

To sum up, in these diglossic models, important questions of power in the shift and maintenance of languages in the linguistic market are left unexplored. The advent of power asymmetries linked to language status differentiation during nation-building processes has been a major theme of activist and academic discourses since the early 1970s. The absence - or the superficiality - of the discussion of power issues in early conceptualisations of diglossia has been underlined by many scholars from and/or studying various Western European minority contexts who have indeed forcibly criticised how such conceptualisations overlook *how* and perhaps more importantly *why* the high variety was *superposed*, or perhaps *superimposed* (Eckert, 1980; Gardy and Lafont, 1981; Lafont, 1982; see chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9). They have argued that the very notions of prestige and appropriacy result from and reinforce sets of ideological values and attitudes - diglossic ideology - which in the long term contribute to valorise the high variety and legitimise the socio-political domination of those groups that are bilinguals or monolinguals of the High variety (Eckert, 1980). Conversely, such notions concur to vilify the practices of those whose command of dominant varieties is nonexistent or incomplete, even in their own estimation (Calvet, 1974 and 2002; Lafont, 1977; Gardy, 1978; Kremnitz, 1981)<sup>23</sup>. The work of legitimation and

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<sup>22</sup> We will see in chapter 5 that this conception of individual rights, which is central in French political philosophy, is also an insurmountable obstacle to recognizing minority rights.

<sup>23</sup> This is what Catalan sociolinguists have called *auto-odi* and Albert Memmi the 'complex of the colonised' (quoted in Thiers, 1989: 23)

vilification underlying the unequal distribution of linguistic power links a theory of the nation with a concomitant, constitutive (normative) theory of language, and part of that work is discursive in nature so that it is partially hidden (Gardy and Lafont, 1981). Yet, it creates its own resistant, counter-discourse (Foucault, 1971, 1972 and 1979, and Bourdieu, 1994)<sup>24</sup>. What is lacking in diglossic descriptions is a fuller diachronic and synchronic theorisation of the intrinsic conflicts underlying differentiated language uses and language shift.

Overall, critical commentaries on studies of linguistic nationalism and diglossia emphasize that, contrary to what the modernisation thesis claims, the acquisition of new social norms is not a matter of free will but imposed from above (even if this is a hidden process), but such analyses often overlook the fact that power asymmetries can be and often are resisted, and they overlook the role of language in processes of resistance. Historical approaches underline how the diglossic compartmentalisation of languages has come to emerge but more emphasis is needed that diglossia is the temporary result of unachieved and ongoing 'language wars' or processes of 'glottophagy' as Calvet (1974, 1999 and 2002) puts it. For Coulmas, likewise, '[...] *the nation-state as it has evolved since the French Revolution is the natural enemy of minorities.*' (1998: 67; quoted by May, 2000: 370) This further suggests that the speakers of dominated languages have nevertheless the means to resist what some commentators have called *linguicism* (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1986). These means and the conflict they imply must be explored. In that connection, Bourdieu's sociology of language offers interesting insights.

### *Bourdieu's Sociology of Language and Power*

Bourdieu's own contribution to how language and society interact is an exploration of the relationship between language and power with strong Neo-Marxist overtones. It begins with an epistemological attempt to move beyond the aforementioned classic set of oppositions: 'macro-' *versus* 'micro-', society *versus* individual, structure *versus* agency, etc. Hence, his 'theory of practice' and the conceptual framework he develops from the notions of *habitus*, *fields* and *markets*. (1991: 17)

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<sup>24</sup> The Corsican situation is a case in point where such counter-discourses are produced by academics closely involved in language planning processes.

The *habitus* is a set of dispositions that incline social actors to act and react in certain ways, i.e. a system of habits. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are *inculcated* (i.e. taught or acquired during childhood), *structured* (i.e. reflect the social conditions in which they were acquired, thus differentiating between social groups), *durable* (i.e. because they are embodied), *generative* and *transposable* (i.e. they can generate a multiplicity of practices and perceptions, so that the habitus is reproduced in contexts other than those which inculcated it). In other words, the very notion of habitus extends from macro- to micro-levels of society: it is 'macro-' in that it is structured, i.e. class-related, 'meso-' in that it involves the influence of the immediate social environment on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, and 'micro-' in that it can be observed at the level of interpersonal interaction<sup>25</sup>. *Fields* are social contexts where 'products', i.e. instances of social practices, are exchanged with a view to increasing the agents' capital, i.e. economic and/or cultural and/or symbolic capital, according to a pre-determined exchange rate. Indeed, the products exchanged in a particular field, are typically granted a particular *market* value by dominant social groups at 'macro-' level. Insofar as fields are the locus of the individual's social development, they are also anchored in 'meso-/micro-' or local social reality.

Crucially, however, social practices do not merely *reflect* the habitus of the agent in a deterministic way: rather, they are the products of the relation between the habitus and the market where participants interact in search of profit. The *linguistic* habitus is one dimension of the habitus, so that linguistic practices, which are characterised as the relation between a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market, can be considered as social behaviours intent on increasing one's linguistic capital, and thereby one's symbolic power.

Finally, central to an understanding of Bourdieu's sociology is that it assumes that social actors are in a permanent quest for an increase of their different forms of capital, which are seen as the basis of power (for an in-depth discussion of Bourdieu's sociology as resting on an axiom of interest, see Caillé, 1981). Put otherwise,

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<sup>25</sup> The bond between members of these groups is somehow similar to the one described by Durkheim's *mechanic solidarity* (for a fuller explanation, see Giraud, 1997: 55), itself reminiscent of Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft*. This influence of the immediate community is particularly observable in social contexts of inculcation of the habitus (i.e. family, school), therefore recalling Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses (1971).

although not all fields are economic in the narrow sense, various practices follow a logic that is economic in the broader sense: they are oriented towards the augmentation of some kind of capital (e.g. cultural or symbolic), or the maximisation of some kind of profit (e.g. honour or prestige). For instance, in a pragmatic way, if the value of RMLs augments on the dominant market, they are likely to become more coveted and perhaps revitalised.<sup>26</sup> The question then becomes how value is determined.

When focusing on the relationship between the production and re-production of social structures, Bourdieu argues that to understand the way the linguistic market functions, one first needs to consider the conditions of emergence of dominant linguistic varieties. In other words, as in the nationalism studies considered above, the relation between language change and language hierarchisation, i.e. linguistic market determination, first needs to be looked at from a socio-historical perspective - in the processes of creation of the nation-state (ibid: 5-6) - and as a device of *élites* to linguistically secure their political and economic domination over the masses. The study of nation-building processes highlights how particular linguistic structures were imposed by socio-historical change, and how resulting hegemonies are further nourished by those who benefit (and, as we will see below, by those who 'suffer') from it. Thus Bourdieu's sociology accounts for the variability of language practices in a market where varieties are unequally valued. Moreover, like other aforementioned theorists of ideology and power (e.g. Gramsci, Foucault), Bourdieu underlines the role of ideology in establishing hegemonic hierarchies, thus indicating that because these ideologies are typically covert, users of 'low-value' varieties largely endorse the hierarchy that vilifies their own practices. This is what he calls symbolic power which wields symbolic violence.

However, most importantly, Bourdieu also acknowledges the possibility of resisting dominant market ideology and its value-system, notably by adopting or maintaining a parallel or alternative market on which products are valued according to different criteria. The notion of the alternative market itself embodies resistance and shows that

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<sup>26</sup> This is why language officialisation with its train of positive values is so insistently demanded by RML activists.

people behave in complex ways that must be explored and accounted for<sup>27</sup>. Finally, the existence of alternative markets has several important further theoretical and methodological implications for our purpose here.

First, the fact that the aforementioned language-identity link is malleable and fluid and adaptable to different markets undermines the idea of the fossilization of identities and shows that identities can be plural and situated. If the definition of identity is plural and malleable, then the intrinsic equation between language and identity does not hold and rather seems to confirm, as 'post-modernist' commentators on the linguistic discourse of nationalism argue, that this relationship is largely contingent: *'[...] language does not define us, and may not be an important feature, or indeed even a necessary one, in the construction of our identities, whether at the individual or collective levels.'* (May, 2000: 372; see also Silverstein, 2000; Laakso and Östman, 2004; Edwards, 1985) Identity, in this approach, is constructed by individuals or groups to achieve political ends. It follows that the nationalists' legitimising discourse of the existence of a cultural nation defined by its common language, that in turn legitimises access to statehood, is seriously undermined by the characterisation of that link as *instrumental and strategic* rather than *primordial and essential*. Notwithstanding, as May argues, the persistence of cultural forms of nationalism reflects that, engineered or constructed though it may be, essentialism as an ideology retains enormous purchase in people's affects, and can thus be mobilised (2001: 70-80)<sup>28</sup>. In that respect, we will see that plural models of language and identity departing from reified conceptions of language and based on actual language practices, like the *polynomic* approach developed by Corsican academics in charge of acquisition planning, are not easily accepted as a basis for language plans precisely because they seek to deconstruct and challenge deeprooted, essentialist linguistic and political ideologies (see chapter 9).

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<sup>27</sup> For an early illustration of the use of ethnographic research methods to complement Bourdieu's conceptual framework, see Heller's ethnographic research on language ideologies, language attitudes and language behaviour in a French-medium minority school in Ontario, Canada (Heller, 1994 and 1999).

<sup>28</sup> Put otherwise, analysts must be aware that academic discourse is not necessarily hegemonic: as was pointed out above and as the Corsican example dramatically shows, folk ideologies, however poorly informed in academic terms, must be acknowledged and accounted for in plans if those are to be accepted.

Second, and connectedly, the existence of an alternative market both deconstructs and confirms the weakness of the central 'modernist' assumptions on language and nationhood of structural/functional approaches like the ones outlined above. This leads to consider the laws and value systems that are hegemonic in the alternative markets to see how they function and ultimately if their existence can suffice to thwart language shift and perhaps trigger language revitalisation or whether, as many scholars warn (Krauss, 1992; Crystal, 1999; Hagège, 2000), massive language death is imminent. In other words, analysis must determine the purchase of dominant and resistant discourses in both the dominant and alternative markets and in their interaction. As Bourdieu's theory of practice suggests, the order of discourse varies across markets. Moreover, as a number of commentators have argued '*no two language-contact situations are alike, nor do language shifts resemble each other exactly.*' (Brenzinger, 1997; quoted by May, 2001: 146). Thence, the nature and functioning of the alternative market - its internal characteristics - must be approached *per se*. Analysis must include a description of patterns of identity making and change in the alternative market during socio-political, economic and cultural/linguistic nation-building processes (see chapters 6 and 7). This constitutes a sort of converse historiography of nation-building processes, the bottom-up history of the 'losers'.

[To sum up, studies of nationalism and nation-building processes provide insightful cinematographic conceptualisations of the multifaceted relations between language, identity and the nation. As for the concept of diglossia, it remains convenient as shorthand for a 'bird's eye' characterisation of situations of language contact and a snapshot understanding of patterns of sociolinguistic dominance in a given multilingual situation. Because of the limitations of their 'macro-'perspective though, both these approaches must be supplemented with more 'micro-' theoretical and methodological tools. Bourdieu's sociology of language and power fills the former gap while ethnographies of language practices provide useful information on the dialectics of compliance with/resistance to dominant ideologies and on their translation into actual practices.



## *Conclusion*

In this chapter, I have argued that language planning for contemporary RML sociolinguistic situations in the EU context calls for a cross-disciplinary framework that draws together concepts both from political and social theory and from sociolinguistics. To develop such a framework, I have drawn critically on the following approaches and concepts: governance and policy network approaches, studies of the role of language in nation-building processes and in nationalist discourses, diglossia informed by such socio-historical approaches, Bourdieu's sociological concepts of linguistic habitus and dominant and alternative linguistic markets, and ethnographic perspectives on the relationship between language ideologies, language institutionalisation and language practice (i.e. language maintenance and language shift.)

The governance and policy network approaches developed in the fields of public policy and European studies show that, in increasingly differentiated and polycentric polities like the EU (but this actually also applies at national and subnational levels as we will see), new theoretical models are needed to understand who participates in sector-specific decision-making processes, and how. The particulars of language decision-making processes and the variety of participants involved in various ways and with various resources in such processes need to be identified more satisfactorily than through a mere formal/legal lens. In that connection, the policy network concept combined with power dependency theory accounts for such processes and interactions between actors more satisfactorily than traditional formal/legal models of government. Yet, the open-ness intrinsic to the concept of multi-level, multi-actor governance should not conceal the fact that member states remain largely hegemonic in EU language policy-making processes and that no change in RML glottopolitics is likely to take place that has not first occurred at national levels. Further, considering that the ideologies that determine member states' approaches to linguistic diversity have been historically shaped in specific ways and therefore vary across national contexts, what is needed then to account for potential change in RML legislation at supranational level is an analysis of how language policy is devised at national levels: according to which principles and/or motivations and how.

The sections on linguistic nationalism and diglossia have therefore focused on the national level. Drawing on studies of linguistic nationalism and the role of language in nation-building processes, I first sketched the main theoretical perspectives framing the practical and symbolic ways in which the notions of language, nation and identity have been conceptualised and operationalised during nation-building processes. I emphasized the deeprootedness of essentialist approaches to language and political identity and how these notions have been made to interrelate in nationalist discourses. As a result, the construction of nation-states has articulated reified and totemized conceptions of language and identity. Likewise, early conceptualisations of the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia were described as exemplifying equally unsophisticated approach to how language relates to conflict-ridden nation-building processes and what a 'language' actually is. Both these approaches fail to transcend the inadequacies, intrinsic to 'macro-' structural approaches, to account for actual language practices. I showed that the main reason for these limitations has to do with an uncritical assumption of the modernisation thesis which itself is rooted in the 'evolutionary fallacy'. Ultimately, I suggested that approaches to linguistic nationalism document the origins and nature of linguistic and political ideologies and diglossic approaches have value as a snapshot for multilingual situations. Notwithstanding, the possibility of resisting the 'modernisation fallacy' must be better accounted for.

In that connection, Bourdieu's sociology of language and power turns out to be useful in that it looks at nation-building processes as predicated on social and discursive conflicts, notably through the existence and/or the creation of alternative markets. In other words, Bourdieu underscores the concomitance of antagonistic systems of values and norms which has resulted from and perpetuated social conflicts originating in nation-building processes. By doing so, he undermines the aforementioned structuralist/essentialist biases that assume a homogeneous social body. The problem with Bourdieu's theoretical framework is that it lacks a corresponding methodology to collect practice-based evidence of patterns of compliance and/or resistance to dominant orders of discourse on language and identity. For the heterogeneity of the social body to be described and analysed, some ethnographic data on patterns of compliance/resistance to diglossic hierarchies and on actual language practices must be collected at subnational level (e.g. Heller, 1994 and 1999).

What is therefore needed to account fully for contemporary RML sociolinguistic situations in general and that of Corsica in particular are: 1. diglossic representations informed by studies of nation-building processes and nationalism in the wider EU context of multilevel governance; 2. ethnographic information on what discourses on language planning and language prevail both in dominant and alternative markets; 3. legal and policy analysis of which discourses are legitimised and institutionalised, and how, which gives an idea of how they interact and which are hegemonic, and who the dominant actors in the Corsican language policy network are; 4. finally and most importantly, both how these various discourses are accepted or resisted by policy recipients and ultimately translated, or not, into actual practices at meso- and micro-level. With reference to Corsica, Jaffe (1999) following Thiers (1989) has largely documented points 1, 2 and 4 above.

My own contribution to such issues in this study consists in bringing together the scholarly traditions outlined above in complementary ways. On the more specific issues of the impact of EU integration processes on French-Corsican glottopolitical relations and Corsican language revitalisation processes, further, I ultimately focus on the institutionalisation of discourses on language planning and language in contemporary Corsica (point 3) and I provide an update on elite and popular attitudes towards the modalities and outcomes of that institutionalisation through the analysis of media discourse on language and language planning (point 4) (chapters 8 and 9).

## Chapter 2: Foundations of the EU Sociolinguistic Regimes: Community Official and/or Working Languages

### *Introduction*

This chapter analyses the EU legal framework regulating issues of language status and language use within the EU and the political and linguistic ideologies underpinning it. The focus is on the legal configuration of the EU's sociolinguistic order, and especially on the distribution of glottopolitical powers between various European actors: member states, Community institutional actors, and European citizens. As indicated in the previous chapter, it proposes that decisions made at EU level result from the interplay of various ideological motivations, formal legal provisions and actual patterns of institutional practice.

The main ideological frameworks relevant here are the ongoing debate on the locus of political power in the EU – the *intergovernmental* versus *supranational* debate and, within that broad debate, the EU's discourse on respect for multilingualism and language equality – the 'unity in diversity' discourse. Moreover, insofar as European integration is largely a law-driven phenomenon wherein primary and secondary legislation govern institutional relations and policy-making processes, legal texts play a primary role in establishing and legitimizing the pattern of distribution of (glotto-) political power within the EU. The analysis therefore investigates the attribution/distribution of glottopolitical power as established by the legal provisions appertaining to language status and use within the EU: Article 290 and the derived Regulation 1/1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community.

The implementation of the provisions contained in Regulation 1/58 is scrutinized in the context of inter- and intra-institutional practice and EU-European citizens' relations, but I also look at how advocates of a pro-active EU intervention in RML protection and promotion - hereafter RML activists - have sought to interpret and exploit the glottopolitical provisions of EU law, and their underlying ideological assumptions, in ways that can benefit RMLs despite the absence of a legal base for

RMLs *per se*. Indeed, although at first sight the question of official and working language status may appear largely irrelevant to the cause of RML recognition and rights, we will see in this chapter and subsequent ones that the principles of respect for multilingualism and language equality inscribed in Regulation 1/58 have been largely summoned up by RML promoters. Moreover, the vagueness of the requirements for Community official language status granting leaves open a discursive space in which language official-ness at national levels can serve to catalyse claims for Community language officialisation on the basis of domestic statuses, e.g. Catalan and recently Irish. This is an important stake both symbolically and financially. Symbolically because for a RML to be recognised beyond the national level is unheard-of, and financially because language official-ness determines which languages may be recipient of EU policy activities and therefore obtain financial assistance, e.g. through education policy and related programs, and which ones cannot.

As was claimed in chapter 1, central to these issues of attribution/distribution of glottopolitical power are the conditions of production and above all interpretation of legal texts, as they are discussed within the EU institutional arenas. To understand how legal production and interpretation may constitute a discursive springboard for RML activism, I draw on modern genre theory taken as a (critical) discourse theory. Modern genre theory indeed sees the rules governing patterns of text production and interpretation as socio-political constructs determined by ideological motivations and actualising particular schemes of power distribution. Thence the dominant interpretation of texts is open to challenges from those who benefit least from such schemes.

→The analyses offered here therefore contrast two possible readings of legal texts: 1. a hegemonic, 'legal/political' expert reading and 2. a critical - more sociolinguistic - reading. The former is highly conventionalised and usually performed by members of the EU's legal *discourse community* (Swales, 1990) within EU institutions. Typically, it focuses essentially on the construction and legitimisation of various positions of authority, by defining glottopolitical rights and obligations. Unsurprisingly, the categorisations of *language* itself in these texts are unsophisticated. By contrast, critical, sociolinguistically-informed readings performed by RML activists focus on

the definition/construction of the object *language* and pinpoint the ideological and political conflicts intrinsic to the definitions of the status of languages. This alternative reading points to the aforementioned, perceived inconsistencies resulting from the different ways in which language status is granted within the EU's glottopolitical framework and at national levels. In turn, these perceived inconsistencies constitute a privileged site of discursive struggle for RML activists to obtain a pro-active RML policy in the EU.

In the first section, I analyse Regulation 1 from a 'traditional' legal/political perspective looking at how political authority is constructed and distributed amongst various actors and then show that actual institutional language use is in contradiction with the statement that the EEC respects and promotes language equality and multilingualism. In the second section, I provide a sociolinguistically-informed reading and claim that the vagueness and/or absence of clear language definitions in Regulation 1 serves exclusive purposes on the Council's part, which in turn reinforces but may also endanger its glottopolitical hegemony. Finally, I conclude on the evolution of the EU's sociolinguistic regime from its establishment up to its transformations in the 2000s.

#### *Article 290 and Regulation 1/58: The Initial Language Regime of the EC*

Article 290 (formerly article 217) states that:

*'The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously.'*

The scope of applicability of this general provision is then further defined in Regulation 1/58, which I reproduce here in its entirety and discuss below:

REGULATION No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community.

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,  
Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules governing the languages of the Institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously;  
Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of the Community;  
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

#### Article 1

The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian.

#### Article 2

Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same language.

#### Article 3

Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State.

#### Article 4

Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted in the four official languages.

#### Article 5

The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in the four official languages.

#### Article 6

The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are to be used in specific cases.

#### Article 7

The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be laid down in its rules of procedure.

#### Article 8

If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law.

Regulation 1 determines the languages to be used within the framework of the EU. It sets glottopolitical positions for various social and institutional actors ranging from supranational institutions down to individual citizens. It regulates language use for both ‘horizontal’ interactions within and between the EU institutions, i.e. working languages, (articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and ‘vertical’ interactions between individual Community institutions and the Community as a whole and both member states and ‘persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state’, i.e. (Community) Official languages (articles 2 and 3). My goal in this section is to explore the ideologies underlying the glottopolitical power positions that Regulation 1 constructs. In that connection, I read the text in terms of the (legal) function it performs – imposing obligations and conferring rights – but my reading also critically calls upon Systemic Functional Linguistics [SFL] within a Critical Discourse Analysis [CDA] approach the better to convey the formal linguistic devices at play to fulfill this function and the various underlying strands of the ideological struggle. Specifically, I explore the ways in which the text is made to cohere as a revelator of the ideological assumptions underpinning text production.

In Hallidayan terms, I explore the text’s ideational and interpersonal meaning, i.e. how it constructs a specific social reality, social identities and social relations *inter alia* through coherence building. Following Fairclough, my assessment here is three-dimensional (Fairclough, 1989; 1992: chapter 3; 2001: chapter 2; Clark and Ivanič,



1997: chapter 1). I first discuss Regulation 1 as an instance of discursive practice, attending to its conditions of production, distribution and reception/interpretation. I thus explore its intertextuality, the chain of communication it enters, and its host of in-built subject positions (Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986). I also scrutinize it as an instance of textual practice, looking at diverse textual features - modality, voice and theme - to see how their analysis corroborates, or not, the findings of the discursive analysis<sup>29</sup>. Throughout, moreover, I attend to Fairclough's third analytical stratum and characterize the findings of the above perspectives as an instance of social practice, i.e. the EU's pattern of construction/distribution of glottopolitical power.

### *Authorship, Authority, and Intertextuality - The Council*

I first examine the conditions of production and in-built subject positions of this text, discussing the relation between its authorship - who wrote the text? - and its authority - what is the nature of the power derived from and distilled through the text? And whose power is it?

The Council explicitly claims authorship and authority in the preamble of the text, i.e. *the Council of the European Economic Community...has adopted this regulation*<sup>30</sup>. This assertion of authorship and authority frames the whole text and authority is here legitimated by the inter-textual reference to Article 290 of the Treaty that provides for the Council to act unanimously in language matters<sup>31</sup>. In turn the unanimity of the collective author's voice reinforces its authority. Moreover, Regulation 1 directly originates from the Council and does not follow a Commission proposal, which is highly unusual in EU law making. The council is thus the only author, which consecrates its hegemony in language-based policy making<sup>32</sup>. The relationship between authorship and authority is twofold: the legitimacy of authorship both determines and is determined by legal authority.

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<sup>29</sup> For a discussion of the importance of convergence to validate analyses, see Gee (1999: 94-95)

<sup>30</sup> In Bhatia's framework, the preamble thus serves as the main provisionary clause (ibid: 113).

<sup>31</sup> For legal texts as a particular genre of textual product, manifest intertextuality is a requisite to the process of legitimization, a necessary generic feature of the compositional structure of legal texts: what Bhatia calls the *referential qualifications of legislative provision* (Bhatia, 1993).

<sup>32</sup> For further discussion of the concept of text authorship, see Goffman (1981: 144; quoted in Fairclough, 1992: 78-79).

As a Regulation, furthermore, it is a decision ‘legally-binding’ in its entirety. Legal binding-ness constitutes a key criterion of legal authority and refers to the nature of the power constructed in Regulation 1. In that regard, text types like Directives, Regulations and Decisions are necessarily to be enforced, Resolutions and Opinions are not. Still, the latter can constitute (non-binding) legal bases for Community action even though they do not necessarily generate policy outcomes<sup>33</sup>. This uneven legal status is both reflected and constructed through the distribution of authorship of particular texts and the generic conventions of each legal text type, i.e. *sub-genres* in Bhatia’s terms (1993: 21), and by the interpretation of legal provisions. Thus, the EP and the Committee of the Regions (hereafter CoR) can only pass Resolutions and emit Opinions and, in effect, the consultative, ‘advisory’ status of these legislative acts positions them as (glotto-) politically sub-ordinated to the Council in the legislative process. In language matters, the Council’s decisions alone are hegemonic in the sense that only they can prevail over national laws in cases of conflict, but EP and CoR texts can enact resistant discourses to that hegemony, as we shall see later.

Finally, Regulation 1 sets up the glottopolitical power positions of the other institutions. They are addressees in Regulation 1’s ‘chain of communication’ (Bakhtin, 1986)<sup>34</sup>. Looking at the ‘chain of communication’ that Regulation 1 enters into implies both considering its inter-textual relations with other texts, e.g. with Article 290, and to whom it is addressed, i.e. individual EU institutions, individual member states and European citizens.

### *Subject Positions - Modality, Voice and Theme: Constructing Power Relations and Social Reality*

We saw that the Council is the dominant player in determining glottopolitical power. Here I focus on how its dominance over other actors is both discursively and textually constructed. Regarding the latter I specifically focus on interconnected semantico-grammatical categories<sup>35</sup> such as modality, voice, and theme.

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<sup>33</sup> See the analysis of article 149 in chapter 3.

<sup>34</sup> On *addressivity*, see Bakhtin (1986: 95-100).

<sup>35</sup> The adjunction of the prefix *semantico-* here points to a view of grammar, as advocated by Halliday and his followers, which does not separate form from meaning.

Modality was traditionally regarded as essentially constructed through the choice of particular modal auxiliary verbs. However, Critical Discourse Analysts amongst others have argued that this view of modality is over-restrictive. Modality also encompasses the use of adverbs, hedges and various other grammatical features like voice and syntactic configurations (Halliday, 1985: 85-89; Hodge and Kress, 1988; Fairclough, 1992: 158-162; Stubbs, 1996: chapter 8; Thompson, 1997: 56-65). Typically, the frequency of such or such modal device varies across text types; in legal texts their variety is rather limited. I explore below the text's modal profile, looking at the modal construction, voice (i.e. active or passive) and syntactic configuration of articles (i.e. what is thematic or rhematic). The thematic perspective relates to Halliday's textual function of language: how certain elements are foregrounded or backgrounded as Theme or Rheme according to their sentential positioning. The rationale for that distinction lies in that thematic foregrounding and rhematic backgrounding are ideologically motivated emphatic devices as well as cohesion devices.

Regarding the interpretation of how power relations are constructed, the use of various modal devices reflects/enacts the degree of *affinity* (Hodge and Kress, 1988) the author seeks to establish with its propositions. Further, the construction of affinity determines how explicit or implicit, causality, agency and responsibility are, and each particular design indexes relations of power between the author and her/his addressees. I will explore below the relationship between these grammatical features and the construction of agency and authority.

### *The European Court of Justice (ECJ): Preamble and Article 7*

Amongst EU institutions, the ECJ occupies an outstanding position. In Regulation 1, it is dealt with separately from other institutions, first in the preamble and then in article 7. The anterior and separate positioning of the ECJ entails a distinction between the ECJ and the other institutions, which can be read at two connected levels. At the inter-textual level of legitimization, it positions the ECJ on equal footing with the Council: the legitimization of the Council's aforementioned power prerogatives is toned down by the constraint that they cannot cause '*prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedures of the Court of Justice*'. Looking at textual

features though, the use of authoritative modal *shall* in the agent-deleting passive form in article 7 tones down the ECJ's glottopolitical autonomy to make it look as if the Council had granted it<sup>36</sup>. This apparent paradox indicates the hegemonic struggle over (glotto)-political authority between the Council and the ECJ.

### *The Parliament and the Commission: articles 2, 3 and 6*

The Parliament and the Commission<sup>37</sup> are dually positioned in this text. They are both glottopolitically sub-ordinated to the Council's authority, to member states and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state' (articles 1, 2 and 3), and partially autonomous (article 6).

Their subordinate status is manifest in that, in their internal functioning and mutual inter-institutional relations (article 1), and when interacting with member states and/or 'European citizens'<sup>38</sup> (articles 2 and 3), they must exclusively use the working and official languages determined by the Council, i.e. excluding RMLs. With member states and/or European citizens, furthermore, they must abide by the addressor's language choice, which is not necessarily the language of the state of origin but can be any of the EU official languages (article 2). Conversely, when addressing a member state and/or European citizens, EU institutions' communications '*shall be drafted in the language of such state*' (article 3). In brief, the language choice of the EU institutions is apparently more constrained than that of European citizens, and this constraint is modally imposed by the Council by means of authoritative *shall* and agent-deleting passive form *be drafted*.

Regarding institutional glottopolitical autonomy, article 6 states that '*institutions [...] may stipulate in their rules of procedures which of the languages are to be used in specific cases*'. The voice is active and agency is thematically foregrounded

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<sup>36</sup> An alternative syntactic (and modal) organisation of article 7 could have foregrounded rather than backgrounded the ECJ's glottopolitical prerogatives (e.g. *The Court of Justice lays down in its rules of procedures the languages to be used in its proceedings.*.)

<sup>37</sup> No mention is made of the Committee of the Regions [CoR], as it did not exist at the time this Regulation was adopted. However, since the text refers to 'the Institutions of the Community', the same provisions apply to the CoR.

<sup>38</sup> The reason for my hedging of 'citizen' will become clear below. For now, I will keep using it as a convenient short hand for 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State.'

conveying the institutions' glottopolitical autonomy. This autonomy is then further reinforced by the vagueness of the expression 'in specific cases' to be determined by the institutions themselves and not by the Council<sup>39</sup>. However, the use of permission-granting auxiliary *may* still signals that the institutions' autonomy remains a function of the Council's prerogative to grant some amount of autonomy. Regarding working language use too, then, the institutions' glottopolitical autonomy seems constructed in contradictory ways, which signals a process of hegemonic struggle for glottopolitical authority.

Member states and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state' apparently enjoy greater glottopolitical powers than EU institutions, whilst the latter retain some glottopolitical autonomy for their internal workings only<sup>40</sup>.

*Europe, Member States and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State'*

Article 2 confers special rights to senders of documents to the Community institutions, i.e. they can use '*any one of the official languages*' (i.e. as defined by article 1), and not necessarily *the* official language of the Member State 'to the jurisdiction of which they are a subject'. For instance a British national residing in France may send a query to a Community institution in English rather than French. Senders are thus positioned in a dual manner: as 'subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State', i.e. in which they reside, and as a 'subject' of the larger European entity. This provision therefore glottopolitically transcends the notions of citizenship, territorial residence and nationality. Within national contexts, the language choice of residents is territorially determined: whether nationals/citizens of the Member State or not, they must address the institutions in the official language(s) of the Member States. Migrants, both from EU and non-EU Member States, have to use 'the official language' of their country of residence. Thus, a British national residing in France must exclusively use French in its communication with French institutions. In communications with the EU, Article 2 grants senders glottopolitical rights irrespective of their place of residence and rather based upon their 'national

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<sup>39</sup> See the discussion of working languages below.

<sup>40</sup> Yet this is no minor issue, as we will see in subsequent sections when we discuss the general coherence of this text.

language'<sup>41</sup>. This significantly undermines Member States' glottopolitical prerogative to govern official language use for all the residents on their territories. Should a conflict between a resident and her/his residing Member State's institutions seek supra-national arbitration, the issue of language choice is clearly one of empowerment. This provision is therefore reminiscent of the ECJ's rules governing the language of cases which also gives pre-eminence to persons rather than to institutions with respect to language choice (see below). Inter-discursively, furthermore, this provision can be interpreted as the linguistic correlate of the European fundamental stance for the free circulation of goods and workers.) I view it as a clear discursive instance of a supra-national, rather than inter-governemental, view of European construction wherein the communication channel between 'citizens' and European institutions can be un-mediated by national levels.

At issue here, furthermore, is the category of 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State'. In that connection it is significant that Regulation 1 should use a lengthy periphrastic formula instead of a nominal expression like *European citizen* for instance. This non-categorization is better explained from a historical perspective. Indeed, when Regulation 1 was adopted (1958), the concept of European citizenship did not exist; it is a Post-Maastricht development. Moreover, one could argue that it is a republican concept even though Member States are not all republics. Still, it is nowadays broadly accepted as the denomination characterizing all the 'persons subject to the jurisdiction of Member States', including the 'subjects' of the European monarchies. If we accept that broad inclusive approach to European citizenship, and consider that the text of Regulation 1 was not amended in the post-Maastricht period, we can investigate the reason for this non-amendment.

The concept of citizenship has to do with the legal notion of political identity: '*The legal conception of an individual who owes allegiance to, and receives protection from, a state.*' (Scruton, 1983: 63-64). It thus relates to the legal 'positioning', in our terms, of persons subject to the jurisdiction of a state. My contention here is that even today the concept does not explicitly appear in amended versions of Regulation 1 as it inter-textually refers to states only in current political imagery. Inter-discursively, the

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<sup>41</sup> I broadly take 'national language' as the language they have acquired in their country of origin, provided this is also the state language of their country of origin, and not a non-EU language.

category of *European citizen* would imply the categorization of the EU as a (supra-) state and thereby endorse a significant symbolic move towards supra-national hegemony. Non-categorization can thence be construed as recognising resistance to instituting a fully-fledged European political regime in which, in language matters, European citizens would primarily owe allegiance to Europe, i.e. as the highest jurisdiction, beyond their national allegiances<sup>42</sup>.

### Summary

The above analysis shows that the Council's authority remains hegemonic but unstable. The Council is glottopolitically positioned in complex contradictory ways through the combined use of different modal devices and instrumental syntactic choices in the successive articles. Critical analysis has helped further qualify the apparent omnipotence of the Council, more than a 'traditional legal analysis' of authority and autonomy, for instance, would. EU institutions are granted a significant amount of glottopolitical autonomy and the glottopolitical hierarchy between member states and European citizens is configured in such a way that the latter derive new glottopolitical powers outside the scope of national decisional arenas.

The next section pursues the analysis of how glottopolitical power and authority are constructed and distributed in Regulation 1 considering how glottopolitical power is sociolinguistically defined, i.e. through the categorization(s) of language(s) within the EU sociolinguistic order.

### Categorizing Languages

In this section, I explore the pattern of distribution of glottopolitical power within the EU by considering how *language* is categorized as *official* and/or *working* language. Whilst above I looked at modal and syntactic characteristics of textual construction, I now examine nominal and cohesive features of the text to see how the object *language* is discursively constructed<sup>43</sup>. I claim that the classifications of languages are

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<sup>42</sup> For a discussion of the conception of Europe as a state and of the need to depart from traditional definitions of state, see Sbragia (1992: 205; cited in Cram, Dinan and Nugent, 1992: 363-365).

<sup>43</sup> Lexicalization and nominalization are discussed in Fairclough (ibid: chapters 3 and 6). See also Kress for his discussion of the process of classification (Kress, 1985: 61-67).

themselves an important element in the EU's discourse on language and glottopolitical authority, within the larger order of discourse of power distribution in the EU. I therefore examine the glottopolitical power and subject positioning that such categorizations construct. As Fairclough puts it: '*Cohesive markers have to be interpreted by text interpreters as part of the process of constructing coherent readings of the texts... Cohesion is one factor in coherence*', and coherence is another surface mark of underlying discourses: by looking at how texts are made to cohere, we can trace the ideologies they assume (Fairclough, 1992: 177). Here I show that the textual construction of language equality and multilingualism displays limited coherence, and that textual cohesion/coherence is also defective in the characterisation of official languages. This 'lack' of coherence becomes apparent in a critical reading and betrays Regulation 1's failure to be both precise and clear, and all-inclusive. To illustrate this claim, I contrast the discourses on language and glottopolitical authority with actual patterns of institutional language use to emphasize further the discursive tensions and contradictions intrinsic to this Regulation and the discrepancies between legal provisions and empirical reality.

### *Coherence and Cohesion in the Definition of Working Languages and/or Community Official Languages*

Regulation 1 equips the Community with official and working languages. In article 1, these are identified *ad hoc* rather than conceptually - i.e. through a definition rule - as the four languages of the original Community.<sup>44</sup> This *ad hoc* identification suggests that the four languages mentioned are equal between themselves and also individually both working and official languages. This tends to signify the will of the Community to implement language equality and respect for multilingualism. Yet, the repetition of article *the*, and the use of coordinating conjunction *and* seem to establish a distinction between official and working status that is in contradiction with the aforementioned *ad hoc* definition along lines of equality: they act as separators (compare *the official and working languages* with *the official and the working languages*). The clausal and sentential organization of article 1 thus grammatically and semantically constructs the relation between *official languages* and *working languages* in contradictory ways: the

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<sup>44</sup> As the Community was further enlarged in subsequent years, the official language of the new members states acquired official recognition and working language status as well. Today there are 20 EU official languages.



combined use of *the* with *and* establishes a separation whereas the *ad hoc* definition suggests equality between languages and between official and working language statuses. As a result of this apparent contradiction, article 1 only displays limited coherence *per se*.<sup>45</sup> One has therefore to look elsewhere to transcend this apparent contradiction.

### *Working Languages*

In the absence of a definition rule for 'working languages', I define them as 'languages used within and between the institutions at various structural levels', so that they have to do with actual institutional proceedings. This leads us to look for further characterization in articles 6 and 7. Article 6's expression *which of the languages* implies a choice without clearly specifying what the options denoted by *the languages* are. It is for the interpreter to make the expression cohere with *the languages of the institutions of the Community* as defined in article 1. Via the use of *which*, furthermore, each institution can use some, not necessarily all, languages in their procedures according to *specific cases*. Potential linguistic inequality thus results from the fact that each institution enjoys some degree of glottopolitical autonomy which is ill-defined by the vagueness of the expression *in specific cases* (effectively the only stipulative rule here) even though this autonomy is intra-textually restricted by Article 1. In terms of categorizing languages in their mutual relationship, all official languages are not necessarily on an equal footing as working languages. The intra-textual, cohesive link established between articles 1 and 6 (i.e. *in specific cases*) regarding the categorization of languages to be used reflects the conflict underlying the distribution of glottopolitical power underlined above, i.e. the tension between intergovernmental and supranational sovereignty evidenced by the limited coherence between article 1's implicit statement of linguistic equality and individual institutional working language autonomy which opens some space for some form of language hierarchisation.

Article 7's wording reflects the ECJ's aforementioned glottopolitical autonomy and its equal glottopolitical footing with the Council. Indeed, the expression '*the*

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<sup>45</sup> Coherence later emerges from the provisions of articles 6 and 7. Article 1 becomes retroactively coherent with articles 6 and 7.

*languages to be used* does not refer here to article 1 but to the ECJ's own rules of procedures without any restriction of language choice whatsoever. By contrast with Article 6, thus, the meaning of '*the languages to be used*' is to be read through an inter-textual reference to the ECJ's Rules of Procedures rather than by reference to article 1. Arguably the identical collocational use of the expression '*the languages to be used*' in articles 6 and 7, and the lack of overt semantic differentiation between the two referents of article *the* masks the different glottopolitical status of the ECJ and the other Community institutions. This collocational use is therefore a deceptive cohesive device.

The limitation in coherence between articles 1 and 6 originates in the actual generic legal conventions underlying the production of Regulation 1 where only limited aspects of cohesion are considered: the only cohesive link between articles 1 and 6 is a vague expression (i.e. *in specific cases*) which, if it is all-inclusive, nevertheless remains imprecise and leaves more room for legal interpretation. In turn, I see the limitation in cohesion/coherence within and/or between the various articles as resulting from the discursive tension between the intergovernmental approach to integration (resting upon the symbolic equality of national languages) and the construction of a supranational entity to some extent autonomous and increasingly costly. The original context of production of Regulation 1 did not make that tension so acute since only four languages were concerned. As the Community enlarged though, as was noted in chapter 1, the equal use of all the member states' languages as working languages became financially and technically difficult due to the important costs and time constraints involved. This has progressively become a more sensitive political issue and constitutes, after the 2004 enlargement, a further glottopolitical challenge. Today, in practice, the use of English and French has become the rule *de facto* at 'working group' level in all institutions, including in preparatory meetings of the EP despite the latter's recurrent statements in favour of respect for symbolic language equality and practical multilingualism. At higher levels – in Plenaries and Committees – interpretation is provided in all member states' languages, but it has to be required first (Bakker, 2003).

The limited coherence between article 1 (language equality) and article 6 (institutional glottopolitical autonomy) has entailed numerous parliamentary questions denouncing

the discrepancy between the proclaimed equal use of all official languages as working languages and the actual restricted use of English and French on many occasions. The Commission has therefore had to further qualify the meaning of *specific cases*:

- [...] documents intended for use outside the Commission are drawn up in the official languages of the Community in the case of instruments of general application and in the languages of those to whom they are addressed in other cases [Regulation 1/58, article 4].
- [...] documents for internal use are drafted in the languages corresponding to the actual needs of the Commission and its departments based on operational efficiency [Regulation 1/58, article 6]<sup>46</sup>.

The need for operational efficiency has not been limited to internal use though, and since the creation of the EU's Website *Europa*, language equality in information has been repeatedly breached where constraints of time and/or money justified language restrictions<sup>47</sup>. The Commission has eventually explicitly acknowledged that constraints of efficiency and urgency have to prevail over translation in all languages<sup>48</sup>. Arguably these exceptions could be seen as infringing article 4. The Commission having denied infringement following several such accusations, the case was eventually brought before the Court of First Instance that concluded against allegations of infringement. In its judgement, the Court stated that:

*Council Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community is merely an act of secondary law [...] To claim that that regulation sets out a specific Community law principle of equality between languages, which may not be derogated from even by a subsequent regulation of the Council, is tantamount to disregarding its character as secondary law [...] [Article 217] does not provide that once the Council has established such rules they cannot subsequently be altered. It*

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<sup>46</sup> Answer to Written Question E-0615/02, OJ C 309 E, 12/12/2002 (p. 33).

<sup>47</sup> See Written Question E-201/02 and the Commission's Answer (OJ C 92, 17/04/03, pp.3-4).

<sup>48</sup> See the dispute over the languages in use in the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Written Question E-2529/01, OJ C 93 E, 18/04/2002 p. 152, and the Commission's answer, OJ C 93 E, 18/04/2002 p. 153), and more recently the one over the restricted use of languages in the European Patent office (answer to Written Question E-1416/02, OJ C 52 E, 06/03/2003 p. 70)

*follows that the rules governing languages laid down by Regulation No 1 cannot be deemed to amount to a principle of Community law.*<sup>49</sup>

The 2001 Court's conclusions thus denied that Regulation 1 had set out a specific Community law principle of equality between languages. Interestingly the repeated emphasis that, as an act of secondary law, Regulation 1 could be derogated from shifts the focus away from the initial discourse of language equality to the possibility of change. Is the Court acknowledging that Regulation 1/58 *initially* established a *de facto* principle of language equality? The implications of that recent judgement are far-reaching and fully legitimise the aforementioned discrepancy between apparent language equality (article 1) and institutional language autonomy (article 6) and the subsequent limitation in the number of working languages. They also undermine the oft-stated EU principles of respect for and promotion of language equality and multilingualism (see below).

I claimed above that the definition of working languages had only limited or indirect relevance to the question of RML status and use in 1958, because when Regulation 1 was drafted the question of RML status was not yet as politically salient at domestic levels as it later became, let alone at Community level, so that there was no pressure from RML activists for RML use within the Community (Milian, 2001). However, one 1990 EP Resolution<sup>50</sup> calling for use of Catalan in official publication and information campaigns, and for communication between the Commission and Catalan speakers met *some* success: an agreement between the EEC and the principality of Andorra was drafted in all official languages and Catalan<sup>51</sup>, and it is reported to have been occasionally 'used' in plenaries in the EP (Strubell, 2002: 31).<sup>52</sup>

Unsurprisingly in the light of the discussion above, a more notable exception to the possibility of institutional use of RMLs as working languages is to found in the ECJ.

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<sup>49</sup> Christina Kik versus Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market; Case T-120/99. Available at [http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga\\_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=61999A0120&model=guichett](http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=61999A0120&model=guichett) accessed October 10<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>50</sup> OJ C 019, 28/01/1991, p. 0042.

<sup>51</sup> OJ L 374, 31/12/1990 p. 0014 - 0032

<sup>52</sup> Another source confirmed a very limited use - *a few words* - with no interpretation/translation provided (Bakker, 2003).

In practice, in chapter 5 of its Rules of procedure, the ECJ has defined its *language of the case* as to be chosen from a list including all the official and working languages of the Community<sup>53</sup>. However, and most importantly, article 4 of chapter 5 stipulates that ‘Where a witness or expert states that he is unable adequately to express himself in one of the languages referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article, the Court of First Instance may authorize him to give his evidence in another language.’ This provision constitutes a clear possibility for any RML speaker to use his/her language in the ECJ with no restriction whatsoever as it is for the witness or expert to determine the language in which s/he can most *adequately* express him/herself<sup>54</sup>. It can be seen as resting on an intertextual reference to other conventions drafted by a number of international organizations where such provision is a basic minority right (e.g. in the *UN Charter on Human Rights*), sometimes the only one (e.g. the 1947 *International Labour Organization Convention on Minority Rights*). At EU level, seeing linguistic democracy as the right to use the language of one’s choice in public spheres makes the ECJ the most linguistically democratic EU institution.

### *Community and Member States’ Official Languages*

The only explicit classificatory/definitional references to the *official languages of the Community* are in articles 1 and 8. The existence of *Community* official languages (as distinct from *Member States’* official languages) is assumed in Article 1 through two linguistic devices: definite article *the* and the nominal group *official languages*. Besides, the thematic positioning of this noun phrase reinforces the assumption of pre-existence, masking the Council’s agency whilst emphasizing its authority with *shall be*.

Like working languages, community official languages are identified empirically. However, the expression *official language* recurs throughout the text (articles 2, 4, 5 and 8). Articles 4 and 5 seem to reinforce the linguistic equality hypothesized above. Article 4 establishes that all regulations and other legal documents produced by the institutions and aimed at public information must be drafted in all (Community)

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<sup>53</sup> The ECJ does not actually speak of *working languages* but recognises them as *languages of a case* (OJ Doc. No C 39/1, 15-02-1982). Arguably, since they can be used in legal procedures, they are effectively *working languages* in the ECJ.

<sup>54</sup> This article has been *de facto* interpreted in that sense by Catalan speakers (see the 1990 EP’s *Resolution on languages of the Community and the situation of Catalan*, paragraph 5).

official languages, thus allowing EU officials to have access to draft texts in their own respective languages. Article 5 states that the Official Journal of the Community must be equally published in all official languages, which allows citizens to access legislation in their own language. Articles 1, 4 and 5 thus concur to ensure that official multilingualism and linguistic equality be built into the legal framework of European integration despite the concomitant translation costs.

An important stake for RMLs are the provisions contained in articles 3 and 8. Article 3 regulates the ways in which Community institutions must communicate with Member States and the 'persons subject to the jurisdiction' of such states. Communications must 'be drafted in *the* language of such State.' (Emphasis added) What is implicitly conveyed here, both in the thematic use of article *the* and in that of *language* in the singular, is a view of Member States as monolingual, which reflects the essentialist principles guiding Western European glottopolitics since early modern times (see chapters 1, 5, 7 and 9). It is only in Article 8 that this categorization of States as monolingual is further qualified. Article 8 acknowledges that Member States can potentially have more than one official language. Still, Member States' potential multilingualism is only approached from the viewpoint of officiality. This calls for several observations.

First, Regulation 1 does not deal with *non-official* languages of the Member States, i.e. (most) RMLs as well as migrant languages. Again, this can be seen as a generic constraint of the text, but I believe that it is essentially an attempt not to encroach upon national prerogatives in the definition of their own sociolinguistic profiles. Second, a coherent reading of article 3 is conditioned by article 8's provision: the expression *The language of such state* deceptively signals some yet unestablished shared knowledge that in situations of official multilingualism, the State in question chooses one language to be used in the Community.

Second, since article 8 stipulates that (national) official language choice is 'governed by the general rules of its [i.e. a State's] law', the definition of official languages calls for a sociolinguistic distinction between different levels of officialness within Member States. A more sociolinguistic discourse indeed would clearly distinguish between *state/national* official languages and 'sub-national' official languages, e.g.

Catalan in Spain, Frisian in Holland. Insofar as this inter-textual/inter-discursive reference remains implicit rather than manifest in article 8, the distinction, or lack thereof, remains a stake of hegemonic struggle.

In terms of higher-level textual cohesion and coherence, finally, and given its location at the very end of the text, article 8 textually underlines the aforementioned Member States' glottopolitical prerogative only in retrospect, which can be seen as a structural 'defect' in the cohesion, and hence coherence of the text. Thence, it is for the reader/interpreter to infer that Community official languages are Member States' national/official languages<sup>55</sup>. This inference is only implicit in article 1 and only becomes partially explicit in article 8 but nowhere is it stated that to become Community official languages, national official languages have to be official throughout the territory of the member state.

The question of official languages seems to have more relevance for RMLs for both symbolic and more practical/financial reasons. Article 8 remains vague as to how to define official languages and does not clearly rule on sub-state official languages. In a 1999 written question MEP Camilo Nogueira Román asked the Commission for some clarification regarding *'[...] its view on the possibility of conferring the status of official EU languages not only on the official languages of the Member States, but also on those languages which are official in the Member States'* (written question E-1445/99; in OJ 29-1-2000, C27 E/71). The Commission's answer invoked article 290 (ex 217), invariably reiterating that *the rules governing the languages of the Community are to be 'determined by the Council, acting unanimously'* [and that] *the Treaty does not provide for Commission proposals on this matter*. The answer only indicates that granting officialness is beyond the Commission's remit. This question could have been put to the Council, at least to force it to clarify its position on the issue. In that connection, it would also have been interesting to ask whether languages need to be Community official languages to receive community support through certain provisions (e.g. education). Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter on the EU education and culture policies, languages may not need official recognition at EU level to benefit from EU policy support. What is therefore also lacking in the EU's

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<sup>55</sup> Incidentally, French only became the official language of France via constitutional provision in 1992. It was official *de facto* before, but not *de jure*.

sociolinguistic regime is an explicit stipulation of the difference between Community official languages and languages considered by EU policy activities.

I see the aforementioned lack of conceptual language definition (i.e. through definition rules) and the resulting vagueness of certain provisions (e.g. articles 6 and 8) as a strategic discursive device aimed at avoiding interferences from a sociolinguistic discourse and genre where such conceptualizations and categorizations could not remain as 'vague', or merely empirical. Arguably a sociolinguistic discourse on language might put Regulation 1's author's authority at risk and would point up the lack of coherence in Regulation 1's discourse on language and glottopolitical authority, as the above analysis suggests. Conversely, as the next chapter will show, the lack of sociolinguistic definitions also generates challenges to authority.



## *Conclusion*

Regulation 1 establishes the fundamental glottopolitical positions for EU actors at large and defines their respective powers. As the author, the Council is the dominant producer of language policies and all language-related queries are referred to Regulation 1's provisions. As a multinational body, the Council has pledged to respect and promote linguistic equality, restrictively in the definition of Community Official languages, and in a less interventionist way regarding the institutions' working languages.

From a sociolinguistic perspective, we have seen that Regulation 1 remains imprecise and ambiguous as to its inclusivity. Yet, these features do not come forth as long as the legal discourse excludes sociolinguistic analysis. Thence the EU sociolinguistic order can only be incomplete, inconsistent and unstable: various languages receive uneven treatments at EU level, and various statements regarding the scope and meaning of linguistic diversity, the locus of decisional power regarding language policies, and/or the appropriate legal basis for RMLs are in contradiction with one another because of political reluctance to create and implement a fully coherent EU sociolinguistic system. This reluctance is instrumental in maintaining a predominantly intergovernmental approach to language issues. Consequently, when sociolinguistic issues arise, the EU chooses not to respond in sociolinguistic terms and can only retreat behind legal provisions, e.g. role distribution in law-making processes, or voting modes. In doing so, it preserves member states' glottopolitical sovereignties.

Regarding change in the EU's sociolinguistic regime, finally, the aforementioned dismissal of the principle of language equality by the Court of First Instance on July 12<sup>th</sup> 2001 signaled an important evolution, which attests to the difficulty of remaining loyal to the principles that lay beneath the original sociolinguistic regime of 1958. Yet, the EU is not altogether ready to admit that language equality and multilingualism remain more symbolic than actual and, whereas the hierarchization of languages is well advanced, the EU still adopts a blind eye strategy, continuing to claim that:

*All the European languages, in their spoken and written forms, are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of European cultures and civilization* (Council Resolution of 14<sup>th</sup> February 2002; in OJ C 50/2, 23/02/2002).

In the EU's sociolinguistic regime, all the European languages are thus theoretically '*equally valuable from the cultural point of view*' and yet increasingly hierarchized at the practical level. It is on that contradiction that RML activism has focused since the inclusion in the 1992 Treaty of provisions indirectly establishing an EU language policy within member states: article 149 (Education) and 151 (Culture). The next chapter therefore provides a critical reading of articles 149 and 151.

#### *Introduction*

After looking at the ideological foundations of the EU glottopolitical order in the previous chapter, the objective of this chapter is to show on what legal fronts RML activists have fought to obtain a legal basis for an EU RML policy and with what success. I therefore analyse the treaty articles with a language content (i.e. articles 149 and 151, respectively regulating the EU competence in education and culture) and their translation into concrete EU action programmes.

This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first deals with the place devoted to language promotion in the EU education policy and, in the second section, I look at language promotion within the EU cultural policy. In both sections, I first undertake a 'conventional' legal analysis of the respective articles mentioned above using the same analytical categories as in the previous chapter and then measure the extent to which RML activists have been successful, or not, in challenging and elaborating on conventional readings to impose their own paradigm(s) of text interpretation during the processes of implementation of the legal provisions via programmes and actions.

Put otherwise, I first analyse how glottopolitical power is constructed and distributed in the texts of articles 149 and 151, looking first at how the subject positions of Community institutions and member states are legally defined through particular lexical choices. To complement this legal perspective I then also examine the sociolinguistic configuration of education and cultural policy, i.e. how *language(s)* is/are conceptualised within it and how this conceptualisation has positioned the various actors and become a stake of discursive struggle for RML activists. Specifically, I focus on the main institutional platforms through which challenges to conventional readings have been channelled: parliamentary written questions and the still-born project for a Council Decision in favour of RMLs (i.e. the Archipelago project), as far as education policy is concerned. Regarding the place devoted to

language promotion within the EU's cultural policy, I analyse other parliamentary questions, and then briefly the framework programme *Culture 2000* and, in detail, the action *European Year of Languages 2001* (hereafter EYL; see selected excerpts in Annex 1) for EU cultural actions.

As in other policy areas, Community action in the education domain preceded the introduction of a legal basis for education *per se*. Such a legal basis was however introduced in the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) i.e article 126 (now 149).

I reproduce the entire text here and discuss it below:

1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.

2. Community action shall be aimed at:

- developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;
- promoting cooperation between educational establishments;
- developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to the education systems of the Member States;
- encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio-educational instructors;
- encouraging the development of distance education.

3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the field of education, in particular the CoE.

4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:

- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States;
- acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.

The author of the text is the Council and its main addressees are member states. Nevertheless, the legislative procedure involves the Commission (that proposes acts of secondary legislation to the Council and ultimately devises implementing measures, e.g. programmes and/or actions), the EP as a co-decision maker (see intertextual reference in clause 4 to article 251 entailing the co-decision procedure), and for advisory purposes, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the Committee of Regions (CoR). To some extent, the CoE can also be associated to the EU education policy (clause 3). Glottopolitical authority derives from clauses 1 and 4. The former defines the broad objectives of the EU education policy and provides for glottopolitical hierarchical positions. The latter regulates the potential policy outcomes.

Clause 1 defines the scope of intervention of the Community in education matters. That the Community *contributes by encouraging* implies that member states retain full decisional powers and that Community action is limited to providing material/structural-organisational assistance. Yet, the community can also *supplement*. This leads to interpreting what follows in two significantly different ways. First, the article can be semantically understood as if it were written: ‘... *whilst fully respecting the responsibility of the member states for the content 1. of teaching and the organisation of education systems; 2. their cultural and linguistic diversity*’, which accords responsibility to member states for the content of cultural and linguistic diversity. However, an alternative reading found in a report commissioned by the EP, and drafted by a group of well-known RML activists, suggests that there already exists a legal basis for an EU RML policy in the current Treaty in force, which another interpretation illustrates: ‘[...] *fully respecting 1. the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and 2. their cultural and linguistic diversity.*’ In this alternative reading, the Community fully respects member states’ cultural and linguistic diversity. Thence the meaning of *supporting and supplementing* tends to suggest that article 1 allows for independent Community action according to the principles of subsidiarity and complementarity whereby the Community can act independently of member states if the latter’s policies are ineffective and/or insufficient to attain the Community’s

objectives<sup>56</sup> (Strubell, 2002: 24-25). What usually prevails is the stipulation clause that Community action must ‘fully respect the responsibility of the member states’<sup>57</sup>. However, if this is the case, the report claims, ‘*the statement that the Community will act by ‘supporting and supplementing their action’ becomes void*’ (ibid). Arguably, there is only limited coherence between keeping responsibility at member state level and allowing the community to act where supplementary action is necessary to achieve Community objectives, e.g. promoting linguistic diversity.

The distribution of political power is also a function of particular legislative procedures wherein various power positions are granted to various actors. The competition between levels of governance is finally arbitrated by the legal basis which a proposed policy invokes, and which itself determines: 1. the kind of vote required, i.e. qualified majority or unanimity<sup>58</sup>; 2. the type of legislative outcome for a proposal of the Commission to become legally binding (Regulation, Decision and Directive), or not (Recommendation, Opinion, Incentive Measures), in the Member-States. These measures, along with the substantial importance of the budgetary grants for implementation purposes<sup>59</sup>, arguably reflect the political will either to preserve national sovereignties or to favour supranational governance.

Clause 4 provides that the voting mode is qualified majority and the legislative procedure is *co-decision* (art. 251, ex 189b). Qualified majority implies that decisions on education made at European level could potentially be binding at national levels regardless of the opposition of certain Member States if a sufficient blocking minority cannot be obtained<sup>60</sup>. *Co-decision* grants the EP some leverage on the content of education provisions. However, clause 4 also stipulates that the Council can only adopt ‘soft law’ legislative acts, i.e. *incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States... and recommendations*, so that

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<sup>56</sup> I return to the importance of objectives for legal interpretation below.

<sup>57</sup> See for instance the Council’s answer to written question E- 3948/00 by Pere Esteve. (OJ C 235 E, 21/08/2001, p.35.)

<sup>58</sup> Regarding voting modes, article 205 (1) (ex 148(1)) of the Treaty states: ‘*Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, the Council shall act by a majority of its members.* In most cases, though, the Treaty does provide for a different system of voting.

<sup>59</sup> The crucial importance of the budgetary issue, both at the legal and practical levels, will be further underscored in the section of chapter 4 devoted to the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (hereafter EBLUL).

<sup>60</sup> On the issue of defining a ‘sufficient blocking minority’, see the Ioannina Compromise (1994).

legislative outcomes provided for cannot be binding at Member-State level no matter what voting mode is chosen. Still, even a (non-binding) Recommendation can legitimately constitute the legal basis for a Commission proposal for Community action even though it cannot be followed by sanctions in case of non-compliance. At the very least, it can become a potential site for grassroots activists to exert pressure (see chapter 4).

### *Defining Language(s)*

Sociolinguistically, the text contains only two direct references to languages. Due to the ambivalence of clause 1 discussed above, clause 2's expression *the languages of the Member States* is also ambiguous. The Council's interpretation of article 1's provision suggests that national prerogatives to define their own respective sociolinguistic profiles remain unchallenged. In turn, this implies that the above expression refers to national/state official languages which establishes an intertextual reference to the restrictive interpretation in Regulation 1/58 of the expression *the languages of the Member States* (chapter 2). The alternative interpretation of how article 149 relates to often-repeated Community objectives such as the promotion of and respect for linguistic diversity<sup>61</sup>, and legal principles - subsidiarity and/or supplementary principles - suggests that the Community could thus support and/or supplement member states' actions where their cultural and linguistic diversity is not fully supported (Strubell, 2002). Thence, *the languages of the member states* would refer *ex maxima* to all the languages used in member states, including RMLs, *ex minima* to those languages which have received officialness at domestic level.

Finally, an issue untouched by article 149 concerns the actual foreign languages to be taught in priority. In 1988 the Commission had called for measures to '[...] *diversify language teaching* [...] [and asserted that] *Member-States should be encouraged to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within the educational system, even if there is an increasing trend towards certain languages* [= by implication English and French].' (COM (88) 203, p.5 and 280, p.14). In other words,

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<sup>61</sup> See for instance the *Council Conclusions on Linguistic Diversity and Multilingualism in the EU*, 26/06/95 (see Press Release 7839/95 at <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?lang=1>; accessed November 26<sup>th</sup> 2003). See also article 22 of the *EU charter for Fundamental Rights*.



although in principle all Community official languages ought to be on an equal footing in member states' education systems, it has long been acknowledged that English is increasingly the first foreign language of a vast majority of European citizens despite multiple statements reiterating the need to promote less widely spoken Community languages<sup>62</sup>. Here again, multilingualism and linguistic equality were *de jure* objectives whilst *de facto* Community languages were steadily hierarchized with English rapidly becoming the dominant first, and sometimes only, foreign language of European citizens<sup>63</sup>.

Moreover, by calling for measures merely *encouraging* Member States, by means of (non-binding) measures, *to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within the educational system*, the Commission perpetuated a policy of *laissez-faire* essentially benefiting English (and to a lesser extent French)<sup>64</sup> and excluding non-official Community languages, whether non-EC migrant languages or RMLs, from its proposed policies of multilingual education.

It is significant that the Commission should have equated multilingualism with *official Community languages* thus stating unambiguously which languages should be targeted, whereas later article 149 (2) ambiguously referred to *the languages of the Member States*. The ambiguity here lies in the fact that if we consider that Member States retain full responsibility to define their *cultural and linguistic diversity*, languages other than national official languages, which are granted some official recognition at sub-national level, may be entitled to be embraced by European policy activity should a national government so decide (e.g. Catalan in Spain).

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<sup>62</sup> For example, one of the LINGUA programme's objectives was to develop '*...a strategy of action which involves the diversification of the foreign languages on offer in education and training programmes rather than promoting one or two priority languages.*' (COM (88) 841, p.3)

<sup>63</sup> We will see the importance of this *de facto* evolution and the consequences it has for the production, by certain Member-States, of discourses of promotion of multilingualism and respect for linguistic diversity at European and supra-national level. More specifically chapter 5 illustrates that, in the case of France in particular, discourses on the desirability of multilingualism at European level are in sheer contradiction with domestic discourses of monolingualism when addressing sub-national groups' claims.

<sup>64</sup> In the most recent results from the Euro-barometer, the most taught foreign language in Europe is by far English (89% of pupils), followed by French (32%), German (18%) and Spanish (8%). Available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/languages/index\\_en.html#EU%20and%20new%20memberstates](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/languages/index_en.html#EU%20and%20new%20memberstates); accessed October 11<sup>th</sup> 2004.

There seem to be two ways of defining the languages entitled to be the recipients of European policy activity: a narrow one implicit in article 290 and Regulation 1/58 and a broader one due to the ambiguous wordings of article 149. For interpretation purposes when sociolinguistic status-related queries arise, the former prevails.

Most significantly, the interpretation of article 149 to the effect that member states retain responsibility for the content of their cultural and linguistic diversity excludes sub-national official languages. Yet, the text could also provide for their inclusion in the provision. Interestingly, what is naturalised in this essentialist interpretation is that member states wish to exclude them. In that connection, it will be interesting to see what eventually comes out of Spain's proposal for Catalan, Galician and Basque to be granted the same status as Irish: that the Treaties be translated into these languages and that they even be used as languages of communication between citizens and EU institutions. This proposal was made in the context of the negotiations around the draft Constitution in May 2004, and as EUObserver reported: '*Sources present at the meeting in Dublin say that other member states did not object to the request by Spain.*' (EUObserver, May 6th 2004)<sup>65</sup>. Ireland made a similar demand for Irish in November 2004<sup>66</sup>. In the final Draft of the Constitution to be discussed by Member States, moreover, a provision was made for the Treaties to be translated into the member states' official languages 'whether they are official throughout or just on a part of the territory.' (Article V-10, paragraph 2)<sup>67</sup>.

#### *From Primary Legislation to Practice: The Archipelago Proposal.*

As indicated above, once a legal basis grants the EU legal competence, the Commission can make proposals to have legal provisions and Community objectives translated into concrete actions. Practically, various Community education programmes and derived actions have been launched over the years, making foreign language teaching and learning core priorities. Thus, in 1989, the LINGUA programme was established and effective from January 1<sup>st</sup> 1990. This pioneered the

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<sup>65</sup> Available at <http://www.euobserver.com/index.phtml?sid=9&aid=15516>; accessed October 11<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>66</sup> Available at <http://www.euobserver.com/?sid=9&aid=17838>; accessed 27<sup>th</sup> November 2004.

<sup>67</sup> Available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/press\\_room/presspacks/constit/consolidated%20version\\_fr.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/presspacks/constit/consolidated%20version_fr.pdf); accessed October 11<sup>th</sup> 2004.

promotion of foreign languages training in the EU. A number of other educational programmes and actions have been carried out since the 1990s, mainly under the 'umbrella' programme SOCRATES.<sup>68</sup> Interestingly participation in these programmes is open to 31 countries, thus going well beyond current EU Member-Statehood. As for the recipient languages of these programmes, the largest programme, LINGUA, is restricted to the 11 EU official languages plus Irish and Luxemburgish. The case of Irish and Luxemburgish is symptomatic of the EU's unequal treatment of languages and deserves some explanation: both are national/state languages in their domestic contexts but during accession negotiations, Ireland and Luxemburg agreed that they would not become Community official languages. They are thus not working languages and official documents do not need to be translated in them. Yet, they are eligible for all EU programmes and thus constitute a blatant case of exception to Regulation 1/58's article 8 and, as we have seen, Irish can also be used for communications with the institutions.

RMLs are excluded from LINGUA but RML-based projects can be eligible under certain SOCRATES programmes and actions, as we will see later<sup>69</sup>. For now, I turn to a programme project by the Commission intent on creating a legal basis for RML policy-making within the larger legal framework of education policy: the still-born programme *Archipelago*<sup>70</sup>.

*Archipelago* was a 1999 project for a Commission *Proposal for a Decision* aimed at creating a legal basis for Community action regarding the promotion of RMLs. It was established by the Commission's Language Policy Unit (in the Directorate General for Education and Culture) after the May 1998 legal 'crisis' for RMLs (see chapter 4). I will return to its interdiscursivity and intertextuality below. For now I want to insist

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<sup>68</sup> An exhaustive list of currently implemented programmes and actions, and of the conditions of eligibility can be found in the European Commission's *Le guide des programmes et actions. Education et culture* (2000). Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes. See also EBLUL (1998) and Strubell (2002)

<sup>69</sup> On the possibility of a Commission linguistic policy for the safeguard and promotion of minority and regional languages under SOCRATES, see written question E-1731/00 (OJ C 046 E, 13/02/2001, pp. 211-212).

<sup>70</sup> Although it is here referred to as *Archipelago*, the programme was only drafted in French, i.e. *Archipel*. Quotes refer to the original text in French. This project is a Commission internal document transmitted to me by a source that chose to remain anonymous.

on two fundamental features of this proposal: 1. its invocation of the principles of subsidiarity and supplementarity; 2. its definition of linguistic diversity.

The legal basis invoked in the proposal is article 149. The proposal first draws on the subsidiarity and supplementarity principles recalling that:

*[...] l'action communautaire vient soutenir et compléter les actions engagées par et dans les états membres... Les actions du programme sont conçues de façon à produire [...] des résultats qui ne seraient pas réalisables par l'action entreprise au niveau des Etats membres agissant seuls ou sur base de coopération bilatérale.*<sup>71</sup>

These actions notably include the:

- *Développement de matériel didactique;*
- *Encouragement à l'établissement de réseaux dans le domaine de l'éducation et de la promotion des langues régionales et/ou minoritaires;*
- *Observations, diffusion et échanges d'expérience;*

*Archipelago* thus defined a number of domains wherein Community action could be more effective and efficient than at member state level. Most importantly, besides, the proposal offered a hitherto unheard-of definition of the EU's linguistic diversity and the languages qualifying for Community support:

*[La] diversité linguistique ne se limite pas aux langues officielles de l'Union Européenne, mais s'enrichit également de toutes les langues parlées dans certaines de nos régions, langues appelées régionales et/ou minoritaires [...] Sont considérées comme langues régionales et/ou minoritaires dans le présent programme, les langues autochtones traditionnellement parlées par une partie de la population d'un Etat membre de l'Union Européenne ou de l'espace Economique Européen, excluant à la fois les dialectes, les langues des migrants et les langues artificiellement créées.*

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<sup>71</sup> The proposal was originally in French and to my knowledge was never translated as the Commission's legal advisors censored it.

This definition, which is reminiscent of that of the CoE's *European Charter for Regional and/or Minority Languages*, is the first and only explicit definition in a EU document of 'linguistic diversity' which, as was seen, is the core bone of contention between RML activists and their opponents. This definition could be read as another intertextual reference to Regulation 1/58, expanding its approach to linguistic diversity and encompassing RMLs as cultural assets for the EU.

Had it been adopted, this proposition would have constituted a legal basis for Community actions in favour of RMLs, and a legal precedent for the contentious definition of linguistic diversity. Besides, it provided for the largest budget ever devoted to their promotion: € 30 million for a period from January 1<sup>st</sup> 2001 to December 31<sup>st</sup> 2005. However, it was blocked internally by the Commission's legal services. The only explanation for that refusal I could find was provided by a Commission Official via email, in which he commented on the objectives of the *Action for the promotion and safeguarding of RMLs* (conducted until the '1998 crisis'; see chapter 4) and the impossibility to take education as a legal basis for RMLs:

*The objective of safeguarding and promoting regional and minority languages in the regions in which they are spoken, which has been the principal objective of action in this field, is not compatible with the objectives of Article 149. It does not constitute per se a contribution to the development of quality education, nor does it fit into any of the aims of Community action listed in Article 149 (developing the European dimension in education, encouraging mobility, promoting cooperation, developing exchanges of information and experience on common issues, encouraging distance education, etc.) The appropriate legal basis is therefore Article 151 (ex 128) which has as its objective to "contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. Activities involving regional and minority languages that are acceptable under article 149 (mobility, cooperation, exchange of experience, etc.) are already eligible for support under the Socrates programme. (Commission Official McPhail, Email to the author, 2002) (Emphasis added)*

The legal basis invoked was rejected on the ground that *Archipelago* did not pursue Community objectives, e.g. here quality education, and the proposal was stillborn. Arguably, one can question the extent to which the teaching of say English objectively contributes more to the quality of education than that of Welsh or Corsican. Additionally, the emphasis above clearly establishes that projects seeking to promote *mobility, cooperation and exchange of experience* contribute to quality education and are thus eligible under article 149 (compare with Archipelago's planned actions above) and thus already incorporated in SOCRATES, which shows that the actions planned in Archipelago drew on existing practice and may therefore have been discarded for reasons of overlap with SOCRATES rather than/as well as for legal invalidity. In relation to this, one can also wonder how this state of affairs can be made to cohere or be reconciled with the September 1998 statement by the Commission, in response to a Written Question about whether article 149 '*should be recognized in principle and used generally as the legal basis for RMLs*', that:

*Community action must also be aimed at "developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States". In effect, the Commission's action in support of regional and minority languages is based on this article.*<sup>72</sup>

Confronted with what may justifiably, in my opinion, be seen as a series of contradictions, I sought to obtain the actual Opinion of the Commission's legal services that declared the invalidity of education as a legal basis, but in vain. After sending requests to three different Commission addressees and eventually invoking article 255 on transparency, I was finally denied the right to access that document on the grounds that disclosure, partial or total, would endanger the independence of the legal services. Specifically, it was argued that:

*The opinions of the Legal Service are internal working documents, the principal objective of which is to offer the Commission and its services advice on legal questions on the basis of which they can adopt their final positions. In order to ensure that these opinions are given frankly and objectively, it is*

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<sup>72</sup> Written question E-2139/98 by Friedhelm Frischenschlager; Commission Answer, 23/09/1998 (both in OJ C 50, 22/02/1999, p. 130).

*necessary to preserve their confidentiality. Their disclosure would result in the internal discussions and exchanges of views on the legality and scope of legal measures to be adopted being made public. This, in turn, would give rise to uncertainty with regard to the legality of the measures and have a negative effect on the stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions, which are matters of public interest for which it is unquestionably necessary to have due regard.* (letter by David O' Sullivan, Secretary General of the Commission, received September 9<sup>th</sup> 2003)

Interestingly this paragraph implicitly acknowledges both the arbitrariness of decisions regarding the legality of the measures, and the danger of emphasizing arbitrariness to the stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning of the institutions.

### *Summary*

There are inherent conflicts of interpretation over the meaning of legal provisions. Central in these conflicts are: 1. The definition of key concepts such as working languages, Community official languages, national/state official languages, sub-state official languages, or rather the lack of definition, and issues of coherence where such definitions lack or overlap (e.g. Regulation 1/58); 2. The interpretation and scope of applicability of principles like subsidiarity and supplementarity in particular policy areas (e.g. article 149); 3. The interpretation of how proposals concur with Community objectives, e.g. *Archipelago*. One site of such conflicts can be the intra-institutional level, e.g. between different services within the Commission, as with the *Archipelago* proposal, which shows that RML supporters can also be found in the Commission. The interpretation ultimately favoured, amongst the range of possible interpretations, denotes and enacts a specific political choice, a social discourse that appropriates meaning according to ideological semantic patterns of inclusion and exclusion, e.g. an *intergovernmental* choice with *Archipelago*. Ultimately, the interpretation of meaning can be contested and the ECJ has the last word, but it is today unlikely that the ECJ would challenge the 'intergovernmental' legal interpretation of the current EU sociolinguistic order.

In this section, I analyse the legal framework for EU cultural action and show that the provisions of article 151 are even less precise and clear than those of article 149. In turn, this allows for greater interpretation. In the next section, I will explore what patterns of interpretation have been privileged in cultural actions and programmes - *Culture 2000* and *European Year of Language 2001 (EYL 2001)* - with particular reference to the issue of including RML defence and promotion within the EU's cultural policy. To emphasize how discursive struggle is also embedded in the very process of text production, I will examine the respective textual contribution to the drafting process by the various institutional actors involved in processes of negotiation. Put otherwise, I will scrutinise the various drafts eventually produced during the textual construction of the action programme *EYL 2001*. I will show that policy formulation constituted a site of discursive struggle between various policy actors at the time *EYL 2001* was devised and negotiated and before the voting stage by the Council in which the final draft was adopted. This somewhat lengthy journey into the intricacies of policy text drafting will however provide an insight into who the RML policy institutional actors are and how they share decision-making powers. This prolegomena will be further elaborated in chapter 4.

As before, I reproduce the entire article and discuss it below.

1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas:
  - improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples;
  - conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
  - non-commercial cultural exchanges;
  - artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.



3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture, in particular the CoE.

4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures.

5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, the Council:

- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred to in Article 251;

- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt recommendations.

#### *Distribution of Authority – Legislative and Discursive Powers*

Broadly speaking, the subject positions of authority in the legislative process are the same here as for education (the legislative procedure is co-decision, the CoR has consultative status and policy outcomes are non-binding) and article 1 indicates that the Community *contributes* to the cultural *flowering* of the member states with the possibility for the Community to supplement their action. The extent to which RML activists might seek to interpret and exploit article 151's provisions is however radically different from their strategy with article 149 for several reasons. First, language is not mentioned, so that the link between language and culture is never explicit. This is extremely significant and revealing since, as chapter 1 illustrated, the essential link between language and culture is one of the most potent elements of legitimisation of ethnic groups' or stateless nations' political claims to various forms of political autonomy ranging from partial devolution to full statehood. I will return to

this link and its ideological and political implications in chapters 5 to 9. Arguably, however, the link between language and culture is implicit *ex minima* in the aim to support literary creation, but as such it is void of political connotations. Second, and most importantly, the Council must endorse any policy outcome unanimously, which precludes any measure and/or any interpretation of *supporting and supplementing* that would not be entirely approved by all member states. Culture is clearly a matter of intergovernmental sovereignty.

Clause 2's aims are very broadly worded so that they leave much room for interpretation and, in turn, many projects can be related to such broad aims, especially as enhancing regional diversity is explicitly considered as an objective in its own right (clause 1). Additionally, clause 4 broadens the definition of culture by recognising that cultural considerations can also pertain to policy areas from which they may traditionally seem to be excluded, e.g. economic policy, social policy, education policy. The enlarged characterisation of the scope of cultural community action thus broadens the traditional view of cultural development, i.e. as essentially applying to domains like literature, art, cinema, and the like, to view culture as a dynamic component of a wider array of domains of socio-economic activity in which practices may be culturally differentiated, i.e. culture as custom across member states. Emphasis is reiterated on cultural aspects of policies as a means to promote diversity.

In sum, clauses 2 and 4 allow great freedom to put bids to benefit from Community support, thus opening the door to a multiplicity of project initiatives by a multiplicity of actors but at the same time they subject RML-targeting actions to the necessity of obtaining unanimity, which on RML issues can be fraught with difficulty. This is why RML activists' reports on strategic areas to target for RML promotion suggest invoking Cultural policy as a last resort (Strubell, 2002: chapter 3).

In the programmes analysed below, the intertextuality and interdiscursivity established by a number of stipulation clauses contribute to further define the meaning and scope of the EU's cultural competence. I therefore now examine how the meaning and scope of article 151 have been negotiated between institutional RML supporters (i.e. the CoR and the EP) and the Commission and/or the Council, and how the EU's

cultural policy has been implemented through the umbrella programme *Culture 2000* and the action programme *2001 EYL*.

With the EP, the CoR stands out as the most fervent defender of RML rights. From its creation in 1994 to 2002, it has multiplied its recommendations for the EU to support linguistic diversity, especially RMLs. In its capacity as an EU consultative body, it has issued no less than 46 *Opinions* on the necessity to support and promote minority languages within the EU education and culture framework. However, the CoR has only consultative powers and its *Opinions* are legally non-binding.

The EP has also played an important role for the inclusion of RMLs within EU cultural policy by making explicit the language-culture link. The Commission issued its first report on Community cultural activity in 1996. In two 1997 Resolutions, the EP responded to it suggesting a change in the voting mode from unanimity to Qualified Majority (hereafter QM), and that '*the safeguarding of cultural and linguistic diversity forms part of the conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage ... [so that] changes should be made to that article [128, now 151] to enlarge its scope [accordingly].*'<sup>73</sup> It later specified the meaning of linguistic diversity pinpointing '[...] *the great importance of minority languages and cultures as a key feature of the European cultural heritage.*'<sup>74</sup>

In the next section, I first briefly examine the extent to which the emphasis on the language-culture link was taken into account in the drafting of the current umbrella programme for EU cultural action (i.e. *Culture 2000*), and in particular what space is devoted to RMLs within it. Then I focus in greater depth on the action *EYL 2001* with the same analytical objectives. To scrutinise the various contributions of EU institutional actors in text production, I look at the various drafts produced during text production processes.

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<sup>73</sup> OJ C 055, 24/02/1997, p.37

<sup>74</sup> OJ C 304, 06/10/1997, p. 40.

*Culture 2000* has been the single programming instrument for Community cultural action from January 1<sup>st</sup> 2000 and will continue to serve this function till December 31<sup>st</sup> 2006, bringing together all previous sector-based programmes. Because of the unanimity requirement, the adoption of the programme was not without problems: 100 amendments were discussed and the programme was finally voted on February 14<sup>th</sup> 2000 (whereas the programme was supposed to start from January 1<sup>st</sup> 2000) (Loup, 2001)

Remarkably, the text contains only three mentions of language. First, paragraph 6 recalls the role of the EU in '[...] *contributing to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity [...]*' and indicates that '[...] *special attention should be devoted to safeguarding the position of small cultures and less widely-spoken languages.*' The light cast remains very dim though, as nowhere is the expression 'less widely-spoken languages' defined<sup>76</sup>. On that account, two interpretations are possible: it either exclusively refers to less widely spoken 'national official' languages or encompasses RMLs as well.

Unfortunately, little clarification is offered in the remainder of the text. Only two vague references to language(s) appear in the Annexes. The first refers to the support of *cultural diversity and multilingualism*, the second to the Community's help in translation of literary works *especially those in the lesser-used European languages and the languages of Central and East European countries*. Ultimately, as a general rule, the Commission's working definition of *lesser used and/or lesser taught European languages* is: 'all Community official languages but English, French and Spanish.' (Loup, 2001)

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<sup>75</sup> This section must be read in conjunction with the tables in Annex 1. The references to language in *Culture 2000* are so few that they are reproduced in the text. By contrast, the numerous provisions of 2001, *EYL* analysed in this section are reproduced in tables 1 and 2 in Annex 1. Table 1 reproduces the thematic content and/or functional value of each. Table 2 reproduces the intertextuality, authorship and the Decision in relation to their author and the modifications Article 1 received as its wording was negotiated through the policy formulation phase.

<sup>76</sup> The EU's language terminology remains obscure here and elsewhere as it comprises many overlapping, and/or ambiguous expressions as Strubell indicates: lesser taught languages, least taught languages, lesser-used languages, lesser-used European languages, less widely used languages, least widely used languages, and regional or minority languages. (Strubell, 2002: 31).

The action EYL was conceived as a short term, one-off initiative involving a Europe-wide information campaign and a number of actions aimed at promoting linguistic diversity, in particular through language learning.<sup>77</sup>

The Commission proposal for the EYL was initially due for March 1999. With the resignation of the Commission after allegations of fraud and inefficiency in March 1999, the proposal was finally postponed until October 1999 (COM (1999) 485 final – 1999/0208(COD)). In accordance with the co-decision procedure (article 251), it was then submitted to the ESCR and the CoR for preliminary Opinions and then passed to the EP. After receiving a number of amendments after the EP's first reading (April 13<sup>th</sup> 2000), the EYL was eventually jointly voted on July 17<sup>th</sup> 2000 by the European Parliament and the Council (Decision 1934/2000/EC).

In what follows, I contrast the content of the three texts, i.e. Commission Proposal, EP Position and Council/EP Decision, to see what legal provisions and discursive legitimisations finally prevailed and came out of the Commission/Council/EP trialogue. Dealing with the final product without access to internal intermediary documents (at the intra-institutional level and as a result of informal contacts during the consultation phase) makes difficult the analyst's task of eliciting with certainty the initiator and drafter responsible for the inclusion of these new paragraphs. In other words, the analysis of the product divorced from the minute processes of textual construction somewhat blurs the respective contributions of the various actors involved in the legislative process, and leaves out of account the informal bargains throughout the consultation process. The focus here can therefore only be on the ultimate content of each addition: the analysis below thus refers to the final text of the Decision.

Broadly speaking the structure of the three texts is fourfold and identical (whereas the CoR's Opinion has a different generic structure). The preamble can be subdivided

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<sup>77</sup> A more detailed description of the EYL's rationales, conditions of eligibility and operational modalities is to be found at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/languages/actions/year2001.html#6>; accessed July 30<sup>th</sup> 2002.

into two parts unequal in length: the first part specifies the programme's legal bases<sup>78</sup> and recalls the phases of the legislative procedures. It thus serves as the legal legitimisation of the Decision. The second part fulfils the discursive legitimisation function. It consists of a series of paragraphs/clauses re-locating the Proposal/Opinion/Decision within the broad discursive context of Community language-oriented action. The third part, following the Preamble, then consists of a number of articles formally establishing the EYL action and defining its scope of applicability (article 1), its broad objectives (article 2), content of actions (article 3), and modalities of implementation and evaluation (articles 4 to 11). It concludes with the ritual formula conditioning the entry into force of the Decision upon its publication in the OJ (article 12). The fourth and last part, the annex, complements and refines the actions described in article 3. Below, I focus on the preamble's second part and on article 1 of part 3.

### *Discursive Legitimation: The Preamble*

The Decision's Preamble eventually consisted of 26 paragraphs as against 12 in the Commission's proposal. Thus 14 new paragraphs were inserted into the original Commission proposal throughout the legislative procedure, all sprouting from the EP's Opinion, except for paragraphs 8 and 21 that can be attributed to the CoR. For obvious reasons of space, it is impossible to perform a comprehensive analysis of the final text's content. Consequently, I hereafter undertake a selective, linear thematic analysis of the Decision, indicating when relevant what paragraphs were subsequently added to the Commission's proposal, how and by what institution (see Table 1 in Annex 2). Where the Commission appears as the author/initiator, the clause was maintained as such throughout the production process; where the author/initiator is the EP, the clause was introduced in the EP's Opinion.

Unsurprisingly, the Preamble abounds in legitimating manifest inter-textual references to the major texts through which the Community has asserted its commitment to the promotion of linguistic diversity, multilingualism and language

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<sup>78</sup> Two legal bases are invoked in both texts, Treaty articles 149 and 150, respectively on education and vocational training.

equality throughout the years, and especially from 1995<sup>79</sup>, as a correlate linguistic response to Community fundamental principles and objectives. Thus, for instance, clauses 1, 2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19, originally in the Commission's proposal, illustrate the linguistic dimension of broad Community objectives such as building a European Knowledge society, promoting multilingualism as a means of favouring mobility, etc<sup>80</sup>.

As can be seen the EP added a number of clauses to the Commission's original proposal (clauses 3 to 11, 14, 17, 21 and 23). With the exception of clauses 3, 6, 14 and 17, all these contain no manifest intertextual references. They can be seen as 'off the cuff' discursive stances by the EP without explicit (intertextual) legal bases. Still, they serve to assert a number of principles: language equality (4), the legitimacy of EU intervention in language questions and the experiential value of the EYL for future (Community) '[...] *measures to encourage cultural and linguistic diversity* [...]' (5), language diversity as a source of economic benefit (9), etc.

By contrast with the above clauses, clauses 3, 6, 14 and 17 contain manifest intertextual references to other EU texts, possessing a different type of force in that their presence in a Decision may constitute a jurisprudential precedent of interpretation of their legal value. I now turn to clauses 3 and 17, and 6<sup>81</sup>.

Most interestingly, clause 3 refers to article 151 on culture (which is why this programme is analysed here rather than in the previous section). Strictly speaking, though, article 151 is not presented here as a legal basis for the Decision. Still, it is invoked as a discursive legitimisation of the actions of the programme and, most significantly, its presence allows for an explicit linking between language and culture, a link which was not explicit in article 151: '*Among the cultural aspects, matters*

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<sup>79</sup> This commitment is epitomized in paragraph 12 of the Preamble: '*linguistic diversity must be preserved and multilingualism promoted in the Union with equal respect for the languages of the Union and with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity...*' (Council Conclusions of 12 June 1995 on linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the EU - Council - General Affairs -12/06/1995 -Press: 174 - Nr: 7839/95 - <http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.asp?lang=1>; accessed August 8<sup>th</sup> 2002).

<sup>80</sup> The clauses are reproduced in table 1 annex 2 (first column) in the same order and with the same numbering system as in the original text.

<sup>81</sup> I do not dwell on clause 14 because it is an intra-textual response to clause 13 on the Community's objective that European citizens should become trilingual.

*pertaining to languages are of great importance.*<sup>82</sup> In that connection, Clause 17, by referring to the objectives of Culture 2000, also reiterates the link between cultural diversity and multilingualism as *a means of improving mutual understanding between the European peoples*.

Clause 6, finally, evokes Article 6 on the EU stance to respect fundamental rights and refers back to the 1950 CoE's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This is the only reference to a non-EU legal provision. Article 14 of the Convention states that:

*The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.*

This provision, which positions EU law within a human rights perspective, defines article 6's pledge to protect human rights as an anti-discrimination provision, and intertextually refines the nature of the co-operation between the EU and the CoE provided by clause 4 in both articles 149 and 151, not only for implementation purposes but also in terms of sharing legal standards<sup>83</sup>. However, as many international legal scholars have observed, non-discrimination relates to individual human rights and remains a rather poor legal basis for actual, efficient (collective) language rights protection and promotion (De Varennes, 1996; Henrard, 2003: 42-47).

To conclude on the Preamble, although the 'main' legal bases invoked for the EYL are articles 149 and 150 on education and vocational training, the link between language and culture appears enhanced in a variety of ways especially after the EP Opinion's addition. In the original Commission Proposal, Community support for the promotion of linguistic diversity and multilingualism was introduced as the linguistic correlate of a number of Community principles and objectives, e.g. achieving the

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<sup>82</sup> The CoR statement on that link was somewhat more radical: '[...] *the basic distinguishing feature of cultural identity is the language spoken by the people belonging to a Community.*' (Introduction, 1.1.3) Significantly this radical formulation was not retained.

<sup>83</sup> We will come back to the issue of the trans-organizational operationalization of sociolinguistic legal standards chapter 4.



highest level of knowledge for the European peoples (1), multilingualism as a correlate of the free movement of persons (2, 13, 15, 16 and 18). In all these clauses, the emphasis was on Community action for multilingual education, with essentially economic justification and aims. The link between language and culture was then added during the legislative procedure, under the joint impetus of the CoR and the EP. This additional discursive emphasis was put both with and without explicit inter-textual references. The former are of particular interest since, as was noted above, they potentially provide a scheme of interpretation for previous texts, which could thus gain jurisprudential value. Moreover, the final text was co-signed by the Council and the EP, and the Council thus endorsed a number of discursive stances hitherto absent from primary legislation. Notwithstanding, the discursive value of clauses without explicit legal intertextuality also means that some provisions can potentially have far-reaching consequences, e.g. clause 5.

Significantly though, it must be observed that no explicit mention is made in the Preamble about the scope of interpretation of linguistic diversity, multilingualism and language equality. Directions for interpretations are to be found in Article 1 of the Decision establishing the EYL. Article 1 defines its scope of applicability, i.e. the languages its provisions encompass. I now turn to the evolution of the wording of Article 1 throughout the drafting process (see Table 2, Annex 1).

*Article 1: From the Commission Proposal to the Council/EP Decision.*

Regarding the languages targeted by the EYL actions, interestingly, the Commission initially proposed that measures '[...] *cover the official languages of the Community, together with Irish and Letzebuergesch, and other languages recognised by the Member States.*' (Emphasis added) The same wording was retained in the CoR Opinion. Interestingly two comments were added. First, the CoR rejoiced in the Member States being responsible for defining which languages the EYL would embrace. The choice of languages for the purposes of the EYL was thus not restricted to Community Official languages and RMLs could also be included, a *première* on such a territorial scale. Moreover, the second statement testifies to the CoR's knowledge that Member States were not to restrict eligibility to the programme: '*In 2001, all the Community languages will be promoted, and in particular those that are*

not currently widely used, including minority languages, backing up the European Year's key principle: that all languages are to be equally respected'. (Paragraph 1.2.5 of the Opinion of the CoR of February 17<sup>th</sup> 2000 on the EYL) In my opinion, this illustrates the fact that at the time of writing, after the consultation process, the positions of each institution was already known to other actors. Methodologically this illustrates one limitation of focusing analysis on products, and thereby ignoring 'informal contacts', which I underlined above. Do these informal contacts and 'behind-the-scene' negotiations account for the fact that the EP, in its Opinion, reworded the EYL's scope of applicability in a way that could be threat-free to national sovereignties?<sup>84</sup> The new formulation indeed clearly manifests the concern to avoid encroaching upon national issues of officialness, i.e. *recognized*, and prefers a more neutral, less 'official-sounding' wording, i.e. *identified*, which guarantees the respect of national sovereignties<sup>85</sup>.

This ultimate wording was cautious in two ways, finally, as it restricted the identification of 'other languages' to 'the purposes of implementing this Decision.' Put otherwise, the definition of linguistic diversity remained empirical rather than conceptual in the EYL, which was probably the price to pay for getting voted an EU programme involving the 'identification' of languages other than those, hypothetically, 'identified' *by the general rules of its [= each Member State's] law* (see regulation 1/58, article 8) to be voted. As a result, whereas the original formulation, then retained in the CoR Opinion, could have constituted a jurisprudential interpretative precedent, the final wording dismissed that possibility.

### *EYL: Summary and Outcomes*

As indicated above, national committees operating at the selection level did not restrict eligibility to EYL to EU official languages, which enabled a number of actions involving the promotional participation of RMLs to take place. The 200 odd initiatives eventually sponsored included *inter alia* language tasters, studies and

<sup>84</sup> Compare the CoR and the EP formulations in Table 2.

<sup>85</sup> As a matter of fact, the first selection/evaluation of qualifying projects took place within national committees. The final selection at supranational level only occurred a posteriori. Notably, no restriction whatsoever governed processes of selection although the inclusion of *Esperanto* remained contentious on the ground that it is a 'language without a culture'. (Loup, 2001; see also Written Question E-2631/01, OJ C 093 E, 18/04/2002 P. 0170 - 0171).

conferences, publications, multilingual public entertainment and games, etc. Most of them also involved a special celebration for the European Day of Languages (September 26<sup>th</sup> 2001).

As a follow-up to EYL, the Council issued a Resolution on February 14<sup>th</sup> 2002 *on the promotion of linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework of the implementation of the objectives of the EYL 2001*<sup>86</sup>. In generic and functional terms, a Resolution is a non-binding declaration *recalling* and *emphasizing* the discursive context of Community action in a particular field and *inviting* relevant actors to open a debate, make proposals (Commission) and/or take action according to defined principles and objectives (Member States). The above Resolution constituted a step backwards for RML defenders in that almost all the aforementioned EP amendments of the EYL Decision that might have constituted a jurisprudential precedent have been removed. The only statements potentially beneficial to RMLs were both the (re-) assertion already featuring in the aforementioned 1995 Council's Conclusions that '*all European languages are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of European culture and civilisation*' and the reference to Article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which states that '*the Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity*.'<sup>87</sup> Apart from these statements, which again can be interpreted more or less selectively, overall, the Resolution re-located the promotion of language diversity under the education policy umbrella, thus linking linguistic diversity and multilingualism to broad social and economic objectives (e.g. language-in-education policy to facilitate freedom of movements of workers) rather than to cultural policy as the EP's introduction of clause 3 had entailed. Further, the council also left out the various forms of intertextual references linking linguistic diversity and language rights to other more political rights (e.g. the 1950 CoE's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) which, in effect, reduced the promotion of linguistic diversity to the exclusive protection of member states' official languages.

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<sup>86</sup> OJ C 050, 23/02/2002, pp. 1-2.

<sup>87</sup> In fact, this reference was absent from the Decision because the Charter dates from December 2000.

## Conclusion

Through the analysis of primary and secondary legislation establishing the EU's competence in educational and cultural matters, this chapter has confirmed chapter 2's findings, showing that member states largely remain dominant players and that their sovereignty is enshrined in and protected by a variety of strategic legal devices, e.g. the restricted interpretation of the subsidiarity and supplementarity principles. RML activists have long sought to find a durable legal basis for an EU RML policy but have significantly failed to have that policy secured under the umbrella of education and cultural policies.

As far as education policies are concerned, diverging interpretations of article 149's provisions for language issues show how legal and sociolinguistic perspectives can conflict but also that, in the interpretation of the EU's competence as inscribed in legal provisions, legal interpretation always prevails. The analysis of the *Archipelago* project further illustrated how Commission lawyers preserving member states' sovereignties avoid entering a sociolinguistic discourse and simultaneously addressing RML status issues legally, e.g. through explicit definition of linguistic diversity. Therefore, by re-locating linguistic diversity exclusively under the education umbrella (which we have seen implies a restrictive approach to linguistic diversity) in its 2002 Resolution, the Council effectively reinforced its restrictive interpretation of how the EU defines linguistic diversity.

In Article 151, the preservation of member states' sovereignties included *inter alia* particular legislative procedures and legal outcomes, i.e. unanimous vote and non-binding legal outputs. In the text launching *Culture 2000*, legal restrictions included above all the scarcity and vagueness of the links between language promotion and cultural action. In the text launching *EYL*, finally, the potential benefit for RMLs after 2001 was curtailed by the absence of explicit reference to RMLs in the Preamble, by the rewording of article 1 into a more 'intergovernmental' formula and, as was said above, by the fact that the *EYL* innovations regarding the value and scope of linguistic diversity, language equality and multilingualism, were not echoed in the 2002 Council Resolution that followed and concluded the implementation of *EYL*. Thus the discursive shift introduced by the EP, e.g. the emphasis on the link between language

and culture (clause 3), was not taken up, although, arguably, it is one of the fundamental tenets of definitions of culture in Western European national historiographies, as was seen in chapter 1. Whereas RML actors had hoped that the *EYL* could serve as the basis for a genuine, multi-annual promotional programme for RMLs, the Council's 2002 Resolution insisted on the one-off character of *EYL* in terms of both practical actions and discursive production.

Nonetheless, it should not be concluded that, in the longer term, the discursive content potentially beneficial to RMLs of programmes like *Culture 2000* and especially the *EYL* is nil. Indeed, the view that legal provisions enact a particular order of discourse on glottopolitical authority and language does not rule out the discursive force of resistant discourses. Moreover, if discourse is the matrix of the socio-political order, insofar as resistant discourses are incremental, the aforementioned Preamble clauses introduced by the EP still constitute positive steps forward for RML lobbyists, despite the limitations delineated by the 2002 Council Resolution. Notwithstanding, indeed, the implementation of the *EYL* granted further symbolic credit to RMLs as recipients - without discrimination and for the first time on a large scale - of an EU action programme. In that respect, furthermore, the diffusion of ideas in favour of language equality, of multilingualism as a source of mutual understanding between the European peoples in order to realize the hitherto theoretical idea of European citizenship, and of the legitimacy of EU intervention in language questions, all gave/give actual substance and discursive legitimacy to actions aimed at supporting and promoting RMLs. We will see in the next chapter that the inclusion of such ideas in recent EU programmes results from a long process of lobbying at European level, process of which the main actors have been the EP and to a lesser extent the CoR as well as civil society actors like NGOs, e.g. organizations like the *European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages* (hereafter EBLUL).

Finally, this chapter has provided insights on who the RML institutional actors in the EU are and on their respective bargaining powers. As was observed above, the Council remains dominant on issues of language status granting and language promotion. Regarding the Commission, the *Archipelago* project showed that a holistic view of the Commission ignores that there exists no institutional univocity on RML

issues, and that the Language Policy Unit's efforts to establish a solid legal basis for RMLs failed because the Commission's Legal Service censored it. Regarding the EP, the analysis of the different stages of the textual construction of the policy text launching the *EYL* has shown that it remains the most fervent supporter of an EU pro-RML policy and that it offers a path for regional RML activists to have their voice heard at supranational level (e.g. in academic/policy reports commissioned by the EP). In the next chapter, we will see in which practical ways the EP can enact its pro-RML advocacy. Just as we saw that the analysis of RML actors needs conducting at sub-institutional level, besides, the next chapter examines which EP actors belong to the EU RML policy network and how they interact with other institutional and non-institutional actors at and below EU level, and how.

## Chapter 4: The EU's RML Policy Network: Legal Governing and Governance Politics

### *Introduction*

Chapter 3 indicated that despite vain efforts to have RML issues integrated into the education and cultural legal framework, and the absence of a legal basis *per se*, some kind of EU RML policy has existed since 1981. This chapter provides an explanation for this apparent paradox. I show in particular that the very existence of such a policy can be attributed to the political and discursive activity of a network of actors - institutional and not - who managed to bypass some of the legal obstacles mentioned above and succeeded in creating a supranational RML policy network comprising institutional and organisational apparatuses devoted to RML promotion and defence. This chapter shows that these actors had these opportunities because of the very nature of the EU as a system of governance. Limited though policy outcomes may be deemed, the successful translation of pro-RML rights discourses into actual policy actions exemplifies the very nature of the EU as a system of multi-level/multi-actor governance in which the particulars of policy-making and implementation processes cannot be reduced to the sole consideration of the power positions intrinsic to the legal framework, because access to policy processes is granted to a wider panel of actors than in a traditional system of government. Looking at how the RML network works, this chapter investigates the kind of policy outcomes that can surface from such governance politics.

It is divided into three main sections and distinguishes between two main periods of RML lobbying activity which saw drastic change in the balance of decisional powers between the actors of the RML policy network: between 1983 and 1998, and ever since. The first section initially provides an overview of the context of the emergence of a RML policy network from 1979 and then assesses the politico-discursive and budgetary successes obtained by RML activists until 1998. I show that this period set the symbolic (discursive) and material (institutional and organisational) foundations

of the EU RML policy and that, in legal terms, the question of RML policy benefited from a legal void.

The second section first briefly returns to the context of what I have called above the 1998 ‘budgetary crisis’ and analyses the subsequent change in power distribution amongst the actors of the EU RML policy network. Specifically, I focus on the strategic responses made by RML activists to the threat of seeing the RML policy annihilated and on the outcomes obtained in particular by the EP’s *Intergroup for RMLs*. I explore the *Intergroup*’s functional role and discursive contributions: the actual strategies whereby it collectively seeks to influence and/or determine RML policy-making both within and outside the EP. In that connection, by looking at written questions to the Commission and the Council, I assess whether the *Intergroup* is a Europeanised organisation or merely a European platform for a limited number of RML communities.

The third section then briefly examines the structure and roles and assesses the impact of other bodies constituted to represent, promote and defend RMLs: the Mercator information centres and, importantly, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). I conclude with an assessment of the current situation of RML activism in the EU and tentatively explore the challenges RML lobbyists will have to confront in the context of the post-2004 EU enlargement and of the Draft Constitution for Europe.

### *RML Policy Making between 1983 and 1998: Structural Foundations and Political and Budgetary Outcomes*

#### *The EP’s Budgetary Powers*

In the 1970s, various societal changes catalysed and legitimised supranational action in Western European RML politics. The regionalist movements of the 1960s flourished and broadened their social base in the 1970s as they embodied the protest against the homogenising effects of nation-state building and the concomitant sense of loss of cultural identity. Some communities, e.g. Corsica, sometimes adopted violent political strategies which underlined the urgent necessity for political solutions of



appeasement. Waves of political devolution across Western European states sought to defuse the crises, with some success (see chapters 5 and 6).

It is in that context that the EP emerged as a new supranational forum for regional representation. Directly elected for the first time in 1979, the EP was to become the forum of the peoples in Europe, the champion of regional and minority interests, as more voices advocated a more democratic 'Europe of the Regions' (Jaffe, 1993). This concept was indeed all the more relevant since there was a growing sense of democratic deficit in the EU that somehow impeded further supranational integration. Moreover, understanding that many regional communities faced similar problems and that regional interests might be better defended collectively at supranational level, various regional activists turned to the EU to defend minority rights. Alone, regional/minority communities were often demographically small, thus with limited political weight and sometimes used violence as the last resort; collectively represented they numbered tens of millions and might gain a politico-institutional alternative to violence. In 1979, the EP was not yet the full co-legislator it became from 1992, yet it already possessed some political leverage, especially through its budgetary powers, and to some extent through the Resolutions it could take.

The EP was conferred substantial budgetary powers when the Community opted to function with its own resources (1970). Budgetary authority was shared with the Council: the latter prevailed on Compulsory Expenditure (CE), e.g. Agriculture, but the EP prevailed on Non Compulsory Expenditure (NCE) within certain agreed limits, e.g. in the 1980s the EP enjoyed significant discretion in distributing expenditure of between 300-400 million ECUs (Corbett *et al*, 2000: 227). It is under the NCE category that it could allocate funds to effectively initiate policies so that budgetary allowances could serve small-scale political purposes. The legality of such appropriations was disputed in the early 1980s: the EP considered that inscription in the budget constituted a sufficient legal base for spending *per se*, to which the Council objected. A compromise was eventually reached in 1982 with the Council, the EP and the Commission signing a Joint Declaration specifying that a legislative base was only required for '*significant* new Community actions.' (ibid: 229). Of course, such a vague specification left the door open to contradictory interpretations. This perhaps partially explains why the EP voted a number of Resolutions from the 1980s that,

although non-binding, bore *some* politico-legal status making it possible to legitimise funding for RMLs. Besides, it could be argued that, if significant Community actions had been defined in budgetary terms, it would not have been possible to justify calling the size of the first RML budgetary envelopes *significant*. Such considerations held sway until 1998.

### *The EP's Discursive Powers: Resolutions*

Resolutions can be initiated in the EP in several ways: a parliamentary Committee can draw a report on its own initiative, or in response to a MEP or group of MEPs tabling a motion for a Resolution. Typically, the report is then discussed at Committee level and then in plenary and if enough support can be secured, a Resolution is voted which calls for new legislative proposals from the Commission. In that latter respect, in 1982, the Commission agreed to respond to EP initiatives orally first during plenary debates and then through actual legislative proposals as long as it did not have major objections to the content of EP initiatives<sup>88</sup>. In other words, Resolutions 'force' the Commission to clarify its position on a number of issues both as Guardian of the Treaties and as drafter of proposals for legislation.

The original sketch of an EU RML policy dates back to 1979 when five Motions for a Resolution were put forward in the EP calling up for a 'Bill of Rights for the Regional and Minority Languages of the Community'. North Irish MEP John Hume authored one, highlighting the discourse of unity in diversity, a leitmotiv in RML discursive activism in subsequent years: '[...] *this union ought to be and can be made compatible with the diversity of the peoples of Europe [...] this diversity is one of the main sources of the vitality, richness and originality of European civilisation.*' The draft resolution was translated and circulated, and a report was established by Gaetano Arfé (which led to the first eponymous Resolution).

In a subsequent seminar in Ireland, Hume also called for the creation of '[...] *a non-official group of [EP] members actively concerned about the fate of the Lesser-Spoken Languages to act as a lobby on their behalf and to ensure in particular that the*

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<sup>88</sup> See the Andriessen Report (Bulletin EEC supplement 3/82).

*Parliament votes money for them.*' (Hume, 1981) Thus was defined the *raison d'être* of the *Intergroup for RMLs* which was formally established in 1983.

RML policy-making between 1981 and 1998 crystallised around both EP Resolutions and budgetary lines. Ó Riagáin counts 14 such Resolutions, four of which are specifically targeted at RMLs whilst the others only mention RMLs as potential recipients of more broadly defined policies (Ó Riagáin, 1998). For reasons of space, here I focus on the content and outcomes of the RML-specific four:

- Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities of October 16<sup>th</sup> 1981 (Rapporteur: Arfé<sup>89</sup>)
- Resolution of February 11<sup>th</sup> 1983 on measures in favour of minority languages and cultures (Rapporteur: Arfé<sup>90</sup>)
- Resolution of October 30<sup>th</sup> 1987 on the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community (Rapporteur: Kuijpers<sup>91</sup>)
- Resolution of February 9<sup>th</sup> 1994 on linguistic minorities in the European Community (Rapporteur: Killilea<sup>92</sup>)

The first two Arfé Resolutions posited the EP's discursive strategy regarding RML issues. They recalled *the resurgence of regionalist movements*, thus rooting the legitimacy of the EP's action in both popular demands and the pressing needs to respond to tense political situations. Reasserting that *regional languages and cultures [were] a source of enrichment for European civilization and an indication of its vitality*, they reminded member states of their prior commitment, inscribed in international documents by the UN and the CoE, to bolster minority rights. To give policy flesh to this commitment, the 1981 Resolution invited member states to grant RML communities legal rights in education, media and public life, echoing a similar CoE Resolution voted in only a few days before, and anticipating the 1992 CoE *European Charter for RMLs*. At a colloquy on how to implement the 1981 Resolution that gathered MEPs, Commission officials, independent experts and RML

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<sup>89</sup> OJ C 287, 9.11.81, p. 57.

<sup>90</sup> OJ C 68, 14.03.83, p.104.

<sup>91</sup> OJ C 318, 30.11.87, p. 144.

<sup>92</sup> OJ C 61, 28.2.94, p. 110.

representatives, it was then decided to create the *European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages* (EBLUL) (in 1982), an organisation that could speak and act on behalf of the various lesser-used language communities at European level. In addition to the 1983 Resolution, additionally, budget line B3-1006 for RML promotion was established with an initial 100,000 ECU envelope.

The 1987 Resolution re-asserted and further developed the principles and provisions contained in the first two Resolutions, regretting that *so far the Commission has not put forward any proposals to implement the abovementioned [1981 and 1983] resolutions*. The EP also raised the RML annual budget up to one million ECUs, thus allowing the creation of the MERCATOR Information Centres (to produce research databases on areas of RML promotion).

The 1994 Resolution, finally, the most elaborate hitherto, reiterated the aforementioned principles and stressed the Community's commitment, made in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), *to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity*<sup>93</sup> [clause A] which, it declared, *included the safeguarding of minority languages* [clauses B and L]. In relation to associated and third countries, and in preparation for its future enlargement waves, it re-emphasized the Community's *duty to draw attention to the rights of minorities and [...] to condemn any deliberate denial of these rights* [clause I], and recalled that *many lesser used languages* [were] *endangered* given the rapid drop in their number of speakers [clause M]<sup>94</sup>. It therefore called on: 1. the Member States for the urgent signature and ratification of the CoE's *Charter for RMLs* by EU member states; 2. the Commission to insert lesser used languages in its existing, mainstream education and media programmes (article 10(b)); and 3. the Commission to propose for a multi-annual programme for RMLs (11(b)).

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<sup>93</sup> See the analysis of article 151 in chapter 3.

<sup>94</sup> In that connection, the 1993 Copenhagen EU summit established economic and political criteria by which candidate countries would have to abide as a precondition to EU accession. The political criteria included the '*respect for and protection of minorities*'. For an assessment of how the Commission has monitored compliance with such criteria focusing on the Baltic States application for membership, see Adrey (2005).

## *Assessment and Outcomes*

Over that period, the EP progressively emerged as the champion of RML rights in the EU. EP Resolutions established its role as guardian of RML interests and served to diffuse a number of discourses through supranational channels, thus granting some sort of supranational access to grassroots regionalist discourses, e.g. the richness of diversity, language endangerment and the urgent necessity to preserve diversity, etc.

The EP also emerged as a stronger player in the EU's decision-making process since the budget lines it voted led the Commission to create and fund supranational organisations for RMLs, i.e. EBLUL and the Mercator Centres. In that connection, resolutions legitimised - and *de facto* legalised - the granting of increasing budgets for RML defence and promotion between 1983 and 1998. Through these years, budget line (B3-1006) for RML promotion voted jointly by the EP and the Council steadily rose from 100,000 to 4 million euros, a still relatively modest amount though, which may explain why the Council yielded to parliamentary pressure to have it increased throughout the years.

In practical terms, the Commission implemented line B3-1006 through a specific *Action for the Promotion and Safeguarding of Regional and Minority Languages*. In addition to funding EBLUL and the Mercator Centres, the *Action* also financed a large number of smaller-scale projects directly in the communities through calls for proposals, so that both symbolic and material supranational support for RMLs became somewhat visible in domestic contexts, arguably an important social-psychological development for RML communities and for the legitimisation of the EU level of governance. Through its budgetary powers and discursive production, and despite its initial lack of formal legislative powers, the EP could thus initiate and sustain a RML policy by establishing and annually negotiating a budget line for RMLs despite certain Council ministers' reluctance (O'Riagáin, 2001: 24).

Although they remained non-binding legal instruments, these resolutions also served to exert discursive pressure on both member states and EU institutions. In a variety of domestic contexts, some provisions were made for RML use in education and the media, and sometimes in the public service as well. Although it is difficult to assess

the role played by EP Resolutions in these developments - were they causal or coincidental? - my contention is that discursive productions such as the EP's were conducive to more pro-active promotional policies for RMLs. In that respect, through its discursive contributions, at the very least, the EP *participated* in a general movement of liberalisation of RML politics in a number of national contexts.

At EU level, however, resolutions could not induce the Commission to encompass RMLs within mainstream EU programmes, '*for lack of legal basis*' as was seen in chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, MEPs could not bring member states to sign and ratify the CoE's *Charter for RMLs* nor bring the Commission to propose a multi-annual Programme for RMLs. The former was obviously not a domain of EU competence and, arguably, the EU could not have signed it because it does not have *legal personality*<sup>95</sup>. As for the latter, this failure indicates that conciliatory and consensus-seeking though it may have been, the Commission could nevertheless not exceed its legal-administrative remit. A multi-annual programme would have required a legal decision well beyond the EP's autonomous budgetary powers - multi-annual programmes fall under CE, a Council prerogative - or the Commission's administrative powers. Arguably, if the Commission did not take up that proposal it was because it knew that the Council would not vote for it<sup>96</sup>. RML policy thus continued to be devised on a yearly rather than multi-annual basis. These restricted outcomes provide an indication of what the limits of discursive inputs during that period could be.

In sum, then, the EP had only partially 'captured' the RML policy process, working 'hand-in-hand' with the relevant working group in the Commission that was to administer budget line B-1006, but it could not induce a legislative proposal to create a legal basis for RMLs *per se*. The 1998 budget crisis dealt a more serious blow to RML activists as it challenged and eventually led to suppressing line B-1006.

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<sup>95</sup> In that respect, the Draft Constitution's article 6 would give the EU *legal personality* so that it could sign and ratify international treaties.

<sup>96</sup> See discussion of the *Archipelago* project in chapter 3.

The 1998 budgetary 'crisis' was not initially linked to the RML question but to the UK challenging a Community action programme against social exclusion on the ground that it was not a domain of EU competence for lack of a valid legal basis. The ECJ ruled in favour of the UK, thus making obsolete the aforementioned 1982 Joint Declaration on budgetary procedure<sup>97</sup>. The Commission then had to 'freeze' a number of budget lines (including B3-1006) lest their legality might be challenged. Ever since, it has monitored the legality of budget lines much more closely. Thus, this ruling put an end to the concern-free years during which the EP merely needed to vote line B-1006 for RML-based projects to be EU-funded.

The establishment of the illegality of budget lines like B3-1006 entailed two Inter-Institutional Agreements (1998 and 1999): the Council, the Commission and the EP indeed sat to negotiate ways not to interrupt altogether all Community actions with uncertain legal bases<sup>98</sup>. In the 1998 Agreement, effective as of October 1998, paragraph 36 stated that: '[...] *Recommendations and Opinions do not constitute basic acts* [=legal bases], *nor do Resolutions or Declarations.*' confirming the invalidity of resolutions as sole legal bases for RML budgets and the consequent need to find other legal bases for RML funding. Before 1998, there had been a legal void as to what constituted a sufficient legal base for EU funding; the institutional agreement shed new light on the issue. From 1998 on, therefore, the legal-political value of resolutions shrivelled. Subsequently, RML activists saw their legitimising resource for RML promotion reduced to a mere discursive device and had to focus on obtaining more solid legal bases for RMLs.

However, paragraph 37 of the Agreement stipulated that certain budgets could be appropriated for pilot schemes and preparatory actions without a basic act, provided that such actions fell *within the competence of the Community* (Introduction), i.e. intended actions should pertain to policy areas where the EU had been delegated competence. Further, two types of appropriations could be made: a. *for pilot schemes* [...] *aimed at testing the feasibility of an action* [...] *The relevant commitment*

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<sup>97</sup> It was formally cancelled in the 1999 inter-institutional agreement.

<sup>98</sup> OJ C 344, 12/11/1998, p.1 and C 172, 18/06/1999, pp.1-22.

*appropriations may be entered in the budget for only two financial years; and b. relating to preparatory actions to prepare proposals with a view to the adoption of future Community actions [...] for only three financial years at most [...] The legislative procedure [had to be] concluded before the end of the third financial year (par. 37, art. a (ii)). Both types were allocated a limited annual budget that the EP's Budget Committee would distribute and for which all interest groups whose budget lines had been frozen would compete. The struggle for a RML policy was thus also relocated onto the intra-institutional scene, with MEPs seeking to obtain the largest possible share of the budgets available for actions without a basic act. I now examine who lobbied, where and how, and with what results, scrutinising in particular the role of the *Intergroup for Regional and minority Languages* in intra- and inter-institutional lobbying.*

*Institutional Representation of RML Interests within the EP: The Intergroup for Regional and Minority Languages and the 1998 Crisis*<sup>99</sup>

In his 1997 study on interest group representation in the EU, Greenwood insists on the variety of Intergroups present in the EP:

*'[...] groupings of MEPs clustered around particular areas where members have particular interests. [...] Because of their unofficial<sup>100</sup> and sometimes rather fluid status, no one seems clear precisely how many Intergroups there are. [...] The semi-anarchic existence of these groups means that they do quite different things and offer quite different avenues of influence to the EP for outside interests [...] Some meet frequently and have a full time secretariat, whereas others are little more than letterheads. Some restrict membership to MEPs, while others are open to a variety of outside interests.'* (Greenwood, 1997: 44)

Of course, Intergroups vary in their focus but also, importantly, in the actual role they can play in decision-making processes in their respective policy areas because they

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<sup>99</sup> This Intergroup's exact name remains uncertain, as various names have been used in the literature. For convenience's sake I henceforth simply refer to the *Intergroup*.

<sup>100</sup> Although the Intergroup for RMLs was granted '[...] full status as an official Intergroup of the European Parliament', such a status is largely symbolic and implies consultative rather than formal decisional powers. See also Kuipers Resolution above, 30/10/1987: Article 17



widely differ in status, resources, and membership<sup>101</sup>. Here, I investigate which EU RML policy actors belong to the Intergroup for RMLs and their respective bargaining powers, and the extent to which meetings of the RML Intergroup are one of the main fora where RML interests are represented, promotional strategies devised, and where RML-based decisions are negotiated on the European institutional scene.

The *Intergroup* meets monthly in Strasbourg to tackle various RML-related issues. At the time of analysis, it comprised<sup>102</sup>:

1. 40 MEPs sitting on various Committees (including 9 MEPs on the Education and Culture Committee, and 5 on the Budget Committee).
2. EBLUL representatives attending meetings to report on EBLUL's activities and providing secretarial assistance.
3. Sometimes, Commission officials from the Education and Culture DG's language policy unit.
4. Occasionally, representatives of the CoE and/or guest speakers from RML communities, e.g. to present EP-commissioned studies on RMLs.

It thus brings most EU RML actors together<sup>103</sup> although, more often than not, RML communities are only virtually present through their MEPs. Meetings serve to keep members in touch, diffuse information, examine the Commission's actions in favour of RMLs, or the lack thereof and in that case pressure it, and to update lobbying strategies. I will return to the Intergroup's interinstitutional role later. For now, I focus on its response to the budgetary crisis.

A first crucial outcome of the negotiations between budgetary authorities that followed the crisis was that, from 1999, EBLUL and the Mercator Centres would be co-funded under line A-3015, an 'administrative' (sic) line requiring no legal basis

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<sup>101</sup> Jacobs *et al.* listed around 50 Intergroups in 1994 and Corbett *et al.* over 80 in 2000, gathered around subjects ranging from Ageing, Ceramics, Ethnic Minorities, to Rugby League via Friends of Music and Indian Peoples (Jacobs, *et al.*, 1995; quoted in Greenwood, 1997: 44-45; Corbett, 2001: 81-82; for a more recent list see Corbett *et al.*, 2000: Chapter 10).

<sup>102</sup> Because of its fluid nature, the membership is in permanent flux. Here I use the membership list of March 2003 provided by EBLUL. The parliamentary questions analysed below were posed between 1999 and March 2003 by MEPs on that list.

<sup>103</sup> Notable absentees are state representatives though, but these are present at Committee level.

other than that the recipients of funds should be ‘institutions of European interests.’ (Grin and Moring, 2002) The next target was to secure funds to finance projects in the communities through calls for proposals.

The Intergroup rapidly secured funds for RMLs from the total allowance of 32 million euros negotiated at the inter-institutional level by the Budget Committee. According to former Intergroup Chairwoman MEP Eluned Morgan, this proved no difficulty since fourteen Intergroup members, belonging to six different political parties and sitting either on the Culture and Education Committee or on the Budget Committee, were personally sympathetic and actively supportive to the RML cause (Morgan, 2002). The Intergroup thus ensured that the Education and Budget Committee would earmark funds specifically for RMLs from two budgetary lines: Lines B3-1000 (Cooperation in the Fields of Education and of Youth Policy) for 2000-2001 with 2.5 out of 4.5 million euros, and B3-1003 N (Preparatory Actions for Promotion of the Linguistic Diversity of the Community in the Information Society) with 2 out of 10 million euros for 2000.<sup>104</sup> Following calls for proposals, funds could then be allocated to a number of projects.

Regarding line B3-1000, an agreement could be reached because that Cooperation Programme established no restrictions whatsoever as to the languages targeted by its action. In other cases, the Commission, acting as the Guardian of the Treaties, rejected the proposed legal basis for RML promotion due to such restrictions, e.g. RMLs are excluded from the action LINGUA<sup>105</sup>. Funding RML-based projects under the education heading was problematic and it took some negotiations for the Commission to finally accept the validity of some of the proposed legal bases<sup>106</sup>.

On balance, the question of education as the legal basis for RMLs points to an apparent paradox: RML promotion can be funded within obviously education-oriented actions – e.g. the Cooperation Programme – whilst legal services have refused to endorse other proposals taking the Treaty article 149 as the RML legal basis, e.g. *Archipelago* (see chapter 3). Article 149’s scope as primary legislation is

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<sup>104</sup> For more details, see Written Questions E 0465/00 and E 1732/00 by Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna.

<sup>105</sup> See Written Question E 1731/00.

<sup>106</sup> See Written Questions E 1730/00 and E 3098/00.

indeed much wider and durable whereas action programmes are 'soft law' - implementation rather than legislative measures - and thus provisional and outside the ECJ's domain of competence. Article 149 is legally much wider ranging than action programmes. In chapter 2, we saw that the Court of First Instance had denied that Regulation 1/58 established the legal principle of language equality because it was a piece of secondary legislation. Likewise, the education issue illustrates that one way to prevent the interpretation of RML-promoting actions from having jurisprudential value is to base such actions on secondary legislation only. Put otherwise, the EU does support RML policy making, in part as a response to pro-RML lobbying, but only to the extent that this does not grant them formal recognition.

As for line B3-1003 N, the negotiations around it show that although the Commission could not fund RML projects under an action *per se*, these could be financed as preparatory measures inasmuch as they corresponded to objectives of other programmes or actions no matter what the legal bases were, e.g. preparatory actions for promotion of the linguistic diversity of the Community in the information society, or preparatory measures for the action 2001 *European Year of Languages* (EYL)<sup>107</sup>.

#### *Inter-Institutional Representation of RML Interests: The Intergroup and the Commission*

In its relations with the Commission regarding policy initiation and implementation, the Intergroup possesses two main instruments of political leverage: Resolutions and parliamentary questions. This section assesses the impact of these resources in terms of the policy outcomes they produce, directly or indirectly.

Notably, when decisions to push forward a draft Resolution are put to the vote in the Intergroup, only MEPs can vote: they constitute the decisional 'core' while other members enjoy more 'peripheral status' (adapted from Maloney *et al.*, 1995). However, although here I focus largely on MEPs, it must be borne in mind that 'non-MEP members' can participate in debates and in the production if not in the final adoption of draft texts. Indeed, various sources claim that RML-related Resolutions

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<sup>107</sup> See Written Question E 1732/00. For a more recent illustration, see also Written Question E 0043/02 by Barbara Dührkop Dührkop tabled on 23/01/03.

are first collectively drafted in Intergroup meetings (EBLUL Official Bakker, email to the author, 2003; Corbett *et al.*, 2000: chapter 10). Regarding written questions, besides, even if perhaps not systematically discussed at Intergroup meetings, they are undoubtedly informed by those meetings (see role of EBLUL below). Authorship is therefore extremely difficult to establish: it is easy to know who signs texts, but not who participated in text production processes<sup>108</sup>. Another related difficulty is that parliamentary questions, which can be important lobbying platforms, are usually individual questions and therefore not conspicuously attributable to the Intergroup *ex cathedra* since it possesses no formal existence<sup>109</sup>.

The actual outcomes of resolutions were assessed in the previous section. The data I analyse now consists of 42 Written Questions addressed by MEPs to the Commission and/or the Council on sociolinguistic issues. Parliamentary questions are an essential feature of the EP exercising its prerogative of scrutiny and control of the executive, and their number has constantly increased during the 1990s. They serve various purposes: to control the implementation of the budget; to obtain technical information for non-specialist MEPs, but also, importantly, as discursive platforms (e.g. recognition of official multilingualism in the EU on the basis of the existing legislation in the Member States).<sup>110</sup> They can effectively force a policy statement to be made (e.g. Is the threat made by the French state on bilingual RML immersion schools compatible with the Copenhagen criteria?)<sup>111</sup>, as the addressees must obey time constraints to answer, and replies are published in the OJ. I classify the questions asked as follows:

1. General Questions relating to RML defence and promotion in general (type 1).

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<sup>108</sup> This requires a reconsideration of the actual authorship of policy texts and the relevance of distinguishing between policy consultation and policy formulation; in turn, this can be seen as emblematic of the permeability of institutions in the EU system of multi-governance.

<sup>109</sup> In the past, in particular policy sectors, Intergroup meetings have been perceived as a direct challenge to the Committee level regarding the locus of decision-making. In 1999, the EP's Bureau issued a statement recalling the unofficial status of Intergroups. This status is ambiguous though as they can be recognised as official but not in an institutional 'decisional' sense (Corbett *et al.*, 2000: chapter 10).

<sup>110</sup> Written Question E 1445/99 by Camilo Nogueira Román to the Commission.

<sup>111</sup> Written Question E 3812/02 by Miquel Mayol I Raynal to the Commission. The Copenhagen Criteria comprise *inter alia* the respect of minority rights, including linguistic rights. There exists a controversy because current member states do not have to comply with them whereas candidate countries do which in fact seems to establish a 'double standard' of minority rights protection in the EU. I return to this issue in the General Conclusion of this study.

2. Questions specifically relating to the addressor's home RML community (type 2).
3. Questions relating to a RML different from the addressor's original RML (type 3).

A first observation was that type 1 questions (28) largely outnumbered the other types (14), so that the Intergroup did not seem to constitute an arena for individual RML communities to promote their domestic regional interests<sup>112</sup>. In their supra-national capacity MEPs embody the collective voice of RML communities in general rather than defend the particular sociolinguistic interests of their own regional community, despite the fact that the most 'prolific' MEPs (in terms of producing questions) originate from regionalist/autonomist parties in their countries.

Type 2 and type 3 questions showed that MEPs remained attentive on a variety of problematic sociolinguistic situations throughout Europe. For instance, two questions referred to minority issues and freedom of expression in Greece after a language activist was sentenced to 15 months in prison for distributing a Commission-funded EBLUL information brochure entitled *Unity in Diversity* that mentioned Greek minority languages. Several MEPs protested asking the Commission to verify the compatibility of such a sentence with the fundamental rights of self-expression (convicted February 2001; released December 2001)<sup>113</sup>. Other questions on less dramatic situations were issued about language discrimination in France, Slovakia, Istria, and Spain. Even if they do not systematically entail the desired effects, such questions undoubtedly exert pressure on the addressees, distill discourses supporting RML rights, and contribute to sustaining the EP's profile as a prominent attentive public on European RML issues. Crucially, they also remind RML communities of the support they can find at supranational level and can draw RML groups out of isolation by revealing similar situations and needs across communities.

As for General Questions, they were usually more technical in nature and essentially pertained to securing the implementation of budgetary lines benefiting RMLs on a yearly basis, and to the establishment of a durable legal basis for RMLs. In other words, general questions are also significantly a reflection of the EP's role of

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<sup>112</sup> This was further illustrated by the fact that there were only 5 type 3 questions.

<sup>113</sup> Written questions E-0487/01, E-2884/01. For further details, see *Contact Bulletin*, March 2002, volume 18, No1.

budgetary scrutiny and control rather than essentially discursive platforms like types 2 and 3. In recent years though, some have also focused on the Copenhagen Criteria for the protection of linguistic rights amongst candidate countries, and the Commission's monitoring process of candidate countries' compliance with these criteria. For reasons that will become clearer later, I will return to the question of the Copenhagen Criteria in the concluding section.

Another illustration of lobbying through general questions was the action *EYL 2001*. Data examined in the previous chapter indicated that this action had entailed important financial support for RML projects in 2001. The previous section of this chapter showed that from the cancellation of the specific Action for RMLs, financial support for RMLs had been temporarily relocated within other programmes until, it was hoped, a durable RML-specific legal basis would be established, in particular as a follow-up to the action *EYL 2001* (see also chapter 3).

This was the sense of a collective question put to the Commission on November 11<sup>th</sup> 2000 requesting '[...] *a solid legal basis for a specific programme at European level in favour of the lesser-used languages*'<sup>114</sup>. The Commission's answer indicated its incapacity (political reluctance?) to yield to pressures: it replied that it would '*be looking at the possibility of presenting a draft programme for safeguarding and promoting regional and lesser-used languages as a follow-up to the European Year of Languages*' (Emphasis added) Likewise, to a similar question in March 2001, the Commission merely asserted its intention '[...] *to draw lessons from all these initiatives and discussions, and to arrive at conclusions as early as next year [2002]*'.<sup>115</sup>

Finally, a *Resolution on Regional and Lesser-Used European languages*<sup>116</sup> was tabled on December 13<sup>th</sup> 2001 that called for the execution of a budget line the EP had voted in 2001 for the 2002 budget; it targeted *Preparatory Actions Concerning the Promotion and Safeguarding of RMLs, Dialects and Cultures* (B3-1007). However, the Commission cancelled its execution on the ground that *there was no prospect of*

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<sup>114</sup> See collective Written Question E 3702/00.

<sup>115</sup> See Written Question E 0620/01.

<sup>116</sup> OJ C 177 E, 25/07/2002 pp. 334-336.

*the legislative procedure for a legal base being concluded before the end of the third financial year of preparatory actions*<sup>117</sup>. The Commission added that: *'it [would] conduct a thoroughgoing evaluation of the European Year of Languages 2001 from which it [would] draw conclusions with a view to presenting proposals for actions in favour of linguistic diversity and language learning in 2003.'* (ibid) (Emphases added) Here again, it was clear that the Commission carefully avoided committing itself to announcing the future tabling of a specific proposal for RML-based actions, let alone for a specific RML legal basis and that the Intergroup no longer had the means to impose its preferences through the combination of resolutions and budgetary lines.

Notwithstanding, the *Action Plan on linguistic diversity and language learning for 2004-2006* issued in August 2003 can be seen as a positive response to the Intergroup's pressure. It was drafted after the Commission launched a vast consultation process on promoting language learning and linguistic diversity. In the eponymous Consultation Document, it indicated its philosophical approach to language learning and linguistic diversity in Whorfian terms, i.e. *'[...] each language shelters a subtly distinct view of the world and is fundamental to the personal, social and spiritual identity of its speakers [...]*', and advocated an approach including RML-promotion into more EU programmes actions in a more systematic way<sup>118</sup>.

Hitherto, however, this Action plan has brought no significant achievement to the cause yet because of its limited legal scope - it is only a Commission Communication - but it clearly advocates the inclusion of RML policy under mainstream Education programmes from which they have hitherto been excluded and encourages member states to adopt the principles behind and provisions of the *European Charter for RMLs* in *'[...] education, the media, culture, economic and social life and, where appropriate, government, public services and judicial proceedings.'*<sup>119</sup> Attentive publics are now eager to see how member states will respond to the Commission's

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<sup>117</sup> See Written Question E 0445/02 and minutes of the Intergroup meeting (03/07/2002).

<sup>118</sup> See [http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/policy/consult\\_en.html](http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/policy/consult_en.html) [accessed October 13th 2003]

<sup>119</sup> See [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/doc/official/keydoc/actlang/act\\_lang\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/doc/official/keydoc/actlang/act_lang_en.pdf) [accessed: October 13th 2003]

suggestions, and what concrete support for RMLs may indeed emerge from mainstream Education programmes.

*Semi- and Non-Institutionalised Representation of RML Interests in the EU: Structures, Discourse and RML Network Change.*

Before concluding this chapter, I concentrate on the main semi- and non-institutional organs for representation of RML interests in the EU: the Mercator Centres and the EBLUL, the Europa Diversa Network, and I will examine their structures and actions to promote RMLs in the EU outside institutional spheres.

*The Mercator Information Centres*

The Mercator Centres were founded in 1987 to constitute research databases and documentation centres on RML issues and to network RML-interested researchers. These databases were divided along the three traditional domains of language policy-making: Education (Mercator, Friesland), Media (Mercator, Wales) and Law (Mercator, Catalonia) and the centres are hosted by RML-promoting academic institutions: the *Fryske Akademy*, the *Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Ètniques i les Nacions* (CIEMEN), and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Over the years, beyond such databases, the centres' activities have also revolved around a publishing role (i.e. bulletin, reports and working papers, articles and books) and the organisation of conferences gathering RML activists and/or academics and thus fulfilling a networking function. Often these events have led to the publication of pleas for RML promotion. In sum, the centres serve to gather expert knowledge on RML policy-related issues and to provide scientific backing and legitimacy to RML defence and promotion strategies at supranational level.

*EBLUL: Status, Roles and Structures, Discourse*

The EBLUL presents itself as a NGO and has observer status at the CoE, UNESCO and the UN. Due to its particular relation with the Commission, its status is problematic though. NGO status implies full independence in speech and practice from official/state institutions. In EBLUL's case, its almost total financial dependence



on the Commission, which has forced it to adapt its *modus operandi* to the Commission's prerequisites, tends to suggest seeing it as a QuaNGO: '[...] *an organisation pursuing goals and operating using principles similar to fully independent NGOs, but receiving most of their funding from states.*' (Adapted from Grin and Moring, 2002: 60)<sup>120</sup> Yet, its freedom of speech has been rather unrestrained, which is a defining characteristic of NGOs. This calls for further explanation.

Within EBLUL, two sets of actors must be distinguished: the executive/administrative antennas based in Brussels and Dublin, and the General Assembly federating the representatives of its Member State Committees (MSCs), which constitutes its political arm. Broadly speaking, the executive deals with the day-to-day activities: publications, project development, expert consultancy in relation to the Commission's calls for proposals, facilitating networking and partnerships between RML organisations, secretarial assistance, diffusion of information, RML-focused web tool development and representing EBLUL at conferences and in RML-targeting fora in general. As for political actors, their objectives are:

- to promote active EU policy-making in favour of regional or minority languages and to defend the linguistic rights of the speakers of those languages
- to represent regional or minority languages in dealings with EU institutions and other international organisations
- to maintain a permanent communication between communities and to facilitate contacts and exchanges between them
- to identify legal and political instruments in favour of the promotion of lesser used languages of the Union's Member States.

Two strategies serve to attain those objectives: 1. bringing together MSCs three times a year to establish EBLUL's lines of actions, 2. designing and issuing lobbying documents during consultation phases in various policy-making contexts.

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<sup>120</sup>The bankruptcy situation of the Brussels' Office at the time of writing is a telling illustration of Eblul's dependency on Commission money. (October 2004).

One of the major achievements of EBLUL since its creation has indeed been its networking function at supranational level, bringing together RML representatives from all member states. At one level, EBLUL thus helped create a RML community at supranational level, in which local communities could benefit from each other's experience and practices in RML planning, e.g. EBLUL's Study Visit Programme.<sup>121</sup> Also importantly, MSCs have allowed the RML communities of a given state to network and voice their demands and/or grievances collectively to their own governments, and to express themselves on supranational developments.<sup>122</sup> Other types of action, as was indicated above, include offering expert help to apply for EU funding, establishing networking platforms for local, provincial and regional authorities to collaborate on RML-promoting initiatives, etc. Finally, it launched the Eurolang news agency (February 2000) - online daily news on RML issues - that eventually became an autonomous agency.

On the political front, as a consultant and interest group representative, EBLUL has conducted an important informative and/or discursive activity, notably through numerous publications, from countless booklets describing various RML communities' sociolinguistic situations, through glossaries about RML debates for non-experts, to pamphlets praising diversity and linking it to economic developments, etc. EBLUL has targeted publics at both domestic and supranational levels. At domestic levels, in a way similar to the Intergroup's type 3 questions above, EBLUL's Assembly has passed many resolutions on RML 'current affairs', e.g. calling various member states to adopt more RML-friendly legislation. In that sense, its freedom of expression has been unrestrained and it has helped increase the visibility of domestic RML developments in Europe<sup>123</sup>.

At supranational level, O'Riagain (2001) draws attention to EBLUL's participation in the drafting of a number of international documents and its incessant lobbying of

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<sup>121</sup> More than 105 visits, in 41 RML communities and involving 1140 persons have been organised since 1983 ([www.eblul.org](http://www.eblul.org)) [accessed December 2003].

<sup>122</sup> We will see in chapter 8 that in the case of Corsica, this opportunity has not been fully exploited. Besides, some MSCs were only created recently due to enduring reluctance to acknowledge the existence of minorities in some states (e.g. Greece, Portugal) and new additions were made as a consequence of eastwards enlargement (e.g. Poland).

<sup>123</sup> A notable exception to its freedom of action was mentioned above with the case of Greece imprisoning a RML activist for diffusing EBLUL's discursive material.

voters when texts were to be voted by international bodies, such as the CoE's *Charter for RMLs*, and/or EP Resolutions. Further, EBLUL has issued Opinions and Recommendations each time a consultation process was undertaken by the Commission or other international organisations. During the consultation process before the *Convention for the Future of Europe*, for instance, EBLUL's General Assembly reiterated the broad principles of richness in diversity and suggested a number of amendments to the Treaty: proposing a legal basis for RMLs per se, adding 'language' to Article 13 on non-discrimination, changing voting from unanimity to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in Article 151, creating a multi-annual programme for linguistic diversity with special reference to RMLs, etc (EBLUL, 2002).

Its ideological positions, epitomised in its motto 'unity in diversity' that has since become the motto of the 2004 EU, are well epitomised in its *Contribution to the* [Commission's] *Consultation on Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity* (01/02/03). This document shows that EBLUL's typical discourse on diversity is extremely heterogeneous. Beyond broadly praising diversity as '[...] a democratic and cultural cornerstone of the European construction', it argues that:

[...] *linguistic diversity including lesser-used languages also importantly increases social cohesion, cross-border and inter-regional co-operation* [...] [and that] [our] *cultures and our linguistic heritage are not only part of the Union's wealth and a key element of the identity of its regions, but as well an important source of economic activity and new jobs* [...] [and] *a valuable and constructive mechanism for conflict prevention and conflict management* [...]. (EBLUL, 2003)

As can be seen, the heterogeneous discourse of diversity displays broad interdiscursive and intertextual strategies. As the excerpts quoted above illustrate, EBLUL strategically relates to a number of domains where EU actions have become legitimate and preponderant, e.g. social cohesion, cross-border cooperation, and links

diversity to economic development<sup>124</sup> and conflict management. Economic development is a founding objective of the EEC and conflict management refers to a growing body of minority rights literature that advocates granting political rights to regions, including language rights, as a solution to core-periphery conflict management (Loughlin and Daftary, 1999; Daftary, 2000; Poleschuk, 2003). EBLUL's pleas typically also call for defining language rights as fundamental rights and condemning language discrimination. In sum, EBLUL's discourse heterogeneity seeks to legitimate an EU pro-active approach to RML promotion by relating the preservation of diversity to the broad umbrella of the EU's traditional or more recent objectives and accepted domains of intervention.

### *RML Network change?*

In recent years, the legitimacy and functional role of the EBLUL's EU 'superstructure' as main representative and 'spokes-organisation' of RML communities in the EU has nevertheless been questioned. While its usefulness as a lobbyist at EU level is unchallenged, critiques have emerged arguing that EBLUL has been too institutionalised and dependent on public manna, and consequently not critical enough *vis-à-vis* the Commission, and that decision-making has been too centralised so that many civil society associations are not fairly represented. In that connection, in 1999, the Commission organised a meeting asking MSCs to increase their representativity at national levels (Menciassi, 2003)<sup>125</sup>. Other trans-national networks have also emerged, like Europa Diversa, an organisation including mainly Catalan RML-defending organisations, the broad aims and objectives of which largely replicate EBLUL's: promoting cultural and linguistic diversity and RMLs in Europe through publications, networking and lobbying activities, etc. In that connection, a number of other projects have also been sponsored by the Commission that provide similar information on RML issues. For instance, the *Universitat Oberta de Catalunya*, in collaboration with other academic and research centres in Belgium, Wales, Slovenia, Italy and Ireland, coordinates a project for a virtual community on

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<sup>124</sup> The link between diversity and economic development is explored in detail in the *Euromosaic final Report* (Nelde, Strubell and Williams, 1996).

<sup>125</sup> See also Comitès Catalan, Galicien et Basque (2001)

minority languages: ADUM (Press release, 27/02/2004)<sup>126</sup>. While the discourse on diversity as richness remains a broad common umbrella and whereas the multiplication of RML-promoting organisations may increase the pressure on deciders, it may also be seen as a reflection of divisions amongst RML communities' representatives and therefore as an obstacle to their becoming a unified lobbying force. Thus, organisational diversity may undermine lobbying efficiency.

Interestingly, the aforementioned new networks involve more academic actors than mainly political representatives from RML communities as in EBLUL's MSCs, even though the separation is not always clear-cut, as the Corsican example demonstrates (chapter 8). One may therefore perhaps expect a change in their political agenda and in their lobbying discourse and/or methods that will require further investigation. We will see in chapters 8 and 9 how Corsican academics address language revitalisation issues in Corsica as they play a central role in the Corsican language policy network.

As regards lobbying strength, finally, it is also interesting to observe here that Mercator and EBLUL RML activists lobbying at EU level exclusively focus on status issues. Thus the information they provide on RML communities typically comprises sociolinguistic data on the demographic weight of RMLs in their respective states and on their legal status and institutional use. In the accompanying comment to that data, moreover, it is typically assumed that RML revitalisation depends essentially if not solely on obtaining a more favourable status and concomitant institutional space. This conception, largely inspired by structural/functional models and inherited from the sociolinguistic processes accompanying and/or enacting nation-building processes described in chapters 1, 5 and 7, thus leaves aside many other issues linked to language revitalisation, e.g. corpus management issues and popular language attitudes.

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<sup>126</sup> Available at [http://www.uoc.edu/web/eng/noticies/ADUMeng\\_imp.html](http://www.uoc.edu/web/eng/noticies/ADUMeng_imp.html); accessed December 3<sup>rd</sup> 2004. See also the MIRIS database on minorities hosted by the European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano (South Tyrol); available at <http://dev.eurac.edu:8085/mugs2/aboutEurac.jsp?TopBarItem=Eurac>; accessed December 4<sup>th</sup> 2004.

The recent, apparent evolution in the sociology of the networks of RML activists at EU level and the institutionalisation of scholars of various origins with an interest in minority issues may induce a change in that approach. Scientifically-informed claims may become more politically radical but less supranational, e.g. lobbying for an official EU recognition of certain RMLs only as some locally-oriented organisations may not seek to become 'spokes-organisation' for all RMLs but rather work for their more immediate, own interest. They may also become more materially pragmatic and focus on obtaining more funds to address RML issues in the communities (e.g. how folk ideologies intervene and/or interfere in planning processes; see chapters 1 and 9), and for trans-community networking. In that connection, multiplying opportunities for RML academics to network may further contribute to the development and diffusion of new discourses on and practices of language and language planning. It remains to be seen how these actors could lobby EU institutions and in what ways their action could come to supplement rather than being redundant with that of EBLUL's domestic and EU structures.

### *Conclusion*

This chapter has illustrated that in a system of governance, legal/institutional obstacles can be bypassed but that, even in a RML policy network characterised by power dependency and consensus seeking attitudes, legal powers remain largely hegemonic. RML activists can and have persuaded the EU to support RML safeguarding. Between 1983 and 1998, the unclear legal weight of Resolutions enabled the EP to vote a yearly budget line that served to fund projects in the communities. When the legal status of Resolutions was clarified in 1998, however, the EP lost its legitimising device and the Commission found itself in the difficult situation of having to respond to the EP's pressure to perpetuate its *Action for RMLS*, notably that of the *Intergroup*. Moreover, the Commission's response remained strictly curtailed by the ECJ's 1998 judgement and by its function as Guardian of the Treaties. The compromise found through the inter-institutional agreements enabled the Commission to overcome this predicament and grant RMLs some support to an extent acceptable by the Council. Yet, it could not go as far as creating the legal basis for RMLs demanded by activists, which the Council would not have accepted. Some

solutions were also found so that the institutional apparatus that had emerged from the 15 years of legal void could be preserved, at low symbolic and material cost for the Council.

The main cause of the Commission's ongoing predicament is the persistent ambiguity around the EU's commitment to the value of cultural diversity and multilingualism, and the necessity to preserve and promote them. Chapter 2 demonstrated, through the analysis of the *Archipelago* proposal, that the Commission could not use the education-legal basis for RMLs, despite the fact that it is acknowledged to be the main channel to preserve multilingualism, and that any attempt to define diversity more broadly and as encompassing RMLs was doomed to fail. Yet, we have also seen that, paradoxically, the action for RMLs is largely based on educational actions but that these stay legitimised at a secondary legal level, e.g. inter-institutional budgetary agreements between the EP and the Council, well beneath the level primary legislation and not subject to the ECJ's scrutiny.

What clearly emerged from the analyses was that the EU will support RMLs but that the Commission, and behind it the Council, sole legislator on language issues, will not share decision-making powers with the EP in a way that would grant RML communities some symbolic recognition at supranational level, which they may not have at domestic level. They will continue to receive material support within the framework of a number of programmes<sup>127</sup> but anything that would entail some specific recognition at EU level and go against any member state's will, e.g. granting them some symbolic recognition derived from their inclusion in primary legislation, is for the time being out of the question.

The RML policy is now strongly established and, considering the political salience of the discourse of diversity in recent years, it is unthinkable that the EU could stop promoting RMLs as it does now even though their institutional representation may change quite drastically. In the absence of a genuine legal basis based on primary legislation, however, RML policy-making undeniably remains a domain of national sovereignty, and a very sensitive one. It is therefore quite unlikely that a legal basis

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<sup>127</sup> Material support for RMLs within non RML-specific programmes rose from 375, 855 euros in 1997 to 3, 667, 409 euros for 1999-2000 (Grin and Moring, 2002: 67).

for RMLs *per se* could emerge in the near future. In that connection, the evolution of the RML network and of RML-related claims in recent years might appease concerns of intergovernmentalists that the EU could constitute a forum for RML communities seeking to bypass national levels on RML status issues.

Indeed, the developments since the 1998 crisis in particular have had consequences for RML activists' future strategies. RML activists and lobbyists are nowadays 'divided' as the appropriate legal basis for RMLs: academic proponents of a more pragmatic approach advocate obtaining money for RML indirectly, under the aegis of programmes not specifically geared at the RML promotion, the better to respond to each RML community's specific needs. This is the direction suggested early in the *Euromosaic* Report (Nelde *et al.*, 1996) and in the most recent *SMILE* Report established on RML support strategies (Grin and Moring, 2002)<sup>128</sup>, and endorsed in the Commission's *Action Plan* mentioned above. The other, more radical, route typically favoured by RML activists remains that of lobbying for a legal basis *per se*, possibly through the constitutionalisation of article 22 of the *European Charter of Fundamental Rights* on linguistic diversity. It is yet too early to anticipate such developments but, at the time of writing, legal research has already pointed to existing legal limitations on the operationalisation of fundamental rights in the Draft Constitution (Hofmann, 2003: 19-21). Consequently, the advocacy of mainstreaming RML policy rather than seeking symbolic recognition seems to be gaining ground among academics. This may further alleviate remaining worries that the EU's treatment of RMLs could undermine national sovereignties.

I will return to possible routes of evolution of the EU legal framework and their implications for RML rights in the General Conclusion of this study. For the time being, in any case, RML-oriented decision making powers remain located at national levels. If any evolution towards granting RML communities more language rights is to be found, it must primarily be within national arenas. To see if Corsican may be granted additional rights in the future, I therefore now turn to RML policy-making processes in France.

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<sup>128</sup> Available on <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/langmin/support.pdf> [accessed 09-07-2003]



*La langue française est un élément constitutif de l'identité, de l'histoire et de la culture nationales. La réaffirmation du statut du français symbolise l'unité de la République et favorise la complète intégration de tous dans la vie de la cité.*

Circulaire du 12 avril 1994, J.O. 20 avril 1994, p. 5 773.

*La Révolution, comme le catholicisme, est d'essence universaliste, phare autoproclamé pour les autres nations. L'outil par excellence de l'universalisme de la République française est la langue française, langue de la clarté et de la raison; le ciel bleu de Touraine ("Là où le français est le plus pur") s'opposant aux sombres forêts germaniques dont les ténèbres ne pouvaient qu'engendrer des parlers obscurs, faits en même temps d'à-peu-près et de mots rudes, voués à l'efficacité immédiate. Le français, que sa clarté emporte sur les ailes du Progrès, s'opposerait également aux langues régionales, empêtrées dans leurs lourds sabots, embrumées de superstitions, repliées sur un passé obscurantiste.*

Gabriel Krom, courrier des lecteurs, *Libération* (July 1999)

### *Introduction*

This chapter looks at the dynamics of glottopolitics and language policy formation at the national level in France. I explore France's internal glottopolitical dynamics and how this internal dynamics is also partly shaped by (glotto-)political developments at both supra- and sub-national levels.

This chapter thus maps out the politics of the French language in France and abroad and their inter-relations over three distinct periods: from early modern times until the Revolution, from the Revolution until WWII and since WWII. These three periods are characterized by different conceptions and ideologies of language, identity and the nation and of the ways in which they interrelate. The first period sees the reification and totemization of the French language and its 'intergovernmentalisation'; the

second's main characteristics are the construction of the French nation through the politicization of language and its slow diffusion in French society; the third witnesses the rise of political and linguistic insecurity leading to more active, but ultimately contradictory, discourses and strategies of language promotion and exclusion.

Throughout the chapter, I show how ideological, sociopolitical change and sociolinguistic change have been mutually constitutive in France and how the concepts of language, identity and the nation have been engineered in different and strategically connected ways according to the perceived and/or desired evolution of political situations. I base this analysis on the view, outlined in chapter 1, that *language, identity and the nation* are largely constructed, situational and mutually constitutive notions. Besides this, I look at the ideological context in which legal/institutional developments take place for each of the aforesaid periods, and at the implementation, or not, of the policies official discourses prescribe. Regarding the latter, I show that policy implementation and acceptance is not only a matter of formal structures but also, and perhaps most importantly, of attitudes towards the underlying discourses. In other words, the possibility of resistance to change and the maintenance of former structures and political and cultural/linguistic loyalties and practices must be acknowledged.

In the first part of this chapter, I show that, from the late middle-ages, a number of broad contextual changes in Western Europe facilitated the rise of new forms of elite national consciousness which led to the standardization of national languages (Anderson, 1983). At the political level in France, this also entailed the gradual construction of a state apparatus and the concomitant reification and totemization of the 'national' language and, in Western European politics more widely, the establishment of sociolinguistic hierarchies between national languages, the latter process eventually seeing the progressive hegemonisation of French as the international language (e.g. Calvet, 1974 and 2002; Wright, 2004). Thus, French was ideologically constructed or totemized as a superior, 'universal language' due to the image projected abroad of the mutually constitutive relation between its intrinsic 'fossilized' linguistic characteristics (i.e. reification) and its embodiment of universal

values (i.e. totemization). During that period, the idea of the nation emerged but only in a restricted, elitist sense that did not include popular masses.

The second part analyses the politics of language and the advent of new political economies of language in France as a consequence of the politicization of those masses. I begin with an account of the Revolutionary discourses on language and the nation which promoted their congruence as a corollary of the advent of French, so-called, 'civic' nationalism. I then examine the extent to which discourses on language and the nation led to structural/institutional developments and actual policy-induced sociolinguistic change, or not, from the nineteenth century until WWII, and I consider the consequences in terms of popular attitudes to sociolinguistic developments and actual language use. The discussion first focuses on the construction of the heterogeneous discourse on language and the nation at the time of the Revolution and during the Third Republic and then moves on to other factors underpinning language shift, institutional or not, between the 1880s and WWII. Structural/institutional developments and the importance of non-institutional and/or unplanned factors for language maintenance and shift in Corsica will be considered in detail in chapters 6 and 7.<sup>129</sup>

In the final part, I examine French politics and the political economy of language since WWII. I show that the domestic and international politics of the French language, which had hitherto followed parallel paths, converged in the 1960s under the pressure of a number of socio-economic, political and cultural internal and external developments. These developments catalyzed glottopolitical change as a reaction to growing feelings of sociolinguistic insecurity and loss of image (Ager, 1999). On the international scene, these developments included the demise of French as the international language, decolonization, and the creation of *Francophonie*. Internally, they included the phenomenon known as *franglais* and the language protectionist reaction it triggered, regionalism and sub-national cultural/linguistic demands, and the political and (relative) cultural devolution that ensued. After this broad contextualization, I analyze a corpus of legislative measures on the French

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<sup>129</sup> For reasons of space, I do not tackle the issues linked to the sociolinguistic developments of French in its colonial empire here.

language and on the RMLs, as well as divisive language debates, e.g. over the ratification of the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* (1999). I show that French language politics and discourses and the various language policies of the 1990s seem to have evolved in contradictory directions, and argue that the French case constitutes an interesting illustration of the difficulty of transcending essentialist approaches to language, identity and the nation, and their interrelations, inherited from the Revolutionary period.

*Language Reification and Totemization: The Politics of the French Language in and out of France before the Revolution (1539-1789)*

In his oft-cited *Reflection on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Anderson (1983) locates the emergence, or rather invention, of national forms of consciousness as a consequence of the gradual waning of Christendom and the dynastic realm. The rise of national languages from the 16<sup>th</sup> century thus coincides with the progressive decline of the political hegemony of Christendom and its unifying language Latin, facilitated and accelerated by the Reformation, and then the Counter-Reformation, and later by 18<sup>th</sup>-century rationalist secularism. Later, national vernaculars also benefited from the growing importance of the 'mass nation' as an alternative source of political legitimacy as divinely-ordained legitimacy slowly declined. Anderson also points to other important catalysts and consequences of sociopolitical and sociolinguistic change favouring the promotion of national languages: the advent and exponential development of print capitalism<sup>130</sup>, the rise of an increasingly educated, urban middle class and the spread of bourgeois mercantilism facilitated by the extension and multiplication of trade routes, and the more systematic use of vernaculars in the increasingly centralized administrative structures of developing states (regarding the significance of bureaucracy, see also Giddens, 1984, quoted in May, 2001: 64).<sup>131</sup> Anderson particularly insists on the prominence of the printing revolution as an overarching determinant factor of change. Although he recalls that

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<sup>130</sup> Printing did not only favour state languages though and also facilitated the publication in local languages of literary and religious works aimed at educating and evangelizing the province (Bell, 2001: 173 and 187-189).

<sup>131</sup> In France, the expansion of the royal administrative structures from the 13<sup>th</sup> century progressively covered the Languedoc (13<sup>th</sup> century), Brittany (1532), Béarn (1621), Flanders (1684), Alsace (1685), Roussillon (1700), Lorraine (1748), Corsica (1768) and Nice (1860) (see Grau, 1992: 94 and Bell, 2001:274, note 5).

the development of administrative languages preceded both religious decline and the printing revolution<sup>132</sup>, he underlines that the progress of printing techniques largely laid the bases for national consciousness, as communication and transactions became faster and easier, and as printing required the increased fixity of the language (Anderson, 1983: 41-45).

In France, the usefulness of a common 'national' language as an auxiliary for state building was understood at an early stage. The first important action on language is usually regarded as François 1<sup>er</sup>'s *Edit de Villers Cotterêts* (1539), establishing that all public dealings (i.e. legal and administrative documents, notarized acts, contracts, etc) should henceforth be written in the '*langage maternel françois*' and no longer in Latin: French thus became the state/administrative language, and this measure initially targeted Latin rather than regional/local 'languages'.<sup>133</sup> Arguably, although the promotion of a state language increasingly served the centralization of power from the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the equation of language with *the nation* mentioned in chapter 1 was yet unrealized and not even anticipated. What mattered for the consolidation of the King's political power was that all subjects should endorse the motto '*one faith, one law, one king*' (Peyre, 1933: 10) and:

[...] [although] *the existence of a unique administrative language is an element favourable to the organization of the state which has attained a certain level of centralization [...] linguistic unity is not to be imposed on peoples speaking different languages who live under the same sovereign.* (ibid, 217)

France at the time was what Gellner describes as an 'agro-literate' society, i.e. where '*the state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining peace [...] and has no interest in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.*' (1983:10). The

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<sup>132</sup> On the early spread of French as the administrative language, see for instance Poignant (2000: chapter 1)

<sup>133</sup> This formula is usually accepted as meaning the language spoken in the Kingdom of France so that the edict is seen as the birth of 'country-wide' language planning (for another interpretation of the expression's meaning as referring to the respective regional languages within the *territory* under the king's rule, see Peyre's thesis (Peyre, 1933, cited by Grillo, 1989a: 22 and Poignant, 2000)).

policy of language unification was therefore more symbolic than effective and it was implemented with caution. Although subsequent edicts confirmed official monolingualism in French in 1563 and 1629 (Grau, 1992: 94; Bell, 2001: 171), a large measure of bilingualism was tolerated (Grillo, 1989a: 28).

In addition to being *one* domestic factor in the consolidation and spread of the King's administrative and fiscal power, and one important factor in the development of the mercantile, increasingly self-aware middle class, more drastic French language status change was taking place on the European scene. The gradual demise of Latin had created a vacancy for a dominant European language which, it was increasingly understood, would bolster political hegemony, and the developing 'national' vernaculars - French, German and to a lesser extent Italian - joined the contest (Calvet, 2002: 29-35). The terms and stake of the conflict articulated around the so-called intrinsic linguistic values of each competing language which were seen as depending on their alleged etymological relation with the idealized, superior, pre-Babel unique language. Beyond linguistic disputes, however, Calvet argues, was a struggle for political and linguistic hegemony between the European dynastic families, i.e. the French-speaking Valois-Angoulême *versus* the German-speaking Habsburg (ibid). What is important here is the embryonic theorization of language superiority - the construction of language hierarchies based on formal characteristics - as a corollary of political disputes and a prolegomenon justifying colonization, whether internal or external.

The theorization of the superiority of French was asserted on two mutually reinforcing fronts in the seventeenth century. On the internal front, the hegemony of the '*langage maternel françois*' was further consolidated through language institutionalisation and corpus development measures: the creation in 1635 by Richelieu of a body responsible for standardizing and elaborating the language by publishing prescriptive tools that would fix the norms of French and its status with respect to other languages of the kingdom: the *Académie Française*. The *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* was published in 1694. Thence notions of a *bel usage* developed, refining domestic sociolinguistic hierarchies and postulating that the variety of French spoken in Paris

(Malherbe) and/or by the Court (Vaugelas) and written by the great literary figures of the time had attained an unheard-of level of formal perfection. Thus, the theorization of formal linguistic perfection created or reinforced geographical 'Paris/province' (Malherbe) and social 'aristocrat/people' (Vaugelas) dichotomies.<sup>134</sup> Likewise, the *Grammaire raisonnée et générale de Port-Royal* (1660) allegedly attempted a 'scientific' description of what constituted the logic of Language (rather than languages). Yet, as Calvet (ibid: 40) shows, the elements of comparison remained limited to very few languages and, under the pretext of comparative analysis, it was sought to prove 'scientifically' that French was the most logical language because its syntax reflected the natural order of logic.

On the international stage, from the seventeenth century and throughout the 18<sup>th</sup> century, French became the unchallenged international language. This was not merely due to its increased standardization, since other national languages had preceded French on that route (e.g. the Italian *Accademia della Crusca* had been created in 1582 and issued its *Vocabolario degli Accademici della Crusca* in 1611). France was dominant economically and militarily, had the largest population of Europe (Schoell, 1936; Braudel, 1986), and Paris was acclaimed as the nucleus of the Enlightenment, of progress, *savoir-vivre*, cultural and artistic production, etc. Through a process of totemization, then, the French language came to embody all these qualities and virtues, so it was 'naturally' adopted in many European courts (from Germany to Russia, via Prussia, Poland and Sweden) as the language of diplomacy, the arts, literature and philosophy, scholarly writing, religion, and in general as the language of communication of European elites (Fumaroli, 2001; Wright, 2004: 121-122).

As many European courts adopted French, the theme of the 'universality' of the French language largely spread (see Montesquieu's and Voltaire's testimonies, quoted in Calvet, 1999: 71). As an illustration, in 1782, the Berlin academy's *concours* invited candidates to reflect on the universalism of the French language: its origins and its prospects. One of the two laureates' essays, Rivarol's, epitomised the

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<sup>134</sup> These dichotomisations paved the way for the language-patois dichotomy underlying post-Revolutionary language policies (see next section).

ideological values attached to French: it is universal because it channels a prestigious, enlightened culture and is the language of a great political power. A second reason has to do with formal characteristics of the language: whereas men are torn between logic and passion, Rivarol argued, French syntax respects the logical order (i.e. it is the 'natural' vehicle of reason), whereas other languages, indulging passion, have unavoidably become corrupted:

[...] *Le français, par un privilège unique est seul resté fidèle à l'ordre direct... la syntaxe française est incorruptible. C'est de là que résulte cette admirable clarté, base éternelle de notre langue. Ce qui n'est pas clair n'est pas français. Ce qui n'est pas clair est encore anglais, italien, grec ou latin.* (ibid: 74)

What was profiled here, through the salience of this heterogeneous discourse on the French language as the (only) natural vehicle of clarity and reason, was the struggle between reason- and passion-oriented philosophies which was to dominate the nineteenth century and ideologically justify internal and external colonisation as a *mission civilisatrice*. The hegemonisation of French among European elites was indeed not uncontested by the time of the Revolution, and in the nineteenth century resisting the dominance of France also meant resisting the French language (Fumaroli, 2001: 18).

To recapitulate, by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, through the combined effects of becoming the state language, the Academy's authoritative norm-setting activities that had taken over the standardization process initiated by printers, the pseudo-scientific conclusions of the *Grammaire* conveyed and furthered in Rivarol's essay, and the prestigious status it had acquired amongst European elites, the French language had become *reified* - thus represented as bounded and autonomous - and *totemized* - embodying in its forms the multifaceted (geographical, social, aesthetic) prestige and the universal (philosophical) values it conveyed<sup>135</sup>. The period covered here thus witnessed the construction of a multifaceted ideology about the French language that is still salient today whenever a new language debate surfaces, as the final part of this

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<sup>135</sup> France has not been isolated in producing a discourse of linguistic superiority justifying linguistic colonialism. Fishman has collected a number of similar discourses in various contexts (Fishman, 1997; quoted by Phillipson, 2003: 214)



chapter shows. Further, this ideology received institutional support and, most importantly, an authoritative language institution developed (i.e. the *Académie*) that helped French displace Latin in a number of diglossic domains, e.g. administration, literature, and has continued to regulate and promote the French language ever since.

In terms of language diffusion, however, the hegemonisation of French largely remained an elite phenomenon, as language education remained the privilege of the aristocracy and the growing urban middle class (i.e. bourgeois and professionals). Arguably, there was no congruence between language and the nation, and the sentiment of national consciousness remained a limited and restrictive notion: the term *nation* was already used in the 17<sup>th</sup> century but as a '[...] *self-description of the bourgeois elements of society.*' (Guiomar, 1974: 28-29), and '*the rest were the people.*' (Smith, 1983:191; both quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29) Yet, importantly, the link between language proficiency in French and social mobility had been established: French was the language of administrative acts, economic (pre-industrial) modernisation and growth, and political power. At the dawn of the Revolution, however, the masses remained largely monolingual in their local dialects.

### *Political Nationalism and Language: The Revolutionary Discourses on Language, the Nation, and Language Planning*

Article 3 of the *Declaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen* (1789) states that: '*Le principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, nul individu ne peut exercer d'autorité qui n'en émane expressément.*' After 1789, for the Revolution to stabilise, the nation had to be enlarged and 'invented': the various provincial peoples had to be politicised and made to imagine themselves as one nation eventually embodied in the monolingual state. The polity already had a state, the revolutionaries then had to proceed to '*the ethnicisation of the polity*' (Grillo, 1980, quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29), i.e. to transform 'newly promoted citizens' into 'nationals'. This implied that all should share and identify with *the* 'national' language.

From a discursive point of view, the revolutionaries could summon the heterogeneous discourse on the superiority of the French language developed during the 17<sup>th</sup> century (see Rivarol's quote in the previous section). To this, the revolutionaries added a new political strand to the discourse on language: French became the language through which the sovereignty of the nation could finally be embodied in the institutions of the *République, une et indivisible* to attain the Enlightenment ideals of '*Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*'. As was suggested in chapter 1, the actualisation of that idealised modern political system promised to generate progress, happiness, welfare, equality, etc, to all those who endorsed its values.

To sketch it briefly, in the republican political ideology, each citizen endorsed a moral and social contract with every other and the sum of these contracts created the nation which in turn was embodied by state institutions. In that process, the emphasis was put on equality and the abolition of any discrimination. To avoid discrimination, the citizen was in direct, unmediated, association with the rest of the nation, through the state structures and institutions (articles 1 and 3 of the *Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen*). No intermediate body was officially acknowledged by the state. One of the consequences of this form of republicanism is that the indivisibility of the people, which guarantees their unity, precludes any recognition of minorities however defined (which would be a form of discrimination). Moreover, equality is interpreted formally and thus implies a uniform treatment. In terms of identity this meant that citizens would renounce their former regional/ethnic identity in exchange for their citizenship. Put in modern political scientific terms, the revolutionaries promoted liberal democracy that valorises individual citizenship rights for their apparent universalism, their protection of fundamental liberal freedoms, and their strict impartiality. Personal and political participation in liberal democracies ends up denying group difference and posits all persons as interchangeable from a moral and political point of view (adapted from Dworkin, 1978 and Young, 1993; cited in May, 2000: 375-376).

At a more practical level, one priority was the diffusion of the revolutionary 'programme' country-wide to inform citizens of their new legal rights and duties (De

Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 303). The first language decrees emerged in 1790 requiring that official texts be translated into the local languages of the territory. The understandable rationale underlying this bilingual policy, however, soon yielded to more radical discourses of linguistic unification and uniformisation. These changes stemmed from the technical and time difficulties of having texts faithfully translated in the great variety of dialects and, more importantly, after the 1793 insurrection of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, etc, from the fear of Counter-Revolution which regional languages were alleged to channel.

Two particularly important discourses significantly set the tone of French linguistic nationalism and have informed French official linguistic philosophy ever since: Barrère's and the Abbé Grégoire's 1794 speeches before the Convention. Both called for the eradication of local languages and the exclusive adoption of the French language. This call was still implicit in Barrère's laudatory speech on the French language and his vilifying portrait of other languages:

*[...] la plus belle langue de l'Europe [...] celle des [...] droits de l'homme et du citoyen [...] chargée de transmettre au monde les plus sublimes pensées de la liberté et les plus grandes spéculations de la politique [...] il n'appartient qu'à elle de devenir la langue universelle [...] la langue italienne doit être laissée aux expressions d'une poésie molle et corruptrice, l'allemande est peu faite pour des peuples libres, l'espagnol est celle de l'Inquisition, et l'anglais celle de la banque et des lettres de change. (Quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 106-107)*

Having fustigated other national languages, Barrère then scathes the idioms of France and takes the example of Corsica to advocate changing policy vis-à-vis these 'languages':

*[...] l'idiome appelé bas-breton, l'idiome basque, les langues allemandes et italiennes [pour respectivement l'Alsace et la Corse] ... ces jargons barbares*

*et ces idiomes grossiers qui ne peuvent plus servir que les fanatiques et les contre-révolutionnaires [...] Le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas-breton; l'émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand; la contre-révolution parle italien, et le fanatisme parle le basque. Cassons ces instruments de dommage et d'erreur.'* (Quoted in De Certeau et al., 1975: 299) [...] *Paoli* [leader of Corsica and founding father of the Corsican nation<sup>136</sup>] [...] *se sert puissamment de la langue italienne pour pervertir l'esprit public, pour égarer le peuple [...] ne vaut-il pas mieux y établir des instituteurs de notre langue que des traducteurs d'une langue étrangère ?* (op. cit.)

In June 1794, Grégoire presented the results of the survey launched in 1790, in his famous report entitled '*Sur la nécessité et les moyens d'anéantir les patois et d'universaliser la langue française*', for which he had sent around questionnaires investigating language behaviour and attitudes. He made his argument for the eradication of local languages even more forceful by presenting quantitative data on language competence and behaviour:

*[...] au moins six millions de Français, surtout dans les campagnes, ignorent la langue nationale; [...] un nombre égal est à peu près incapable de soutenir une conversation suivie; [...] en dernier résultat, [...] ceux qui la parlent purement n'excèdent pas trois millions, et probablement le nombre de ceux qui l'écrivent correctement est encore moindre.* (Quoted by Calvet, 1999: 72)<sup>137</sup>

Not only are various languages differentiated according to their intrinsic qualities but also for the political discourses they serve to convey which, simplistically, are taken to reflect political loyalties.<sup>138</sup> The dichotomies established here echo the ones

<sup>136</sup> Between 1794 and 1796, Corsica under Paoli's leadership had seceded, see chapter 7.

<sup>137</sup> These figures are to be taken with caution though as they add up to 13 millions whereas the population of the time was attested to be around 23 million (e.g. Schoell, 1936; Hobsbawm, 1995: 56).

<sup>138</sup> Against this radical Jacobin position, some Girondine (i.e. federal) voices emerged that denied the intrinsic relation between language behaviour and politic loyalty and advocated linguistic federalism.

mentioned in chapter 1 as a corollary of the modernization discourse. What permeates the vilification of regional languages reified as '*jargon barbares*' and '*idiomes grossiers*' and totemized as the language of '*fanatiques et contre-révolutionnaires*', furthermore, is an ideology of contempt justifying their eradication among '*[...] a peasantry perceived as alien, primitive and incapable of abstract reasoning*' and thus needing to be enlightened (De Certeau *et al.*, 1975:155-169; quoted by Bell, 2001: 180). The linguistic nation was still to be constructed: 'universal' in some European Courts and among educated urban elites, French remained a foreign language for the vast rural masses.

To sum up, what is distinctive in the Revolutionaries' discourses is that they established a durable, coterminous relation between a theory of language and a theory of the nation. That relation expanded the hierarchies established during the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries to include other languages and/or dialects. This ideologically prepared the unification of France, and later the colonial empire. Once these political and linguistic ideologies were clearly established and/or reinforced, policy makers had indeed to translate them into durable and efficient practical measures. Two main channels of language diffusion were identified: 1. education and 2. the development and spread of republican administrative structures to monitor the implementation of the new body of laws.

Regarding education, on account of Grégoire's alarming statistics, one priority was to develop popular education in rural areas, and in particular language education.<sup>139</sup> It was therefore decided to appoint a French-speaking schoolteacher in every non-French-speaking commune of the territory within ten days. However, this rapidly proved unfeasible for lack of qualified teachers (see Grau, 1992: 95 and Furet and Ozouf, 1982, for a detailed account of the spread of literacy in France). In general, the early 1790s saw a profusion of education plans (see the Talleyrand (1791), Condorcet (1792), Le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau (1793), Lakanal (1794) Plans and the Daunou

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Jacobinism nevertheless prevailed and Girondine perspectives were swiftly discarded (Brunot, 1967: 80-83; De Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 280-283; Bell, 2001: 185-186)

<sup>139</sup> Although they were important North-South geographical variations, French had steadily progressed in cities since the 17<sup>th</sup> century, *inter alia* as a result of the development of middle class education (Combes, 1997: chapter 6).

law (1795), summarised in Combes (1997: 70-73)). All fell through, which indicates that the education of the masses aroused significant difficulties and resistance. The final blow to the revolutionaries's mass education discourse was then given by Napoleon who did not share their concern for mass education and focused his education policy on secondary education for elites.

As far as state institutional/administrative structures are concerned, an initial 1794 decree inaugurated what Brunot called the '*terreur linguistique*' (1967: 189), stipulating that all public acts should henceforth be written exclusively in French and that any civil servant caught doing otherwise risked a prison sentence. This decree was rapidly suspended and then excavated again in 1803 (Marchetti, 1989: 108-109). In practice, after threatening civil servants, the state sought to develop a more incentive-based policy and the command of correct French spelling soon imposed itself as the main requirement to obtain any public position and thus became a class marker which favoured the middle classes' access to administrative and bureaucratic power. In the 'less French-speaking South', however, official French monolingualism was often unrealistic to implement. In Corsica, for instance, an imperial decree exempted the island from that measure - thus tolerating official bilingualism - '*jusqu'à ce qu'il soit autrement ordonné [...]*' (it was repealed in 1852). Overall, despite apparent inconsistency and confusion in law making, the important recruitment conditionality requiring the mastery of French spelling was permanently adopted in 1805 and reinforced in 1833 (i.e. Guizot Law) (Ager, 1999: 129). This conditionality was unevenly applied though and, as Marchetti recalls, in Corsica official instructions required *some* proficiency in French. (Marchetti, *ibid*)

During the nineteenth century, the revolutionary discourses of *mass* instruction largely failed to be implemented because of the lack of resources and political will. From Napoleon's rule, under the Restoration (1815-1848), the Second Republic (1848-1852) and then the Second Empire (1852-1870)<sup>140</sup>, primary and secondary education structures multiplied but, as education was neither free nor compulsory, they served the privileged classes only. Thus the growing, already French speaking,

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<sup>140</sup> For an overview see Furet and Ozouf (1982) and Combes (1997: chapter 8).

urban middle class continued its acquisition of French, responding to new job incentives and ultimately providing the French-speaking workforce needed in the rapidly developing bureaucratic system<sup>141</sup>, in its various new domains of state intervention (e.g. transport, communication) and in the growing domestic economic market (Balibar et Lapporte, 1974; Higonnet, 1980). Regarding free and compulsory popular (i.e. primary) education, not until the Third Republic did a genuinely efficient education policy accelerate *massive* French language diffusion (Calvet, 1974 and 2002: 226-227). Initially, the restricted scope of language education reinforced social inequalities and the power positions of the already French-speaking middle and upper classes.

### *Language Wars? Education Policy under the Third Republic (1870-1939)*

In 1864, the Duruy country-wide language survey was launched which underscored hugely different levels in proficiency above and beneath a diagonal '*running from Saint-Malo to Geneva*', at the south of which illiteracy rates remained much higher than in the north (Weber, 1979: 309). Weber stresses the discrepancy in literacy rates between rural and urban areas and argues that the provision and quality of education did not sensibly modify until the turn of the century (Weber, 1979; quoted by May, 2001: 160). Finally, the survey also indicated huge discrepancies among southern *départements* and that Corsica belonged to the five departments where more than 90% of the population did not know French (De Certeau *et al.*, 1975: 270-272).

The efforts to accelerate the acculturation process *inter alia* through public education were therefore redoubled: new budgets were voted, new schools opened and the material conditions and salaries for schoolteachers improved. However, it is with the 1880s policies of free, compulsory and secular school education known as the *Lois Ferry* that French spread more rapidly. Interestingly and significantly, Jules Ferry - the acclaimed architect of French nation building through education in French mainstream historiography - was also the theoretician and minister in charge of

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<sup>141</sup> Hobsbawm indicates that '*Mid-nineteenth-century Europe witnessed a rapid increase in state expenditures and the size of state bureaucracies [...] Between 1830 and 1850, public expenditure increased by 40% in France [...] (1995: 229; quoted by Anderson, 1983: 112)*

colonial expansion. Ferry's several hats were no quirk and the discourse of France's *mission civilisatrice* - which epitomised all the revolutionary positions on language and language planning - legitimated both French hegemony at home and the colonial enterprise. In view of the uneven knowledge of French across regions which was alleged to lie behind the persistent fragility of the new republican regime, the need to spread the French language was keenly felt and equally applied at home and abroad.<sup>142</sup>

As in 1793, the republican regime was indeed fragile and weakened by various anti-Republican forces (amongst them monarchists, ecclesiastical authorities, Bonapartists) and certain provincial elites inclined to cultural regionalism and in some cases, like Brittany and the Basque country, to regional separatism (Poignant, 2000: 103). The conquest of inner France remained incomplete and republican schoolmasters - *les hussards noirs de la République* - were to play a prominent role. To counterbalance the forces of opposition and succeed where the revolutionaries had failed, republican school was to be compulsory, secular, and free<sup>143</sup>. Moreover, article 14 of the application decree for the 1881 Education Law reiterated the 1853 imperial language-in-education provision that: '*le français sera seul en usage à l'école*' (Fusina, 1994: 64).

Various historiographies of education policies and practices during that period offer contrasting views on schoolteachers' management of multilingualism though. For a long time, 'regionalist' discourses (e.g. *Front Régionaliste Corse* [FRC], 1971; see also Poignant, 2000) have claimed that the use of regional languages, or *patois*, was systematically, severely repressed by schoolmasters through a range of punishments and measures of humiliation (for attested evidence, see Helias, 1975: chapter 4; Calvet, 1974: 229). A recent study by Chanet (1996) - *L'école républicaine et les petites patries* - offers a more qualified account<sup>144</sup>. Chanet based his research on

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<sup>142</sup> The network of the *Alliance française*, the institution in charge of diffusing French linguistic ideology and the French language in the colonies, was created in 1883 (Bruézière, 1983).

<sup>143</sup> Yet, even when education became free, Weber (1979) writes, school truancy remained high in rural contexts where child labour on the farm long remained a necessity.

<sup>144</sup> See also Agulhon (1988), Thiesse (1999) and Lacorne et Judt (2002: chapter 1).



interviews with schoolmasters and pupils of the schools of the Third Republic and the analysis of the contributions of many schoolmasters to the rich pedagogical debate that emerged and was published in educational reviews in the late nineteenth century and flourished until WWII (see also Martel, 1992: 115-117).

Recalling that schoolmasters were typically recruited at the county level, Chanet reports that many praised the local cultures and used the 'dialect' as an auxiliary to the learning of French, not as a subject but as a medium of instruction. The two schools of thought - for the radical prohibition of local languages or for their use to supplement French language teaching and avoid alienating pupils - actually coexisted amongst schoolteachers, academics and education officials (Chanet, 1996: 216-234). Moreover, he adds that if the former view was hegemonic in certain regions like Brittany and the Basque country, where separatist struggle was fiercer, until the late nineteenth century, broadly speaking the general tendency was reversed from the 1920s, reflecting the more liberal approach to the issue at the national level and the increasing participation and influence of schoolmasters in the pedagogical debate on the instrumentalist use of local languages (*ibid*; see also Fusina, 1994: chapter 4)<sup>145</sup>. Notwithstanding, as Jaffe (1999) points out, this dichotomisation of the French 'language' versus the local 'dialects' reinforced French linguistic ideology of superiority. After all, as a mere auxiliary, the dialect could but remain a less prestigious form than 'the language': the language was written, codified and channeled a prestigious body of literature, etc. The dialect was fragmented and geographically varied, essentially used orally and did not have a *literature* (except essentially religious writings which Jesuits had translated or written in local languages; see Bell, 2001: 187-190).

All this illustrates the discrepancy between the radicalism of the official discourse (largely shaped during the most radical times of the Revolution) and the reality of educational practices by schoolmasters uneasily acting as mediators between the local and the national in an evolving ideological and political, and sociolinguistic context.

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<sup>145</sup> This liberalisation undoubtedly also mirrored the massive spread of French throughout the territory (see below).

Their pedagogical philosophies and practices under the Third Republic often departed from the radical official discourse and largely respected the plurality of identities: to many, love of the *petite patrie* and the *grande patrie* were not incompatible. Besides, official policies became somewhat more liberal between the beginning and the end of the Third Republic as a function of broader socio-political and socio-cultural change. Overall, Chanet's work tones down the systematic, deliberate plan of cultural and linguistic genocide often uncritically attributed to republican schools and schoolmasters even though it does not question that, liberal though some schoolmasters may have been, they did promote a French linguistic ideology of language hierarchy. (Chanet, *ibid*: chapters 6 and 7; Poignant, 2000)

Finally, this study also reminds us that, central as the role of official discourse and the school may have been, other socioeconomic and social psychological factors weighed in favour of language shift, including the popular will to be associated with the new political, economic and socio-cultural orders. As Ozouf summarizes it:

*[...] ce n'est pas l'école seule qu'ils ont dans leur camp, mais les lumières de la ville, les rêves des parents, la culture de la réussite, la religion de l'utilité. C'est donc la société tout entière qu'il faut accuser de logique meurtrière à l'égard des langues minoritaires. Non les maîtres eux-mêmes, en posture trop commode de boucs émissaires.* (Ozouf, 1996, preface to Chanet, 1996: 12)<sup>146</sup>

Ozouf emphasizes social psychological change and argues that popular perceptions of the benefits of language shift and the unavoidability and/or desirability of modernisation processes are equally important alongside ideologies, official discourses, policies and plans. Weber's aforementioned detailed study of the *Modernization of Rural France* under the Third Republic shows that central factors of modernisation included demographic growth, industrialisation and massive urbanisation and increased geographical mobility in general, compulsory conscription

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<sup>146</sup> For a similar argument, see also Brookes and Brice Heath (1997; quoted by Mar-Molinero, 2000: 72-73) and Hélias (1975: chapter 4)

(1905) and enhanced patriotism during WWI, the spread of literacy, the growth of the press, and then of the media (Weber, 1979).<sup>147</sup> In brief, planned and unplanned factors participated in nation-building processes and people were often willing to acculturate and acquire literacy to get on the train of modernisation. In Marxist historiographies of nation-building processes, the question of the spread of literacy is of course viewed as a planned effort from ruling classes to create the necessary workforce to reproduce their domination; people did not acculturate by free choice - the modernisation thesis - but because they were manipulated to do so by hegemonic discourses. (Hobsbawm, 1990; Bourdieu, 1991)

As was indicated in chapter 1, however, modernisation processes did not entail the unconditional language acculturation of the masses and language shift. First, as we saw, they did not take place evenly throughout the territory. Second, and relatedly, various patterns of resistance to the disturbing effects of so-called economic 'modernisation' and the hegemony of French republican nationalism also flourished, notably through the valorisation of local cultures and the interest in folklore, traditions and rural knowledge induced by the Romantic movement throughout the nineteenth century<sup>148</sup>. Despite French nationalist discourses and the demands of a modernising society that eventually seriously undermined the value of local cultures and languages on the newly created dominant symbolic and material markets, forms of cultural and sometimes political regionalism also emerged that contributed to preserve dominated cultures. The revival of local cultures did not systematically lead to political demands for statehood. Yet, in some cases like Brittany and Corsica, they became salient and sociopolitically significant in the interwar period and again from the 1960s, as they catalysed significant popular support at times when these regions resented the action, or lack thereof, of the central state (see chapters 6, 7 and 8)<sup>149</sup>. In turn, this led to a

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<sup>147</sup> See also Agulhon (1988: 172-173).

<sup>148</sup> This is not to say that the romantic valorisation of local cultures had essentially economic determinants, but I endorse the view that economics play a role in the dormancy or salience of regionalist/autonomist/nationalist 'culturalist' movements (Nairn, 1977). The political economy of language maintenance and language shift in the nineteenth century and the related role of Romanticism will be further explored in chapters 6 and 7.

<sup>149</sup> For Bourdieu, the supposed readiness to abandon one's own cultural heritage for material reasons - so-called 'individual rational choices' in modernisation theory - is the response to a form of symbolic violence and therefore morally indefensible. There may seem to be no objective moral position on this topic as the value of one's cultural heritage varies across individuals. Yet, whereas it was in the interest of dominant classes to abandon local uses in exchange for other forms of capital, arguably, lower

gradual and modest recognition of the value of regional cultures and languages and their eventual tolerance in education, as the next section will show. Finally, Giordan argues that local languages also survived because the elites did not want the local population to become completely acculturated, which would undermine their local dominance (1992: 129-144). Put cynically, hegemony requires perpetuating inequalities.

To summarise the argument so far, this chapter has illustrated the discursive continuity between the *Ancien Régime* and the Revolution through to WWII regarding the linguistic superiority and universalism of the French language and, at the same time, the inevitable stigmatisation and exclusion of other languages and/or dialects. I showed that the construction of linguistic superiority and universalism resulted from a double process of reification and totemization - itself supported by discursive and institutional means - which both reflected and furthered French economic, political, artistic, literary, domination in Europe. As a result, French became the dominant international *lingua franca* until WWII (Gordon, 1978 and see below). With the advent of the Revolution and the politicisation of the masses, the French language became a stake in gaining political legitimacy and stability and of national identity in a mass nation. The discourse about the universalism of the French language was again couched in evolutionary terms that legitimised its mission to *civilise* the 'primitives': both the unenlightened French people<sup>150</sup> and more external 'savages' in the colonies from the Third Republic.

Through these processes of reification and above all totemization, successive regimes have thus conflated theories of political legitimacy based on the sovereignty of the nation with theories of language in a way whereby unity and uniformity of the language and of the nation are mutually constitutive and reinforcing: 'one language = one nation'. In its social constructivist guise, the equation reads: one (superior)

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classes incited to reason in the same way were not rewarded in the same way. Hence the un-kept promises of the modernisation discourse, with its language shift corollary, may legitimise the academic chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9.

<sup>150</sup> In that connection, it is significant that Weber's opening chapter is entitled 'a country of savages' (1979).

language must *become* the unique language of one (superior) nation, whose mission is also to spread its values by spreading the totemized language that embodies and best serves them.

French nationalism is thus just as essentialist as German nationalism in that it rests upon the equation of a conception of a reified language which is the totem of a monolithic, uniform and all encompassing nation (as opposed to just an elite nation). The difference is that nationality can be acquired and must be diffused whereas in the German model it is a given and remains exclusive. Although German imperialism is also justified as based on superiority, this is a superiority grounded on racial particularity.

Moreover, as was underscored in chapter 1 and above, even under its *post hoc* guise, socially-constructed linguistic 'essentialism' always refers to a language which is not 'nobody's language' and so everyone's: it is the language of what Smith calls the *lateral* 'ethnie', that develops around a centralised state and is confined to a social and political elite (1986: chapter 4; quoted in May, 2001: 71 & 89). Linguistic 'civic' essentialism, in that it articulates around a process of totemization, which itself is based upon the values of a particular group, inevitably contains 'ethnic elements of identification'. This group is a partially ethnically- partially socially-defined group, i.e. the pre-revolutionary (elite) French nation.

The second point that emerges from the argument so far is the large discrepancy between official discourses and their derived policies and plans on the one hand, and the implementation of such plans both domestically and in the colonies on the other. In effect, the mass instruction advocated by the revolutionaries to construct a genuinely all-encompassing nation based upon the aforementioned ideological principles did not begin to materialise for the masses until the Education laws of the Third Republic. Even then, a significant discrepancy remained between official instructions and their implementation: the process of language education remained slow, socially divisive and geographically uneven, both catalysing and enabling

resistance to acculturation. As a result, Chanet (1996: 205-206) indicates, local bilingualism persisted at least until the 1930s. In the colonies, where language planning started almost at the same time as in metropolitan France, the process also fell short of being massive and only applied to colonised elites that mediate between colonial authorities and the population (see Calvet, 2002: chapter 11, for actual rates of literacy in Western Africa one and half centuries after the beginning of the *mission civilisatrice*). Notwithstanding, by denoting a French-speaking empire, and inasmuch as French was the international language at least until WWI and largely dominant until WWII, French retained a lot of the prestige acquired in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century until recently (for the domestic impact of the demise of French linguistic dominance in the world, see next section).

Third, I have highlighted the importance of other factors leading to language shift but have claimed that, planned or unplanned, they failed to eradicate the linguistic diversity targeted by the revolutionaries and later Third Republic officials. Despite overall massive language acculturation, a number of regional languages survived alongside French. As the dominant linguistic market was unevenly created in certain regions, an alternative linguistic market survived and/or was created which secured the survival of these languages. In a number of cases, e.g. Brittany, Corsica, this unachieved acculturation and the growing opposition to the dominant discourses and the political hegemony of the centre entailed the cyclical rise of regionalist movements. For Corsica and Brittany, the first movements emerged during the Third Republic but were eventually de-legitimised by their alleged or actual associations with foreign interests in the interwar period (Corsica and the Irredentist movement) and during WWII (Brittany and the collaboration of certain regional activists with the Nazi regime). They re-emerged in the 1960s, but in a different socioeconomic, cultural, political and discursive context to which the next sections now turn.

The processes of modernisation - including industrialisation and exodus - initiated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century significantly accelerated in the interwar period and even more so after WWII. Their effect on language use and shift was emphasized above. By the time WWII broke out, France had become globally French-speaking. In many regions, RML family transmission had ceased even in the country. In many others, it still existed but was increasingly in jeopardy. With accelerated modernisation and the colonisation of the spaces of orality (still hitherto largely occupied by local modes of expression) by the media after the war, language shift accelerated exponentially.

The post-WWII period was indeed called the *Trente Glorieuses* to signify that the years 1946-1975 were years of drastic economic and sociocultural change (Fourastié, 1979). Fourastié's book's subtitle *la révolution invisible* refers to rapid demographic change and unprecedented economic growth, hinging on massive rural exodus as rural, agricultural France turned into an urbanised, mass-consuming, tertiary society. Beyond averaged national statistics, a very uneven picture emerges though, separating France into two halves, above and beneath a Brest-Marseille diagonal (comparable with Weber's St Malo-Geneva diagonal above and see how the map of RML activism overlaps with economic underdevelopment in France below). Above this line, France was rapidly industrialising and modernising. Beneath it, it remained more agricultural and poorer. Moreover, economic backwardness and rising unemployment (due to the decreasing competitiveness of traditional products) were driving people away from their original regions. Dayries and Dayries (1986: 15) indicate that between 1954 and 1962, depopulation affected 20 *départements*. Already in 1947, French geographer J.F. Gravier could talk about 'Paris et le désert français.' (Gravier, 1958) To respond to this unbalance, the state began a prudent double regional policy of economic planning and political *déconcentration*.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> The term *devolution* unsatisfactorily renders the distinction in French between *déconcentration* (i.e. the process whereby state authority is exerted by state representatives in regions rather than in Paris) and *décentralisation* (i.e. more authority is granted to regional, non-state, actors). In what follows I will

In the 1960s, the pressing need to reduce growing economic and demographic disparities between Paris and the southern and western regions entailed more top down regionalisation: regions progressively emerged as new economic and administrative strata to which some state authority was devolved. By the late 1960s, the reshaped Socialist Party made devolution one of its electoral battle-horses. After the 1981 socialist victory, regional entities slowly gained new powers and responsibilities, so that devolution partially accommodated regionalist demands (Keating, 1985), but these debates have remained highly controversial because of the aforementioned deeply ingrained idea that any form of division between the citizen and state authorities (centralised or deconcentrated) is a threat to national integrity. Less rigid attitudes have nevertheless surfaced among certain national political leaders, as the debates around the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs* and the Matignon negotiations analysed below show.

Meanwhile, bottom up regionalist movements surfaced longing for more devolution (Dayries and Dayries, 1986). The political salience of regionalist movements in the 1960s/1970s was a Europe-wide phenomenon and many movements developed political agendas emphasizing their self-perception as peripheries exploited and/or abandoned by their respective cores. Sub-state nationalist rhetoric drawing on the centre-periphery theory of *internal colonialism* could then appeal to decolonisation discourses.<sup>152</sup> In France, Occitan activist Robert Lafont diffused the thesis and the Socialist Party in opposition even endorsed it at its 1966 national congress<sup>153</sup>. As decolonisation became the orthodoxy, territorialized groups that considered they had been treated like colonies felt legitimate in claiming various forms of autonomy or 'home rule'. This discourse was especially topical in the post-1968 anti-centralisation atmosphere and at the dawn of De Gaulle's failed attempt to reform regionalisation

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use *devolution* for *décentralisation*, and keep *deconcentration* as a synonymous of state power's relocation.

<sup>152</sup> On the relationship between uneven economic development and nationalism, see Nairn (1977); for 'regional' case studies, see Lafont (1967) for Occitanie; Front Régionaliste Corse [FRC] (1971) for Corsica; Hechter (1975) for Wales, Scotland and Ireland; McDonald (1989) for Brittany.

<sup>153</sup> See the report its leader's – Michel Rocard – entitled *Décoloniser la province* (1966). On the relations between regionalist movements and the socialist party between 1966 and 1991, see Giordan (1992: 129-144).



within regional assemblies<sup>154</sup>. As was noted above and will be seen in chapters 6 and 7, the thesis of internal colonialism is linked to uneven economic development and found a favourable echo in such underdeveloped regions as Corsica in the early 1970s. Underdevelopment thus contributed to increasing popular support for autonomists' economic, political and cultural claims. In turn this led to more RML planning as a state strategy to defuse swelling political tensions (see below in this chapter and chapter 8).

Two important external and internal developments determined France's language policy making from the 1960s. The first had to do with the waning of French language status on the international scene due to the rise of English. The international status of French constructed in the seventeenth century was relatively unchallenged even by France's political opponents until WWI when English was also used in the Versailles Treaty (1919) (although opposition to France was sometimes paralleled by opposition to French). Its decline as the preeminent international language accelerated with decolonisation processes after WWII and has continued ever since, proportionally to the rise in power of the US and English. Relatedly, feelings of growing insecurity linked to the 'Americanisation' of French society and the phenomenon of *franglais* - a corollary of a wider cultural phenomenon - emerged. Second, the international status of French also suffered through decolonisation. Before the creation and growth of *la francophonie* from the 1960s, and its subsequent discursive construction as the alternative to ultra-liberal, English-only globalisation in the 1990s, decolonisation was initially experienced as another blow to the French language since within twenty years France lost most of her colonial possessions. In the following sections I analyse the consequences of these changes on French glottopolitics.

### *Language Insecurity, Palliative Language Institution Building and Language Legislation*

The threat to French pre-eminence was felt at an early stage and the first institution of defence and promotion of the language was created in 1937 (Ager, 1999: 102; Wright, 2004: 122). Feelings of linguistic insecurity then re-emerged in the mid-1960s and, as

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<sup>154</sup> A further consequence was that the wide diffusion of this discourse throughout European minority contexts strengthened the trans-regional links established at the turn of the century and re-actualised in the 1950s (Fusina, 1994).

De Gaulle launched his manifold policy to restore *la grandeur de la France* (notably against American dominance and through French hegemony in the EC), he inaugurated a new era of institution-building for the French language. The founding institution was the *Haut comité pour la défense et l'expansion de la langue française* (1966) that later split into the *Délégation générale à la langue française* (DGLF) and the *Conseil supérieur de la langue française* (1989). Their role has been to defend and, significantly, to promote French against the threat of English both at home and abroad, in terms both of its corpus and status. Since 1995, they have been seconded by officially-approved 'civil' associations, i.e. *Défense de la langue française* (DLF) (1958 ; housed by the *Académie Française*), *Avenir de la langue française* (1992), *Droit de comprendre* (1994), etc.

This institutionalisation responded to the so-called massive invasion of French by English expressions and the rise of a mixed code: *franglais*. Certain intellectuals denounced the bastardization of French at an early stage (Etiemble, 1954; see Noguez, 1991, below). Etiemble's widely-echoed manifesto against *franglais* made subsequent recommendations for the state to take legal measures to thwart the 'decline of French', which led to: 1. The creation of the *Haut comité* and of terminology committees in all ministers to propose alternatives to the use of English<sup>155</sup>; 2. the Loi Bas-Lauriol (1975), the first significant law on the status of French<sup>156</sup>. The themes of invasion and decline have never waned since and countless publications have developed them, often authored by well-known public figures. Noguez - chair of *Avenir de la langue française* in 1993 - published *La colonisation douce* in which he denounced:

[...] *a form of colonisation, agreeable and friendly but highly destructive* [...] [which] *had forced the French to believe in their own inferiority* [...] [affecting] *those who are socially and culturally least able to defend themselves: those in the lower social groups and the worst educated.*' (Noguez, 1991; cited in Ager, 1999: 107-108)

<sup>155</sup> Most of the legal measures taken on the French language since the 1970s have to do with the official publication of thematic terminology. See <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/SardeUneRubriqueBase?num=25200000>; accessed January 1<sup>st</sup> 2005.

<sup>156</sup> This was the first *law*, rather than edict or decree, on the French language in French sociolinguistic history, which attests to the new approach adopted by the state on status issues.

Similarly, Maurice Druon - permanent secretary of the *Académie française* and as such member of the *Conseil supérieur de la langue française* - wrote a *Lettre aux français sur leur langue et leur âme* (1994), warning them against the continuing impoverishment of the French language and its consequences: '[...] *l'irrespect de la langue traduit l'irrespect de tout,*' and that '*la France ne saurait conserver son rang de grande puissance, et mener une politique mondiale que si elle continue de disposer [...] de la maîtrise d'une langue universelle.*' (1994: 23-39; quoted by Ager, 1999: 231) Variations on the same theme abound on the websites of the aforementioned associations.

Interesting in the above quotes is the denunciation of an implied strategy of brainwashing by American colonialists targeted at those *least able to defend themselves*. Put otherwise, Noguez patronisingly emphasizes the duty of the elites to defend their unaware, attacked population, and Americanisation is portrayed as reinforcing social inequalities, which reasserts the alleged role of French as a weapon against such inequalities. This position recalls both the actual strategy whereby French was first compared to dialects - the glorification/stigmatisation strategy - and totemizes the French/American language relation in terms of then equality/inequalities opposition<sup>157</sup>. Druon's letter's title is interesting in emphasizing the essentialist relation between language and the soul of the nation. Although his argument is about corpus protection, Druon reiterates the revolutionary assumption that the nation is the unmediated sum of the totality of individual language uses finding the language use of *la France* in the sum of individual usages. In turn, this justifies that France should take the necessary measures to conserve her universalism.

Facing such alleged threats, research was conducted to examine if the discourse of invasion was grounded in reality. Hagège (1987: 74) argued that statistical analysis of lexical borrowings revealed that borrowings from English amounted to a mere 2.5% of the whole lexical stock and 0.6% in speech, which seriously undermined the claims of 'invasion'. An investigation of language attitudes in 1988 revealed the French had a generally positive attitude towards English and that although they acknowledged the link between a language and the culture it carries, they did not believe that '[...]

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<sup>157</sup> Kuisel notes the same of dichotomisation of French '*individualism, good taste [...] and above all civilisation*' against American '*[...] vulgarity and [...] Yankee barbarism.*' (Kuisel, 1993: 233).

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*speaking English would result in the adoption of American values.*' (Flaitz, 1988: 191-197) Finally, a 1994 poll surveyed popular reactions and attitudes to the increasing presence of English in the French sociolinguistic panorama and people's evaluation of their own uses (SOFRES, 1994; all surveys cited in Ager, 1999: 102-111). The results show that the majority of French are aware of the increasing presence of English but do not feel that it threatens French and are less idealistic than practical about fostering Americanisms and if they can be useful<sup>158</sup>. They also largely see school and the lack of vigilance by the French as responsible for the alleged impoverishment of the French language. For Ager, this clearly indicates that sentiments of linguistic insecurity vis-à-vis the entrenchment of English in French society are mainly found in *'[...] the literary world and [...] those working on language and culture in government-related organisations or in associations devoted to the defence of French, which tend to see an Anglo-Saxon (i.e. American) plot for world domination.'* (Ager, 1999: 113)

As a result of growing linguistic insecurity, new legislation updated the 1975 Loi Bas-Lauriol. The latter had been largely inspired by Etienne's recommendations and it made the use of French compulsory in commerce, the workplace, official notices and advertising. Despite modifications in 1976 and 1982, following European Commission arguments that its provisions hampered free competition, the law was universally regarded as ineffective because the fines were small and little effort was made to enforce it. In the 1990s, the legal apparatus to protect French was therefore reinforced, first with the modification of article 2 of the Constitution in preparation for the ratification of the TEU (1992) and second through the Toubon Law (1994). Article 2 of the French Constitution was modified and *Le français est la langue de la République* added. This provision vested the French language with constitutional recognition making it a symbol of French identity alongside the flag, national anthem, etc. This consecrated *de jure* a long standing *de facto* situation and inscribed the defence of the French language at the highest level of the French legal hierarchy

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<sup>158</sup> In that connection, Wright shows that, despite government calls for the diversification of the foreign languages chosen by French pupils, English continues to remain the largely dominant first choice. She argues that government efforts can only be successful if they accompany rather than seek to thwart general social trends and notably that English learning is seen as an inevitable necessity to social mobility (2004a: chapter 6).

(whereas as we will see most RML provisions have only regulatory status)<sup>159</sup>. Indirectly, it endowed French with a powerful legal principle against the encroachment of English and other languages (i.e. RMLs) in official, public domains of use. As for the Toubon Law of 1994, which applied the 1992 constitutional principle, it updated and expanded the Loi Bas-Lauriol and has incontestably been the widest-ranging legal measure of language protection in France.

### *The 1994 Loi Toubon: Discourse, Legal Scope and Implementation*<sup>160</sup>

The Legendre Report that preceded the discussion of the Toubon Bill before the parliament recalled the domains of use in which English had gained ground and was threatening French, particularly emphasizing the scientific domain and cultural production, both cinema and radio, and the alleged increasing choice of English by artists because it opens wider markets. In other words, the report opposed a view of culture as the expression of cultural identity and an instrumentalisation of culture in exclusively economic terms. French represented the former approach, based on intrinsic values (channeling universalism and humanism for cultural production) and English was depicted as the agent of '*economic savagery and cultural sterility*.' Facing such a plight, parliamentarians had no choice except to engage protective measures against English attacks and the risk of absorption of French values by the English world (Ager, 1999: 114-115).

Article 1 of the Toubon law recalls that: '*La langue française est un élément fondamental de la personnalité et du patrimoine de la France*.' The meaning of that article is further specified by the Circular of April 12<sup>th</sup> 1994 quoted at the beginning of this chapter. To Fenet, this legally furthers '[...] *l'ethnicisation du lien national et [...] estompe la distinction entre nation subjective et nation objective*.' (2002: 72)

The law imposes the exclusive or dominant use of French in five domains: employment, education, publicity and commerce, the media, and scientific meetings and publication. As for its implementation it is supervised by the DGLF with the

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<sup>159</sup> France is the only country with exclusive reference to only one language in its Constitution. Other national constitutions refer to the differentiated status of other languages as well.

<sup>160</sup> The entire text is reproduced in Annex 2.

collaboration of the aforementioned officially-approved associations for the defense of the French language. In the foreword of its 1996 yearly report, the DGLF states that its actions aim at preserving ‘[...] *le français [qui] est un élément essentiel de notre cohésion sociale*’. (Ager, 1999: 234) Closer analysis in the domains of employment, commerce, media (with quotas of French-language programmes and music) and even education show that behind that honourable purpose actually lie a number of economic protectionist measures (Ager, 1999: 135-141).

Although it is predominantly aimed at safeguarding the status of French in these domains, an important outcome of the Toubon Law has been the development of corpus planning, and in particular the actual implementation of the poorly-enforced use of official terminology by civil servants for fear of career sanctions: ‘*Il est souhaitable que, parmi l'ensemble des éléments dont il est tenu compte pour la notation des agents, soit pris en considération l'intérêt que porte et le zèle que met chacun au respect de la langue française.*’ (Circulaire du 12 avril 1994, relative à l'emploi de la langue française par les agents publics, article 4).

The role of the approved associations has been to oversee the implementation of the regulations of French language use and to inform the DGLF of infractions and/or to act as aggrieved party in justice. Interestingly, the main action of the associations has been to check on the quality of the language, especially in the media, and their reports are exemplars of purist attitudes. Moreover, being independent associations rather than government agencies, their freedom of speech has been less curtailed. The association *Droit de comprendre*, for instance, hosts the *Académie de la carpette anglaise* [English Doormat Academy]: ‘[...] *La Carpette anglaise, prix d'indignité civique, est attribué à un membre des « élites françaises » qui s'est particulièrement distingué par son acharnement à promouvoir la domination de l'anglo-américain en France au détriment de la langue française.*’<sup>161</sup> In terms of corpus-based action, the purist attitudes are usually overt. The DLF, for instance, states as one of its main aims: ‘[...] *Assurer la sauvegarde des qualités qui ont longtemps valu aux Français la précellence au sein des langues européennes, en s'opposant en particulier à*

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<sup>161</sup> Available at [http://www.langue-francaise.org/Actions\\_carpette\\_2004.php](http://www.langue-francaise.org/Actions_carpette_2004.php); accessed January 4<sup>th</sup> 2005.

*l'invasion incontrôlée, et pourtant nuisible, des vocables étrangers.*'<sup>162</sup> Overall, whereas the DGLF has endeavoured to fulfill its mission through information and negotiations rather than court cases, it is clear that the associations' tone is much less diplomatic and amounts to a call to arms. As for their avowed motives, they summon the discourse of language endangerment, identifying both internal and external threats, and present their action as the noblest mission to preserve the integrity and *rayonnement* of the French language. Finally although their membership includes well-known figures from Parisian French academic, literary and scientific milieux, their numerous branches in the French regions attest to the concern of French language-based issues among provincial elites too.

The reception of the Bill and then of the law was very mixed: it was widely supported by elites but the Socialist Party denounced the institution of a 'language police' and the number of offences remains high (Ager, 1999: 143). Overall, the law and its implementation stimulated various negative reactions to the simplistic dichotomies conveyed in the preparation of the law and the purist assumptions during its implementation. As a result, the initial elitist discourse in government communication strategy on language, relayed and amplified by the associations, shifted towards stronger emphases on the rights of speakers of French and the economic advantages of the law (Ager, 1999: 151). However, this should not conceal the fact that, elitist though their representation of the language may be, the ideas propagated by the defence associations remain very deep rooted in France and, as Ager points (ibid: 152): '[...] *there are many very active, self-appointed guardians of the language both in and outside the Associations.*' In the process of discursive shift, more space was also made to justify the law as an example of the defence of multilingualism which was also one dimension present in the associations' discourse against American domination. As the next section shows, this element had long been a core theme of the defence of the status of French on the international scene.

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<sup>162</sup> Available at <http://www.langue-francaise.org/Origine.php>; accessed January 1<sup>st</sup> 2005.



I claimed above that one of the sources of growing linguistic insecurity in France was the collapse of its colonial empire. Somehow, worries were rapidly lifted as several leaders from the former colonies founded an organization aimed at preserving some influence for French in the world: *la Francophonie*. Ironically, at the time of its creation, it appealed little to De Gaulle the goal of whose strategy to maintain the prestige of French against the rise of English was to reinforce French through the EEC. From the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the growing structures and membership of the *francophonie* made it a privileged forum to promote Frenchness. Beyond economic cooperation, the theme of diffusing the French language was co-located with that of contributing to building a more democratic world. Another theme that developed in the 1990s equated the promotion of French with the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the world, against cultural uniformisation through the hegemonisation of English-mediated dominance (Ager, 1996 and 1999; Wright, 2004a: 127)<sup>163</sup>. Arguments against the economic instrumentalisation of culture were also forcefully made in the 1993 GATT negotiations at which France and other countries obtained the recognition of the *exception culturelle* to the advocated reinforcement of ultra-liberalism (Baer, 2003; see also the discussion of the Toubon law above). At the last bi-annual summit of the Francophonie at Ougadougou (November 2004), finally, the defence of cultural diversity was also portrayed as one crucial aspect for achieving sustainable development.

In sum, the creation and growth of the 'French commonwealth' has somehow compensated for decolonisation and maintained some French influence in one of the largest intergovernmental organisations. Although the French language was the initial precondition for membership, this requirement considerably loosened through the years until 1995 when non-French speaking countries were admitted. The organisation then also asserted more political and economic ambitions, although the defence of multilingualism and cultural diversity has become its core discursive battlehorse and France remains its standard bearer, the world champion of cultural

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<sup>163</sup> An early formulation of that thesis can be found in Bruézière (1983).

and linguistic diversity. Vested with this new mission, France thus retains its role of the diffuser of universal values, and the amalgamation of those values with that of the French language itself perpetuates the totemization of the French language incrementally shaped earlier.

Within the EC and then the EU, France also sought to preserve its hegemony at an early stage. If Regulation 1/58 seemed to guarantee language status equality amongst the national languages of member states (see chapter 2), it is not in doubt that the long domination of French in European diplomacy and its continuing privileged position in a number of international organisations (e.g. UN, UNESCO) favoured its *de facto* pre-eminence as the EC's institutional working language. As late as 1971, President Pompidou could declare that: '*French is the natural language of the peoples of Europe, English that of America.*' (Haigh, 1974: 33) De Gaulle's objection to the UK joining the EC for fear that it could be a Trojan horse for American interests was noted above. When Pompidou finally assented to the UK joining, however, Phillipson reports (2003: 54), he demanded:

*[...] that the preeminence of French as the dominant language of EU institutions should remain unchallenged [to which Prime Minister Heath reportedly agreed that] all British civil servants connected to the EU should be proficient in French.*

This dominance gradually vanished as Europe enlarged and new non-French speaking countries acceded. Gradually, English superseded French as the *de facto* institutional working language (Phillipson, 2003: 129-138; see also chapter 2). Several attempts were then made to respond to the technical and financial problems created by EU's *de jure* commitment to official multilingualism and the *de facto* increasing pre-eminence of English in working groups. We mentioned in chapter 2 the aborted proposal by French minister Lamassoure to establish five working languages, including French and English (1994), thus compromising between full multilingualism as equality and reduced multilingualism as reasoned, functional equality. This would have formalised status equality between French and English and perhaps the inevitability of the hegemonisation of Europe on issues of supranational language status. More recently, in October 2004, another campaign was launched by Maurice Druon who sent a

manifesto to have French adopted as the only legal reference language of the EU (*Le Monde*, October 20<sup>th</sup> 2004). As Druon's text claims:

[...] *la langue française, comme jadis le latin, est celle qui offre, grâce à son vocabulaire, sa syntaxe et sa grammaire, le plus de garanties de clarté et de précision, et qui réduit au minimum les risques de divergences d'interprétation.*

Beyond providing another illustration of the perennial heritage of Rivarol, this text singularly departs from the logic of multilingualism to which France has allegedly been committed during the 1990s. If the French government did not officially endorse this text<sup>164</sup>, it cannot deny the 1994 one. The question of the absolute promotion of cultural pluralism and multilingualism, then, can only be seen as an anti-English discursive strategy. It also finds its empirical limits in the way RML issues have been dealt with in France since 1951.

#### *RML Legislation: From Deixonne to Lang (1951-2001)*

Unlike other language legislation, RML legislation has almost exclusively been concerned with acquisition planning, which remained the hot potato of RML rights debates, until the 1999 debates around the *European Charter for RMLs*<sup>165</sup>. The Deixonne Law (1951) was the first legal act granting some (implicit and limited) recognition that RMLs no longer constituted the danger they had been deemed to embody since the Revolution. The law itself reflected more tolerance than the genuine political will to promote RMLs. Initially (i.e. until 1974) the law restrictively applied to Breton, Basque, Catalan and Occitan, excluding Corsica on the ground that Corsican was a dialect of Italian rather than of French. Not only were the provisions

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<sup>164</sup> The text was however signed by high-level politicians from various countries, such as two former heads of state, two prime ministers, and five ministers.

<sup>165</sup> Provisions were also made for the use of RMLs in the media (1982 and 1986 laws respectively on audiovisual communication and freedom of expression). Available at [http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte?fs\\_jour=&fs\\_mois=&fs\\_annee=&fs\\_natu=loi&fs\\_num=&fs\\_nor=&fs\\_jour=30&fs\\_mois=Septembre&fs\\_annee=1986&fs\\_pubjour=01&fs\\_pubmois=Octobre&fs\\_pubannee=1986&fs\\_rech=TIT&fs\\_mot=&checkMot=&checkMotTit=checked&checkMotTitTex=](http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte?fs_jour=&fs_mois=&fs_annee=&fs_natu=loi&fs_num=&fs_nor=&fs_jour=30&fs_mois=Septembre&fs_annee=1986&fs_pubjour=01&fs_pubmois=Octobre&fs_pubannee=1986&fs_rech=TIT&fs_mot=&checkMot=&checkMotTit=checked&checkMotTitTex=); accessed January 3<sup>rd</sup> 2005.

very limited and actually defined in ways that make their fullest implementation unlikely, but the first actual implementation measures were only issued in the late 1960s (Fusina, 1994: 126). Besides, the law's minimal provisions for RML use - one hour a week in primary schools and three weekly hours for a minimum of 10 students in secondary schools, outside normal timetables and on a strictly voluntary basis - granted limited scope for genuine language promotion. The *Commissions Académiques d'Etudes Régionales* constituted in 1966 offered little improvement to the various practical problems linked to RML teaching.

Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law, which reasserted that regional cultures constituted a patrimony to be preserved but with a telling proviso assuming the potential sociopolitical danger of granting some recognition to RMLs and implicitly reasserting the primacy of French: '*Le respect absolu de notre unité nationale ne saurait être remis en cause par une opposition artificielle entre les cultures locales et la réalité nationale qu'incarne l'Etat.*' Notwithstanding, Article 12 stipulated that '*[L'] enseignement des langues et cultures régionales peut être dispensé tout au long de la scolarité.*' The law also provided for teacher training measures but emphasized that such measures should remain voluntary (quoted by Fusina, 1994: 153-155).

The first really influential and more systematic law in favour of RML was undoubtedly the 1982 Savary Circular (text reproduced in Fusina, 1994: 256-264). It established a three year language-in-education plan defining more clearly the role of the state in RML promotion throughout school education. Crucially, it established that the state would henceforth take central responsibility for such promotion, by establishing syllabuses, a pedagogical council, exams and training programmes, by sponsoring research and production of teaching material, and by coordinating actions with civil society organisations (article 1). This marked a significant change for Corsica from the Deixonne Law under which schoolteachers and families had to obtain Corsican language classes with no official support. Article 2 also made RML education a specific, rather than marginal, subject, timetabling up to three weekly hours for it. Article 3 re-emphasized the optional character of such teaching and learning. Finally, most importantly, as a circular aimed at providing guidelines for

interpretation of the Haby Law, it left a large amount of discretion to interpreters in RML communities. The importance of having discretion in legal interpretation was outlined above and will be forcefully illustrated in chapter 8.

In the 1984 and 1989 Laws<sup>166</sup>, it was respectively reasserted that: '*Le service public de l'enseignement supérieur [...] veille à la promotion et à l'enrichissement de la langue française et des langues et cultures régionales*' (article 7) and that '*[...] Les écoles, les collèges, les lycées et les établissements d'enseignement supérieur [...] dispensent une formation [qui] peut comprendre un enseignement à tous les niveaux, de langues et cultures régionales.*' (Article 1) These provisions that echo the 1975 law, nevertheless attest to the political will of the Socialist governments of the 1980s to boost RML promotion (for the implementation of these provisions in Corsica see chapter 8).

Even more significant progress was made during the 1990s, beginning with the creation in 1991 of the IUFM and the extension to RMLs of the *Certificat d'Aptitude à l'Enseignement Secondaire* (CAPES) (analogous to the PGCE in the UK education qualification system). The former enabled primary and secondary schoolteacher training to be provided in a systematic way, remedying one of the major weaknesses of language teaching during the 1970s/1980s. The latter formally put RML training on a par with any academic subject (see chapter 8).

Finally, the 1990s saw the development of bilingual education legislation in France in application of the principles of generalised RML education in the aforementioned successive laws. Yet, the implementation of the law was largely left to the deconcentrated state education authorities - the *Rectorats* - and as chapter 8 further illustrates, implementation varied across regions. Bilingual education was regulated by the *Circulaire Ministérielle No 95-086 du 7 avril 1995: mise en place de l'enseignement des langues et cultures régionales*. The text remained rather vague, leaving significant discretion to its interpreters. In Corsica, for instance, its interpretation/implementation led to both the creation of bilingual sections in a number of schools where French and Corsican were used on a par as medium of

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<sup>166</sup> Relevant excerpts available at <http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/dglf/garde.htm>; accessed January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2005.

instruction, and the creation of a few schools where teaching was articulated around the method of full immersion (chapter 8). Both methods were only fully enshrined in national legislation for other French regions *post facto* through two ministerial orders on August 5 2001 and on April 19th 2002, under the socialist government in which Jack Lang - a notorious supporter of RML rights - was the Education Minister. The lost election of April 20<sup>th</sup> 2002 and the subsequent return of a right-wing government led to the amendment of the orders and the full immersion method was repealed<sup>167</sup>.

Overall, despite limited provisions and slow implementation, the Deixonne Law and its legal offspring marked an apparent discursive shift in French glottopolitics. Although RMLs became legalised and institutionalised in educational settings *ex minima*, the process seemed to put an end to the anti-dialect rhetoric of the Revolution and the Third Republic. In the 1990s, French attitudes towards English-induced corpus change appear to have remained very puristic among certain intellectual elites but less so among the population. In terms of status, the internal dominant discourse shifted from an elitist representation of the language to the defense of people's rights to live in their languages. On the external front, France positioned herself as the champion of cultural and linguistic diversity, both through the *francophonie* network and in the EU, despite certain contradictory moves to reduce multilingualism and impose French within the latter. The real test to this new approach to diversity and the advocacy of multilingualism to preserve the intrinsic values of all cultures came with the debates around the CoE's *European Charter for RMLs*, which the next section briefly analyses.

#### *Diversity and Multilingualism: Debates around the European Charter for RMLs.*

The idea of a charter for RMLs dates back to the late 1970s/early 1980s and was first formally brought forward by the EP in the 1981 Arfé Resolution (see chapter 4). The Charter finally came out in 1992 and entered into force in 1998.

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<sup>167</sup> The texts of these three ministerial orders are available at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/SarDeUneRubriqueBase?num=64230000>; accessed January 2<sup>nd</sup> 2005.

The Charter comprises three main parts. Part I deals with general provisions (including language definitions), part II establishes the objectives and principles to be retained for the application of general provisions, and part III comprises 98 articles regarding language use in education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities and public services, media, cultural activities and facilities, economic and social life and transfrontier exchanges. The meaning and legal scope of the provisions contained in parts I and II were also made explicit in the Charter's explanatory joint report. Signatories must endorse the provisions of parts I and II and choose 35 out the 98 articles, including three articles from the 'education' and 'cultural activities and facilities' headings, and one under other headings. Each heading comprises articles sorted by their degree of constraint.

The debate around the Charter in France has been widely commented on not only in academic writing (e.g. Poignant, 1998 and 2000; Moutouh, 1999; Wright, 2000; De Saint Robert, 2000; Fenet, 2000 and 2002) but also in the press and media. The first stage in the *Charter* 'saga' was Chirac's speech at a banquet in Brittany in 1996 where he lauded regional cultures and pledged to facilitate the signature and ratification of the Charter. After the return of the Socialists to power in 1997, Prime Minister Jospin commissioned a report on RMLs (Poignant Report, 1998) and an expert opinion on the Charter's compatibility with the Constitution from a Professor in Constitutional Law (Carcassonne, 1998). The Poignant Report promoted the idea of republican regionalism as an alternative to the resurgence of regional nationalisms and strongly advocated signing and ratifying the Charter arguing *inter alia* that RMLs no longer constituted a threat to national integrity and that continuing a policy of exclusion could exacerbate regionalisms: '*Le XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle aura à gérer la revendication identitaire. Les républicains doivent le faire. Sinon d'autres s'en chargeront.*' (Poignant, 1998: 20)<sup>168</sup> The Carcassonne Report identified 39 of the 98 articles immediately compatible with the Constitution. Jospin subsequently declared that: '*[...] Le respect et la promotion du pluralisme supposent également que soit reconnue la contribution des cultures et langues régionales à notre patrimoine national [...] Le temps est révolu où l'unité nationale et la pluralité des cultures*

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<sup>168</sup> We saw in chapter 4 that this has now also become a central element of the pro-RML discourse at supranational level (EBLUL, 1/02/03).

*régionales paraissaient antagonistes.*' (September 29th 1998). The Charter was then signed on May 7th 1999. Notwithstanding the Carcassonne Report, Chirac then solicited the Constitutional Council's opinion on the Charter's compatibility with the Constitution to see if a Constitutional revision would be necessary before its ratification. The latter ruled on June 15<sup>th</sup> 1999 that the 38 retained articles constituted no obstacles but that part II's provisions would force the government to deal with the rights of groups and established the right to use a language other than French in public matters: both provisions contravened the Constitution. Finally, Jospin asked Chirac to start of procedure to amend the Constitution accordingly, which Chirac refused to do. Since then, the whole process has stalled.

An assessment of the legal interpretation of the Constitutional Council and its legal critics is beyond the author's expertise (for some contradictory expert legal analyses, see Moutouh, 2000 and Fenet, 2000 and 2002). As was claimed in chapter 1 and illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, legal analysis cannot be completely divorced from political considerations in any case. For our purpose here, I will just emphasize a few points.

First, in its interpretation, the Constitutional Council ignored the proviso in the explanatory report that: '*The Charter does not establish any individual or collective rights for the speakers of RMLs.*' (p.5), and that this proviso was reiterated almost *verbatim* in the government's legal reservation accompanying the Charter's signature: '[...] [le gouvernement] *interprète la charte dans un sens compatible avec le préambule de la Constitution [...] qui ne connaît que le peuple français sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.*'<sup>169</sup> Second, the 38 selected provisions largely overlapped and/or were often less constraining than the legislation current in domestic law (e.g. education and media). Third, where no provisions existed in the RML legislation such as RML use with public authorities, the options retained were the minimal ones and merely established that certain legal texts may be translated into

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<sup>169</sup> A precedent in the use of such a proviso to ratify an international treaty was in 1980 when France ratified the UN's *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (in force from 1976) with the reservation that article 27 on minority rights did not apply in France since there are no minorities (Fenet, 2002: 64).



RMLs (e.g. article 9 on judicial authorities, paragraph 3: '*The parties undertake to make available in the regional or minority languages the most important statutory texts and those relating particularly to users of these languages unless they are otherwise provided.*'). Fourth, the Charter somehow innovates with its final provisions on transfrontier collaboration. We saw above that this is one of the main areas where RMLs have benefited from EU funds (e.g. through the interregional (INTERREG) programmes; see chapters 4, 6 and 8). Finally, the whole textual modality, with such hedges as '*the Parties undertake as far as this is reasonably possible*' and verbs such as '*encourage*' and '*facilitate*', largely preserve the signatories' discretion for implementation purposes. Overall, it seems that the Council of Europe allowed a series of 'diplomatic' textual and discursive devices intent on diminishing the Charter's potentially threatening character. If the main contradictory interpretations had political rather than legal motives then, the importance of the Charter must be measured in ideological terms. I therefore now look at elite and popular responses to the debates and events.

What emerges from the analysis of elite and popular reactions in the media and press is the vociferous character of debates, the polarisation of positions and, most remarkably, that opposition to the Charter substantially echoed Revolutionary rhetoric, both Jacobin (i.e. in favour of a high level of political centralisation) and Girondine (i.e. in favour of a more federal system). On the Jacobin front, best embodied on the left by the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), Jean-Pierre Chevènement stated that granting RML a status would lead to '*balkaniser la France.*' and in a very Manichean approach to the civic/ethnic dichotomy he objected that '*[...] on substitue à la notion de peuple français d'autres concepts plus fumeux qui ont un rapport avec l'origine ethnique*' (Reuters, June 23<sup>rd</sup> 1999). Georges Sarre, echoing Barrère, denounced '*[...] une arme politique [dans les mains] des mouvements autonomistes et régionalistes [qui s'en serviraient] pour favoriser l'éclatement du cadre national et la création d'une Europe des régions.*' (Le Monde, June 24<sup>th</sup>) What is common to these approaches is that they equate RML recognition with the inevitable return to pre-Revolution political and dialectal fragmentation. In that connection, Wright (2000: 420) quotes Gallo (1999) who foresees the break-up of

French society into its old provinces if RML rights were granted and the advent of regional language/English bilingualism in France [sic].

On the Girondine side, the advocates of the Charter fustigate the aforementioned rearguard Jacobin positions (in ways reminiscent of Poignant's arguments p. 171) and redefine linguistic diversity as a vanguard European characteristic, notably against the hegemony of English. Le Drian, spokesman of Breton socialists, for instance, called the Council's decision ' [...] *jacobinisme intégriste et archaïque qui me paraît complètement dépassé.*' (Agence France Presse [AFP], June 24th 1999). Other defenders of diversity like Bayrou, president of Démocratie Libérale, also emphasized the European general approach to diversity, evoking RMLs as ' [...] *un trésor de l'humanité*', and denouncing the French contradictory discourses on diversity at home and abroad, arguing that ' [...] *la défense des langues régionales n'est pas du tout incompatible avec la défense du français, mais au contraire, c'est complémentaire vis-à-vis du rouleau compresseur anglo-saxon.*' Finally, Méhaignerie, former centrist minister declared he was ' [...] *favorable à la Charte européenne*' and that ' [...] *le système uniforme ne correspond plus à notre société.*' (Both in AFP, June 24th 1999) Unsurprisingly, the regionalists reacted violently to the stalemate created by the Constitutional Council's Decision and demonstrations and pledges to continue the struggle emerged in all RML regionalist movements (Wright, 2000: 421).

As for popular reactions, finally, they broadly reflected the discourses of the elites sketched above even though in popular discourse the pro-Charter position seems to have gained some ground between 1999 and 2000. A 1999 CSA/DN survey revealed that 50% were favourable to the Charter and 31% against (July 8<sup>th</sup> 1999). A subsequent poll, after heated debates had cooled down, indicated that 80% would be favourable to its ratification and 79% even if it required a Constitutional amendment (IFOP, 2000)<sup>170</sup>. Overall the debates around the Charter clearly show that, on the one

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<sup>170</sup> These results are provided by the website available at <http://french.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ciral.ulaval.ca%2Falex%2Ffamlxmonde%2Ffrancophonie%2Ffrancophonie.htm>; accessed January 3<sup>rd</sup> 2005

hand, a significant proportion of the French society no longer endorses the radical, exclusive approach to RMLs inherited from the Revolution while, on the other, certain elite circles do perpetuate radical forms of linguistic Jacobinism.

### *Conclusion*

Although the French language became totemized in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, language use only became a litmus test of political loyalty at the time of the Revolution. Thence, the coterminous relation between language and nation became the Revolutionaries' goal: to create a unified nation out of the 'objective' linguistic, cultural and sociopolitical fragmentation characterising the various peoples living on the territory. Once that project was deemed to be achieved, the concept of the nation ceased to be a quest for an inclusive 'coming together' but fossilized into a form of 'being', exclusive of any variation and difference.

The very concept of universalism implies a constant process of spread of values, i.e. linguistic and political ideologies. As was seen, in French history it goes hand in hand with imperialism under a civilizing guise. Moreover, by definition, universalism can of course accept no challenge, and it knows no limits so that any potential check can only be seen as a return to a former, more fragmented and regressive state. The 'essence' of universalism is to be all-encompassing, holistic and indivisible; any divisions, even if merely formal and not at the level of values (i.e. one can speak Breton and endorse the values of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*) is necessarily seen as a challenge to these values because in a totemized approach form and substance are conflated. Hence it is impossible to accept the idea of mixed identities and value systems.

Because it was constructed in opposition to biological (ethnic) loyalties (see also how the biological evolutionary metaphor justifies imperialism) themselves exclusive of other loyalties, French political ideology has become totemized in the political/institutional system as oppositional: divergence/difference is seen as regress

and as opposition. Any admission of divergence/difference, or of the divisibility of the French nation (to put it in the dominant republican metaphor), is a denial of the *République's* very legitimacy *as opposed to* exclusive 'ethnic' systems. Republicanism therefore reproduces the very exclusiveness and intolerance it claims to oppose. Transposed to the sociolinguistic level within a logic where languages are totemized, to acknowledge languages that are clearly identified with some long-standing ethnic culture in the republican domain of legitimacy - the public domain - is to deny republicanism's own *raison d'être* (i.e. to combat the alleged exclusivism and *arrièrisme* of those languages and cultures). As long as the essentialist equation 'one language = one nation = one political system' and its converse 'one political system = [can only have] one nation = [and speak only] one language' prevail, there can be no official liberalization of the RML question in France.

Article 2 of the Constitution, the Toubon Law and the debates around the Charter show that French nationalism has long ceased to be, if it ever was (Smith, 1986), a form of political nationalism, and both language purism (a reified and totemized vision of the 'formal language/clarity/universal values' equation) and the refusal to admit any linguistic diversity are telling evidence of the ethnic essentialism characterizing some proportion of the French society. It is precisely because the French society has sanctified a covert form of 'biological' essentialist approach to political and cultural hegemony that it cannot open up to diversity and become more liberal towards RMLs. In that light, French liberal discourse about multilingualism in Europe is clearly an additional device to promote a French ethnic identity. The fact that it stemmed from linguistic insecurity following the rise of English can only confirm this. In a sense, accepting diversity in France would be tantamount to denying all French political history and the ideological construction of the superiority of French as universal since before the Revolution. Since that ideology is inevitably being forced to evolve in the outer, supranational spheres, the territory of the Republic is increasingly seen as the last redoubt of such values. This eventually results in the contradiction between France's intransigence at home - its monolithic, monolingual and monocultural discourse - and its external pluralist discourse where it serves to thwart the ongoing minoritisation of French in relation to English. As France must

admit that it is no longer *the* dominant world power, it seeks to compensate its international demise through more rigid attitudes at home.

The question of RMLs is therefore stalled at the level of rhetoric as long as political deciders cannot transcend these national/international contradictions and see the unity/diversity relation dialectically rather than as a set of incompatible and radically antithetical (political and cultural) value systems. At the level of practice though, as this chapter has illustrated, the universalisation of the core's dominance has always been very uneven because the different peripheral contexts made the uniform implementation of dominant policies impossible. Consequently, different forms of resistance linked to different histories, geographies, economic resources, and cultural backgrounds, have contributed to maintaining a large number of exceptions to the so-called uniform or indivisible system. This unachieved uniformisation has led to the cyclical rise of resistant forms throughout history when uniformisation under the guise of modernisation seemed to deliver more evils than benefits. It is to such resistant forms in Corsica - seen as the result of unachieved uniformisation (chapter 6) in the context of different cultural histories and loyalties (chapter 7) - that I now turn.

## Chapter 6: Unity and Diversity in Corsica: Patterns of identity and Political Separatism

### *Introduction*

This chapter and the following ones focus on the regional and sub-regional levels. This chapter provides the general backdrop of geographical, socio-psychological and political elements that have contributed to shape Corsican identity and patterns of political loyalty especially since 1769. As indicated in chapter 1 and illustrated in chapter 5, identities are durable and ingrained on the one hand, and plural, inconsistent and shifting on the other. As Bourdieu's sociology has it, identities are shaped by the *habitus* but their actualisations are unstable, contingent and context-dependent. This chapter illustrates the dual, dialectical nature of Corsican identity.

The first part begins with the influence of geography in Corsican perceptions and patterns of identity and political allegiance, pointing to two fundamental factors in identity formation: island-ness and mediterraneity. In the Corsican context, following Corsican anthropologists (e.g. Gil, 1991), I argue that the prominence of localism and local forms of political loyalty, and their political correlate - the rejection of external authority - are fundamental facets of Corsican-ness for certain social groups. Localism has fossilised diversity and maintained social fragmentation, and the rejection of external authority features as an attitude reinforcing separateness. At the supra-local level, the rejection of authority especially expressed as opposition to French hegemony, has helped maintain some Corsican cultural distinctiveness, which was eventually institutionally acknowledged and recognised by the state. At the local level, however, it has undermined efforts to erect an internal, supra-local, pan-Corsican framework of political reference and loyalty.

In the second part, I continue with historical elements that have moulded Corsicans' political identity through their conflict-ridden experience of otherness in general and their contact with French-ness and the French state in particular. I outline economic, demographic and political changes in Corsica between the nineteenth century and the

1960s that have aggravated the social fracture between pro- and anti-French forces on the island and thereby reinforced the local, oppositional nature of the identity of a significant part of the Corsican population. This illustrates that certain elements of identities are also largely the product of historical experience but can become ingrained and durable so that discourses questioning and attempting to reshape them are likely to be resisted, as we shall see in this chapter and chapter 9.

The third part provides a brief sketch of political developments since the 1970s that have transposed the aforementioned divisions between region and state into the local versus the supra-local, thereby nourishing 'natural' inclinations towards defiance and wariness of forms of authority that overflow the local frame of reference. In this enduring, fragmented socio-political context, any form of supra-local planning after the 1980s devolution, including language planning, became subject to contestation by a significant proportion of the population. In turn, inner fragmentation has also considerably limited the potential Europeanisation of the island during the 1990s as the last section shows.

### *Geography and Perceptions of Identity – Corsica's 'Double Insularity'*

Corsica is a Mediterranean island located 90 km west from the Italian peninsula and 170 km southeast from continental France. To Andréani, these two dimensions - insularity and mediterraneity - are fundamental constitutive facets of Corsican identity patterns (1999: chapter 1).

First, insularity crystallises a sense of eternity due to immutable natural borders: Corsica has always existed (Dottelonde, 1989; cited by Jaffe: 1999: 35) and archaeology has recorded human presence as far back as the Neolithic. Second, the lack of territorial continuity - the natural bounded-ness of the island - has favoured the perception of the island as a centre rather than as a periphery, translating its natural closed-ness into social-psychological perceptions of 'us' and 'them'. This has had clear consequences for the social-psychological definition of Corsican identity and for the relation to 'others' throughout Corsican history, especially since the presence of the various regimes by which Corsica was 'conquered' have long been confined to a few coastal cities, leaving inner Corsica largely unexplored and untamed until

recently. Invaders have thus never completed assimilation and, even in the recent past, tradition has not disappeared but survived and conflicted with the advent of modernity. Island-ness has thus closed Corsica to the rest of the world; even with modern transportation, leaving the island remains no casual enterprise, if only because of the cost of travelling. This experience of closed-ness has somehow acted as cement amongst Corsican populations. At the same time, Corsica's strategic position exposed native islanders to the imperialist ambitions of their numerous invaders. Corsicans have been linked together in their experience of danger and wars, learning at their own expense that danger irremediably came from the sea. Corsican cultural tradition recalls past experiences of murder, kidnapping, and human exportation into slavery. Hence, a cultural wariness of aliens still persists today, which is further enhanced by the internal isolation created the mountainous relief of the island.<sup>171</sup>

For, Corsica is also, and perhaps above all, a chain of mountains, *a mountain in the sea*, to use the traditional formulaic definition. This chain of mountains running from the northwest to the southeast divides Corsica into two halves. With about fifty peaks reaching above 6,000 feet, and many passes and valleys, Corsica's internal communications were considerably limited for a long time, except in rare plains such as the central-eastern Aleria plain. Yet, harsh though a mountainous environment may be in terms of economic development, mountains have not been altogether hostile to Corsicans: rather, they have constituted natural fortresses and refuges from invasions and contributed to preserve inner Corsican communities from acculturation. Indeed, as was said above, foreign administrative centres long remained confined to the cities of the littoral and foreign influences hardly penetrated inner communities.

In a significant way, nonetheless, the mountainous configuration also kept village communities isolated from one another. In his *Rapport sur l'état économique et moral de la Corse en 1839* Adolphe Blanqui indicated that:

*Tous les villages, sans exceptions, sont situés sur des hauteurs [...] cet isolement des villages est tel, que deux communes adossées aux flancs de la même montagne, et séparées seulement par un trajet de quelques heures,*

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<sup>171</sup> The theme of *invasion* is a recurrent element of Corsican consciousness and has been passed on almost genealogically.



*demeurent sans communication d'aucune sorte pendant plusieurs années.*  
(Quoted in Gil, 1991)

Andréani adds that '[...] *avant le percement des routes et l'invention des véhicules automobiles l'isolement était la règle pour la Corse de l'intérieur.*' (1999: 11) Eugene Weber amongst others has largely documented the importance of the road networks in the social psychological building of communities beyond the village community (Weber, 1979, chapter 12). First initiatives to build a road network in Corsica date back from the 1830s-1840s and were re-launched under the Second Empire (from 1853). However, these modest structural developments did not suffice to break the isolation of villages (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 100). Thus, the lack of mass road construction in Corsica until the 1960s contributed to sustaining a way of life, a particular socio-political, socio-cultural and linguistic set of habits, and non-industrial modes of production until late in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The main locus of identity and political loyalty has therefore long been, and largely remains, local: the immediate village community. In the village-based location of Corsican identities, *them* is somehow defined as everything external to the village, including other villages. Furthermore, although today half of the island population spends its working week in coastal cities, villages fill again at weekends and, during summertime, the Corsican Diaspora returns to live in the villages whose population then more than doubles<sup>172</sup>.

In sum, because of its mountainous landscapes and due to the late development of its road network and routes of communication, Corsica is a Mediterranean island divided into a great number of 'mountain' islands: a geographic, geopolitical and socio-cultural (and therefore linguistic) archipelago. Analogically, it can be seen as a microcosm of the political, social-psychological and socio-cultural fragmentation of other nation-states before nation building processes. The consequences of such a persistent localism have been numerous and have *inter alia* significantly shaped popular responses to centralising language planning efforts since the 1970s, as will be seen in chapters 8 and 9.

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<sup>172</sup> Jaffe (1999: chapter 2) shows that the village is the locus of the inalienable identity where diasporic members retire and, in many accounts, this return wipes out a sometimes life-long parenthesis away from the village. The village is then the unbroken cord and living one's Corsican-ness is tied to village life.

As for mediterraneity, it can be defined as the set of characteristics common to the peoples living around the Mediterranean. Amongst these features, family ties are preponderant and constitute the matrix of solidarity. Further, the family is defined both narrowly as kinship and more broadly as the clan - the socio-political extension of the immediate family - itself the sole and ultimate limit of identity and social loyalty before the advent of the Republic. Mediterraneity also denotes a set of values such as honour and solidarity, and its bloody correlate *vendetta*, that participates in a justice system wherein solidarity prompts 'family' members to avenge in blood the maculate honour of any group member, without resorting to institutional arbitration. In other words, mediterraneity implies a form of violent justice autonomous from a formal legal system imposed by outer forces. By extension, mediterraneity entails defiance towards forms of external authority that explains some Corsicans' resistance to that which is imposed in general. In a sort of antithetical way, island-ness and Mediterraneity thus constitute unifying links between Corsicans, based upon defiance and/or rejection of the other's authority. At the same time, inner insularity acts as a separator of communities: culturally unified in their mediterraneity, politically diverse and often opposed in their inner insularity (see chapter 9).

In the next sections, I survey the historical stages of the politicisation of the island from the 18<sup>th</sup> century, contrasting patterns of resistance to authority with trends towards acculturation. I begin with Corsica's short-lived attempt to constitute itself as an independent nation-state from the 1730s and explore the extent and limitation of the Frenchification of the island from 1768 till today.

#### *From Independence to the French Aegis.*

Colombani describes the 18<sup>th</sup> century as the *grand siècle* for Corsica (1999: 1). It is indeed the century of the Corsican Revolutions which, starting in the 1730s in the context of a loosened domination from Genoa, eventually led to the independence of Corsica, under the leadership of Pasquale Paoli, the *father of the nation* in contemporary nationalist imagery, between 1755 and 1769 (Ettori, 1971; quoted by Andréani, 1999: 64). This short period of time saw an embryonic Corsican nation-state develop its own political and judicial institutional structures, navy, conscripts, currency, flag, national anthem, university (1765-1769), Official Bulletin, etc, but no

national language<sup>173</sup>. Although this period was short, later Corsican nationalist historiography largely glorified the years of independence that brought the turmoil of the previous 40 years to a halt and saw the birth of political feelings of Corsicanhood, especially as great 18<sup>th</sup> century figures like Jean-Jacques Rousseau hailed the birth of the Corsican nation and begun drafting a constitution for it.

The advent of French rule in 1769 was resisted but royal forces eventually defeated ‘nationalists’ at the battle of Ponte Novu. Royal administration then engaged in a number of economic, legal and political reforms that privileged a few supporters of the French presence but soon also entailed growing resentment and marked opposition to the new regime by many others. The news of the first troubles of the Revolution was therefore unsurprisingly followed by popular uprisings: Corsicans embraced early revolutionary ideals, hoping for reform to bring them more egalitarian treatment and some material prosperity. Arrighi and Pomponi (1997: 87) argue that even ideas of an independent Corsica faded before the prospect of joining the Revolution. On November 30<sup>th</sup> 1789, a decree promulgated by the National Assembly established that ‘[...] *la Corse fait partie de l’empire français et [que] ses habitants seront régis par la même constitution que les autres Français*’. (ibid) Paoli, exiled in England since Ponte-Novu, returned and, re-installed in his role of leader of the nation, represented the island in Paris. However, he swiftly disapproved of the ‘excesses’ of the Revolution, and stood against radical Jacobinism, which he foresaw as a new form of tyranny. His vision for Corsica was incompatible with the Jacobin conception of a highly centralized state that Napoleon was later to embody: Paoli advocated a more ‘federalist’ *Girondine* position. The two conflicting positions divided Corsicans but Napoleon’s Jacobinism eventually prevailed<sup>174</sup>. Subsequent pockets of resistance could not constitute a really serious challenge to French domination. Notwithstanding, they were severely repressed.

After the ultimate armed upheaval of 1816 in Fium’orbu, ‘[...] *la Corse s’intègre à la France. Son histoire n’est plus celle d’une nation. Elle est celle d’un département.*’ (Antonetti, 1990) But historians disagree on the unproblematic welding of Corsica in

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<sup>173</sup> In the next chapter I offer some explanations for what, at first, could seem to be an oddity.

<sup>174</sup> It is no wonder then that Paoli’s image and discourse should have been re-appropriated by regionalist and then nationalist movements in the 1960-70s, as the terms of the discursive conflicts have remained almost identical.

the French mould. As Vergé-Franceschi puts it: '[...] [in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century], *la greffe française ne s'est pas opérée et l'île demeure sur la lancée des siècles antérieurs avec ses troupeaux d'ovins et caprins, ses exportations livournaises et l'attrait toujours exercé par les universités italiennes.*' (Both quoted in Andréani, 1999: 68)

### *Economic Underdevelopment, Demography and Social Fracture*<sup>175</sup>

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the island population substantially rose so that villages ended up overcrowded and, by the end of the century, the meagre resources could no longer feed everyone<sup>176</sup>. Although, the insular economy had seen unprecedented positive developments from the 1820s, and demographic growth had entailed a proportional economic boom based on cattle breeding, the increase of pastoral activity, and the development of agriculture and viticulture<sup>177</sup>, agricultural techniques remained fundamentally unchanged and did not experience the technological innovations spreading elsewhere on mainland France: production increased but productivity did not, which in the longer run proved lethal to Corsican products in competition with less costly external products.

By the last quarter of the century, the Corsican agro-pastoral economy collapsed under the combined pressures of demographic growth and increasing economic competition from mainland France and the colonies at the turn of the century. The fragile prosperity of the early nineteenth century, characterized by an autarchic agro-pastoral type of socio-economic organization of life in 'inner Corsica', failed to resist the economic changes of the time. The international economy was increasingly based on policies of free-exchange and on industrial modes of production with which agro-pastoral economic modes and craftsmanship could no longer compete. The crisis was all the more drastic in that internal communication channels were still largely underdeveloped. Communications with mainland France were in no better state and exchanges functioned in a colonial mode: Corsican exports were heavily taxed whilst

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<sup>175</sup> The following account is largely based on Pomponi (1979).

<sup>176</sup> From 130,000 inhabitants in 1770, it rose to 185,000 in the mid-1820s, to 255,000 in the mid-1850s, to finally reach about 300,000 inhabitants at the turn of the century, its highest rate ever. (Pomponi, 1979: 330-331)

<sup>177</sup> Pomponi reports that between 1830 and 1874, agricultural production tripled (ibid).

continental products benefited from custom facilities (Parliamentary Report; Rapporteur Delannay, 1908). Prices therefore fell dramatically and the first waves of mass emigration ensued, prompted by the prospect of social ascent in the French administration and within the growing French colonial empire.

Corsica entered the twentieth century in a state of economic backwardness and moral despair and ever more voices emerged to denounce the abandonment of the island by France and the concomitant corruption of the clans, which were held largely responsible for the lack of genuine policies of economic development. The Great War bracketed out protest for some time. Enrolling massively, Corsicans paid a large tribute in human lives. As in other French regions, this significantly cemented their loyalty to France<sup>178</sup>. Yet, the commitment of island forces and the trauma caused by high losses were poorly rewarded, as relations with mainland France temporarily loosened up:

*Des milliers de morts, la coupure des relations avec le continent d'autant plus grave que l'île en était devenue de plus en plus dépendante, le retour en catastrophe aux pratiques culturelles les plus archaïques pour pouvoir survivre, l'absence de circulation monétaire semblèrent replonger la Corse en plein XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle.* (Arrighi and Pomponi, *ibid*: 108)

The economic situation of the island continued its endemic decay during the first half of the twentieth century, due to both the lack of adequate economic structures and the increasing dependence on public sources of income.<sup>179</sup> Beside this, few economic incentives were offered for war veterans to return to the island and emigration continued. With an average yearly migration rate of 2.3% in the post-WWII period (between 1946 and 1954), the population dropped to approximately 191,000 inhabitants in 1954.

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<sup>178</sup> Estimations vary from 16,000 (Andréani, 1999: 160) to 30,000 (FRC, 1971).

<sup>179</sup> Briquet indicates that by the 1930s, salaries and pensions amounted to 40% of the regional revenue, and more than 50% by the 1950s (1997)

To regenerate the economy and compensate for Corsica's increasing dependence on public money, the state launched a *Plan d'Action Régionale* (1957) to promote economic and social expansion along two main lines: agriculture (and especially viticulture) and tourism. But many commentators have reported that the provisions of the *Plan* favoured immigration and essentially benefited the 17,000 Northern African repatriated French nationals whose settlement in Corsica the government of the time found convenient to facilitate (Labro, 1977; Arrighi & Pomponi, 1997). Thus, the arrival of French *Pieds-Noirs*<sup>180</sup> and Northern African immigrants significantly accounted for post-WWII population growth<sup>181</sup>. Yet, little or no room was made for the masses of Corsicans whom decolonisation left unemployed and increasingly bitter and frustrated, in a context of cultural revival heralded by the slogan '*vivre et travailler au pays*'.

Indeed, during the 1960s, it was felt that native Corsicans had been excluded from the process of economic regeneration that the central state had finally undertaken after two centuries of perceived abandonment, whilst continental France lived the '*Trente glorieuses*', years of accelerated and unprecedented economic boom. The bulk of Corsica's new workforce was thus of 'foreign' breed<sup>182</sup>, and favourable fiscal and banking facilities were offered to newcomers but not to 'Corsican natives', which aggravated feelings of discrimination. Unsurprisingly, this fuelled the discourse of *colonial invasion* that was latent in many European regional contexts of the time (see below). As a result, although in absolute figures the island's population rose again, the proportion of Corsican natives slowly began to decline whilst that of non-Corsicans grew<sup>183</sup>.

In parallel with this re-modelling of the demographic picture, coastal cities developed, whilst villages, offering little prospect of economic success, were progressively and

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<sup>180</sup> This is the generic term to call French nationals residing in Northern Africa before independence.

<sup>181</sup> The INSEE reports an average yearly immigration rate of 2.1% between 1962 and 1968, while 28,000 Corsicans left the island during that period, the FRC claims (1971: chapter 3).

<sup>182</sup> 'Foreign' here is to be understood in the sense of 'non Corsican natives', therefore including both Northern African nationals (Moroccans and Algerians) and repatriated French nationals (even though a certain proportion of the *Pieds-Noirs* was of Corsican ascent).

<sup>183</sup> Still, it must be borne in mind that some Corsican natives returned to the island to retire: the Diaspora also fed into demographic growth, but an ageing population.

massively abandoned and shrivelled during the 1960s. Internal emigration and immigration indeed converged towards the city accelerating the depopulation of rural areas and the concomitant growth of urban centres like Ajaccio and Bastia, respectively Corsica's administrative and economic capitals<sup>184</sup>. As Andréani writes: '*La société corse est déchirée entre l'immobilisme et le mouvement, la nostalgie du passé, le refus du changement et la force de la modernité.*' (1999: 35) and quoting Taddei and Antomarchi put it:

*Le XXe siècle, celui de la ville s'est imposé tardivement mais avec brutalité, dans cette société rurale et archaïque [...] En deux générations, un peuple de montagnards est devenu un peuple de banlieusards. (1997)*

For Franchi (in *Corsica*, Mars 2000: 57), the change was even more sudden from the 1960s:

*Brutalement, c'est l'implosion. En moins de dix ans toute une société de type agropastoral s'effondre, les activités communautaires s'arrêtent, les écoles ferment, les familles avec de jeunes enfants doivent quitter le village. C'est la fin d'une société, d'une culture et, par là même, l'évaporation de la langue qui en était le vecteur.*

The 1960s thus saw drastic socio-demographic change in Corsica, through population movements towards increasingly cosmopolitan cities, with all the social problems rapid urbanisation entails, and this situation accelerated language shift into French. For the uprooted rural population, all this contributed to further stigmatize the 'evils of modernisation' that France embodied.

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<sup>184</sup> For an illustration of the rate of depopulation of rural areas, see the map of the *Evolution of Communal Population between 1901 and 1990* (INSEE, 1999: 35).

In the 2000 census, the proportion of non-Corsican natives amongst Corsica's residents almost equalled that of Corsica-born residents<sup>185</sup> and about half of the population of the island now live in urban areas. This is a demographic fact that weighs a great deal in the difficulty of keeping Corsican from language death today. Regionalist, autonomist and then nationalist political discourses since the 1960s have denounced emigration, immigration and demographic change as the deliberate minorisation of the *Corsican people*.

In the next sections, I briefly survey the evolution of Corsican socio-political structures under French rule. I first examine the development of clanic politics in the 1850s, the concomitant rise of regionalism in the early days of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and then focus on the revival of regionalism and the advent and development of nationalism within the post-WWII context to the present.

#### *Clanism, State Dependency, More Social Fracture and Early Forms of Regionalism*

Clanism is a pyramidal type of organisation that can be seen as a remnant of feudalism in that the people pledge their political and military allegiance to the head in exchange for physical protection. It pre-existed the French presence on the island but French rule gave it a new impetus whilst disturbing the balance of power between rival clans through the selective distribution of public manna. Clanism can be seen as the theoretical opposite of republicanism since it implies renunciation of one's political rights whilst republicanism enhances and individualises such rights. In Corsica, the traditional and the modern types of political allegiance were conflated and dominant clanic structures were intertwined with nascent republican structures: '*Les clans se sont adaptés à la République, et la République aux clans.*' (Andréani, *ibid*: 71)

Modern forms of clanism developed under Napoleon III's Second Empire (1852-1870) and during the Third Republic (1870-1939) republican clanism fully spread its wings. During the first half of the century, despite the advent of a liberal bourgeoisie

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<sup>185</sup> This leads to a situation where the Corsican Diaspora on the continent far outnumbers native Corsicans on the island, with consequences for contemporary Corsican language politics.



on the island and forms of mimesis of mainland politics, Corsican elites were initially restrictively associated to French power structures and still largely linked to the Italian peninsula. It is from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, under the return of a Bonaparte to power, that links with Italy loosened while Corsican dynastic families fully became agents of Frenchification. Numerous Corsican elites were appointed in the highest political spheres on the mainland whence they distributed favours and positions to their clientele in the island, or attained positions in colonial administrations, and most importantly in the colonial army. This entailed two phenomena. First, power distribution was bipolar and uneven amongst rival clans at regional level; each had its own network of ramification at municipal levels, the effective level where individual-state relations were mediated. This favoured competition and conflicts of interests, since favours and privileges could not be granted to all: some clans were dominant, some not.

Second, as the century advanced, the survival of that part of the population that was still largely agro-pastoral that had suffered from agrarian reforms that privatised free communal lands, and that had not benefited from public manna, became increasingly jeopardized. This contributed to the widening of social divisions. If a growing part of Corsica's social spectrum opportunistically endorsed French rule and its symbolic and material endowments, certain rural areas of society felt cheated and abandoned; they strongly resented socio-political evolutions, and sometimes rebelled against authority<sup>186</sup>. It was these sectors who came to fill the ranks of regionalists and autonomists at the turn of century and from the 1960s. Typically, it was they who maintained village life and cultural traditions when urbanisation and depopulation transformed patterns of residence on the island<sup>187</sup>. Today they largely constitute the remaining stock of Corsican native speakers.

The denunciation of clanism and clientelism were fundamental tenets of early regionalist protest and later nationalist revival. This situation was however somewhat paradoxical as autonomists and nationalists championed the defence of the Corsican nation and its decaying culture while clan-based politico-administrative power and

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<sup>186</sup> Some were forced into exile in the mountain becoming *bandits d'honneur*.

<sup>187</sup> It would be exaggerated to dichotomise the urban-rural divide as reflecting the pro-/anti-clan divide, since the rural world - as the guardian of tradition - has helped preserve clanism as a traditional form of political loyalty (Andréani, 1999: 78).

practices were an integral part of Corsican collective identity. Hitherto, the clans had always protected Corsicans against invaders. Under French rule, the system had been perverted and many felt they were led astray.

Regionalist protest received a new impetus between the wars for the economic reasons mentioned above, which strengthened the discourse of cultural and linguistic loss and general abandonment of the island formulated in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. As levels of instruction and basic literacy rose, protest was mediated through increasingly diffused newspapers and reviews, starting with Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* (1896-1914), and through associations promoting insular interests, e.g. *L'union corse*. Casanova projected the themes of the betrayal of the clans in the public sphere and, moreover, did it in Corsican. This was symbolically important because it associated the Corsican language with the oppressed but resistant Corsican people and French with that of the corrupted, betraying elites (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 106-107). Besides, as we shall see in the next chapter, it also divorced Corsican from Italian as the language of writing, which announced the symbolic individuation of both the 'dialect' from its 'standard language' and the people from their peninsular cousins (Thiers, 1989: 41-47).

The regionalist themes of abandonment and elite corruption were then relayed and transformed into autonomist discourses. The manifesto *A Cipra* (1914) claimed: '*L'autonomie, voilà le salut.*' Autonomism was thwarted by the Great War and the autonomous discourse was temporarily discredited in the interwar period when some autonomists embraced Mussolini's irredentism. In 1938, this led the population of Bastia to pledge loyalty to France through the Bastia Oath. The heroic resistance of Corsicans during WWII completed the demise of autonomism and delayed its re-emergence until the 1960s.

### *Regionalisation, Regionalism and Nationalism in Corsica: The Ideological and Socio-Political Context of the 1960s/1990s*

The socio-political context of the 1960s/1990s can be approached from different angles. I have already discussed the supra-national level within the framework of international integration agencies such as the EU, the CoE and the UN, and the state-

national level covering ideological, socio-political and institutional developments in metropolitan France in earlier parts of this dissertation. This section considers developments at the regional level, examining ideological, socio-political and institutional developments in Corsica.<sup>188</sup> These distinctions are of course largely artificial as discursive and political developments at each analytical level overlap and interact with other levels but it is analytically convenient to separate them. As we saw in those earlier chapters, the national frame of political reference underwent drastic changes during the past half-century. Since the Revolution and under the various successive regimes, the strong Jacobin, centralising impetus had periodically been challenged by competing political discourses on the nation and the state. Contending models of the nation state and its cultural and linguistic ideologies were manifest throughout: political centralisation versus a more federal organisation of society and distribution of legal and political prerogatives; cultural uniformity and monolingualism versus some respect for and/or promotion of cultural diversity and multilingualism, etc. As was seen in chapter 5, the post-WWII period eventually saw a form of political deconcentration first and then more genuine devolution. To a significant extent, Corsican regionalist movements can be credited for the form and scope of political devolution that began in the early 1980s.

Like earlier Corsican regionalist and/or autonomist protest movements, those of the 1970s consolidated group mobilisation and solidarity around a series of socio-economic themes and a renewed social-psychological mindset towards cultural revival and the preservation of regional identities. Economic backwardness, the fear of mass tourism and its danger for the environment, as well as important demographic change, however, gave them a wider social appeal than before. Multiple demonstrations by Corsican civil society's during the 1960s/1970s largely testified to this<sup>189</sup>. In Corsica, the thesis of internal colonialism was theorised in 1971 by the Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC) (created in 1966), which synthesized and gave new force to the socio-economic, political and cultural grievances mentioned earlier, in a

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<sup>188</sup> To these levels of analysis can be added the trans-regional level of cooperation and exchange bringing together various regions of Western Europe, which will be examined in the final sections of this chapter.

<sup>189</sup> Dayries and Dayries indicate that a 1975 meeting of the *Action Régionaliste Corse* (ARC) brought together 30,000 people, a considerable number for Corsica.

major publication, *Main basse sur une île* [Takeover of An Island]<sup>190</sup> (FRC, 1971). Regionalist rhetoric revolved around the defence of the environment against attempts to 'balearise' the island with mass tourism structures financed by non-Corsican capital, and significantly around the cultural and linguistic loss portrayed as symptomatic of a deliberate minorisation of the Corsican people. Likewise, the Action Régionaliste Corse (ARC) (created from a schism from the FRC in 1967) later issued another important manifesto, *Autonomia* (1974), demanding a special statute for Corsica. Articulating their political discourse around the thesis of internal colonialism, regionalist, and then autonomist or nationalist movements successfully summoned the concept of a Corsican nation, as inscribed in the Herderian and Fichtean approaches. Corsican culture and language were thus represented as the banners of Corsican nationhood that state policies since the Revolution had endeavoured to eradicate. This struck a familiar chord among the Corsican population, since earlier nationalist rhetoric had also used language endangerment to stand for the endangerment of the Corsican nation. Nationalist groups also benefited from the discrediting of the traditional political class - the clans, held largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the island - which failed to seize the language question until later in the 1980s, and even then only rather inconsistently and weakly (see chapter 8). The nationalists did not come up with a practical language revitalisation programme, yet they contributed to restore the symbolic significance of the language.

The political context of the island, however, became more complex after the Aleria crisis<sup>191</sup> and the subsequent creation of the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale (FLNC). Inspired in choosing its name by the Algerian anti-colonial FLN and claiming independence for Corsica, the FLNC thus went beyond the more limited claims of prior movements for forms of autonomy based on Corsica's specificity within the Republic. This spawned a radical split in the nationalist family - between autonomists and clandestine separatist groups for whom the state became the enemy. For the latter this was the beginning of violence as a political strategy. This split also entailed changes in popular support for radical nationalism. The subsequent drift by some

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<sup>190</sup> My translation.

<sup>191</sup> In 1975, the illegal practice among powerful winegrowers in the central-eastern plain of sweetening wine to increase productivity was denounced through the armed occupation of a cellar in Aléria. The State responded by sending troops and the conflict escalated causing several casualties. The Aléria crisis marked the beginning of political violence and was soon followed by the creation of the FLNC. Political violence through bombings and killings has been endemic ever since.

groups towards corruption and mafia-like activities in the 1980s, and the fratricidal murders of the 1990s, alienated many Corsicans who disapproved of nationalist anti-state ideology and violent methods and eroded their legitimacy. To the extent that the defence of the language amalgamated with nationalism, too, language activism was not altogether and unconditionally supported.

In the 1980s, the new Socialist regime sought to contain political and military activism through devolution and Corsica was granted a special status in the Republic. The *Assemblée de Corse* created in 1982 served as a laboratory for devolution laws and it was endowed with unheard-of, but nevertheless limited, economic, social and cultural prerogatives in the administration of the island (see chapter 8). However, its creation and ensuing mitigated success hardly appeased tensions, *inter alia* because it was seen to consolidate the power of the clans, and it was provisionally dissolved in 1984 for lack of consensus. In the late 1980s, as violence persisted and political activists became increasingly fragmented into competing autonomist and independentist organisations which engaged in bloody conflicts with one another, negotiations were undertaken which led to the second *Statut Particulier* for Corsica in 1991. Much wider ranging than the previous *Statut*, it granted the *Assemblée de Corse* increased powers in a variety of policy areas such as environment, education and culture.

Yet, throughout the 1990s, killings between rival nationalist groups and bombings targeting State buildings and mainland interests in general, private and public, continued and climaxed. Further, the nationalist families lost much of their credit as proof of the corruption and mafia-like behaviours of some of their members emerged in parliamentary reports and was largely echoed by the press. An anonymous interviewee concluded that the nationalists had become '*un nouveau clan, organisé en sous-clans*' (quoted by Andréani, 1999) thus losing their position as a potential, reformist political alternative to the clans.

All in all, since Aléria, successive French governments have alternated strategies of dialogue with and repression against the nationalists, some of whom opted for democratic channels of political action, but to no avail. Despite nationalist electoral successes in the 1992 regional elections, political violence culminated with the

murder of the French Préfet Erignac, the highest representative of the State on the island in 1998. A new plan for a solution to the *problème corse* was launched in 1999 – the Matignon Agreements – but did not survive the change of government in France in 2002. The majority of ‘no’ answers at the 2003 referendum asking Corsicans if they desired more autonomy might indicate a growing disillusion with political autonomy as a solution to Corsica’s endemic violence and economic difficulties.

### *Corsica and Europeanisation: Prospects and Limitations*

A growing body of European studies literature looks at Europeanisation as a method for conflict management, as was indicated in the concluding sections of chapter 4 (e.g. Daftary, 2000). This literature suggests two paths of Europeanisation: socialization, which includes networking, and conditionality, which refers to enlargement.

We saw in the conclusions of chapter 4 that the conditionalities attached to EU enlargement, especially the minority rights conditionality since 1993, may have consequences for the future RML-promotion strategy in the EU. I will return to that hypothesis in the general conclusion of the thesis. I also suggested that the EU offered few bridges for RML communities politically to bypass the national level in terms of RML promotion. Here I examine the second path mentioned above: socialization as networking, in which I take networking in the broad sense of economic and/or political and/or cultural networking. Specifically, I look at the extent to which the Europeanisation of Corsica has been synonymous first with direct political and economic support from the EU, and second with economic/political/cultural networking activities, and consider whether this has had a significant impact on RML promotion in Corsica.

As far as the EU’s political impact on Corsica may be concerned, the *Collectivité Territoriale de Corse* (CTC) has a permanent representative in Brussels whose role is to cascade EU information of relevance down to Corsica. I have only very recently been made aware of this so that, in the absence of further information, I can attempt no analysis of the activities of that antenna here. In theory, Corsican interests are also represented in the Committee of Regions created in 1994. However, we saw in chapter 3 that the latter has essentially consultative powers and does little more than

emit Opinions in the few sectors about which it is consulted. Moreover, every member state has full discretion to choose its appointment procedure: in France members are appointed by the government which of course precludes the appointment of radical regionalists. Finally, the idea of a 'Europe of the Regions' is perhaps best embodied by the EP but, given similar selection procedures in France, it is unlikely that French MEPs would be appointed on a regionalist agenda, although Max Simeoni (a founding figure of Corsican nationalism who was in the Aléria cellar) had a seat in the EP between 1979 and 1994. However, we saw that the EP powers also remained limited. In Corsica itself, as Jaffe (1993) indicates in her analysis of Corsican attitudes and expectations at the dawn of 1992, the media, academic and political discourses displayed a mixture of hopes (that the 'Europe of Peoples' would bring economic welfare and larger political autonomy) and fears (that Corsica would find herself even more marginalised in a framework wider than the national framework). In economic terms, due to its weak economy, Corsica has been a recipient of EU structural funds and the management of these funds is a shared competence between the deconcentrated and the devolved institutions.

Most importantly for our purpose, the main impact of Europeanization and chief source of expected economic and political spin-offs for Corsica was its increasing networking activity with other European regions. At a time when membership in large lobbies was seen as a springboard for political influence, Corsica joined several large organisations. For instance Corsica is a member of the *Conference for Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe* (CPMRE) created in 1973 to coordinate between the European Commission and sixty European island regions; it also sits in the *Association of European Regions* (AER), a political lobby organisation created in 1985 comprising 250 regions. In 1995, it founded the IMEDOC (*Iles de la Méditerranée Occidentale*) network aimed at fostering economic, social and cultural cooperation between Western Mediterranean Islands and, in particular, at bidding for funds within the framework of the INTERREG EU programme of interregional cooperation (e.g. bringing together Corsica, and neighbouring regions Tuscany and Sardegna).

The programme INTERREG funds cross-border cooperation in a number of areas and '[...] aims to encourage exchanges, transfers and various types of cooperation

*between economic, institutional, cultural and social players, with a view to fostering dynamic cross-border cooperation.*<sup>192</sup> In particular, support is provided for exchanges and cooperation in the fields of research, and the socio-cultural area. Amongst the cultural activities thus financed, a number of projects led by the Cultural Centre of the University of Corsica can be mentioned, e.g. the literature review *Bonanova*, various conferences and academic exchanges, cross-border projects of literary and/or drama creations, etc. It is through this network that Corsican been indirectly (i.e. not *per se*) promoted.

Overall, the ‘Europe of Peoples’ imagined in the late 1970s and again on the eve of the Maastricht Treaty as an alternative to the ‘Europe of Nations’ has not materialised as hoped and the main outcomes of networking have been economic - through cooperation funds - rather than political. Two discernible effects, trivial though they may seem, have been to lead ‘[...] *Corsicans to compare and contrast their political economy with other European regions* [...]’ (Jaffe, 1993: 65) and to renew cultural and economic links with Italy which until the 1990s were perceived ‘[...] *as an elitist attempt to undermine both the status of Corsican and the resources allocated to its teaching.*’ (ibid: 67)<sup>193</sup> To a lesser extent, Corsican autonomists have established links with the Sardinian autonomist party (ibid: 68).<sup>194</sup> I will explore in chapter 8 the extent to which Corsica has exploited, or not, the few opportunities made available at supranational level, i.e. EBLUL’s activities, the EYL 2001.

## Conclusion

Corsican identity, we have seen, is complex and multifaceted. This chapter has identified some factors - geographical and sociopolitical - that have determined a particular psychological mindset for Corsicans. Amongst these, I have underscored the dialectics of unity and diversity shaped by both Corsica’s double insularity and its

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<sup>192</sup> Information on the scope of cooperation funded under the INTERREG programme is available at [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional\\_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv\\_PAY=FR&gv\\_reg=AL&gv\\_PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=FR&gv_reg=AL&gv_PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5); accessed January 5<sup>th</sup> 2005.

<sup>193</sup> The reasons for anti-Italianism will be made clear in chapters 7 and 9.

<sup>194</sup> In that connection, Corsican nationalist parties also belong to the federation of political parties *Régions et peuples solidaires* created in 1995 that lobbies for a more federalist Europe of autonomous regions.



mediterraneity, and by the uneven establishment of French rule on the island. Regarding the latter, a series of apparent paradoxes were mentioned which result from the persisting blend of traditional and modern forms of economic and socio-political organisation and political allegiance.

Social divisions have indeed been polarised over the past two centuries, as France was both a material benefactor and a tutorial authority long perceived as indifferent to the economic predicaments of many islanders, and even as contributing to Corsica's economic and cultural decay with the complicity of certain elites. We saw that the rise of regionalist and subsequently nationalist forms of opposition to the dominant regime has largely contributed to the polarisation of political loyalty, although the case of clanism somehow blurs the divide between the belief in republicanism and in the rule of law that guarantees equal rights, on the one hand, and ancient, ingrained habits of political loyalty based on family ties, on the other. All this reinforces a hereditary inclination to wariness of external authority and suspicion against those who are in charge of its internal representation and implementation.

I also emphasized emigration and immigration on the island, and the consequences of recent urbanisation, as core determinants of that polarisation. The result today is an image of a Corsican society fragmented by different logics which, however, are not necessarily mutually exclusive: the logic of the Corsica of the villages and that of the cities, the regionalist and/or nationalist Corsica championing the cause of the *peuple corse* and the advocates of French legitimacy and loyalty to the Republic.

To respond to tensions created by these divisions and resolve the endemic violence that began in 1975, the State has granted Corsica unheard-of political autonomy since 1982 which, in effect, has displaced poles of political loyalty back to the internal arena with unanticipated consequences. Part of this 'autonomy package' had to do with sociolinguistic liberalisation and devolution as we will see in chapter 8. The other more recent pole of autonomisation of Corsica, as the last section underscored, has been through the direct and indirect Europeanisation of the island. However, we saw that Europeanisation entailed rather few political gains and that it was more conspicuous through direct economic support, i.e. EU structural funds and to a lesser

extent cross-border cultural exchanges, and through networking. So far this has entailed only limited direct benefits for the Corsican language.

The great absence from these prolegomena is Italy and Corsica's *italianità*. This was briefly touched upon in the last section and, as we will see in the next chapter, constitutes the third explanatory, cultural pole of Corsican identity and identity politics. Through the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation of Corsica since its annexation by France, we will indeed see that although the political ties with Italy faded out at an early stage in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Italy remained a cultural and linguistic point of reference for Corsicans well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This legacy and how to tackle it are still widely debated today, to say the least. (see chapter 9)

## Chapter 7: From one Diglossic Situation to Another - Ideological and Sociolinguistic Change in Modernising Corsica (1769-1974)

### *Introduction*

This chapter reviews the evolution of Corsica's sociolinguistic situation from the island's annexation by France, as a preparation for a more thorough analysis of the cultural and linguistic revival from the 1970s and its contemporary consequences. In this chapter, I show how the diglossic conceptions of language, identity, and their interrelation first emerged in Corsica. Its main aim is to describe how the various political and linguistic ideologies shaping Corsicans' cultural and linguistic identities and informing current language debates and attitudes to language planning were progressively constructed and distilled between 1769 and 1974, who the actors involved in ideological struggle were and the nature and scope of their respective glottopolitical powers.

To do this, I explore a number of related sociolinguistic issues. Specifically, I analyse changes in the functional status of Corsican within evolving diglossic frameworks - first Corsican-Italian, then Corsican-French - before Corsican benefited from the language-in-education policies developed since the 1970s. This description of the evolution of diglossic functional compartmentalization is predicated on the complex links outlined in chapter 1 between competing conceptions of what a 'language' (as opposed to a dialect) is - i.e. the link between the status of a language, its use in writing and its degree of codification - and antagonistic political theories of the nation, i.e. the civic *versus* the cultural nation, and I show that the Corsican case presents a situation where '*cultural nationalisms can [...] be seen as contrapuntal to political nationalism.*' (May, 2001: 78) I will examine the practical response that Corsican Sociolinguists have given to the language planning problems resulting from the dichotomies created by the diglossic model of language and identity in chapter 9.

A critical exploration of the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia was made in chapter 1. Following Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992), I argued that the synchronic structural-functional approach underlying its use as an analytical concept does not satisfactorily account for the complex issues of historical construction and distribution of sociolinguistic power which are fundamental features of nation-building processes. Consequently, I claimed that socio-historical approaches to language maintenance, language shift and bilingualism provide a better understanding of how linguistic ideologies and language policy measures interplay with the construction of state-national socio-political structures. Notwithstanding, I also indicated that diglossia constitutes a useful snapshot device of sociolinguistic situations of dominance. It is in that sense that I use the concept here: I outline the *processes* of domination that lead to the establishment of diglossic political economies of language, and I use diglossia as a convenient shorthand.

I first briefly examine the Corsican sociolinguistic situation before annexation to France, and then explore in greater detail the paths followed by the French administrators of the island throughout the nineteenth century to achieve political and cultural assimilation, *inter alia* through linguistic acculturation. I argue that this assimilation was long delayed due both to the discrepancy delineated in chapter 5 between French nationalist rhetoric and actual language policy measures and to the ongoing vitality of a number of fronts of resistance to French rule and acculturation. In the context of Corsica's dire economic, demographic and sociocultural situations towards the end of the nineteenth century, evoked in the previous chapter, I investigate the rise of Corsican regionalist and nationalist movements during the Third Republic (1870-1939) as a political alternative to French nationalist ideology and its homogenising policies. I argue that these movements of resistance to French hegemony, however, further increased endemic social and geopolitical divisions amongst Corsicans and I investigate the role of language in the maturation and fragmentation of these movements. I conclude with an account of Corsican language activism after WWII as the result of the exclusion of Corsican from the provisions of the 1951 Deixonne Law, which contributed to the rebirth of cultural regionalism and its political radicalisation in the mid-1970s.

Corsica was under peninsular influence since the early eleventh century, first under Pisan rule and then, between the thirteenth and eighteenth century, under Genoese rule until France acquired it in 1768. The Tuscanisation of elite milieux thus started at an early stage, as even under Genoese domination Tuscan was widely adopted as the language of culture and administration in the peninsula and within the whole geographical area under its influence (Dalberra-Stefanaggi, 2002: 12). Its prevalence was reinforced as it became the vehicle of a prestigious body of literature, both written and oral, that gained immense cultural prestige at the European level as the channel of the Italian literary Renaissance (De Mauro, 1963; Migliorini, 1966).

At first sight, the Corsican sociolinguistic situation at the time of annexation, before French came onto the sociolinguistic stage, seemed to fit quite neatly within the contours of Ferguson's model discussed in chapter 1. The High variety, Tuscan, was the language of culture and Letters, (elite) education, religion, the press, law and administration, superposed on a range of oral varieties (Marchetti, 1989: 66-93). These were the vehicles of the intimate, of social memory, popular wisdom and rural religious practice, and thus mediated traditional forms of social and cultural communication in inner Corsica, including some forms of oral literacy and religious practice (Marchetti, *ibid*: 77; Arrighi, 2002: 49-54). The diglossic framework of complementary distribution of this period can be seen as stable for a number of reasons, but a closer look at the Corsican situation also illustrates some of the conceptual and methodological limitations of this framework.

After centuries of coexistence punctuated by regular economic, cultural and linguistic exchanges (especially between Bastia, the capital, and Tuscany), and due to the original linguistic kinship between Corsican varieties and their peninsular cousins within the Italo-Romance dialect continuum, the Corsican varieties spoken by the masses were perceived as dialects of Tuscan. On rare occasions when diglossic domains of use were 'trespassed', e.g. the low variety used in written productions, this was clearly marked as exceptional. Salvatore Viale's *U Serinatu di Scapinu* (1817),

one of the early traces of a written use of Corsican, consists of eleven lines inserted into a long poem in Tuscan when he stages a shepherd. It was part of the Romantic interest in popular culture that, however, represented no immediate challenge to the diglossic order. By contrast, travellers visiting Corsica well into the twentieth century reported on shepherds reciting great sixteenth-century Tuscan poetry from memory, which testifies to the enduring presence of oral forms of literacy characteristic of Mediterranean societies *inter alia* (Marchetti, 1989: 68-69)<sup>195</sup>.

The oppositional values given to the written and the oral, in Ferguson's diglossic model, fail to account for the prestige of profane and religious forms of literacy transmitted orally - oral literature - rather than through formal, writing-based school education. This also points to the importance of linguistic kinship between Corsican dialects and Tuscan, which facilitated access to prestigious forms without the mediation of schooling. As was suggested in the discussion of diglossia in chapter 1, in a diglossic situation where varieties are perceived as akin and therefore where there exists some measure of societal bilingualism, the conflict between the varieties is significantly toned down or at least less pregnant or visible. This calls for a discussion of the community's language repertoire.

Discussing the language repertoire of Corsicans, Thiers (1989) and Jaffe (1999) warn of the discrepancy between perception and representation of language use and actual language use, claiming that self-assessments of Tuscan/Italian proficiency cannot be taken as indicators of language performance, because of the linguistic kinship between Corsican dialects and Tuscan/Italian. Indeed, linguistic kinship allowed 'tapping into' the High variety when the context demanded it, but no data can conclusively document the extent to which actual speech resulted in consistently switching between clearly differentiated varieties rather than in mixing codes. In her recent ethnographic research, Jaffe indeed observes that inserting certain linguistic markers of Italian in their speech in Corsican sufficed for some speakers to qualify it as Italian (Jaffe, *ibid*: 73). This recent observation certainly bears the mark of time as during the pre-French period, Corsicans were quantitatively more exposed to

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<sup>195</sup> I will return to the ingrained cultural presence of orality and to its consequences with regard to popular responses to language planning in the following chapter.

Tuscan/Italian, and also the kind of Italian to which they were exposed was not yet modern Italian as it exists today, which is more remote from Corsican dialects (and Tuscan) than it was some two hundred years ago. In that connection, it is interesting to note the multiple accounts of the linguistic closeness of Corsican dialects and pre-modern Tuscan/Italian, which led many observers to claim that Corsican was 'the purest dialect of Italian' (Marchetti, 1989). This is not surprising as Tuscan served as the basis for modern Italian (De Mauro, 1963).

A tentative typology by Coco (1977) distinguishes between four levels of the *lingua materna*: literary Italian (written), regional Italian (used orally in Corsica in formal contexts and tinged with Corsicanisms), the regional dialects (distinguishing between northern and southern Corsican dialect families) and the range of local dialects (spoken in a limited geographical area like the village). Yet, this typology, analytically convenient though it may be, only offers a coarse-grained photograph of actual variation and its broad assumption of the bounded-ness of linguistic systems fails to account for actual patterns of language use. As was indicated above, the diglossic model suffers from the same defect: it fails to encompass mixed codes that make up people's language repertoires in situations of language contact.

Nevertheless, on balance, one can speculate that the situation was a long one of diglossia with broad societal bilingualism or rather, uneven patterns of individual bilingualism, since it is difficult to measure *a posteriori* how proficient in (what register of?) Tuscan/Italian 'uneducated' Corsicans were, and impossible to draw quantitative conclusions. Etori offers a simplified picture: '[...] *le notable parlait corse et le berger n'ignorait pas l'italien, même s'il n'en usait pas, du moins dans le quotidien.*' (1981: 17-18) The majority did not have a command of written literary Italian, and their knowledge of 'regional Italian' as defined above - passive or active - varied across individuals. Notwithstanding, linguistic kinship with Italian was important and proficiency in French nonexistent. In that sense, the Corsican-Tuscan/Italian diglossic order was certainly not the most blatant mirror of social inequalities and, importantly, no apparent danger to social cohesion.

Finally there is a third major reason, more socio-political than strictly linguistic, that explains diglossic stability during that period. Under the umbrella of Tuscan, and in part because isolation largely remained the rule for the vast majority of Corsicans, Corsican varieties were not perceived as endangered, as they would be with the advent of French socio-political structures and their sociolinguistic correlate and instrument, French linguistic ideology and policies of monolingualism. While the two varieties were seen as one language and crucially, in the absence of a centralising project including the politicisation and uniformisation of the social body and of language use, no attempt was made to eradicate speech varieties<sup>196</sup>. With a dominant language like French, linguistically remote (thus unintelligible) and belonging to a different political and cultural tradition, most Corsicans were *de facto* excluded from nascent power structures, and through the aggressive homogenising policies of French nation-builders, the demise of Italian and Corsican, henceforth on the French agenda, threatened the cultural equilibrium of Corsican society.

In sum, with the beginning of Frenchification, an altogether different diglossic framework was to emerge. In the long term, in the process of Italian nation-building, one can conjecture that Corsican would probably have been partially absorbed into Italian too, as Italian would have become the linguistic referent for upward social mobility; but Italian gradually lost crucial domains of use to French before this could happen<sup>197</sup>. As Thiers puts it:

*Si le toscan exerçait son hégémonie, le français agit par glottophagie. Dans les deux cas la menace est importante car, pour le dire avec les terribles métaphores conventionnelles, l'un étouffe tandis que l'autre dévore!* (1989: 55)<sup>198</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Thus, Paoli's 'failure' to include a national language among the various symbolic attributes of his state-national project mentioned in chapter 6 makes more sense. In a context where Tuscan/Italian was not yet the language of another state, conserving Tuscan as the national language did not compromise ambitions of political independence and Tuscan represented no linguistic exclusion of Corsican masses.

<sup>197</sup> Also, the linguistic ideologies of the two countries and the respective states' management of multilingualism are in sharp contrast.

<sup>198</sup> What is assumed in this view is that Corsican varieties and Tuscan were different languages which itself is an ideological position which I will return too in the last chapter.



Following Calvet's model of linguistic colonialism (1974), the next section illustrates the phases of the gradual demise of Italian and its concomitant replacement by French, spanning from the French Revolution to broadly speaking WWII.

*Corsican-Italian Diglossia versus Corsican-French Diglossia: From Hegemony to Glottophagy*

Calvet distinguishes between three phases of linguistic colonisation: first, the colonial language penetrates through the settlement of soldiers, administrators and merchants, essentially in urban contexts; then the acculturation of collaborative local elites eager to secure positions in new power structures begins. In the mid- or long-term, this results in a double exclusion: of both the local language and of its speakers from power spheres. This first phase is characterised by the monolingualism of colonial elites, local (urban) elite bilingualism, and popular monolingualism in the dominated language. Different patterns of language use thus serve to consolidate social differentiations.

In the second phase, the dominant language permeates the lower urban classes who become bilingual, thus sharpening the contrast between urban dwellers and rural masses, the latter initially remaining monolingual. In addition to the political and economic incentives to acquire the dominant language, this second phase is catalysed by a whole array of language policies and plans aiming at diffusing the dominant language in administration, courts, schools, and in more recent times, the press, radio and television. This second phase reinforces the diglossic functional distribution and sees language attitudes change in opposite directions: whereas the dominant language gains increasing prestige among lower social strata, dominated varieties are progressively devalued, eventually by their own speakers too, as was seen above. Ultimately, the elites may end up monolingual in the dominant language whilst first urban and then rural masses gradually become bilingual. This phase, extending over various lengths of time in different contexts, also sees the emergence of contact-induced mixed codes amongst the less educated masses whose linguistic acculturation remains incomplete.

The third and final phase is that of completed, successful glottophagy in which the dominant language has totally eradicated dominated varieties, but this situation remains rare because pockets of resistance typically thwart complete glottophagy.

In what follows, I will assess the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation in Corsica using this broad model, pointing to the specificity of the Corsican situation, with the ultimate aim to glimpse Corsicans' language repertoires at the eve of the language revival processes of the 1970s.

In the initial phases of the conquest of Corsica, French planners aimed at dethroning Italian to foster Corsican elites, and what the masses spoke mattered little. The process was then slow due to the interplay of three factors. Firstly, the penetration of French into the inner circles of Corsican society was significantly delayed until the late nineteenth century due to the dichotomy between the French rhetoric of mass political integration and cultural assimilation and actual institutional and policy measures on the island (see pp. 147-149). Secondly, Corsican society remained largely anchored within Italy's socio-cultural sphere. Finally, as was illustrated in the preceding chapter, most Corsicans were remote from outer and urban influences and therefore preserved traditional rural ways of living in which Corsican long remained dominant and unchallenged.

### *Diglossic Conflict: French or Italian? Language Shift and Language Maintenance in Corsica till the Third Republic*

At the time of annexation, only a minute proportion of Corsicans knew French. The beginning of the language plan of assimilation of the island is usually located at the time of the Revolution although premises of a policy of Frenchification can be found under the *Ancien Régime*. The initial plans only targeted Corsican elites, not the masses, and provided for them to attend French schools or seminaries before they could come back and rule over the masses whilst remaining subordinated to France (Marchetti, 1989: 100-105). During the Revolution, as was seen in chapter 5, no significant measures were actually taken and the first important status change

occurred in 1804, when it was decreed that the command of French would henceforth be a condition for a position in French institutions and administrative structures. It was also noted that this requirement was less drastically worded in Corsica than elsewhere. These efforts initially had little effect on Corsican elites. Various reports from the 1820s by French civil servants on the island indeed indicate the slow rate of penetration of French fifty years after annexation. Inspector of Public Education Mourre thus testifies:

*Voilà l'état de la Corse en 1818 relativement à la langue française et cinquante ans après la réunion de cette île à la France; les avocats plaidant en italien, la plupart des notaires passent leurs actes dans cette langue, les autres les rédigeant en un français barbare, les administrations obligées de tenir leur correspondance dans les deux langues, ce qui double le travail et les frais de bureau; très peu de maires, de juges de paix, encore moins de fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques qui sachent écrire le français, et quelques centaines tout au plus d'individus en état de le parler [...] (quoted by Marchetti, ibid: 110)*

The situation changed somewhat more rapidly after 1818 when a number of schools opened where French was taught, but in a way that only sharpened the urban-rural contrast. A Calvi official observed in 1822: *'Je ne crois pas me tromper en avançant que, dans aucune école de village, on n'enseigne la langue nationale [...] Dans les villes aussi, la grande masse des habitants demeurent réfractaire au français.'* (Marchetti, ibid: 110-111) Thiers' study on the Frenchification of the island in the 19<sup>th</sup> century nevertheless shows that during the 1814-1830 period, the use of French did progress in education and religious settings, especially through the successive actions of Education Inspectors Mourre (1817-1821) and Cottard (1821-1827) (Thiers, 1977). Yet, Arrighi recalls, in 1829 there were still as many schools teaching in Italian as in French (2002: 59). State education in French was still to be generalised and become secular and popular education by clergymen in Corsican and Italian was to be undermined.

In administration and justice, French did not make great strides but through the development of the aforementioned public employment policy it eventually slowly penetrated domains of use hitherto exclusively occupied by Italian-speaking clerks (Calvet's second phase) (Fusina, 1994: 32). In justice, a 1777 decision had made French compulsory in higher courts and tolerated Italian in lower, 'police' courts. As illustrated above, by the 1820s, some lawyers and notaries had opted for French. An 1833 judgement set a precedent abrogating legal bilingualism and thus consecrated the exclusive use of French, making Italian judgements invalid (quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 113-114). This decision was forcefully reasserted by the Cour de Cassation in 1859 that declared: '*Il n'y a aucune distinction à faire entre la Corse et les autres portions du territoire.*' (Grau, 1992: 96)

These policies were not always passively accepted. Several fronts of resistance can be mentioned. Some elites still largely connected to Italy carried on sending their children to Italy to study despite the 1803 decree on the invalidity of diplomas not obtained from a French University, and the attachment of Corsica to the University of Aix-en-Provence in 1814. Beretti (1990: 14) reports that around the early 1830s, Corsican students still made up a quarter of Pisa University's student population. Corsican departmental authorities also resisted Mourre's efforts to multiply the number of schools teaching French only (Thiers, 1977). In religious practice, bilingual editions of 'manuals' for catechism did not manage to supplant Italian ones, and testimonies report the use of Italian in homilies until the 1930s (Monti, 1982: 166; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 38). In literature, the first half of the century saw the production of acclaimed works in Tuscan, under the impetus of Corsican (e.g. Viale, 1817) and Italian (e.g. Tommaseo, 1841) intellectuals, while island literary production in French was long non-existent, and when it appeared it was deemed of mediocre quality. In that connection, in 1858, Viale's *Dell'uso della lingua patria in Corsica* [Of the use of the fatherland language in Corsica]<sup>199</sup> condemned the negative effects of the switch to French in literature (denouncing the 'literary sterility' of those Corsicans who attempted to switch to French for literary writing), justice (i.e. the promotion of language competence to the detriment of professional value)<sup>200</sup>,

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<sup>199</sup> My translation.

<sup>200</sup> Viale was a lawyer in Bastia from 1817.

education, etc. More widely, he denounced the danger, intrinsic to the French policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation, of debilitating Corsicans as they were slowly deprived from their *cultura materna* even though cultural contacts with the peninsula remained frequent (Marchetti, 1989: 116-119). Literature in particular remained one of the few domains, with rural religious practice, where the Corsican-Tuscan diglossic coupling was maintained until the twentieth century but the number of Italian-medium authors declined during the second half of the century.

By the mid-nineteenth century, French had been successful in gradually displacing Italian in a number of official domains. Through official bilingual policies first, and then through progressively exclusive monolingualism in French, the French presence had become more tangible in administrations, schools and courts, and increasing numbers of Corsican elites embraced French as a springboard for social promotion. With the Second Empire (1852-1870), the pace of Frenchification greatly accelerated as Napoleon III's policy of assimilation of Corsica targeted larger layers of the population, hinging on the attribution of positions and employment in both national and colonial administrations, justice and political life.

This acculturation was however very uneven and sharpened divisions among Corsicans, along patterns of residency (rural/urban) and to some extent social lines (popular/elites) even though cultural elites were divided and some still hesitated between France and Italy (Ettori, 1980). If many urban elites had been convinced to foster French for written social communication, in villages where orality still very largely dominated social interactions, the demise of written Italian little affected traditional Corsican language use. In cities, though, the downfall of Italian in the public sphere closed the door to job opportunities in the developing administrative apparatus, which created new incentives to learn French. In 1854, a traveller observed that:

*Le gouvernement fait de grands efforts pour remplacer le français par l'italien ; tous les Corses instruits parlent le français [...] La mode, l'ambition, la nécessité poussent tout le monde à l'apprendre. [...] La langue*

*française est fort répandue dans les villes mais les gens du peuple ne parlent qu'italien, même s'ils connaissent le français. La nouvelle langue n'a pas du tout pénétré dans les vallées profondes.* (Gregorovius, 1854; quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 115)<sup>201</sup>

Adapting Fasold (1984: 48-49), the resulting situation can be seen as one of embedded polyglossia between three languages: French was becoming the exclusive official language, Italian largely remained the language of written cultural production and religious practice and most rural Corsicans remained 'monolingual' in Corsican. The conflict had initially opposed French to Italian for hegemony in official domains, taking little account of what people spoke. With Italian on its way out except somewhat in the cultural and religious domains, Corsican varieties were to be the next main targets of French mono-cultural/monolingual ideology, and after the first phase of assimilation, targeting the upper classes and urban population, the second phase aimed for inner, rural Corsica.

As was seen in chapters 1 and 5, French strategy included several dimensions, ideological and practical. On the ideological side, the aforementioned revolutionary dialectics of praise and vilification were re-actualised with the diffusion of the label *patois* and its luggage of derogatory connotations (for examples of the pejorative use of the term in the context of Occitan, see Lafont, 1977 and Gardy, 1978; both cited in Martin-Jones, 1989: 120). On the more practical side, the blooming institutional and colonial structures offered material reward to those who would command French and the school system was to prepare Corsicans to seize these new opportunities: French became *la langue du pain*. On Corsica, integration was fostered by allocating administrative positions to Corsicans through clanic networks, rather than through a genuine project of economic development, but these positions were limited: many had to leave the island and those who stayed and did not obtain administrative positions grew embittered.

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<sup>201</sup> Press production also indicates the rate of penetration of French. Poggioli (1971) shows that of the newspapers existing before 1865 still published after, 3 are in French and only 1 in Italian. From 1880, only French remains.

Chapter 6 indicated that although a significant proportion of the population living on the island felt abandoned by central authorities, many others had embraced French rule and its socio-economic promises. Incentives were particularly abundant in Corsica since, as we have seen, the assimilation strategy largely rested on the allocation of positions in the public sector, for which the knowledge of French was a pre-requisite. This resulted in exacerbated social divisions amongst the Corsican people: whilst an ever-wider proportion of the population endorsed cultural and language shift, those feeling deprived of the socio-economic benefits associated with French dominance and betrayed by certain leaders found a new forum in the nascent regionalist protest movement. The next section sketches the ideological basis of that movement and the symbolic and practical role of the Corsican language therein.

### *Corsican Regionalism and the Language Question*

I argued in chapter 5 that one of the origins of regionalist movements in various regions of France can be traced back to Romantic interest in popular cultures, *literatures* and *oralitures* that developed in Western Europe in the nineteenth century<sup>202</sup>. This influential movement for cultural revivalism granted renewed prestige - as in the Felibrige movement in Provence (Fusina, 1994), sometimes catalysing or accompanying the growth of sub-state cultural nationalism as in Catalonia (Conversi, 1997; Mar-Molinero, 2000: chapter 3) - to regional cultures and languages. Although that movement did not always have political motives and echoes, as in Corsica, it allotted prestige to popular cultural production that dominant 'colonial' ideologies were at pains to devalue. It also paved the way for later more radical forms of nationalism of the Fichtean type, in which nationalist mobilising ideology, and in particular the conceptualisation of national identity, rested on the idea that nations are

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<sup>202</sup> For a genealogy of Romantic interests in popular arts and culture, see for example Belmont (1975) and Ozouf (1981), both cited in Bernard (2004). Similar efforts to retrieve, translate and thus preserve oral tradition existed in other countries. A pioneering work in that genre is James McPherson's *Fragments of Ancient Poetry, collected in the Highlands of Scotland and translated from the Gaelic or Erse Language* (1760) (for more details see Thiesse, 1999: 23-28)

primarily defined by an inherited community of culture and language (see chapter 1). In some cases, this led to claims for statehood, in others it did not.<sup>203</sup>

In Corsica, arguably, intellectuals such as Viale and Tommaseo paved the way to cultural politics, albeit unintentionally. Towards the turn of the century, this essentialist form of cultural nationalism was re-actualised by members of the intellectual elite still culturally attached to Italy, who strongly resented the cultural void engineered by French language shift strategies as a threat to their national and intellectual identity, especially as literary production in Italian disappeared at the turn of the century. Thence, many promoted Corsican to fill the cultural and identity gap.

In that connection, the pioneer, seminal journal was Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* (Marchetti, 1989: 95-98). Published between 1896 and 1914, exclusively in Corsican, it voiced these feelings of dissatisfaction, denouncing the derelict condition of the island and the minorisation of the Corsican people through 'forced' emigration, and the responsibility of clans therein. It enjoyed great popular success. This unheard-of use of the language heralded the birth of Corsican regionalism and later nationalism and the sociolinguistic individuation of Corsican, notably its nascent codification and elaboration and growing use in writing, and accelerated the demise of the Corsican-Italian diglossic couple. One outcome of this demise was the publication of the first dictionary of Corsican in 1915<sup>204</sup>.

In 1914, *A Tramuntana* was succeeded by the journal *A Cispia*, created by two schoolmasters, but its publication was interrupted by the war. Its one issue was however important as it advocated political autonomy, thus vesting the Corsican language with a new political symbolism in the Fichtean tradition. As the authors put it: '*La Corse n'est pas un département français, mais une nation vaincue qui va renaître.*' (Quoted by Arrighi, 2002: 66) Advocating the maximum distantiation from

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<sup>203</sup> For a synthesis of the phases of cultural nationalism, see Hroch's influential model (Hroch, 1985; cited by Hobsbawm, 1990: 103-104).

<sup>204</sup> However, the chosen variety was very much based on northern dialectal varieties, which was later to undermine its representativity and its acceptance as the norm (see below and next chapter).



Italian, they sought to promote Corsican language production in its own right along the federalist lines of the Felibrige movement: the nation must be reborn through its literary maturation.

In the interwar period, two competing reviews shared the heritage of *A Cispia*, *A Muvra* and *L'Annu Corsu*, respectively created in 1920 and 1923, and they disappeared at the dawn of WWII (Yvia-Croce, 1979). Almost entirely published in Corsican for nineteen years, they produced two contrapuntal political discourses. The former advocated political autonomy and demanded that Corsican culture and language be taught in schools, as a natural right of the Corsican nation, taking Tuscan/Italian as its natural linguistic reference point<sup>205</sup>. The latter's discourse responded to the growing nationalist orientation of the former and the perception that some collaborators to *A Muvra* were even tempted by fascist irredentism and separatism. Initially bilingual in Corsican and French and then increasingly in French so that it eventually changed its name to *L'Année Corse* (1937), it channelled a more moderate, regionalist discourse asserting the need to acknowledge and bolster Corsica's cultural individuality but '[...] *en tant que province de la Grande Patrie*' (Arrighi, 2002: 68). On the question of Corsican language education, it also distanced itself from the Muvrist demand for Corsican teaching *per se* on the ground that Corsican remained insufficiently codified (Paul Arrighi, in *L'annu Corsu*, 1924: 228).

All these journals had an important role, both symbolically and in terms of language elaboration: through the multiplication of Corsican-medium journalistic writings and literary works, they propelled Corsican into functional domains whence it had hitherto been excluded, thereby prefiguring the new Corsican-French diglossic coupling in which Corsican was to gain a new status as a written language. Importantly, they diffused the various contending discourses circulating on the island: discourses on the Corsican nation and its political recognition within the French ensemble, and corresponding discourses on the Corsican language. As to the latter, they established

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<sup>205</sup> This movement echoed a number of similar movements in other regions in the aftermath of the war as the project of reconstruction re-actualised the revolutionary debates between federalist and Jacobin conceptions of the nation state (for an account of such movements in Brittany, see Fusina's account) (Fusina: 1994: 78-81)

the foundations of the discourses on language later forcefully re-actualised by Corsican political and language activists during the 1970s' revival (see next chapter). These foundations concerned both the status of Corsican as the core feature of Corsican nationhood and, in the Muvrist discourse, the related demand for its teaching, and various attitudes to the language itself. In particular, voices urged its codification (through grammar and dictionaries) and further linguistic elaboration (through written production). In that connection, opinions diverged on the instrumentalisation of its linguistic kinship to Italian: keeping Italian as the referent or advocating maximum distancing. Also, some expressed the concerns to keep Corsican 'pure' and untouched by linguistic interference from French in a context where such interference was increasing as French was acquired by greater numbers.

Between the 1920s' early regionalist activism and the 1970s' political and cultural revival, the defence of the Corsican language and culture was for some time suspended, for several reasons. Beside the links/amalgamation between Corsican language activism and political separatism, largely echoed by the pro-French press, there were ongoing perceptions that Corsican was still a dialect of Italian and insufficiently codified and that its teaching could even hinder the learning of French.<sup>206</sup> This bears witness to the fact that pedagogical debates on the advantages of using it as an auxiliary language largely remained confined to intellectual circles. For some time after WWII, as Fusina points out, island socio-economic and political issues were also deemed more central than the defence of the local cultures and languages: the economic and infra-structural development of the island, the reconfiguration of the island's political leadership, etc (Fusina, 1994).

When regional language activism in other regions, parliamentary lobbying and pedagogical debates eventually culminated in the 1951 Deixonne Law on the 'teaching of local languages and dialects', Corsican remained outside its scope (until its 1974 extension) (Poignant, 1998). If the Deixonne Law reflected a more tolerant attitude from the central state towards regional languages, authorising their teaching

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<sup>206</sup> This last aspect was particularly significant, as the social basis of the partisans of French rule had considerably widened after the two wars.

on a voluntary basis outside the normal curriculum, it was arguably more *assimilation-* than *maintenance-oriented* (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1994: 79-85)<sup>207</sup>. Discrimination against Corsican triggered little immediate protest, which indicates the deep rooted-ness of the aforementioned political, sociolinguistic and pedagogical arguments against its teaching *per se*<sup>208</sup>.

Yet, cultural demands did re-emerge again in the mid-1950s, channelled by new regionalist reviews, e.g. *U Muntese* (1955), and associations, e.g. *Parlemu corsu* [Let's speak Corsican] (1953) and *Lingua corsa* (1956) leading a 'Holy Crusade' [*A Santa Cruciata*]. Counting amongst their members former central figures from *A Muvra* and *L'Annu corsu*, these associations reiterated previous status demands but in a somewhat more radical manner, calling for mandatory Corsican language education:

[...] [nous demandons que] *la langue corse soit enseignée officiellement dans l'enseignement secondaire au titre de seconde langue, facultative hors de l'île, obligatoire dans l'île, valable pour l'obtention des titres et des diplômes.* (*U Muntese*, 1959: No 51 ; quoted in Fusina, 1994 : 118) (Original emphasis)

Similarly, the Statutes of *Lingua Corsa* included *inter alia* the following founding objectives:

- *Maintenir, ordonner et illustrer la langue corse écrite et parlée;*
- *Poursuivre l'élaboration d'une grammaire et d'un dictionnaire pour assurer la pérennité de la langue corse;*
- *Cultiver et encourager la littérature corse [...]* (quoted in Fusina, 1994: 123)

<sup>207</sup> Besides, its application decrees were delayed until the mid-/late-1960s (Fusina, 1994: 151).

<sup>208</sup> Regarding the political argument though, the involvement of Corsicans in the Resistance and the symbolic self-liberation of the island from the occupiers in 1943 eventually eclipsed suspicions of political separatism.

Moreover, activists also re-engaged in reflection around the desirability of language unification: '[l'association] *tentera de dégager de l'actuel polymorphisme des parlers de l'île, les principes permanents aptes à régir une enrichissante et féconde unification des différents parlers corses.*' (ibid: 124). The latter dialectical approach to unity and diversity (see also the implicit conflict between the first two objectives above) later proved to be a divisive issue amongst activists, as we will see in the next chapter.

Notwithstanding, the activism of the 1950s, however confined within small circles initially, ensured the continuity of language-related demands between the pioneers and the 1970s generation in a context where post-WWII language shift knew unprecedented impetus. It also heralded the emergence of academic language activism and research from the late 1950s, the trans-regional networking of the language activists from various regional language communities in the early 1960s and, finally, the relative mobilisation of island parliamentarians on the language status question. (ibid, 128-142)

By the late 1960s, in addition to more economic reasons, the regionalist discourses on culture, language and nation eventually attracted more supporters, the more so as the discourse of endangerment of the Corsican nation became more acutely felt due to mass emigration and economic backwardness. The question of cultural and language loss then became the banner of socio-political protesters, and popular mobilisation ultimately catalysed the institutionalisation of Corsican language education under the aegis of the Deixonne Law, auguring new language debates and practical problems.

### *Conclusion*

This chapter has delineated the long process of acculturation whereby the Corsican-Tuscan diglossic couple eventually yielded to the Corsican-French diglossic order, after a transitional period that saw Corsican varieties, Tuscan/Italian and French in complex polyglossic interrelations. That gradual process, catalysed by slow state-

nation building and uneven socio-economic and socio-political developments, led to the polarisation of competing theories of the nation: 'cultural' *versus* 'civic'. Concomitantly, the hegemonisation of the French language over Tuscan/Italian and the spread of French linguistic ideology was paralleled by the nascent, resistant individuation of the Corsican language amongst intellectual circles. This initially cultural form of resistance eventually served to cement alternative patterns of political loyalty towards the re-born Corsican nation but remained significantly confined within intellectual circles, whilst patterns of mass language shift attest to the entrenchment of dominant French discourses on the nation and language. Notwithstanding, to draw on Calvet's model again (1974 and 2002), glottophagy was not completed and the resulting unfinished acculturation of the island paved the way for new forms of plural and/or mixed identities and, in some milieus, collective support for cultural regionalism and regional language activism after WWII and even more forcefully from the 1970s.

From a sociolinguistic viewpoint, the outcomes of these acculturation processes resulted in important changes in the language repertoires of Corsicans. Tuscan/Italian exited the stage as the cultural and literary reference idiom, and French colonised public spheres and largely permeated the private domain, undermining the family transmission of Corsican. The sociolinguistic situation between the 1920s and the 1970s varied greatly in one crucial respect: in the 1920s, all Corsicans spoke Corsican and it was still largely family transmitted, even if signs of language shift within the family cell could be detected as French became the dominant language of power and as the Great War boosted sentiments of patriotism. In the 1970s, family transmission was much weaker, and the percentage of immigrants residing on the island - both continental and foreign - who were monolingual in French was higher. During the former period, Corsican speakers largely outnumbered French speakers although many were becoming bilingual; during the latter, it was the reverse: perceptions of language endangerment were more salient whilst surviving, 'minoritised' Corsican varieties were also vested with new identity garments. Finally, mixed codes resulting from contacts between French and Corsican varieties had progressively emerged as new linguistic resources (see chapter 9).

In terms of language attitudes, the discursive dichotomisation between the French *language* and the Corsican *dialects*, still largely geographically fragmented and uncodified in the 1970s, reflected the successful hegemonisation of French linguistic ideology even amongst activists, i.e. the mutually constitutive relations between language prestige, the level of codification and language formalism, and literary production. Within that diglossic language ideological framework, Corsican varieties were inevitably stigmatised and relegated to a position of lesser prestige and value. By the time the Deixonne Law was extended to Corsican in 1974, this set of language values had become a central issue to tackle for the Corsican language activists undertaking to prevent the death of the Corsican language and nation. Yet, these values and the dominant discourses underpinning them were not fully endorsed and unquestioned by Corsican language activists and planners, nor by the layers of the population still speaking Corsican varieties, and alternative discourses on the symbolic value of Corsican, and on the language itself, gradually made their way into language decision-making circles from the 1980s.

*The next chapter* focuses on the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and the concomitant rise of a Corsican language policy network after a period of 'semi-anarchic' language planning from 1974.

### *Introduction*

In this chapter and the next, the focus is on Corsica's contemporary sociolinguistic situation. This chapter thus aims to scrutinise the ways in which the Corsican language was eventually admitted within the scope of the Deixonne Law in 1974 and then institutionalised, to reconstitute the Corsican language policy network that emerged from the progressive institutionalisation of Corsican from 1974, to identify who the dominant players in that network are and their respective powers, and to assess the success of the language revitalisation plans they have devised amongst the population by looking at popular attitudes to such plans.

The first section outlines the historical conditions and modalities of the emergence of a Corsican language policy network, showing that after the 'semi-anarchic' *débuts* that followed the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law, the defence and promotion of the language was largely placed under the responsibility of a more formal network of Corsican language activists occupying official positions in newly deconcentrated state institutions and devolved Corsican institutions from the early 1980s. Specifically, three main institutional arenas emerged, to which language decision-making powers have gradually been largely devolved: the *Rectorat*, the *Assemblée de Corse* and the *Université de Corse*. By looking at what revitalisation actions each regional institutional actor has undertaken under the overarching aegis of French central authorities and national law, moreover, I analyse the extent and the legal and political limits of the glottopolitical autonomy and powers granted to regional activists. Then, I review a number of other domains that Corsican has also entered, such as radio and TV broadcasting, literary production, the written press and performing arts, and I claim that the impact of these developments on actual practice may appear quantitatively limited. On balance, however, it is more difficult to assess their effectiveness in the revitalisation process for lack of significant objective criteria, and these domains may have important symbolic effects that need exploring (see chapter 9). I finally examine the extent to which Corsican language planners have sought to Europeanize their language promotion strategies.

In the subsequent sections, I assess the impact of revitalisation actions on Corsican society, seeking to draw a sociological picture of Corsican speakers and non-speakers from statistical data. Drawing critically on quantitative data (i.e. census results and statistics on school attendance), I show that, despite the aforementioned institutionalisation and structural developments, including the adaptation of European programmes to Corsican, and the most favourable interpretation and application of national legislation on RMLs by local policy actors, Corsican language policies since the 1970s have hitherto largely failed to reverse language shift. Census data indeed illustrates a continued decline in practice and statistics on school attendance reveal that the attendance of Corsican language education decreases as students advance through the curriculum. I interpret this data as an index of popular indifference and/or opposition to Corsican language planning, which itself constitutes an indication of language planners' failure to sustain the initial popular support towards language revitalisation processes.

In the conclusion, I argue that this failure illustrates the necessity of devising more qualitative methods to supplement the abovementioned more quantitative methods of assessment of success or failure of language revitalisation processes: quantitative methods indicate trends and correlations but fail to provide explanations for such trends. In that connection, the limitations of an analysis of language revitalisation strategies through objective, traditional categories based on the diglossic model (i.e. positive legislation, institutionalisation and structural developments, spread of the dominated variety in new domains of use) demonstrate that, necessary though they may be, these legal/institutional measures do not suffice to guarantee successful language revitalisation. In other words, there is more to effective language revitalisation than just reversing institution-based language hierarchies. As Jaffe (1999) amongst others forcefully demonstrates, what is needed here is a theoretical approach to policy evaluation that also takes greater account of *all* language and political ideologies, both the ideologies of policy actors, whether they are dominant or not, and folk ideologies, and of how these ideologies interplay. Put otherwise, the community's norms and attitudes largely determine its will to preserve and/or revive its language, or lack thereof, which in turn remains one prevailing factor in language



maintenance or shift and the possibility of reversing diglossia. Chapter 9 explores such norms and attitudes in depth.

*Language Activism, Language Institutionalisation and Language Planning in the 1970s: Context, Developments and Outcomes*

I indicated in the previous chapter that Corsican language activism had been ‘kept alive’ in the after-war period, albeit within restricted cultural circles. I also argued in chapter 6 that the 1960s had constituted a major turning point in the political, socio-economic, socio-cultural and sociolinguistic make-up of the island. Sociolinguistic issues were indeed revived with new momentum in the 1960s for various reasons. First, the ‘top down’ economic regionalisation of the island little benefited many Corsicans; it entailed unprecedented waves of emigration and hindered the return of many of those Corsicans who had lived in the colonial empire. Second, this was accompanied by important waves of non-Corsican speaking immigration, whilst massive internal migrations brought Corsicans into contact with them in coastal cities<sup>209</sup>. Third, the demise of family transmission that had begun in the interwar period became more conspicuous. Many youths no longer spoke the language.

Overall, the demographic weight of Corsican speakers in relation to the whole island population was therefore largely reduced. All this reinforced the perception that the Corsican people or nation had been deliberately minoritised and was facing extinction (Fusina, 1992: 158). As an early nationalist slogan put it: *Morta a lingua, mortu u populu* [The death of the language is the death of the people] This gave a new impetus to regionalist claims and regional movements championing the defence of the Corsican nation and its most prominent sign of identity - its language - and the very exclusion of Corsican from the 1951 Deixonne Law could easily and successfully be presented as another form of discrimination against Corsicans.

Language activism emerged first on mainland France and then on the island and was taken up both by academic institutions and civil society organisations. On mainland France, various university courses were created in the late 1960s, e.g. Certificates in

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<sup>209</sup> In 1954, Bastia and Ajaccio gathered 54,000 inhabitants, in 1975 they were 100,000, more than a third of the population.

Corsican Language, Literature and Civilisation at the Universities of Provence (1969), Nice (1970) and Paris III (1972). The diaspora also organised various Corsican courses from 1971. On the island, where the language question had become a central rallying point and aroused renewed interest in learning the language, isolated language courses were established from 1971 and eventually federated under the umbrella of the newly-created association *Scola Corsa* in 1972. Commentators of that period describe 1972 as a milestone in language activism. *Scola Corsa* indeed networked all scattered initiatives and lobbied for the extension of the Deixonne Law and the creation of a university on the island. Regarding the former demand, in September, the minister of Education initially responded to a written parliamentary question on the possible extension of the law that: '[...] *l'enseignement du dialecte corse dans les écoles publiques pose un problème complexe [...] Il apparaît nettement que le dialecte corse n'a encore trouvé ni son unité ni sa codification. La mesure proposée ne peut donc intervenir dans la situation actuelle.*' (Quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 184-185) His successor, however, relentlessly lobbied by activists, reconsidered the issue in January 1973 and agreed in principle to an 'experimental' extension of the law, perhaps responding to the growing popular mobilisation around the issue on the island, as Marchetti suggests (*ibid.*)<sup>210</sup> The law was finally extended in January 1974 granting Corsican some official recognition as a regional language of France. As for the university, it opened its doors to 500 students in 1982 in the symbolic fortress of Paoli in Corte.

Having obtained juridical status for the language, language planners were nevertheless confronted with a series of symbolic and practical challenges to actually achieving its revitalisation. First, due to its lack of unity and codification, many saw Corsican as a dialect – or series of dialects – and dialectal variety as an insurmountable obstacle: what variety should be taught? For others, besides, it was a still dialect of Italian and not a language *per se* (Marchetti, 1989: 185-188). Second, the language had hardly been taught before so that extensive language-in-education planning was needed: teacher-training programmes were almost nonexistent, volunteer teachers and teaching materials were scarce, no curriculum existed etc. Third, as chapter 5 indicated, the provisions of the Deixonne Law were very minimal

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<sup>210</sup> A petition with 12,000 signatures mirrored the large mobilisation in favour of the inclusion of Corsican in the law and was sent to the minister (Arrighi, 2002: 78).

and denoted a tolerance rather than a genuine political will. After *Scola Corsa* dissolved in 1977 due to internal dissensions, besides, the responsibility for Corsican language teaching increasingly fell on schoolteachers whose motivations and commitment varied greatly. Fourth, many stood against the institutionalisation of the language at all for ideological (see the *resistance of separation* in the next chapter) and/or practical reasons such as that other subjects should be prioritised.

Regarding the lack of language unity and codification, language activists responded in various ways. DiMeglio (1997) shows that the public funds devoted to didactic production in the 1970s were largely used to produce textbooks in which a northern variety had been selected as part of a classical process of standardisation: one single variety is selected, codified, and diffused to the detriment of others (Haugen, 1983: 275; quoted by Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 21). This approach was very controversial and challenged by southern activists, so that other scholars advocated a conception of language that saw diversity as richness and contacts as mutual enrichment and, in practical terms, endorsed that teachers should teach their own dialectal variety (see the discussion of the concept of *langue polynomique* in the next chapter). The pioneer work in that respect, *Intricciate e Cambierini* [Connectors and Alternators], was published by Geronimi and Marchetti (1971) who devised a spelling system that could take account of and respect dialectal variety, running counter to the aforementioned dominant model of standardisation. Equally important was the creation of the *Association pour le Développement des Etudes Archéologiques, Historiques, Linguistiques et Naturalistes du Centre-Est de la Corse* (ADECEC) in 1970. In the field of lexicographic research and innovations, it has remained the most active association to date, and since the 1970s has produced a very large body of work<sup>211</sup>. As for teaching methods, they were typically devised *ad hoc*, although networks were progressively constituted to develop ‘best practice’ strategies (Fusina, 1994).

In sum, throughout the 1970s the implementation of the Deixonne Law and the concomitant standardisation of the language remained largely improvised, sometimes following opposite directions, and predominantly dependent on the good will, motivations and commitment of language activists, in the initial absence of solid

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<sup>211</sup> <http://www.adecec.net/adecec-net/brochures.html>; Accessed June 18<sup>th</sup> 2004

institutional structures. Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law although, here again, little effective implementation followed declarations and at the time when France was voting its first radical law of language protectionism (the Bas Lauriol law; see chapter 5, pp. 159 & 161-162), its apparent commitment to promote RMLs must be viewed with extreme caution.

In the light of the obstacles to these first steps towards language revitalisation, assessments of the evolution of the situation were primarily subjective and tended to contradict each other. Thus, Etti's initial account optimistically pointed to the progress made in enrolment figures (Etti, 1975; quoted in Fusina, 1994: 144). The Bozzi Report for the Regional Council (1979) however regretted the scarcity of teachers participating in episodic teacher training days and, on the basis of statistical data on attendance, questions the population's support for Corsican language education<sup>212</sup>. It concluded that: '[...] *sans une ardente croisade pour l'emploi du corse dans la vie quotidienne et d'abord au sein des familles qui peuvent encore le pratiquer convenablement, et dans la rue, la bataille de sa survie ne sera pas gagnée.*' (Bozzi, 1979; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 159-160)

To a large extent, crusaders emerged outside official institutional structures through associations with more or less radical nationalist agendas. In that connection, the revival of traditional Corsican-medium singing, under the impetus in particular of groups like *Canta U Populu Corsu* [The Corsican People Sings] that undertook to revive feelings of Corsican nationhood by travelling and performing concerts in inner Corsica from village to village, played an important symbolic and practical role. In doing so, they diffused Herderian nationalist themes and prompted Corsicans to reacquire their endangered cultural heritage. Their appeal can be measured by the fact that the state went so far as to prohibit some performances because of the subversive message they channelled. Notwithstanding, many youths joined the band and/or created new bands reviving Corsicans' predominantly oral culture and experience of language use.

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<sup>212</sup> A 1981 report established by state authorities observed the same situation: low commitment of teachers and poor attendance (Fusina, *ibid*: 163-169).

In the next section, I sketch the institutional evolution pertaining to Corsican language status, focusing on the interplay of changing legal provisions at the national level and the creation of new language-planning institutional structures. By examining structural developments, one can reconstitute the institutional pillars of the emerging Corsican language policy network on the island and identify the dominant actors in it: the *Rectorat de l'Académie de Corse*, the University of Corsica and the *Assemblée de Corse*.

This is not to say that these are the only actors. I take the concept of network in its broad acceptation as all the actors with an interest in Corsican revitalisation and who have an input into Corsican-related policy debates and/or decision-making processes and/or who are involved in the implementation of policies and thus produce an output. In some cases, that input may be merely discursive in which case it can be retrieved through the analysis of policy text production patterns, e.g. the nationalist legitimising discourse and the demand for compulsory bilingualism and/or language co-officiality; in other cases the output may be more objectively measurable, e.g. the number of articles published in Corsican in the written press. In yet other cases, the input and output in terms of revitalisation might be more difficult to gauge objectively, e.g. the effect of polyphonic bands like *Canta U Populu Corsu* on revitalisation processes. I will therefore deal with policy inputs that have an effect on attitudes rather than on structures/institutions in the next chapter.

#### *Language Institutionalisation, Policy Network Formation and Language Planning: Overview of the 1980s/1990s.*

The 1980s/1990s saw drastic legal change for RMLs through their institutionalisation within French state educational structures. For Corsica, this took place under the umbrella of the *Rectorat de l'Académie de Corse* (which had been made autonomous from that of the Provence Académie in 1975). Moreover, the University of Corsica was opened, which was also to play a prominent role in subsequent plans of language revitalisation. These changes coincided with the national programme of increased political devolution, piloted in Corsica (see chapter 6, pp. 190-194), from which the *Assemblée de Corse* gradually gained new powers, notably in terms of cultural and

language planning. These developments led to the emergence of an institutional language policy network which is examined in the next three sections.

*The Rectorat: Primary and Secondary School education.*

In France, institutional responsibility for primary and secondary education rests with the *Rectorats*, the decentralised state education authorities in regions. They are in charge of implementing national education laws and adapting them to regional realities and therefore enjoy some budgetary autonomy.

As we saw in discussing the chronology of national language legislation on RMLs (chapter 5, pp. 167-170), the 1982 Savary circular constituted a significant change in the state’s approach to the question because the State seemed to commit itself to taking active measures for RML promotion rather than simply adopting a tolerant laissez-faire policy as before. Significantly, though, this change was made by a circular, that is through a regulatory measure with less legal status and scope than a law. On the other hand, that circular gave interpretative directions to the Haby Law while leaving more discretion to administrators to implement it.

To monitor the implementation of these provisions, additional structures were created within the *Rectorat* and official responsibilities allotted to Corsican cultural activists, which would impact greatly on the design and implementation of policies. In other words, state authority was granted to Corsican activists within the limits of new legal provisions. Implemented from 1983, the first language-in-education plan was evaluated in 1986. The following table summarises some results for secondary education (*collèges* and *lycées*):

	Number of students attending Corsican classes	Hours devoted to Corsican language education
1975	450 (not including <i>collèges</i> )	1050 hours /year
1982-1983	1485	
1986-1987	3417	375 hours /week

**Table 1: Number of secondary school students attending Corsican language classes between 1975 and 1986-1987 [adapted from Fusina (1994: 178-179) and Arrighi (2002: 104)]**

The increase in secondary school students choosing to study Corsican since 1975 was thus clear and marked some positive popular responses to secondary school education in *Langue et Culture Corses* (LCC) as it became more available. As far as primary education was concerned though, evaluation was more difficult as the content of Corsican language classes, less formalised than in secondary schools, varied significantly across schools, due to unequal teacher competence in and/or motivation for Corsican language teaching (Fusina, *ibid*: 183). This pointed to the dire need to boost teacher-training programmes. Teacher training was systematised from the creation of *Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres* (IUFM) [University Teacher Training Institutes] from 1991.

As far as teaching materials were concerned, their production, sponsored by the Departmental/Regional Centres for Pedagogical Documentation (CDDP/CRDP), steadily augmented from 1982. Since 1992 they have received EU education funds<sup>213</sup>. Regarding syllabuses, first outlines were produced in the early 1980s but only officially endorsed in 1988, which illustrates a recurrent concern for activists: the delay between policy design and decision making/ implementation. On the other hand, state authorities decided to encourage initiatives from cultural associations aiming at developing bilingual pre-elementary private education as in other regions, e.g. Diwan schools in Brittany, Calendretas in Occitanie, Iskatolas in the Basque Country, and progressively to integrate them within the public sector. In Corsica, only one association seized the opportunity and only two such schools were opened, in Haute-Corse. Public authorities however launched additional initiatives: two more bilingual state schools were opened and the education authorities also facilitated the experimental development of integrated Corsican language education, whereby Corsican became the medium of instruction rather than merely a taught subject. By the 1980s, then, cultural movements and associations that had originally borne the demand for teaching and programmed language courses had largely abandoned the ground to official structures. Nevertheless, having cultural activists in key positions at the *Rectorat* meant that decentralised state authorities would more readily accompany the cultural movement and even supplement it where needed.

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<sup>213</sup> If funding was overtly for Corsican, this may seem an oddity since producing teaching material is funded under the LINGUA action that is normally exclusively for EU official languages. One of the Archipelago aims was to extend that EU funding of teaching material to RMLs (see chapter 3, p. 89).

Overall, the early 1980s thus witnessed structural progress for LCC education and encouraging, but not massive, popular support for it, though the population appeared to be divided on the relevance and legitimacy of such education. As Fusina (ibid: 195 and 198) indeed indicates, the issue of LCC education has remained a controversial focal point for Corsican society in general going well beyond educational frames.

Another evaluation report - the Arrighi de Casanova Report - released in 1989 - entailed more institutional developments. It observed a pause in attendance rate, indicating that out of 44,077 pupils in state education, a mere 5,454 (13%) attended Corsican classes. (Silvani, 1988, in *La Corse*; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 202) Its conclusions pointed to the need to further generalise educational provision, *inter alia* by boosting teacher training programmes so that all state schools could offer Corsican language education, at all levels<sup>214</sup>. Departing from a previous essentially institutional and structural approach to Corsican language educational provision and in view of growing disputes around language planning, moreover, the report also emphasized the need to take account of the language ideologies behind them and, in so doing, reasserted the necessity of considering Corsica's cultural and linguistic kinship with Italy: '[...] *afin que le corse ne devienne pas une sorte de volapük à la sauce méditerranéenne.*' [sic] (Rapport A. de Casanova, 1989: 5; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 205)<sup>215</sup> Finally, but most importantly, it strategically suggested reinstalling Corsican language revitalisation as a priority within the State/Region Planning Contracts and underscored the crucial role to be played by the University of Corsica in language revitalisation efforts.

During the 1990s, finally, institutionalisation continued with the creation of a Corsican CAPES and of the IUFM. The CAPES generated important symbolic and

<sup>214</sup> Hence, it proposed to train 180 additional schoolteachers a year and anticipated the creation of IUFMs and the extension to Corsican of the CAPES, the national diploma required to teach in secondary schools.

<sup>215</sup> As Vinciguerra, member of the L'Assemblée de Corse and current president of its *ad hoc* Commission for the promotion of LCC, more recently put it:

*Le corse a trouvé ses marques [...] Il n'a aucune raison d'être frileux vis-à-vis de l'italien. En réactivant les liens avec la langue de Dante, tout le profit sera pour lui (ressourcement à des origines communes, intérêt de puiser dans les référentiels la terminologie technique). S'en priver serait risquer de laisser le corse isolé face au seul français, qui, de plus en plus, le grignoterait jusqu'à l'effacement. L'italien nous rendra aussi la mémoire de notre histoire écrite en toscan [...] Le corse grâce à l'italien nous offre la possibilité de nous ouvrir à une aire linguistique de 400 millions de locuteurs. (Corsica, July 2002: 53)*



practical advantages. On the symbolic front, it brought teacher qualifications for Corsican secondary teachers into line with other disciplines through a national examination<sup>216</sup>. On the practical side, it meant that teaching positions were secured for graduates and that professional opportunities were created for Corsicans following the LCC academic path<sup>217</sup>. With these innovations, the formal institutionalisation of Corsican within state educational structures was largely reinforced and secured. In the process, a number of Corsican activists - primary and secondary teachers, university lecturers and *Rectorat* civil servants - gained responsibilities in the RML policy network and gained control of implementation processes. Another illustration of the importance of such control has to do with the adaptation, in secondary education, of the EU initiative of European classes into Mediterranean classes. The objective of that EU initiative, launched under the EU education umbrella, was to encourage the simultaneous learning of three European (national) languages and their progressive use as teaching medium. In Corsica, European classes were adapted into Mediterranean classes, in which Corsican came to replace one of the 'national' languages, e.g. English, and was studied alongside 'Mediterranean' national languages, e.g. Italian, Spanish. Again, this adaptation was possible because activists held the key positions that made such adaptations possible. In the process, notably, Corsican was given a status on a par with 'national' languages. Finally, in quantitative terms, as we will see later, the number of students also increased during the 1990s as Corsican language provision became progressively generalised.

### *The University of Corsica*

Opened in 1982 with 500 students, the University of Corsica now trains over 5000 students across a variety of faculties. In Humanities, from the early days, academic positions were occupied by cultural and/or language activists of the 1970s who, in turn, trained students to become schoolteachers and university lecturers. Its opening was important both in terms of the possibility of developing Corsican studies 'at home' and of offering a full curriculum for them. This was done under the aegis of the

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<sup>216</sup> However, the LCC CAPES is also the only RML CAPES where LCC is the only subject taught; all other RML CAPES are bivalent: candidates have to have two areas of expertise, e.g. Occitan and history.

<sup>217</sup> There were 14 graduates at the first session; there are now more than a hundred certified teachers on the island.

Corsican Studies Institute (which became the Corsican Research Centre (CRC) in 1988) and the Diplôme d'Etudes Universitaires Générales (DEUG) d'Etudes Corses (first two-year University Diploma in Corsican studies) was offered from academic year 1983-1984, recruiting students from all over Corsica. Today the Corsican studies path delivers up to PhD degrees in LCC. Besides, the primary role of the university in language-in-education activism was further enhanced in 1990-1991 when IUFM and CAPES courses in LCC were created. Since then, university lecturers have assumed full responsibility for the training of primary and secondary teachers and higher education teachers and researchers.

In the field of research, the CRC developed research teams across a variety of disciplines, including archaeology, history and geography, ethnology and ethnomusicology, linguistics, applied linguistics and pedagogy, and most importantly sociolinguistics from the early days (Thiers, 1989: 151-152). The research outcomes produced have then fed in the curriculum. This has turned out to be especially important as regards the language ideologies of a whole generation of LCC teachers who, since the 1980s, have been 'moulded' within the sociolinguistic classes. The importance of the sociolinguistic approach for corpus and acquisition planning will be explored in depth in the next chapter on ideological struggle: we will see that the hegemonisation in language plans of sociolinguistically-informed discourses on language has been one of the main reasons for elite and popular resistance to current Corsican language-in-education planning efforts. Finally, research has also served to revalue Corsican culture and history and has certainly contributed to nourishing the Corsican sense of specificity and 'national' pride. In turn, enhanced feelings of nationhood and forms of national pride can fuel more political commitments.

Beyond teacher-training, the university also occupies a central role in the life of the island for several reasons. First, it has provided a basis for and given scientific validity to Corsican studies and propelled Corsican research to new symbolic heights, as some of its research teams received accreditation from the highest national scientific authorities. In the process new intellectual elites have become more visible in Corsican society. Second, it has developed a network of academic and socio-economic partners. In that connection, academics have received funds from the European programmes for networking and/or the organisation of conferences, cultural

and literary activities, and exchanges with other regions with a RML community, as platforms for language promotion, e.g. through INTERREG (Interregional cooperation) (see chapter 6, pp. 203-204). Third, it has brought together Corsican youths who found a new forum for political activism and Corte, where it is located, thus became a crossroad and/or cradle for student nationalist groups. At a more linguistic level, this has also facilitated the contact between various Corsican varieties and thereby accelerated linguistic change and the *koïneisation* of Corsican. Fourth, on a small island like Corsica, Corsican studies academics, many of whom are also prolific literary authors and/or journalists and have occupied official positions in the LCC unit of the *Rectorat*, have also gained enormous prestige. Fifth, as members of one of the main language institutions of the island, academics have been largely involved in the consultation process of the *Assemblée de Corse*'s consultative body (see below), making a scientifically legitimised input to the State/Region Contract and the tripartite negotiations between the *Rectorat*, the *Assemblée de Corse* and the University over education plans. As Bierbach and Hartmann (1980: 13-14) put it:

*Es ist ein spezifischer aspekt der Regionalfrage, dass discours militant und discours scientifique zusammentreffen, eben weil diejenigen, die in Frankreich der Regionalbewegung arbeiten, in vielen Fällen als "Betreffene" selbst in ihr engagiert sind. Die Grenze zwischen "objektiver" Analyse und politischer Handlungsanleitung verschwindet. (Quoted by Grob, 1987: 35)<sup>218</sup>*

In sum, beyond their important teacher and teacher training roles, academics play a multitude of roles in Corsican society, being involved in academic, literary and cultural and journalistic activism and often, Corsica's political life. Their role as language policy actors is therefore central and multifaceted, transcending dichotomies between the scientific and the political, and the public and the private.

Finally, the University has its own internal language policies which it has been able to develop as an autonomous body since a 1984 law that granted universities more autonomy in establishing their own curriculum. One such policy is particularly

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<sup>218</sup> 'The conflation of the activist and scientific discourses is an aspect specific to the Regional Question, precisely because those who, in France, study regionalist movements are themselves actively committed. The boundary between "objective" analysis and involvement in planning thus disappears'. (My translation)

interesting for our purpose: that of co-officiality adopted in 1990, which in practice resulted first in bilingualism for signposting and drafting of official documents and, second, in the organisation of LCC classes for all students throughout their curriculum with an average of 1.5 weekly hours. This teaching is compulsory and counts towards the validation of diplomas, which goes against the French state's legal voluntary principle of language education but has hitherto been unnoticed, or deliberately ignored. Here, the national law of autonomy for universities was interpreted *ex maxima*.

During the 1990s, as was noted in chapter 5 (p.170), RML education in Corsica considerably evolved and Corsican language-in-education provision was increasingly negotiated in regional institutions *in situ* rather than nationally. Amongst Corsican regional institutions, the Assembly of Corsica played a central role through its specific powers and through the *ex maxima* interpretations of the Corsican language-in-education provisions of the State/Region Contracts established from 1989.

### *L'Assemblée de Corse*

The *Assemblée de Corse* elected in 1982 was the first political body to represent the island as a whole and was largely constituted by the traditional political class: the clans. Although it did not enjoy legislative powers, article 27 of Corsica's first *Statut Particulier* gave it the right to address proposals to the prime minister pertaining to the economic, social and cultural development of the island. Regarding the language education issue, in 1983 it passed a first Resolution that read as follows:

*L'Assemblée de Corse [...] a pris acte du caractère fondamental de la langue comme ciment de la culture et de l'urgence de mettre en oeuvre une réelle politique de réappropriation culturelle qui traduise la volonté de l'assemblée de rendre sa langue à son peuple [...] [Elle] a décidé de s'engager dans une politique de bilinguisme dans le cadre d'un plan triennal [...] avec l'Etat, ce bilinguisme étant comprise de la maternelle à l'Université [...] Dès la prochaine rentrée scolaire [...] l'enseignement de la langue fera l'objet d'une modulation horaire sur la base du principe de l'enseignement obligatoire [...] l'usage de la langue corse sera généralisé dans le cadre de la toponymie des*

*lieux, des villages, des villes, dans le cadre de l'information et de la formation audio-visuelles, ainsi que pour certains actes de la vie publique.* (Quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 209)

This amounted to a form of officialisation of the language through its increased institutionalisation. The resolution was altogether rejected by the French Prime Minister on the ground that mandatory bilingual education was incompatible with respect for individual freedom.

Two subsequent motions moved in similar directions: a 1985 motion for a resolution suggested making Corsican language education mandatory for the state and optional for students and a 1989 resolution sought to establish French and Corsican as co-official on the island. Both motions had been prepared by the *Assemblée's* consultative council representing '[...] *les milieux associatifs et considéré parfois comme un contre-pouvoir stimulant de la vie culturelle régionale.*' (Fusina, 1994: 219), which by law must be consulted on cultural and educational actions, notably those related to the safeguard and diffusion of the Corsican language and culture. This consultative body thus constitutes a gateway to official institutions for various interests groups seeking to have an input in policy design<sup>219</sup>. In these particular instances, Assemblymen voted them down, which testifies to the fact that the 1983 discursive convergence about mandatory bilingual education between nationalists and certain clans had disappeared (see next chapter).

On the national scene, despite the socialist regime's multiple pledges to respect and promote cultural and linguistic diversity, the government also progressively stepped back into less radical positions between 1982 and 1986. Nor was much improvement to be expected from the right-wing government in power between 1986 and 1988. This is not to say that the *Assemblée de Corse's* potential for actions became nonexistent. Indeed, in its 1986 *contrat particulier* with state authorities it

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<sup>219</sup> During the consultation process in preparation for the 1997 State/Region *Plan de développement de la LCC*, a number of contributions were made. For instance, the *Cullettivu Pà a Lingua Corsa* [Inter-Organisation for the Corsican Language] submitted a series of proposals inspired by the *European Charter for RMLs*, demanding the generalisation of LCC education, more media space for Corsican and its co-official use in public services. This *ad hoc* organisation consisted of a large number of cultural and/or political organisations, e.g. trade unions, polyphonic bands, Corsican language associations with a notorious nationalist agenda like *Scola Corsa Bastia*, etc.

supplemented and/or sponsored language revitalisation actions such as the creation of a lexical database for the Corsican language, the establishment of language laboratories in all secondary education schools and the production of textbooks and teaching materials. Yet, its more 'legislative' attempts had marked the limits of its political powers and reflected the ongoing dominance of central state authority in state/region negotiations.

Nonetheless, the return of a socialist government to power after 1988 augured further progress, especially after the 1988 visit of Education Minister Jospin who requested the aforementioned Casanova report and subsequently announced his intention to generalise Corsican language education and to create a Corsican CAPES.

In 1991, Corsica became the *Collectivité Territoriale de Corse* (CTC) through its second *Statut Particulier*, which consecrated further devolution and gave its assembly new powers. Draft article 1 included a historic motion recognising the *peuple corse*:

*La République française garantit à la communauté historique et culturelle vivante que constitue le peuple corse, les droits à la préservation de son identité culturelle [...] (quoted by Fusina, 1994: 227).*

However, the Constitutional Council deemed such an 'institutional recognition' of the *peuple corse* contrary to the French Constitution, according to which there exists only one, indivisible people: the French people. Nonetheless, in the field of education and cultural planning, article 53 of the *Statut* stipulated that:

*[...] l'Assemblée adopte un plan de développement de l'enseignement de la langue et de la culture corses prévoyant notamment les modalités d'insertion de cet enseignement dans le temps scolaire. Ces modalités font l'objet d'une convention conclue entre la collectivité territoriale de Corse et l'Etat. (ibid: 228)*

This formulation significantly departed from that of the 1982 *Statut*, granting the CTC more than a simple advisory, consultative role and reinforcing its powers in negotiating education plans with the state via the *Rectorat* LCC services. The

Assemblée's new powers were implemented through the successive contract plans. Starting in 1989, the efforts of the Assembly and the state - and the *Rectorat* for educative actions - were increasingly combined within the frame of the successive Planning Contracts (1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2003-2006). These contracts consecrated further devolution to the CTC, whose role within the policy network increased along its new political and increased budgetary powers. Through the successive plans, LCC education gradually became generalised<sup>220</sup>, first throughout the school curriculum, then into teacher training programmes, and increasing funds were progressively devoted to didactic, artistic, cultural and literary production in Corsican. Notably, the 1994 Plan led to the opening of two educational centres for full Corsican language immersion, which was formally legalised *post facto* the following year by an April 7<sup>th</sup> 1995 national circular<sup>221</sup>. In the latest Plans, then, the *Assemblée's* lobbying action has concentrated on the generalisation of bilingual education as the only path for producing Corsican speakers and it has also sought to generalise the bilingual topographical signposting voted in 1989. Today this is still not implemented, which illustrates the resistance of some part of the population to the increased institutionalisation of the language, as Jaffe shows (1999: 9-11).

The last important developments regarding the institutional emancipation of the Corsican region were the Matignon Negotiations, initiated in 1999 between the government and the CTC, which led to the 2002 *Loi No 2002-92 relative à la Corse* (*Journal Officiel* [JO], January 17<sup>th</sup> 2002). After long and heated debates, notably about the mandatory character of Corsican language education demanded by a number of activists, negotiations resulted in the following 'diplomatic' provision for Corsican language in primary education planning: *La langue corse est une matière enseignée dans le cadre de l'horaire normal des écoles maternelles et élémentaires de Corse*<sup>222</sup>. (Art. L. 312-11-1) This provision consecrated the generalisation of Corsican language education at pre-school and primary levels.

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<sup>220</sup> This was achieved for 95% of students in *collèges* from the 1999-2000 school year (CTC, April 1999).

<sup>221</sup> As was noted in chapter 5 (p. 173), this measure, initially specific to Corsica, was then generalised to other RML regions in 2001.

<sup>222</sup> The original formulation included the concluding expression '[...] *sauf volonté contraire des parents*.' which a number of opponents saw as a mandatory clause *a contrario* (Le Monde, May 16<sup>th</sup> 2001: 7). This was suppressed by the French parliament's *Commission des Lois*. (see also *Corse-Matin*, February 10<sup>th</sup> 2001: 19; April 19<sup>th</sup> 2001: 2; May 15<sup>th</sup> 2001: 2 and the issue of *Journal de la Corse* of May 25<sup>th</sup>-31<sup>st</sup> 2001: 7-8, for a report on the debates on the Corsican language at the parliament).

In that connection, finally, the report established in preparation for the June 2003 State/CTC Convention for the Development of LCC Teaching underlines that all efforts now tend towards the generalisation of bilingual education in infant schools<sup>223</sup> and its follow-up throughout the curriculum, as well as towards more creation of LCC-specific primary school teaching positions. This 'generalisation' objective is still not fully achieved but progress is undeniable and has been deemed a priority of the devolved authorities' actions on RML education, with the necessary budgetary allowance. Today, it appears that once the targeted generalisation is completed, Corsica will have obtained the maximum that national RML laws can grant.

Overall, during the 1990s, even before the Matignon negotiations were concluded, through the progressive generalisation of the LCC provision, enrolment in LCC classes became the default choice in early *collège* classes. As of 1999, following a decision emanating from the *Rectorat*, the voluntary nature of LCC education has modified from parents opting into LCC provision to parents opting out of it (*L'Express*, June 21<sup>st</sup> 2001: 97-100; Arrighi, 2002: 94)<sup>224</sup>. Many voices have however been raised against this shift which is seen as effectively making LCC education mandatory. In that respect, the positions of the *Association pour la défense des droits de la Corse dans la République* are clear:

*Contraindre les parents à accomplir une démarche pour faire dispenser leurs enfants de l'obligation de suivre cet enseignement, équivaut à le rendre obligatoire. Cela procède bien de toute l'hypocrisie qui entoure l'élaboration d'un texte destiné à répondre uniquement aux exigences d'une minorité* (2000: 8)

I now conclude this section on the processes and extent of language institutionalisation in Corsica with two observations on the almost total lack of interest for the Europeanisation of Corsican language revitalization among Corsican language activists (beyond the funds received for the production of teaching material

<sup>223</sup> In that context, Corsican language education is *de facto* mandatory when teaching is provided since pupils do not leave the classroom during LCC lessons (*Corsica*, September 2000: 52).

<sup>224</sup> Interestingly, the author, Jean-Marie Arrighi, is the highest *Rectorat* civil servant coordinating LCC education. He is also a cultural activist, has authored many publications on Corsican history, and writes columns and papers on Corsican in the monthly review *Corsica*. His conception of language is similar to that of the Corsican sociolinguists (see chapter 9).



and *ad hoc* allowances granted to Corsican academics via INTERREG for trans-regional cultural exchanges and the publication of literary works in Corsican; see chapter 6, pp. 198-200). My contention is that this limited interest for EU support results from the equally limited nature of EU opportunities for RMLs (see chapters 3 and 4) but also from a general apathy that hinders private initiatives to language revitalization (illustrated above by the total disappearance of private Corsican language schools). In that connection, finding that EBLUL's national secretary was Corsican and based in Bastia, I interviewed him during my fieldwork and he readily admitted that EBLUL was not more than a letterhead in the Corsican sociolinguistic panorama. Another example of apathy was that only one association put in a bid for funding during the *EYL 2001*, and it was the anti-racism association. No other cultural/linguistic manifestations took place. I will return to the rationales underlying such apathetic attitudes in chapter 9 and in the general conclusion of the thesis.

In the next, final section, I attend to the presence of the language within the Corsican community.

#### *Corsican Language Use in Today's Corsican Society: Quantitative and Qualitative Aspects*

Significant institutional progress has been made since the 1970s to thwart language shift and promote Corsican. As we saw above, Corsican entered diglossic domains from which it had previously been excluded, in particular education. Advances were also made in a number of other domains which increased the social visibility of the language. I now briefly sketch advances in literary production, the media, and artistic creation and conclude with some tentative quantitative and qualitative patterns of language use in the population.

Regarding literary production a first distinction must be established between Corsican-medium productions and others with Corsican themes but in another language. Here I focus on the former. A second distinction separates out oral and written literature. As we saw, the former has always existed in Corsica whereas the latter constitutes a more recent development, finding a new impetus especially from the 1970s as a symbol of Corsican's sociolinguistic maturation and individuation, in

the effort to transcend the political language/dialect dichotomy. Put otherwise, oral literature, and in particular poetry and singing, is traditionally ingrained in Corsicans' experience, while using Corsican in 'cultural' writings cannot be completely separated from politico-cultural developments. Today's literary production is largely sponsored by public authorities but publication figures reflect the tiny size of Corsican-medium readership (Arrighi, 2002: 111-122).

Use of Corsican in the written press remains rare except in the only remaining literary review *Bonanova*. In the daily, weekly, and monthly press, articles in Corsican are scarce. However, as we will see in the next chapter, articles in French about the status of Corsican and LCC education abound. According to Arrighi, the scarcity of articles *in* Corsican is mainly due to the tiny size of the readership since older Corsican-speaking generations do not necessarily read the language and younger generations' reading skills are not yet sufficiently developed (2002: 90). Nonetheless, the development of various cultural and/or political websites has helped diffuse the language more widely in ways that as yet remain unexplored.

Corsican appeared in the broadcasting media - radio and television - from the 1980s, most importantly after the creation of the ADECEC's radio *Voce nustrale* [our voice] broadcasting entirely in Corsican, and after the regionalisation of the national radio Radio France - that became Radio Corsica Frequenza Mora (RCFM) - and the TV channel FR3 (1982)<sup>225</sup>. RCFM is a bilingual radio channel that devotes a large space to Corsican alongside French and has acted as a channel for dialectal contacts through a number of typical radio promotion activities (helping to make it what Thiers calls a *langue socialement circulante*; Thiers, 1989: 85ff). From 1991, its staff has benefited from language training programmes sponsored by state education authorities and the CTC. So has that of FR3 although it devotes much less air space to Corsican<sup>226</sup>. I will return to the practical and symbolic importance of a radio and TV channelling Corsican language use(s), and to popular attitudes to Corsican-in-the-media planning in the next chapter.

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<sup>225</sup> Interestingly, some space was given to Corsican in these media long before the law formally allowed it (1987)

<sup>226</sup> Both media offer Corsican-medium daily news updates. FR3 also broadcasts a regional magazine at peak times - *Noi* [us] - as well as a weekly documentary - *Ghjente* [people] - on various aspects of Corsican culture, traditions, history, etc, and a cartoon and sitcom.

Finally, drama production and polyphonic singing have grown as popular forms of performing arts and I previously mentioned the enormous impact and emulation that groups like *Canta u populu corsu* have catalysed and the immense popular success they have encountered. Importantly, they militated by means of a collective oral patrimony to which Corsicans could relate more easily than through the promotion of Corsican as an institutionalised written medium, which in effect was alien to most Corsican *speakers*. To many observers, polyphonic creation in particular bears the hope of sustained ‘natural’ traditional practice in the language, and they remain essential channels of diffusion of nationalist themes.

What emerges from this presentation is that Corsican has progressed into new domains of use whilst traditional domains of socio-cultural language use, like polyphonic singing, have revived and often sustain the diffusion of nationalist rhetoric. To a significant extent, the scarcity of readers of Corsican has however limited the success of written-medium channels of language revitalisation and confined these developments to the Corsican literate elites. Oral media like radio, by contrast, have propelled popular Corsican use into new ‘public spaces’, albeit in ‘private space’ guise because, unlike written production where the sense of hierarchy and authority is intrinsic and omnipresent, radio-channelled forms of practice appear unmonitored and are thus more congruent with traditional Corsican-medium orality. TV is a different issue as it combines spontaneous expression from Corsicans with more formal journalistic genres and their set of diglossic ‘high’ themes, e.g. international news, from which Corsican was previously excluded. As we will see in the next chapter, popular attitudes towards such developments have varied. I now tentatively assess quantitative and qualitative patterns of language use on the island as revealed by successive language surveys and then by statistics provided by the *Rectorat* on LCC class attendance in recent years.

Various quantitative surveys have been conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute of Demographic Studies (INED) on Corsican language use and competence, reception and/or transmission and/or reading skills since the 1970s. Methodologically, such surveys are limited by their reliance on self-evaluation questionnaires, which were not corroborated by qualitative data and did not address the question of what ‘speaking

Corsican' means. The results obtained are therefore to be taken with extreme caution as '[...] *they are representations of language use rather than accurate reports of practice*' (Kristol, 1996: 7) and are especially problematical in the Corsican context '[...] *where language issues carry heightened social and political significance.*' (Thiers, 1986: 29; both quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 87). A further difficulty is that questions differed from one survey to another.

	Total claiming fluency	Total able to write Corsican	Total claiming some proficiency (a little)	Total claiming understanding Corsican	Total able to read Corsican
1977	69%	33%			
1982	68%		12%		
1995	64%			81%	57%

**Table 2: Self-Evaluation of Language Proficiency in Corsican between 1977 and 1995 [INSEE statistics; adapted from Arrighi, 2002: 83-85]**

Bearing in mind the aforementioned methodological weaknesses, the most complete language survey conducted was that of 1999 when sociolinguistic questions were added to the enquiry on families in the national census. In Corsica, 200,800 adults (over 18) were surveyed and asked the following questions on language reception, transmission and use:

1. In what languages, dialects or 'patois' did your parents usually talk to you when you were about 5?
2. In what languages, dialects or 'patois' did/do you usually talk to your children when they were about 5/now?
3. Today, do you sometimes speak with family, friends, colleagues, shopkeepers, etc, in languages other than French?

	Were spoken to in Corsican at the age of 5 (% of the total of adults surveyed)			
	Usually	Occasionally	Total	Total born on Corsica
Total adults	26	26	53	
Born before WWI	60	15	70	90
During WWII	around 30	around 30		
Born after WWII			55	80
Less than 35 years old	Less than 10%	30	41	44

**Table 3: Evolution of the use of Corsican with parents during the 20<sup>th</sup> century (Source: INSEE and INED, 2004; from data collected in the 1999 census)**

	Totals parents out of all adults surveyed in Corsica (%)	Total parents spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents who were spoken to in Corsican (%)	Parents spoken to in Corsican who spoke/speak Corsican to their 5 year-old children out of total parents surveyed (%)
Parents living on Corsica	72.1	51.9 Occasionally: 27.9 Usually: 27	59.9 Occasionally: 41.9 Usually: 18.4	31.1 Occasionally: 21.7 Usually: 9.5
Parents born and living on Corsica	32.6	81.5  Occasionally: 37.6 Usually: 48.6	61.2  Occasionally: 42.1 Usually: 19.4	23  Occasionally: 15.8 Usually: 7.3
Parents born on Corsica but living on mainland France			25.1  Occasionally: 21.2 Usually: 3.8	N/A because not surveyed on the island

**Table 4: Use of Corsican with 5-year children by parents spoken to in Corsican (except last row) (Source: INSEE, 2002, provisional results<sup>227</sup>; from data collected in the 1999 census)**

<sup>227</sup> I use the figures from the 2002 provisional report rather than those of the 2004 final analysis here because the former are more detailed in terms of the frequency of use with children, i.e. occasional or usual.

Finally, the survey indicates that 45% of all adults - about 90,000 people- claim to speak Corsican with family and/or friends and/or colleagues, etc. The survey revealed the following age differentiations:

	Adults surveyed speaking Corsican today
Generations born between 1900 and 1925	60%
Generations born in the 1940s	Below 50%
Generations born in the mid 1960s	40%
Generations born in the late 1970s	33%
Under 35 years old	1. 50% (born on Corsica) <sup>228</sup> 2. 60% (born on Corsica with parents born on Corsica)

**Table 5: Use of Corsican in today's Corsica according to age (Source: INSEE, 2004)**

Overall, this survey indicates a gradual decline in both usual and occasional use: 53% of adults surveyed declared they had been spoken to in Corsican (table 3) but, in turn, only about 23 and 31% of all pass it on, more occasionally than usually (less than 10% do so usually) (table 4). Today, older generations still speak the language (with differences according to birthplace, residence and socio-professional categories) but only a third of younger generations do, with somewhat higher figures when Corsican born (table 5). In sum, throughout the century, native speaker competences seem to have progressively declined whilst non-native competences have increased. Language shift seems to have accelerated from the interwar period (tables 3 and 5), which correlates with the patterns of emigration and demographic change outlined in chapter 6.

Other sociological indicators further refine the picture, showing that Corsican use varies across socio-professional categories with significant differences between Corsican borns or not. For instance, the highest rates of use are for peasants,

<sup>228</sup> The proportion of Corsican born between 1975 and 1999 has evolved from 73% to 60%.

pensioners, and craftsmen and shopkeepers - usually Corsican born by more than 70% - with respectively more than 70%, 50% and 47% using Corsican. At the other end of the social scale, professionals, and workers, less often Corsican born, speak it between 35 and 40%.

As was said above, however, the design of the questionnaires leaves inexplicit what speaking Corsican means - With what level of competence? In what registers? - and the categories *usually* and *occasionally* are far too vague for precise interpretations. It is therefore impossible to draw precise conclusions about the vitality of the language on the strength of such data although the trends elicited above do seem to confirm language shift<sup>229</sup> and increasing change in competence towards receptive rather than productive skills. Also it is too early to observe any significant impact on Corsican use from the institutionalisation of the language. As we have seen, school education now almost exclusively leads the revival effort, but it is impossible to predict whether this will suffice to reverse language shift as those who have benefited from it are not all yet parents and most were not included in the survey.

I now look at statistics on school attendance provided by the *Rectorat* to examine the extent of parental support towards LCC education.

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<sup>229</sup> In that respect, the survey also indicates that today 1 in 10 children speak Corsican with their parents, usually or occasionally

	Number of students studying LCC in Primary Education	Number of primary school teachers teaching LCC	Number of students studying LCC in Collèges (secondary education, first cycle)	Number of students studying LCC in Lycées d'enseignement général ('general' high school)	Number of students studying LCC in Lycées professionnels (vocational training high school)	Total of students studying LCC in Secondary Education
2000-2001	19,614 (78.09% of all students)	604 (50.08%)	6,408 (51.63%)	896 (15.36%)	895 (37.45%)	8,199 (39.74%)
2001-2002	No statistics available	No statistics available	7,017 (55.08%)	887 (15.99%)	2,276 (43.28%)	8,889 (43.23%)
2002-2003	20,031 (84.64%)	619 (54.66%)	7,108 (52.1%)	1,117 (18.3%)	451 (38.3%)	8,676 (41.43%)
2003-2004	20,031 (84.64%)	619 (54.66%)	6,733 (48.03%)	1,143 (18.5%)	828 (37.7%)	8,704 (38.94%)

**Table 6: Primary LCC education provision and attendance - Secondary LCC education attendance (source: Rectorat; <http://www.ac-corse.fr/communication/stat/Statistiques.htm>; accessed June 25<sup>th</sup> 2004)**

As this table indicates, LCC education now involves almost all primary school students despite the fact that only half of primary schoolteachers teach LCC. However, the provision of three hours a week applies to only 16% of pupils, the rest benefiting from an average of two hours (*Journal de la Corse*, March 22<sup>nd</sup>-28<sup>th</sup> 2002: 6-7). With the creation of a special exam to recruit LCC-specific primary schoolteachers since 2002, these figures should nonetheless increase in coming years.

In secondary education, results remain more mixed with high enrolment rates during the first two years of *collèges* (for which enrolment is automatic and opting out requires a written request) but a significant fall from the third year in *collèges*<sup>230</sup>. At *lycée* level where enrolment is no longer automatic, rates also fall, although this fall is somewhat less marked in vocational education where LCC enrolment remains higher. This seems to indicate that students destined to working and lower middle class positions are keener to learn Corsican, perhaps because in those social strata Corsican speaking retains a higher value. Interestingly in that connection, a 2000 article by President of the Assemblée consultative body, entitled *Dix ans pour réussir*, lamented

<sup>230</sup> The Rectorat's statistics indicate that the rate of enrolment between the second and third year in *collèges* fell from 68.54% to 27.30% (2000-2001), from 72.3% to 35.68% (2001-2002), from 71.8% to 32.8% (2002-2003) and from 66% to 33.4% (2003-2004).



that elite and bourgeois classes seem less interested in LCC education, essentially because of the lower market value of Corsican. This is perhaps also due to the ongoing perceived political overtones of Corsican speaking: speaking Corsican is still marked as a nationalist political statement. All this reflects varying parental attitudes (with differentiations according socio-professional categories that echo the survey results above) regarding the institutionalisation of the language now that provision is more widely available, and enrolment practices significantly conflict with discourses according to which a large majority of Corsicans - 62% according to a 2000 opinion poll - actually support mandatory Corsican language education (*Corsica*, January 2000: 12).

In her detailed account of the mid-1980s debates surrounding mandatory Corsican language education, Jaffe reports on the large variety of opinions - *pro*- or *anti*-mandatory language education - among both elites and the population, and she shows that these opinions are grounded in a wide array of attitudes towards the institutionalisation of language and towards the various values linked to the freedom of choice in matters relating to language use (see Jaffe, 1999:170-177 and next chapter). In other words, language revitalisation is not merely a matter of reversing diglossic language asymmetries by extending the boundaries of Corsican's official domains of use, but it also involves various, often antagonistic, attitudes that can potentially hinder the implementation of language plans.

This chapter has shown that glottopolitical powers have been largely devolved to Corsican activists in devolved institutions. To some extent, the Corsican Assembly's 1983 failed attempt to make Corsican a compulsory subject at school and the later attempt to prompt French-Corsican co-officiality were somewhat compensated by the *de facto* generalisation of Corsican language education in secondary schools and higher education. However, although the generalisation of LCC provision guarantees that a certain freedom of choice regarding LCC education *can* be exercised in schools, it does not guarantee that this freedom *will* be exercised. The amalgamation of the possibility of choice and of the actual exercise of choice is tantamount to assuming that the desire for institutionalised language education is universal. Moreover, as was reiterated by Kristol and Thiers above (p. 240) and as Jaffe's study constantly emphasizes (Jaffe, 1999), and as the statistics on school attendance presented in this

chapter confirm, the discrepancy between discourses on language use - what people say that they do or want - and actual language behaviour must be taken into account: the discourse on mandatory language education - 62% of opinions favourable to it - does not necessarily translate into 62% of pupils attending LCC classes. In that connection, the shift noted above (p. 236) from the generalised *possibility* to the eventual quasi-*imposition* of LCC education triggered unexpected forms of popular disinterest and/or resistance to language institutionalisation, which quantitative data on the continuous decline of language use and mixed patterns of school attendance tends to confirm.

As was claimed in chapter 1, and as will be illustrated in detail in the next chapter, in the very design of language plans, language planners must give careful consideration to the various folk ideologies at play in a given situation, and the attitudes they determine (and to the fact that people may behave in complex, and sometimes inconsistent, ways). Although people are not policy actors *strictu sensu*, language policy acceptance (as shaped by political and/or language ideologies), or the lack thereof, ultimately conditions language policy success or failure, as chapter 9 dramatically shows.

### *Conclusion*

The 1970s attested to mass popular mobilisation for the language led by nationalist movements. This resulted in greater tolerance from the state towards the teaching of all France's regional languages and cultures, even though this was initially enacted through limited legal provisions and modest and uneven structural and implementation measures. At a symbolic level though, these measures constituted a giant step that began to meet nationalist language demands and was therefore instrumental in divorcing the language question from the more radical political claims with which it had been conflated from the late 1960s and to a large extent around the Deixonne Law issue. In this way, the state treated Corsican on the same terms as France's other RMLs and could thereby significantly undermine nationalists' mobilising claims that Corsicans were systematically discriminated against. Nevertheless, as a Corsican stage actor observed in 1986, under the socialist government allegedly more prone to promote RMLs: ' [...] *la situation* [de la langue]

*n'a fait qu'empirer [...] le pouvoir actuel, en récupérant la revendication culturelle tout en la vidant de son contenu politique, est en train de donner à l'assimilation le dernier coup d'accélérateur.*' (Quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 212) The law's central emphasis on the voluntary basis for such teaching, both for teachers and families, meant that the state initially accompanied rather than directed teaching initiatives. The responsibility for language reacquisition was thus reattributed to Corsicans themselves and the limited results initially obtained soon entailed new demands from language activists, i.e. mandatory LCC education and co-officiality.

From the 1980s, new public institutional structures were created which catalysed the emergence of a Corsican language policy network. Within this network, in addition to central state authorities, the dominant actors have since been the political representatives and members of the consultative body of the Corsican assembly on the one hand, and civil servants from the *Rectorat* and university and IUFM lecturers, and among them sociolinguists, on the other. The former deal essentially with issues of status but with limited political outcomes; the latter have largely captured the corpus planning process and, in general, deal with the interpretation of national law and/or the implementation of the new educational provisions. Thus, new institutionalised elites largely took over the revitalisation process from civil society's organisations, and in particular from language associations with a nationalist agenda (e.g. *Scola Corsa*), even though the re-birth of cultural forms of language promotion (e.g. with polyphonic bands and in performing arts) has continued to diffuse a more or less radical nationalist discourse. However, Corsica constitutes a unique case among the largest French RML communities in that Corsica's associative schools have almost disappeared.

This absence of associative initiatives may originate from its political history under the French umbrella, when it was maintained in a greater state of dependence vis-à-vis state administration from an early stage than other regions (see chapter 6) and, as was noted above, the resulting apathy may help partially explain the lack of interest for EU support among language activists. One consequence of that enduring, exclusive reliance on state intervention has been that, in the absence of associative initiatives, those actors who occupy public positions from which they promote RMLs have a quasi-monopoly of control over public resources and structures/institutions (i.e.

schools). Because of their institutional position, their freedom of expression may be more constrained but, on the other hand, having prime access to public resources for RML confers them a dominant status on which (natural) forms of resistance to (their) institutional authority can in turn focus (see chapter 9).

Notwithstanding, most importantly, Corsican has penetrated formerly out-of-reach diglossic domains of use: the media and in particular education. The quantitative impact of the former has remained rather limited but, in education, the status and presence of Corsican improved to an extent unprecedented and unequalled in other French regional communities. This perhaps also partially explains why language planners have not looked up to the EU to find RML support: the EU has little to offer in terms of RML support and Corsican activists have already obtained the maximum that can be retrieved from current national RML legislation. By contrast with the other French RML communities, indeed, and thanks to 'zealous' state education executives, the provision of LCC education is about to become almost universal on the island and LCC has become the default choice, to such an extent that it can arguably be seen as a form of quasi-mandatory provision. Despite such structural improvements, activists still lament the decrease in the use of Corsican and the perceived disengagement of the population, illustrated by the quantitative data examined. This disengagement is especially marked among certain sociological and socio-professional categories, which may bring about the imminent death of Corsican if the community does not accompany and supplement structural and institutional achievements.

The next chapter will seek to explain why the 1970s massive discursive support for institutionalisation has apparently failed to be sustained and transformed into actual support for LCC education from the 1980s. As this chapter illustrates it cannot be blamed on the absence of structures or funds.

## Chapter 9: Language Ideologies, Language Planning and Language Attitudes in Contemporary Corsica

### *Introduction*

In this final chapter, I explore the various ideologies underlying Corsican language debates and language-targeting decisions, status and corpus planning measures. Thus, I propose another, complementary reading to the previous chapters, focusing on the different ideological and normative positions on language and language planning of the local language network's various actors, and on whose positions are hegemonic in the actual planning process.

After being a bone of contention between the region and central authorities, language revitalisation largely became an internal matter when its institutional organisation was devolved to regional actors. In this chapter, I show that this did away with the original large consensus that had formed around the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law. The initial wider (symbolic?) popular support for Corsican linked with nationalism dissolved, due to both the progressive disfavour of nationalist movements (see chapter 6) and the fact that once relocated into Corsicans' hands the politics of language became more contested because LCC-related policy powers were captured by educational elites and to a lesser extent the traditional political class (see chapter 8). These disputes may partially reflect the pattern suggested in chapters 6 and 8 whereby, due to their 'natural' rejection of external authority, in their conflicts with outsider powers Corsicans tend to unite, whereas in internal politics divisions prevail. As institutional provisions for LCC were gradually secured, the language status question which had initially to do with Corsican being granted legal recognition, also became embedded in other, more corpus-based, issues linked to the principles and modalities of implementation of the LCC policy. A number of new issues became salient and increasingly divisive: Is Corsican a language? What should be the link between Corsican and Italian in the revitalisation strategy and process? How can

language/dialectal diversity be tackled in education policy? What Corsican variety should be taught?

In this chapter, I identify what and whose answers to such questions have prevailed. In other words, I investigate which discourses on language and language planning are hegemonic in contemporary Corsica and I assess the amount of consensus built around that hegemony. My ultimate aims are to understand what the dominant order of discourse on language and language planning is in contemporary Corsica, to scrutinise the resistant discourses in that order, and to analyse the policy outcomes of discursive struggles in their implication for the revitalisation process, and eventually to examine how Corsica's internal glottopolitical dynamics affect the interaction between the local and supra-local levels.

In the first section, I broadly contrast two largely antithetical models of language, identity, and their interrelation: the 'diglossic' model and the 'polynomic' model. I first review the set of norms and attitudes persisting from the earlier hegemony of the diglossic model and the problems they posed in the Corsican context, and then outline the theoretical contours of the polynomic approach as an alternative, plural model of language, identity and language planning. The polynomic model has been largely promoted by language planners since the 1980s in an attempt to overcome some of the problems created by a language planning framework based upon diglossic ideology, and eventually to gain the popular support so sorely needed for language revitalisation. In the following sections, I show that, although the polynomic model has become dominant in educational practice, it faces a large amount of constestation. Specifically, I sketch three forms of resistance to language planning efforts embedded in various ways in the diglossic model and its essentialist assumptions: what I call, after Jaffe (1999), the 'resistance of separation', the Italianist position and language purism. In doing so, I show that all language models posit the equation of national unity with language unity, but that they differ radically in their conception of linguistic unity. In the following section on the implementation of the polynomic model in education and its limitations, I then show that some of the thorniest issues dividing Corsicans have to do with the dialectics of linguistic unity and diversity and the meaning of that dialectics for definitions of *language* and the modalities of its planning. In the final section, I then focus on what elite and popular reactions to these

have been, largely basing my analysis on press-mediated debates on Corsican language status and corpus planning gathered during my fieldwork on the island in 2000-2001. In the conclusion, I tentatively delineate routes of evolution of the Corsican sociolinguistic situation on the island and then in the broader trans-regional and supranational contexts.

*Contrasted Models of Language and Identity for Language Planning: Diglossic Ideology and the Polynomic Response*

Chapter 1 showed that as a synchronic structural-functional concept, diglossia has limited value in that it gives only a very coarse picture of the functional distribution of languages, and says little about actual language repertoires and language practices. Looking diachronically at the construction of diglossic situations does reveal the process whereby language status inequalities are established as a correlate of the construction of political inequalities between language groups, and thus helps understand the establishment and contemporary functioning of political economies of language. Yet even historically-informed analyses of glottopolitical economies say little about actual language practices

In the account of the processes of construction of Corsican-French diglossia, I evoked the range of essentialist discourses on the link between language and nation and on language itself that the architects of diglossia summoned and instrumentalised (see chapters 1 and 5). These discourses contributed to secure the dominance of French political and linguistic identities, to the detriment of Italian and then Corsican political and linguistic identities. However, dominated identities did not disappear altogether, glottophagy was incomplete and resistant political and linguistic ideologies became salient, borne by regionalist and nationalist groups. As was claimed in chapter 6, the political philosophy invoked by the nationalist groups seeking to secure a popular basis to legitimise their political claims at various times of nationalist upsurges was embedded in the romantic, cultural model of language nationalism that had taken root in Corsica during the nineteenth century (chapter 7).

In their opposition to the state, nationalists called upon the cultural model of the nation in order to claim a separate Corsican identity, thus reinforcing the French-

Corsican diglossic binary model of opposition in which Corsican-ness is defined as everything that French-ness is not, and vice versa. Ultimately, their purpose was to reverse language shift by revitalising the Corsican identity through the institutional promotion of the Corsican language. They tapped into their experience of how French had come to dominate and applied the same method to Corsican. This is what Jaffe called the *resistance of reversal* (1999: chapter 1). The previous chapter showed that the basic strategy consisted in installing Corsican into High diglossic domains. To do so, literacy - the passage to writing - and language standardisation and elaboration - were key goals to attain to prove that Corsican was a *language* (recall the initial objections to the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law on the grounds that it was not yet unified nor codified in chapter 7) and could thus fulfil all High diglossic functions: literary expression, education, media communication, etc. However, as Jaffe usefully highlights, this strategy reproduced the dominant set of values underlying the diglossic ideology they had internalised, rather than challenged its fundamental tenets about the nature of *language* (Jaffe, 1999). As a result, *before* such key goals were attained, the problem for Corsican activists was that Corsican varieties fulfilled none of the linguistic criteria for '*language-ness*': Corsican had no apparent unity, it was mainly characterised by infinite geographical variation, it had no standard form and no literary models (*ibid*: 24 *ff*).

In short, nationalists claimed some political legitimacy and sought popular support by summoning a separate, Corsican identity indexed by a distinct language but, in doing so, embraced the very strategy and values that had served to devalue their own identity and values and to dismiss Corsican's status as a *language*. With such a paradoxical attitude, they faced significant popular resistance to their strategy which this chapter later examines as the 'resistance of separation'.

To respond to the urgency of the situation, some Corsican activists proposed a model of language in which language-ness would also be based on unity, but where unity would not be conceived as uniformity as in traditional models of standardisation. Rather, they suggested adopting a plural model of language unification based on the notion of unity in diversity rather than conceiving unity as uniformity. This model was then fostered by the Corsican sociolinguists dominating the Corsican language



policy network from the mid-1980s. It was predicated on the concept of *polynomic languages*.

The concept was first coined at a 1983 symposium by Marcellesi but, arguably, it is implicit in Geronimi and Marchetti's 1971 definition of the Corsican language in their proposal for a spelling/pronunciation system that could almost exhaustively account for all Corsican varieties, *Intricciate e Cambierini*:

*Nous appelons langue corse la somme de tous les parlers, distingués entre eux par de minces variantes, qui sont utilisés sur le territoire de l'île de Corse [...] nous rejetons 'l'idée préconçue d'une clarification par réduction à des formes idéales' [...] Nous estimons que si l'uniformisation ne peut être que l'effet d'un usage constant, général et prolongé de la langue, l' 'unification', au demeurant irréaliste, serait un appauvrissement résultant d'amputations décidées par des juges dont on se demande qui les instituerait tels, et qu'à bon droit les usagers du corse se hâteraient de récuser.*<sup>231</sup>

Marcellesi's 1983 definition of polynomic languages referred to:

*[...] les langues dont l'unité est abstraite et résulte d'un mouvement dialectique et non de la simple ossification d'une norme unique, et dont l'existence est fondée sur la décision massive de ceux qui la parlent de lui donner un nom particulier et de la déclarer autonome des autres langues reconnues... (1983: 314).*

Both approaches rest upon the refusal to establish a single, arbitrary norm and endorse the fact that there can be *language* unity in *dialectal* diversity. The former leaves open the possibility for a uniform variety to emerge naturally in the long run - a *koïne* - and re-emphasizes the importance of non-authoritative attitudes. The latter relates the very existence of the language to the *popular will* to identify it as autonomous and distinct from other languages. As Marchetti (1989: 195), citing Thiers (1986: 19-20), recalls,

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<sup>231</sup> As DiMeglio (1997: 157) indicates, this spelling system has been almost universally acclaimed in Corsica within ten years after its publication. For an early illustration of the deconstruction of the idea that variation hinders obtaining the status of a language, see also Thiers (1977, cited by DiMeglio, 1997: 148).

however, the notion of *popular will*, found in Heinz Kloss's theory of language elaboration, '[...] *n'est pas toujours l'expression d'une majorité de parlants, ni celles des membres de toutes les couches de la population concernée*' and he adds that popular will can be '[...] *l'opinion d'une partie de la classe moyenne, et plus particulièrement d'une intelligentsia.*' For Marchetti, the limited nature of 'popular will' delegitimises its possible role in the birth of the Corsican language. It is, he claims, little more than a theoretical creation of language activists with nationalist inclinations, to legitimate their politicisation of the language situation (ibid: 195-196). In subsequent definitions of the polynomic character of languages, its proponents have then increasingly insisted on the centrality of the social psychological criterion of tolerance towards and within diversity and objection to any form of linguistic hierarchisation. As Marcellesi (1989: 170; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 185) writes:

[A polynomic language is] *une langue à l'unité abstraite à laquelle ses utilisateurs reconnaissent plusieurs modalités d'existence, toutes également tolérées sans qu'il y ait entre elles hiérarchisation ou spécialisation de fonction. Elle s'accompagne de l'intertolérance entre utilisateurs de variétés différentes sur les plans phonologiques et morphologiques, de même que la multiplicité lexicale est conçue par ailleurs comme un élément de richesse.*

The notion of polynomic languages thus underscores the refusal to create a hierarchy between linguistic varieties for and through standardisation processes. In theory, thus, it seems to offer solutions to one of the premises underlying Corsicans' resistance to authority and hierarchisations: with a plural norm, there is no need for selection and all varieties are equally valued. As opposed to diglossic ideological attitudes and values, polynomic attitudes thus seek to de-stigmatise dialectal loyalty and linguistic diversity by representing them as richness rather than as problems, and therefore as compatible with Corsican's status as a *language*. Put otherwise, polynomic theory implies attitudes of inter-tolerance directly opposed to diglossic ideas of linguistic hierarchisation based upon praise or stigmatisation, and it is anchored in people's practices.

Yet, as we will see below, the implementation of polynomic theory in the educational system requires establishing some limits to variation and diversity. The polynomic

approach to how language should be conceptualised in a minority language revitalisation situation like Corsica can thus be located somewhere on a 'language status' continuum between a diglossic model presenting an idealised vision of language repertoires where languages are monolithic, bounded and distinct, and ethnographic accounts of language performance showing that languages are polymorphous and that mixed codes are central in minorities' language repertoires.

In this chapter, I will demonstrate that language planners of the sociolinguistic school of thought seeking to promote such a practice-based model of language and language planning as polynomy have encountered both elite and popular resistance to language planning due to this wide discrepancy between deeprooted diglossic representations of language use and actual language practices.

In popular discourses on language (i.e. metalinguistic discourses), indeed, the binary, oppositional dichotomisation of linguistic systems is often fiercely maintained against ethnographic evidence of plural language uses (i.e. code mixing and code switching; for empirical evidence, see Thiers, 1989: 70-115 and Jaffe, 1999: 108-117) because of the symbolic weight language practices acquire in a diglossic ideological framework: language practices become a metaphor for political identities and loyalties. This further attests to the ideological force of diglossic ideology with its fundamental, essentialist logic of separation of both languages and cultural and/or political identities. By contrast, the polynomic framework implies that this dichotomisation is a construct and by showing that, in situations of language contact, languages are often mixed, it is suggested that identities too can be mixed and/or plural.

I now show that one main source of resistance to language planning, as it developed in Corsica, is linked to the internalisation of the diglossic model of oppositional identities which, following Jaffe (1999), I call the *resistance of separation*. This attitude is to be found amongst some of the remaining native speakers who, according to the evidence of table 4 above (chapter 8, p. 242), were/are spoken to in Corsican in 'Low' diglossic domains and who have managed to pass it on 'naturally'. Typically, they do not abide by moderate or radical nationalist claims for Corsican's co-officialisation and want to keep Corsican in the private sphere.

The 'resistance of separation' is a direct social psychological product of the processes that have led to the Corsican-French diglossic situation. In Corsica, it refers to the resistance to the imposition of French-ness at the political and linguistic levels outlined in the previous three chapters.

We saw that diglossia was produced by the French nationalist dichotomisation of language versus dialect, in which the French language was glorified, *inter alia* because of its (uni-)formal qualities, and the 'dialects' stigmatised for the opposite reason. Paradoxically, however, these normative, hierarchical grounds for separation helped preserve Corsican and Corsican-ness from everything French-ness embodied and sought to assimilate. This is what Bourdieu (1991) calls the alternative market<sup>232</sup>; whereas in the market dominated by French hierarchies Corsican varieties and Corsican-ness were devalued, Corsicans maintained a parallel market in which Corsican-ness could retain its value. In this reactive alternative market, discourses reinforce group boundaries in such ways that French-ness cannot permeate them: in discourse Corsican-ness crystallises as everything French-ness is not<sup>233</sup>. Within this dichotomy, any link between language and identity remains natural, local and typically rural, and non-hierarchical, and communication is exclusively oral.

Thus, the resistance of separation endorses the biological essentialist theory of the nation in which language, as the primary marker of identity, is acquired naturally as the 'mother-tongue': '*le corse ne s'apprend pas à l'école*' (Thiers, 1989: 238). The groups who take pride in having maintained family transmission perceive institutionalisation as dispossessing in that the very process contradicts the existence of Corsican as a *natural* feature of the Corsican nation - i.e. the mother tongue image. Of course, it is now established that Corsican is no longer anyone's 'mother tongue' (which in diglossic essentialism implies exclusive early monolingualism in Corsican) although it is sometimes still family-transmitted. Thus, for sociolinguists like Thiers (1989: 242), it matters to raise popular awareness of the dichotomy between the

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<sup>232</sup> For a similar pattern and concept, see also Hechter's theory of reactive ethnic group formation (1975).

<sup>233</sup> For other examples of the logic of total opposition, see McDonald (1989) on Brittany and Woolard (1989) on Catalonia.

'mother tongue' image that symbolically reflects the collective identity function of language but is today un-real, and the plural reality of language practices and sometimes of language transmission. Further, from the deep-rooted essentialist equation 'one language = one culture = one nation', substituting the state for the family implies denying the naturalness of language transmission which, Jaffe suggests (1999: 125), has the following implication: '*no language = no culture = no nation.*' Institutionalisation can thus be de-authenticating.

Paradoxically, institutionalisation can also deprive Corsican of prestige in that only very restricted intellectual elite groups, and not the bulk of the Corsican-speaking population, possess a command of the institutionalised, written Corsican language. In redefining Corsican as a written medium used in High diglossic domains, and therefore in transposing Corsican into the strongly hierarchised world of French values, the alternative Corsican values of orality, informality and tradition become relegated to a position of secondary importance. The institutionalisation of the language through writing can thus be seen as an attempt by some newly-emerged intellectual class to establish new power hierarchies, with the result that their discourse of language democracy is simply not heard (see below).

As was claimed above, the question of mixed forms is interesting because it illustrates the discrepancy between actual practices and discursive positioning. Whereas mixed forms are highly stigmatised in the dominant linguistic market, in the alternative market they are common practice and '[...] *index a (minority) community of use defined by its ability to manipulate more than one language*' (Jaffe, 1999: 26). Whilst constructing a new form of minority identity, therefore, local plural uses also question and challenge dominant views of language as monolithic and bounded. However, in discourse, the unity/purity and exclusive integrity of minority language use as a reflection of the separation of identities can be fiercely defended (see Thiers' *fable d'identité*, 1989: chapter 11). As Jaffe (1999: 29) puts it:

[...] *The diglossic schema [...] comprises multiple and conflicting values attached to both Corsican and French that are in simultaneous operation in Corsica. The coexistence of these competing discourses means that in actual practice, dominant and alternative linguistic marketplaces are not always*

*clearly delineated. [...] These moments of integration of plural identities, however, are seldom articulated in the public discussion of language and identity.*

And she adds (ibid: 31):

*[...] explicit linguistic ideology seems to bolster the simple, exclusionary nature of the binary model, even though people express contradictory opinions and behave in complicated ways. This is [...] one of the reasons that literary and academic justification of a plural model of language identity fall on deaf ears: they keep the focus at the metadiscursive level where the hold of dominant language ideology seems to be difficult to avoid.*

Other motivations underlying the resistance of separation include the denial that language planning is necessary, even when it is aimed at the survival of Corsican<sup>234</sup>, or even legitimate. Regarding the latter, as a form of exertion of political power and therefore authority, institutionalisation and planning indeed run counter to the non-authoritative value system of the alternative market, and passive or active resistance to this system sustains a consistent logic of total or partial opposition. The resistance of separation therefore thwarts the resistance of reversal and rejects hierarchy and authority at all costs, even to the risk of language death. The refusal of Corsican Assemblymen to vote for obligatory bilingualism and mandatory Corsican language education (1985) and co-officiality (1989) may be interpreted as an illustration of that logic whereby the natural, un-institutional, non-authoritative value of Corsican initially precluded its official imposition (chapter 8, p. 233; see also Jaffe, 1999: 170-177).

Finally, and most importantly in a context where linguistic identity remains predominantly local, the institutionalisation of the language through education (even in a polynomic approach as will be seen below) triggers a process of code selection for standardisation, which will alienate the speakers of all un-chosen varieties. Additionally, other channels of language elaboration may also clash with traditional

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<sup>234</sup> In that connection, having maintained it themselves, Corsican 'natural' speakers often deny that it is in danger and can altogether dismiss the need for language planning.

registers of use so that radical forms of the resistance of separation can entail 'separatist' reflexes against the creation of new domains of language use (e.g. TV, the radio, etc; see below). In brief, the resistance of separation can manifest itself in attitudes towards both the socio-political status of the language and its corpus, and can be expressed in more or less radical ways. In all its numerous guises, it is immersed in diglossic ideology.

In the two following sections, I return to the initial, more corpus-based objections to including Corsican in the Deixonne Law and to the institutionalisation of Corsican from both the legislators and some proportion of the Corsican people. I explore issues linked to linguistic kinship with Italian and to purist challenges to language revitalisation processes.

### *Language of France or Dialect of Italian? The Italianist Position*

The objections to Corsican's inclusion in the Deixonne law were dual: first, it was not a language but a group of dialects; second, it was a group of dialects of Italian. The first task for activists was to respond to these two objections. I dealt with the issue of Corsican's status as a language in the opening section above. With reference to linguistic kinship with Italian, this has remained a hot potato in activist milieus to date: how close/distant is Corsican to/from Italian?

Following Jaffe (1989: 132-133), I believe that it is not possible to discuss the kinship issue only in strict linguistic terms because the selection of particular linguistic criteria of assessment (e.g. syntax) rather than others (e.g. lexis) cannot remain politically and ideologically neutral. Linguistic boundaries serve to establish boundaries between identities and are therefore inherently political and ideological. As Comiti (1992: 57) writes:

*L'essentiel n'est pas de savoir ce qui rapproche les langues romanes [...] mais plutôt ce qui les distingue suffisamment aujourd'hui, pour pouvoir dire qu'il s'agit de langues différentes.*

He thus implicitly acknowledges that the identification of some 'sufficient' difference is subjective and therefore ideological. But were the features that serve to emphasize the distance today non-existent yesterday or was there rather no political will to solicit them? Echoing Walker Connor's (1990; excerpt reproduced in Hutchinson and Smith, 1994: 154-159) question *when* is a nation? one could ask: *when* is a different *language*? When does a variety cease being a *dialect*? The answer can only be political and ideological; therefore it ought to be acknowledged upfront as a political/ideological decision. As Létia (*Corsica*, January 2000: 62) puts it: *Entre langues voisines, l'affirmation d'une langue autonome est un choix d'ordre social et politique*. The question then becomes: what political/ideological purposes do uses of the essentialist discourse on language and identity serve?

The issue of the nature of Corsican's linguistic kinship with Italian - assertions of linguistic distance or closeness - largely predates the 1970s cultural revival. As we saw in chapter 7, during the 19<sup>th</sup> century Corsican and Italian were perceived as two varieties of the same linguistic system, by both the people and some acclaimed intellectuals hesitating between France and Italy (e.g. Tommaseo, Viale). This is still the Italianists' position today (Marchetti, 1989 and 1997). At the turn of the century, the move towards Corsican's individuation actually came from two directions with two contradictory purposes. First, Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* empirically 'invented' Corsican as a journalistic and literary language and as a cultural substitute for fading Italian, thus signing one of the birth certificates of Corsican regionalism through the individuation of a language of the Corsican nation. Second, the French state also invoked linguistic distance between Corsican and Italian - implicitly endorsing the individuality of Corsican - but as a means to dismiss Italian (Thiers, 1989: 28-29). In both cases, linguistic individuation was strategic or political. By the same token, the interwar review *L'Annu Corsu* advocated maximum distance from Italian in order to oppose the strategic discourse of kinship adopted by Fascist irredentism (which the Muvrists had endorsed; see chapter 7, pp. 213-214). Similarly, in the post-WWII context, as the state then invoked again linguistic kinship with Italian but as a reason for excluding Corsican from the Deixonne Law, Corsican cultural revivalists sought again to dismiss linguistic kinship between Corsican and Italian (Fusina, 1994). In the 1970s again, as was said above, activists had to prove that Corsican was not (any longer?) a dialect of Italian and, as Jaffe (1999: 136 &



141) illustrates, even in the 1990s they had to face objections to the ‘language’ status of Corsican, from both state officials and Corsicans.

The Italianist voice nevertheless reappeared in the late 1980s, in part because of the perception by some that Corsican was increasingly ‘bastardised’ by French interference (see the discussion of the Casanova Report in chapter 8 and of purism below). The Italianists’ emblematic figure is Pascal Marchetti, a linguist, language historian and journalist, opposed to the individuation of Corsican from Italian. In *La Corsophonie*, a history of the Corsican language, he largely documents Corsican’s linguistic and sociolinguistic debt to Italian. In the late 1980s he was followed by a significant number of intellectuals who petitioned for the teaching and learning of Italian and/or objected to the instrumental, sometimes ‘constructed’ distantiation between the two<sup>235</sup>.

The Italianist position largely rests on the essentialist position discussed in chapter 7: ‘*L’italien n’est pas pour nous une langue étrangère mais la langue de notre histoire et de notre culture [...]*’ (Poli, 1989; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 137). Two points are never questioned: Corsican and Italian are mutually intelligible, and the knowledge of Italian gives access to Corsica’s whole written tradition - historical, literary and legal - before French annexation. From that essentialist perspective, Italian thus constitutes a historical reference point in that it anchors Corsican in its antique, cultural cradle, and also in its linguistic structure from which, Italianists say, French has begun to uproot it (Casanova, 1996; cited by Jaffe, *ibid*: 139-140). As Mondoloni (*Corse-Matin*, March 2001) put it, following Marchetti’s publication (2001a) - *L’Usu Corsu*, a Corsican-Italian-French lexicon:

[...] *Marchetti est [...] la conscience linguistique et critique de la Corse [...] D’où ce souci de ne pas couper le corse de ses racines évidentes et naturelles; d’où aussi ce refus constant du calque paresseux qui, sous prétexte de faire survivre la langue, ne saurait que l’appauvrir en l’altérant un peu plus.*

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<sup>235</sup> See also the various positions expressed in the Italian-medium, pro-Italian Corsican magazine *A Viva Voce* created in 1993.

The Italianist position flatteringly and devotedly expressed here is thus also a form of language purism calling upon ‘natural and obvious roots’ and refusing to endorse linguistic interference from French that is perceived to impoverish the language and end up killing it. In that connection, when interviewed a few weeks later and asked if Corsican could survive, after vituperating against code mixing and the sociolinguists (see below), Marchetti further stated:

*Oui, si par un enseignement conjoint et une pratique simultanée des deux registres on renoue courageusement avec la langue mère, dénominateur commun et indispensable contrepoids pour équilibrer l'autre plateau de la balance qu'occupe solidement le français [...] (JDC, March 2<sup>nd</sup>-8<sup>th</sup> 2001)*  
(Emphasis added)

Also interesting in Marchetti's quote above, although this may seem paradoxical, is how essentialism can also be summoned to establish a difference between Italian and Corsican by emphasizing that Italian is Corsican's ‘mother language’ understood as its standardised variety and actually the standardised variety of the whole Italian world (*dénominateur commun*). For Marchetti, this locates the unity of Corsican varieties in Italian and the latter has instrumental value in that it can thwart French on its own (Linguistic? cultural? political? all together?) terms<sup>236</sup>.

Implicitly, however, this undermines the idea that Corsican possesses a cultural existence on its own (recall Thiers' quotation on Italian jeopardizing Corsican via hegemony whereas French threatened it via glottophagy, p. 204). Further, the subordination of Corsican to Italian has inclined some Italianists to define the future role of Corsican as an auxiliary to the Italian language like Alsatian is an auxiliary to German (Peretti, 1995: 1) and to underscore Corsican's important role at the dawn of newly-defined trans-regional relations within the framework of the European Union (e.g. through the INTERREG European exchange programme)<sup>237</sup>. In educational practice, as was indicated in chapter 8, the Corsican/Italian association has been

<sup>236</sup> See also Jaffe (1999: 139-140)

<sup>237</sup> Corsica receives about € 15 million for cross-border exchanges as part of the EU budget for the development program *Interreg III A - Italy/French Islands*. These exchanges involve Corsica, Tuscany and Sardegna and can serve to fund various cultural and/or academic events. See [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional\\_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv\\_PAY=FR&gv\\_reg=AL&gv\\_PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=FR&gv_reg=AL&gv_PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5); accessed November 2004.

implemented through the Mediterranean classes (in which Corsican is taught in parallel with Romance languages such as Italian and Spanish)<sup>238</sup>.

Of course, seeing Corsican pragmatically as a mere auxiliary for learning Italian denies that Corsican is autonomous, with a cultural personality of its own, and therefore a cultural value - in the Whorfian sense - *per se* (and ultimately a political value - in the Fichtean sense - for nationalists). For Geronimi, this is the heart of the dispute: he posits that the only value of the Corsican language is to actualise a specific Corsican identity and worldview and dismisses its pragmatic value for accessing the Italian culture: '[...] *autrement on devrait apprendre directement l'italien*'. (Geronimi, May 2001)

The subordination of Corsican to Italian, finally, also implicitly expresses an anti-nationalist position which has further crystallised antagonistic views of language(s) and political identities amongst Corsicans, and incidentally, denies twenty five years of militant, nationalist rhetoric and planning efforts. As Létia writes:

*Il s'agirait apparemment de conclure à l'échec de l'action pour faire du corse une langue à part entière, et de reconstituer un couple langue-dialecte entre italien et corse [...]* (Corsica, January 2000: 63).

It is therefore anachronistic, as Létia's use of the conditional mood satirically shows: the autonomy of Corsican has largely been built and there is no turning back. Arguably, it nevertheless reflects a major source of division between the elites on the legitimacy of Corsican cultural nationalism (in both its moderate and radical forms) and further undermines the chances for popular support to language planning.

The next section sketches the position of language planners towards another major theme of debate in Corsican language activism, which is a most prominent manifestation of linguistic essentialism: language purism. As I argue in the subsequent and last section this also constitutes an obstacle to successful language planning.

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<sup>238</sup> As a more recent synthesis of arguments in favour of the massive reintroduction of Italian in the school system, see Vinciguerra's quotation, p. 228.

In the Corsican context, language purism is a prescriptivist reaction against linguistic interference - semantic, syntactic, lexical and phonological - from French and, to a lesser extent, Italian. Like all forms of purism, it rests upon some ideology of an original, ideal state of the language from which any subsequent deviance can but be a 'bastardisation' and thus an impoverishment. From a biological essentialist perspective, further, this bastardisation is related to a dilution of a perfect state of Corsican identity, its corruption by alien influences, and can therefore have nationalist overtones (see chapter 1). Linguistic impurities thus become a symptom of cultural inauthenticity: the loss of traditional linguistic distinctions impoverishes the language and signals a loss of identity (Franchi, 1984 and 1988; quoted by Jaffe, 1989: 150). Put otherwise, language purism is a constitutive element of a radical diglossic attitude of separation in which both language and identities are and must remain bounded and exclusive.

Nevertheless, if one accepts the idea that the language must be elaborated to survive and that diglossic boundaries must disappear, from the purist viewpoint, language planners must revive authentic, but forgotten, vocabulary and coin new words using the language's own morphological mechanisms to adapt it to the linguistic needs of modern life (see the actions of the ADECEC and Franchi's description of the philosophy of *Rigiru* the main literary review in the 1970s, in *Corsica*, March 2000: 57). In doing so, they participate in the effort to reverse language shift by providing the dominated language with the vocabulary to fulfil the functions formerly reserved for the dominant one. In this conception, language planners ought to help diffuse a model of correctness and authenticity after identifying pure original, uncorrupted forms (because they have been tasked with preserving authentic identities by preserving authentic language).

In line with diglossic compartmentalization, however, language purism can be more or less salient according to the degree of formality of the context. As an illustration of that kind of diglossic or 'compartmentalized' purism, a very eminent cultural and linguistic activist, once president of the Conseil de la Culture, de l'Education et du Cadre de Vie (CCECV), said:

*Moi quand je discute avec quelqu'un dans la rue, il ne m'appartient pas de dire: 'il ne parle pas bien le corse ou il le parle bien'. Mais je considère qu'aujourd'hui que le corse n'est plus du tout parlé et que nous ne l'entendons plus qu'à la radio et un peu à la télé, que ceux qui le parlent à la radio et à la télé soient tenus de parler un corse correct. C'est ce que nous attendons de n'importe quelle personne qui intervient à la radio en français. Maintenant dans la rue cela ne me dérange pas: moi je discute du matin au soir avec des gens qui parlent corse qui mettent les trois quarts des mots en français, ou les structures, mais cela ne me regarde pas je ne suis pas un juge. Mais je dis que ceux qui ont en charge de faire écouter la langue, ceux qui ont en charge de l'enseigner [...] eux doivent parler [correctement]. Hélas, je voudrais des Capétiens<sup>239</sup> qui soient très compétents dans la langue, culturellement très fort, etc [...] (Bassani, 2001)*

For sociolinguists, language purism is unjustifiable for both philosophical and practical reasons. On the philosophical front, even though they acknowledge that certain forms can hurt some linguistic sensitivities, they object to purist, normative attitudes on the fundamental ground that the assumption of original pure forms is a construction. Tackling that question, Thiers (1989: 43-47) claims that, in Corsica's essentialist historiography, Santu Casanova's *A Tramuntana* plays the symbolic role of the 'founding father' of pure, written Corsican. Yet, as he forcibly demonstrates, the linguistic analysis of excerpts of *A Tramuntana* underlines the discrepancy between its symbolic representation *a posteriori* as an icon of the original uncorrupted norm, and its instrumental use as such in cultural nationalist discourses, and the mixed linguistic reality of the text. As Thiers (ibid: 40) concludes: '*Quand les monuments ne sont pas disponibles, on en crée de toutes pièces. Et si l'on en possède de trop pauvres [...] on les passe à l'or fin.*'

Put otherwise, in the Corsican context, in the absence of any description of the so-called ideal state of the language via early grammars and/or a substantial literary corpus, any attempt to judge the quality of language practices with reference to some

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<sup>239</sup> Those who passed the CAPES examination.

former 'pure' state of the language is illegitimate. Thiers's vision is thus that language is best seen as a social construct: there is no absolute linguistic essence; there are no objective, 'natural' language boundaries. In this social constructionist philosophy, but also for the practical purposes of a prominent language planner like Thiers<sup>240</sup>, the Corsican language is what Corsicans collectively speak and say it is. As Jaffe (1999: 153) summarises the sociolinguistic position: *'Thiers thus does not accept the purist premise that French influences deform the essence of the Corsican language because he defines language as practice, not as form.'*

On the practical front, the objection of sociolinguists to purism and purist censors is that the idealisation of linguistic form as the index of cultural authenticity intrinsic to essentialism, rather than legitimising actual practice, risks leaving non-speakers or imperfect speakers out of the 'national' community. Thus, purism either denies national identity to non-speakers or silences 'semi-speakers' already anxious to prove their identity by using Corsican (see Hill, 1985; cited in Jaffe, 1999: 24). As Comiti puts it (in *Corsica*, July 2001: 58):

*[...] ceux qui portent un discours puriste sur la langue, sur le respect des authentiques formes anciennes héritées de l'Histoire, [...] paradoxalement, accélèrent les processus de disparition. Car c'est un discours inhibiteur, qui alimente fortement l'angoisse de locuteurs terrorisés par la faute de langue et qui finit par susciter le mutisme [...]*

This postulate - one language equals one national identity - also largely ignores or willfully denies the actual plurality of identities in minority populations which surface in multiform language practices and mixed codes. Yet, in contexts of language endangerment, all speakers are needed to revitalise the language, no 'waste' can be afforded.

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<sup>240</sup> Thiers was one of the earliest language activists. When the University of Corsica opened, he became a lecturer. He was trained in sociolinguistics, diffused the controversial concept of polynomy in Corsica and organised its hegemonization in teacher training and subsequently LCC education. He was president of the CAPES panel for years. He is also an acclaimed Corsican medium literary author, and is a regular interviewee in *Corsica*. As director of the Cultural Centre of the University [CCU], finally, he has also played a central role in organising cultural exchanges and conferences with other regions notably with European funds, e.g. from Interreg.

Finally, too much emphasis on the ‘retrieval’ of original forms can hinder understanding and communication. This has led to both academic and popular forms of condemnation of purism. An oft-given example is the purist attitude of Sicurani (a prescriptivist columnist in and on Corsican in the weekly *Corse-Matin*) whose approach consists in systematically digging out words from his own experience and knowledge of the oral tradition to substitute them with more gallicized equivalents. Another highly stigmatised derived approach, according to a number of my informants, is the use of Sicurani’s vocabulary in the news by TV presenter J. Castellani (see also Létia, in *Corsica*, September 2001: 49-50).

In his column in *Corsica* (February 2001: 53), Arrighi underlines the counter-productivity of such an approach:

*Poussés par le désir louable de maintenir un patrimoine, des obsédés du lexique ont lancé une sorte de croisade qui risque, hélas, de se retourner contre le corse en exaspérant ceux qui le parlent. Le principe est simple. Pour désigner tel objet ou tel fait, on assure connaître le vrai mot, issu d’une mémoire invérifiable, du genre ‘entendu en juin 1923 d’un berger nonagénaire dans tel village.’ [...] On veut imposer, en les répétant sans cesse, une vingtaine de ces mots devenus emblématiques. Cette pédagogie du ressassement utilise pleinement quelques lieux de diffusion, chronique du quotidien local [by Sicurani] et informations télévisées [by J. Castellani], qui ne servent plus dès lors à communiquer, ce qui est la fonction première de toute langue, mais à enseigner du vocabulaire. [...] Ces mots proposés, à l’évidence sortent plutôt d’un dictionnaire latin que de traditions villageoises [...]*

Likewise, in another criticism of purism but with a different agenda, i.e. to justify the restoration of Italian, Marchetti (*Corsica*, 2002: 53-54) condemns the aforementioned media practices:

*[...] les médias audio-visuels qui, incapables de mettre en oeuvre le corse que la population comprend cherchent à en imposer un autre: un calque grossier*

*du français dans les mots et la syntaxe [...] truffé au surplus de néologismes ridicules.*

The various forms and degrees of language purism further underline the persistent hold of diglossic ideology and of the biological essentialist position in the context of reversing language shift. Besides this, in a number of discussions I had during my fieldwork, I was told that forms of radical purism like the ones described above could sometimes even put off the most motivated Corsican-speaking language activists and discouraged them from watching TV news in Corsican at all. Overall, even though some forms of purism can be praised when they motivate an interest in lost lexical patrimonies, purism that hinders communication is counterproductive and damages the revitalisation process. In Corsica, such forms of purism are quantitatively scarce but their presence in TV news gives them a wide audience, stimulating mockery and trivial attitudes detrimental to the revitalisation process.

In the next section, I will show how language-in-education planners have challenged both the essentialist dimension of the aforementioned language ideologies (both the Italianist position and language purism) and the oppositional model of identity intrinsic to diglossic ideology, in their implementation in schools of the polynomic principles outlined above.

### *Challenging Diglossic Ideology? Implementing Polynomy in Schools*

Despite persisting challenges to calling Corsican a language, it gained institutional status as a language in 1974. As we have seen, the main public to convince has been Corsicans themselves because it is their support for the revitalisation effort that has been strikingly absent despite institutional gains. The previous sections have outlined various forms of resistance to planning effort deeply rooted in the ideological premises of the diglossic model. In the opening section, I sketched the principles underlying the polynomic approach to language and language planning, underlining how it seeks to respond theoretically to some of the problems created by diglossic assumptions in a context of minority language revitalisation like Corsica, e.g. dialectal diversity hinders language unity. In what follows, drawing largely on DiMeglio's PhD thesis on Corsican glottodidactics, I critically examine how the Corsican



sociolinguists in charge of Corsican language education have translated the theoretical polynomic principles into practical didactic strategies

As DiMeglio (1997: 141-194) illustrates, the incorporation of the main philosophical precepts of polynomy (i.e. inter-tolerance between dialectal varieties and refusal to hierarchise) into the field of education practices from the late 1980s has posed a number of problems, notably because pedagogical strategies relating to minority languages that take account of their specific condition as un-standardised languages, run counter to dominant pedagogical practices (see also Comiti, *Corsica*, July 2000). In theory, polynomy means that teachers, pupils, and later students, are moulded to accept and tolerate all variability and diversity. Yet this does not abolish the necessity of norm-setting in practice.

For reasons of space it is not possible here to detail all the problems of implementing polynomic principles in the education domain, so I will just mention a few core issues. First, all educational actors agree that some minimal teaching norms are unavoidable. As DiMeglio (ibid: 124) points out,

*Intricciate e Cambierini n'en a pas moins le mérite d'en poser les premiers jalons et opère ainsi les premiers choix de limitation de la norme plurielle afin d'éviter une dérive vers la graphie anarchique ou une norme trop fidèle aux microlocalismes.*

The limitation of the number of norms chosen can be seen as a plural standard. As DiMeglio (ibid: 136-137) writes:

*[...] nous avons figé la norme dans un cadre de variation. [...] Ainsi, l'enseignement du corse développerait une tendance originale à l'ossification dans la mesure où elle donne aux éléments écrits, non pas une forme unique, mais un ensemble fixé de formes possibles qui peut aller jusqu'à trois et rarement au-delà. Ce que fait exceptionnellement le français pour le mot clé/clef, le corse tend à le systématiser, non dans l'impossible objectif de*

*refléter l'ensemble de la variation dialectale mais dans ce qui nous apparaît comme une représentation symbolique de celle-ci.*

Put otherwise, for practical purposes in education, some difficult compromise has to be reached between the need of a teaching norm, however minimal, and respect for the plurality of linguistic identities (ibid: 144). An additional difficulty is linked to the actual management *hic et nunc*, in educational practice, of codemixing, including phenomena of koïnisation.

Addressing the first difficulty, in practice, has meant reducing linguistic diversity to a manageable set of variants reflecting differentiations between three supra-local dialectal zones - Northern, Central and Southern. Comiti labels them *régiolectes* and distinguishes them by typical phonological features such as consonantal change in stressed, intervocalic position, and/or grammatical/morphological features, e.g. in the northern *régiolecte*, the mark for feminine plural agreements is *e* whilst the masculine plural *i*, whereas in the central and southern *régiolectes*, there is only one plural form: *i* (1992: 71-75). 'Applied' polynomy thus implies *some* choice and *some* reduction of linguistic diversity. In the reduction of diversity to *régiolectes* the choice allows for diversity whilst inciting Corsican speakers to project their local linguistic identity onto a supra-local, symbolic representation of sub-regional variation. In turn, this maybe instrumental in transforming localism into supra-local, pan-Corsican forms of identity. Notwithstanding, not all variability can be accounted for in a *symbolic* representation and attempts to do so can provoke some resistance from those Corsicans most radically attached to their local variety and unwilling to consent to *any* sacrifice of their natural variant.

As DiMeglio shows, however, this characterisation of linguistic diversity has become hegemonic in didactic materials since 1987 (ibid: 130). This places upon the secondary school teacher the difficult task of knowing the whole system of variability in order to be able to introduce it to pupils and to teach them a tolerant approach towards variations. At primary school level, as far as possible, teachers are to teach in the local variety and, at university level, students are expected to command the whole system and its variations (ibid: 147). For educators, moreover, the strategy of

adopting *régiolectes* is increasingly justified by the fact that, in school populations, especially in secondary school education, Corsican local varieties are increasingly mixed as local variants come into contact with one another (Marcellesi, 1987: 14). Finally, the reduction to three forms has the symbolic advantage that it tends towards unification which heightens Corsican's *language* status.

This management of diversity has found *some* consensus amongst certain educational actors as increasing numbers of LCC teachers have been trained according to the sociolinguistic principles inhering in the approach, at the University from the mid-1980s and later at the IUFM. Voices have nevertheless emerged that challenge these very principles. For instance, as Fusina (1994: 190) indicates, by refusing to publish a document facilitating the implementation of polynomic principles in the late 1980s, certain members of administrative authorities clearly manifested their opposition to such plural premises for norm-setting.

Most importantly, protest has emerged regarding the implementation of the principle of tolerance towards mixed forms. Comiti (1992: 80-87) distinguishes between two ideal-type categories: *intralectes* (mixed varieties resulting from the contact between various Corsican varieties) and *interlectes* (mixed varieties resulting from the contact between Corsican and other linguistic systems like French). As was said above, the polynomic language philosophy implies a refusal to hierarchize and a commitment to linguistic tolerance, which has led advocates of this sociolinguistic school of thought to accept mixed forms within the Corsican linguistic system (i.e. *intralectes*) and across different linguistic systems (i.e. *interlectes*) as legitimate forms of expression, in order to avoid linguistic insecurity and sociolinguistic silencing (Thiers, 1989: 56-57). To the extent that such mixed forms are becoming common due to increased contacts between local varieties, the 'implementation' of tolerance has had to adapt to this new phenomenon of *koïneisation*.

In the context of educational practice, however, accelerating *koïneisation* creates new pedagogical problems. Arrighi (1990: 41), for instance, emphasizes that some standards of acceptability are necessary in order to preserve linguistic identity, warning against the danger of conceiving polynomy as some form of *anomie*. For instance, he argues that polynomic writing should nevertheless remain internally

coherent and avoid co-locating feminine plurals in *e* and in *i* in the same text because this can create confusion. This constitutes the very limit of polynomic tolerance and its ability to dismiss linguistic essentialism: when does a new linguistic form cease to be a mistake and come to reflect a new form of linguistic identity? Or, in other words, just as we observed various degrees of purist attitudes, polynomic attitudes can also range from simply tolerating variation in speech, to tolerating intralectal varieties, and finally perhaps even interlectal varieties.

Regarding popular language attitudes in Corsica, Comiti (1992) shows that Corsicans have developed polynomic attitudes in that they recognise other varieties than their own as Corsican and authentic (the autonomy criterion). However, he also shows that both *intralectes* and *interlectes*, and particularly the latter, are highly stigmatised in Corsica, which evidences that the polynomic attitude remains limited to what is perceived as (ideal-typical) natural or territorialized, 'pure' or bounded varieties and that the population does not fully endorse the implications of the polynomic philosophy. In other words, the polynomic spirit is bounded by essentialist values. Even in academia, objections to the polynomic philosophy have surfaced, vested with purist rationales and condemning the blind acceptance of interlectal mixed forms: '[...] *il est clair, et les médias en font quotidiennement la démonstration, que l'on ne peut comprendre ce corse-là qu'en passant par le français dont il est un recodage.*' (Dalbera-Stefanaggi, 1989; quoted in DiMeglio, 1997: 193)

As we will see below, the question of how to deal with mixed codes has reinforced the popular 'resistance of separation' and the wariness and condemnation of 'revolutionary' academic positions and discourses on language and language planning that bolster or endorse mixed uses, especially in school education. In turn, this has somewhat contributed to radicalise forms of language purism as a reaction to what is perceived as at best unacceptable laxity and at worst a (socio-)linguistic *coup* (recall Bassani's 'diglossic' purism in the previous section and his final judgement on certain LCC teachers). According to the particulars of the context(s) in which they are expressed, the dialectics of identity and linguistic norm-setting versus respect for and acceptance of diversity, including new speech and written forms, remains extremely divisive and the hegemonic positions of sociolinguists in educational spheres are still extremely controversial and contested.

In the next, final section, I analyse the representation of language debates in the Corsican media at the time I did my fieldwork (2000-2001) to identify the bones of contention and attempt to assess if attitudes are embedded in continuity with the past or if they are changing.

### *Elite and Popular Responses to Language Planning: The Media Discourse*

The data drawn upon in this chapter originated mainly from Corsican researchers (e.g. Thiers, 1989; Marchetti, 1989; DiMeglio, 1997) although I have also borrowed widely from Alexandra Jaffe's (1999) ethnography of language ideologies, language planning and language attitudes on Corsica. Both the Corsican sources I used and Jaffe's work span the 1980s/1990s and both illustrate the issues I have detailed in the previous four chapters. I did my own fieldwork research during the academic year 2000-2001 at the propitious time when the Matignon discussions spectacularised language debates and disputes between mainland France and Corsica and within Corsica. Consequently, considerable media space was devoted to language issues. My data is drawn from articles from the daily *Corse-Matin* and its weekly supplement *La Corse-Votre Hebdo*, the weekly *Journal de la Corse* (JDC), and the monthly magazine *Corsica*. In this final section before concluding, I attempt an updated synthesis of all the positions in the language debates presented above and the way they come into conflict at this level.

The thematic analysis led to two main findings. First, unsurprisingly, very many articles dealt with the various institutional phases of the Matignon discussions and their impact on the evolution of language-in-education provision through these phases. On other language-related, more corpus-based issues, however, it also emphasizes the continuity of discursive positioning on language and language planning: all the antagonistic ideologies and political positions found in the literature discussed above appear in the various newspapers articles unchanged. Thus, we find various illustrations or reiterations of Italianist, purist and polynomic discourses, advocating strategies of reversal of language shift or simply manifesting some well ingrained strategy of separation (for the former two) or seeking to de-legitimise diglossic ideology under its various manifestations (for the latter).

Second, and this is striking throughout the wealth of articles, writing styles reflect and express antagonistic views with bitter acrimony. In other words, positions are criticised and their defenders are sharply attacked, sometimes by name, sometimes not: *ad hominem* feelings often permeate more academic arguments. The following excerpts are taken from the few Corsican newspapers and magazines mentioned in the previous chapter and show that, once institutionalised, Corsican has become a desirable and contested object, all the more so as it is generally acknowledged that sociolinguists have captured the (corpus) planning process. A series of increasingly acrimonious exchanges published in the JDC between January and March 2001 attests to the sensitivity of language issues and the acid tenor of the arguments is so blatant that it requires little critical commentary.

The JDC ‘fired off’ in its December 2000-January 2001 issue:

*0/10 au professeur Jacques Thiers et à quelques-uns de ses disciples pour le mélange anarchique et inconsideré des idiomes du Nord et du Sud.*

To which Thiers replied, in the *Forum des lecteurs* of the February 2<sup>nd</sup>- 8<sup>th</sup> 2001 issue, accusing the newspaper of purism and anachronism:

*[...] l'almanach des communautés dialectales d'antan et le gardien jaloux d'isoglosses bien désuets [...]*

In his reply, the newspaper journalist used *ad hominem* arguments:

*Thiers supporte mal la critique et ... s'énervé lorsqu'on ne lui tresse pas des couronnes de lauriers.*

And in the February 23<sup>rd</sup> to March 1<sup>st</sup> issue he referred to Thiers’

*[...] mépris de mandarin universitaire qui confine hélas au racisme.*

In the same issue the *Forum des lecteurs* also features a longer and more sociolinguistically-informed attack against Thiers in particular, and the University's sociolinguists in general, by a teacher Marc Biancarelli who accuses sociolinguists of engineering '[...] *une nouvelle langue, artificielle et arbitraire*, [qui sera] *demain le triomphe du néant, l'institutionnalisation de la faute et de l'incompétence*', and states that sociolinguists attempt to seize power through language:

[...] *L'enseignement de la langue, avec son corollaire institutionnel (CAPES, Université, IUFM, IUT, rectorat, médias, etc...) peut apparaître effectivement comme l'enjeu d'une certaine prise de pouvoir. Elaborer un nouveau langage pour les corsophones de demain, comme on inventerait un novlangue Orwellien, [...] c'est se prendre un peu pour Dieu le père [...] Plus qu'aujourd'hui, la langue sera demain outil de pouvoir. Ceux qui maîtriseront la langue maîtriseront les outils de communication qui vont avec et leur pouvoir ne sera pas alors "corténais" mais bien au-delà car totalement institutionnel (donc politique), scientifiquement référencé, financé et incontournable, donc indéboulonnable. C'est là, selon moi, tout l'enjeu que pourrait représenter le novlangue corse [...]*

Illustrations of this brand of verbal violence can be multiplied coming from Italianists against sociolinguists:

*On a raison, tant au Sud qu'au Nord, de refuser le mélange arbitraire que des régisseurs désinvoltes et auto-investis tenteraient d'imposer [...] le circuit officiel dont je constate cependant qu'en 20 ans... il n'a produit aucun outil didactique pertinent* (Marchetti, in *JDC*, March 2001: 5),

or from purists like Sicurani responding to Arrighi's aforementioned criticism (see previous section on purism) (*Corsica*, May 2001: 50):

*Arrighi supporte mal le fait que les médias soient ouverts à des intervenants qui ne partagent pas ses opinions... Contrairement à ce que je vois faire je n'ai jamais rien imposé à personne et j'abandonne à d'autres le rôle de donneurs de leçons... Travail de terrain sans prétention si ce n'est de vouloir sauver ce*

*qui pouvait encore l'être, sans penser que cette initiative me serait reprochée un jour par ceux qui se sont fait une situation dans la transmission de la langue...D'autres feignent de croire que le corse est encore à créer et qu'ils ont été investis pour cette tâche...Nous avons connu ceux qui étaient avides d'imposer leur griffe à la langue, ceux qui voyaient déjà les bénéfices qu'ils pouvaient en tirer... Nul n'a aucun droit sur l'idiome. Nous savons ce qu'il était en 1970, il est devenu aujourd'hui une chasse gardée... Aussi quand JM Arrighi annonce que 100% des auteurs et 90% des auteurs se sont pliés aux normes imposées, j'y vois un bon score pour un régime totalitaire [...].*

or from Comiti (Corsica, 2001: 56) referring to criticisms against sociolinguists as: '[...] *polémiques stériles orchestrées par des trublions en manque de reconnaissance.*', etc, etc.

These statements illustrate one of the issues which undermine successful language planning in a small society like Corsica, pointed out to me by one my informants: 'everyone knows everyone' among the 'handful' of language activists, planning cannot be anonymous, and ultimately, to understand language disputes, one cannot ignore the political economy of biographies and personal relationships. Typically, debaters are all actors from the 1970s or their followers: some have gained decision-making prerogatives through the process of institutionalisation of the Corsican language, others not; some have kept these positions and others not. The resentment and/or envy thereby created governs reactions or at least makes their expression more scathing. Thus, in perhaps a slightly caricatured way, my impression is that the way Corsican society has had to address language issues in the changing socio-political and institutional contexts since the 1980s, has created new forms of clanic loyalties along patterns of unreasoned defence of highly sensitive issues of identity from which language questions are inseparable, and that the opposition of the 'heads of clans' has cascaded down to the population.

With the institutional hegemonization of sociolinguistic approaches to acquisition planning, more importantly, the biological essentialist views of linguistic identity underlying nationalist/purist and Italianist discourses have become increasingly



challenged by more plural, social constructionist - or practice-based - views of linguistic identity and their corresponding planning orientations. In other words, beyond the strict linguistic issue, polynomists seek to legitimise a plural, unifying conception of the Corsican society, rich from the diversity of its constituents, rather than a view of Corsica as divided internally and/or doomed by the political and/or cultural and/or linguistic minoritization of its natural, ethnic, 'pure' population. Their position is perceived as all the more threatening to other 'heads of clans' (e.g. Marchetti and Sicurani) and their followers because they can be diffused to the island's entire youth throughout the curriculum. Thus, it is perhaps also because polynomists have captured the RML planning process that a certain proportion of the population has resisted an institutionalisation of the language resting on social constructionist principles. Finally, the disputes were perhaps most extremely acerbic in 2000-2001 because the outcomes of the Matignon negotiations could well have led to the creation of new institutional structures such as a language office, for a (reconfigured?) LCC policy network.

### *Conclusion*

This final chapter has explored the various contending ideologies informing current language debates in Corsica and their actualisation, or not, in the language planning process. It has shown that the essentialist conceptions of language and identity, and how they interrelate, inherited from the experience of French nation-building processes and the correlated construction of French-Corsican diglossic ideology retain enormous purchase in both elite discourses on and popular attitudes to what a language is and how it should be planned. However, in Corsica, an alternative, pluralist discourse on language, identity and their interrelation - the polynomic approach - has been developed by Corsican sociolinguists at the same time as they have captured the Corsican corpus language planning process so that it became hegemonic in the Corsican language revitalisation process.

This alternative model has sought to overcome the discrepancy inherent in diglossic models of language planning (and in theories of nationalism) between representations of language use and actual language practices, by grounding its approach to language planning into actual practices rather than in idealised - reified and totemized -

conceptions of language, such as in the diglossic model. The objective of that model has thus been to promote a potentially wide-ranging model of language unification based on intertolerance and the refusal to create inequalities through language hierarchisation. In doing so, however, the proponents of that approach have encountered various forms of resistance themselves directly grounded in various, complex diglossic essentialist representations of language and identity: the 'resistance of separation', the Italianist position and language purism, so that the struggle for glottopolitical hegemony has remained very acute in Contemporary Corsica.

The 'resistance of separation', which we have seen retains significant purchase in the Corsican population, opposed the polynomic approach *inter alia* because it is recognised that even a plural model of language unification cannot be totally dissociated from (well-known) individuals - here the sociolinguists - and therefore constitutes some form of authoritative discourse and power stake. The discrepancy between the absolute notions of equality between dialects underlying polynomic theory and the necessity to reduce dialectal diversity to a manageable set of variants in education has reinforced the authoritative character of the polynomic proposal in a context of resistance of authority where language planners are forced to negotiate every norm they wish to adopt. The Italianist and purist positions, in their diverse strands, also illustrate that, constructed though forms of essentialism may be and as well-informed as their critiques might be in deconstructing them and in highlighting the inequalities and wrong beliefs on which they lie, essentialism remains well ingrained in popular approaches to language and identity and it sustains attitudes of opposition against what plural models of language and identity propose.

As Jaffe claims, '[...] *it is the only discourse of legitimate identity that has political currency.*' (Jaffe, 1999: 121) In the French-Corsican diglossic context, forms of linguistic essentialisms have generated a large array of both elite and popular positions and opinions on language, identity and their interrelations. An implication of such a diversity of opinions is that they betray the divisions amongst the language planning elites and their respective followers. Through their mutual ideological and discursive oppositions, leaders display a lack of unity (to say the least!). As the press excerpts show, the content of language debates is shadowed by acrimonious open conflicts, which in turn preclude any enactment and representation of a successful

planning process. This certainly has some deplorable social psychological effects amongst the Corsican 'attentive publics' - Corsican society writ large - and constitutes no incentive to transmit/re-acquire/learn/promote the Corsican language.

Another implication of the perpetuated spectacularisation of disputes about language and identity is that they convey an image of the Corsican society as doomed by conflicts and incapable to create a pan-Corsican identity that would unify society in its diversity. The ideals of equality and tolerance that the polynomic model seeks to embody could be usefully exported to other minority language contexts where relatively similar problems of fragmentation of and conflict over language and identity exist, e.g. Occitany. In that case, the Corsican example could acquire a genuinely transregional and perhaps even supranational dimension. Because of the continuous rejection of any form of authority in Corsica, though, this model fails to receive all the attention that it may deserve beyond the walls of academic conferences. Put otherwise, before the Corsican model can be exported, Corsicans must overcome their inner divisions.

In that connection, in recent years, the suggestion was made to create a language office, as if more institutionalisation could solve ideological problems by imposing another authoritative voice. Interestingly, the creation of such an office was suggested by almost all language debaters. For sociolinguists, DiMeglio (1997: 193) thus calls for:

*[...] une instance administrative et/ou scolaire qui, sans être une académie, aurait en charge la régulation et l'harmonisation des problèmes de normes officielles. Les questions de la codification encore en suspens, du cadre établi de la plurinorme écrite, de la prise en compte de phénomènes d'évolution linguistique dans la norme d'enseignement, de l'harmonisation de la néologie, de l'élaboration et orientations des programmes ne peuvent pas être réglées sans une instance compétente et autorisée.*

The collective association *Pà a Lingua Corsa*, composed of many political, cultural associations, trade unions, etc, (see previous chapter) also suggested in 1997 the creation of an:

*[...] Office du bilinguisme [...] formé de représentants des divers groupes politiques de l'Assemblée, des syndicats, des associations culturelles et autres experts de la LCC [...] [avec] pour mission d'impulser et de mettre en œuvre la politique linguistique et culturelle, de vérifier et d'évaluer son niveau d'exécution. (1997)*

More recently, the same idea was suggested by M.J. Vinciguerra, General Inspector of National Education, who argued that a *Centre d'Action pour la Langue Corse* could optimize Corsican language related resources, both material and human resources, and achieve the *de facto* officialisation of the language on the island (in *Corsica*, July 2002: 53) and, according to the CTC's LCC department, the idea is also becoming more popular amongst members of the CTC executive bureau.

Finally, if this Office was eventually created, the current debates may simply be relocated into a new arena, which would not bring solutions to disputes because policy actors would still have their own, respective, antagonistic and (irreconcilable?) agendas. On the contrary, this might only exacerbate disputes as the various language clans would fight again for hegemony in the new institution.

In the meantime, criticised though they may be and contested though their legitimacy may appear to a number of Corsicans, sociolinguists have held most of the institutional reins of the revitalisation process since the mid-1980s. In the medium or long run, they may well eventually naturalise the polynomic solution.

## General Conclusion

This study has assessed the impact of the construction of the EU on regional and/or minority glottopolitics in the EU in general and French-Corsican glottopolitics in particular. Its main objective was to examine whether EU construction has created a new order of discourse on language, and in particular on RMLs, and language planning, and whether this has had repercussions on the RML legal and/or institutional and/or policy frameworks at and across supranational, national and regional levels, with special reference to France and Corsica. Put more briefly, I looked at the interaction between various discourses on RMLs and RML legal/institutional/policy frameworks at each level and across levels.

Chapter 1 established a multi-theoretical, multi-methodological framework in order to study the dynamics of language policy formation at each level of analysis *per se*, and in its relations to other levels. In doing so, it brought together analytical frameworks and theories from political theory, social theory and sociolinguistics, thus broadening the social theoretical foundations of sociolinguistics. At supranational level, the governance approach, combined with such analytical tools as the policy network concept, power dependency theory and the Critical Discourse Analytical method, has provided useful tools to understand how language policy making actually takes place - through which processes, with what actors and according to which norms and values, and within which limits. This manifold approach to language policy formation - as resulting from the interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions and institutional practice - has proved a useful approach at other levels of society, and contributed to the refining of traditional sociolinguistic approaches to language policy formation where such language decision-making processes are scrutinised in less sophisticated ways.

Regarding language policy formation at national levels, I argued that neither students of linguistic nationalism nor sociolinguistic conceptualisations of diglossia had satisfactorily documented the glottopolitical conflicts inherent in nation-building processes and their implications for current issues of RML policy formation at sub-national, national and supranational levels. In that respect, Bourdieu's sociology of

language and power brings useful tools broadly to conceptualise the power relations underlying processes of language maintenance and/or language shift during nation-building processes. Specifically, Bourdieu's central concepts of popular resistance and alternative markets help deconstruct uncritical historiographies of nation-building processes articulated around what I called the 'evolutionary fallacy'. Thus, Bourdieu's notions of conflict and resistance bridge the gap between contradictory historiographies and point to the specificities of each situation of compliance/resistance. In turn, such specificities need to be informed by ethnographic data on the relations between dominant/resistant political and language ideologies, and actual elite and popular attitudes that determine behaviour vis-à-vis such ideologies, in the context of RML policy formation, at subnational levels.

At regional and grassroots levels, focusing on Corsica, indeed, I highlighted the enduring purchase of essentialist political and linguistic ideologies and the difficulty of challenging essentialist premises in language policy making processes. I showed that planners seeking to foster alternative, social constructionist models of language, identity, and their interrelation, in language planning formation have encountered great resistance when they have endeavoured to challenge the essentialist premises intrinsic to the diglossic model.

As indicated above, at and across all levels of analysis, I argued that language policy formation resulted from the interplay of ideological positions on language, identity and their interrelation, legal provisions, and institutional practices involving a variety of actors with various motivations and uneven bargaining powers.

Chapters 2 to 4 scrutinised the EU's own approach to language issues in general and to RMLs in particular. Chapter 2 showed that the principle of language equality that had seemed to prevail in the EU's original sociolinguistic design established in Regulation 1/58 had gradually become *de facto* undermined by the growing dominance of English as a working language and *de jure* challenged by the 2001 judgement of the Court of First Instance. Chapter 3 then showed that RML activists' efforts to interpret rather vague legal definitions of cultural and linguistic diversity in primary legislation (articles 149 and 151) in a way that may have granted RMLs some symbolic recognition at EU level and more practically a durable legal basis for RMLs

*per se* were also legally proscribed by restrictive patterns of legal interpretations (as with the Archipelago project). Chapter 4 finally showed that the RML policy networks that had emerged on the supranational scene since the late 1970s have been accessible to RML communities and have managed to obtain some EU protection for RMLs but also that this protection was still decided on an *ad hoc* basis and could/did not constitute a challenge to member-states sovereignties on language issues. These chapters thus show that, for the time being at least, member states retain full glottopolitical powers on their minorities' language rights at EU level. If, however, they concede some minimal protection to RMLs, they can wield legal power because no supranational binding legal texts constrain them otherwise.

International law needs changing before RML status and glottopolitics evolve and as law making at those levels remains a prerogative of states, it is clear that issues of a formal RML status and protection continue to be decided at national levels. The main reason for that state of affairs and for the politicisation of language issues resides in the fact that languages have been central elements of nation-state building processes, however these may be ideologically informed. As such they constitute primary markers of nation-states' identity, image and sovereignty.

Chapter 5 therefore scrutinized the construction of glottopolitical hegemonies, or political economies of language, in one particular nation-state: France. I showed that the historical construction of language hierarchies in France had deep historical roots and that through drastic changes in ideological and political environments, languages had been reified and totemized since the 17<sup>th</sup> century in France. In other words, I showed how languages have been loaded with immense ideological value at an early stage of French political history. This politicisation of languages was based upon formal distinctions and hierarchies that have persisted throughout French modern history and have been used as rationales to discard the recent opportunities to have the protection and recognition of RMLs durably enshrined in French national and international law. In that respect, we saw in chapter 5 that the radical politicisation of French in relation to other - both national and sub-national - languages through the reinforcement of protectionist French language legislation since 1992 has isolated France on the international scene, where more sociolinguistic devolution has generally taken place, e.g. UK, Italy. In France, RMLs gained a significant place in

the education sector only, and any form of officialisation beyond this and to some extent the media sector remains currently unachievable, as the 1999 debates around the *European Charter on RMLs* showed. This is because the essentialist approach to language and identity inherited from the construction of the French nation-state retains significant purchase among the language planners who are currently hegemonic in France.

At the same time, like other nation-state building processes, French nation-building has been uneven which has resulted in various patterns of compliance and resistance to acculturation in the regions: as was seen, nation-building processes significantly varied across time and space. As a result, the uneven (*inter alia* glottopolitical) conquest of the national territory during nation-building processes facilitated the actualisation from the 1960s of patterns of resistance to 'internal colonisation', and the concomitant organisation of social movements of protest against the (glottophagic) establishment of dominant (linguistic) markets.

In chapters 6 to 9, I first examined some of the reasons that explained this uneven acculturation (chapters 6 and 7) and then the consequences of uneven acculturation for the contemporary language revitalisation process (chapters 8 and 9). In the dialectical processes of acculturation and resistance, in Corsica, the Corsican language became invested with political symbolism against the immoderate dominance of French. Thus Corsican cyclically served as a rallying symbol and political banner for other socio-political and economic grievances during the nineteenth and twentieth century (chapters 6 and 7). As a result of protest forms and the salience of a new orthodoxy of decolonisation from the 1960s, eventually, French traditional political and linguistic Jacobinism has become less forceful and restricted RML rights have been granted as part of a package of devolved powers.

As chapter 8 showed, in Corsica, this eventually resulted in increased political, and to some extent sociolinguistic, devolution from the 1980s, and the actualisation of a devolved Corsican language policy essentially in the education sector. It is in that context, that Corsican language activists have sought to reverse the language hierarchies and patterns of language shift inherited from the experience of French domination through language institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of Corsican



continued steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s under the impetus of a very active Corsican policy network that exploited fully, and often in innovative ways through their interpretation *ex maxima* of national RML laws, the small concessions made in national legislative acts and, in particular, in regulatory acts. As quantitative data on language use showed, however, substantial language institutionalisation did not suffice to reverse language hierarchies and language shift (chapter 8).

Several reasons for this state of affairs were indicated in chapter 9, which showed that popular attitudes to what a language is and how it relates to identity - which remain a determining factor in the success or failure of language plans - were shaped in very complex and often contradictory ways during nation-building processes in Corsica. I showed that various forms of resistance to the legitimacy and/or modality of language revitalisation processes have emerged (i.e. the resistance of separation, the Italianist position, language purism), which are deeply embedded in essentialist conceptions of language, identity and the language-identity link. These forms of resistance then became even more acute in the Corsican context from the 1980s as the language policy network rapidly became dominated by sociolinguistically trained policy makers, and as these proposed a very innovative model of language acquisition that has sought to counter (the negative effects of) essentialist ideologies and promote instead a plural model of what language is and of the language-identity link. Indeed, both the reified and totemized approaches to language, identity and their relations that are intrinsic to essentialist models, and the deeprootedness of such models in popular attitudes to what languages *are* and *mean*, make it difficult for a plural model of language and identity to receive popular endorsement and active support.

This model has been intensely contested and its innovative character creates one of the main difficulties for language revitalisation in Corsica because it goes against both (some) elite and folk ideologies of language and identity. Initially developed as an alternative to authoritarian - monolithic and essentialist - models of language and identity engineered and naturalised in the national arenas, furthermore, this model has paradoxically become so hegemonic in the almost exclusively education-channelled processes of language revitalisation in Corsica that it is now largely perceived as a form of local authoritarianism, which has historically been abhorrent to Corsicans.

As chapter 9 illustrated, finally, much of the language debates in contemporary Corsica revolves around corpus rather than status issues so that the actual co-officialisation of Corsican desired by all language activists would probably not resolve internal corpus-oriented disputes.

In turn, the focus on such corpus issues also means that the developments and lobbying strategies for status change at national and supranational levels are less useful in Corsica than perhaps in other RML contexts, where corpus issues are less salient and/or no longer massively divisive, e.g. Catalonia, Wales, Ireland. In that connection, more ethnographic analyses, like the one on which the present study is based, of what sociolinguistic situations are at grassroots level may also help devise better adapted proposals for a RML policy at supranational level.

It is too early to attempt to predict how the sociolinguistic situation may evolve in Corsica, since the original planning solution adopted there is very recent given the time language planning takes to foster new attitudes and obtain actual changes in language behaviour and use, as was clearly seen in the case of the sociolinguistic construction of France. Progress is steadily being made in Corsica both in terms of corpus development, notably through literary production and constant lexical development, two important factors of legitimisation of status development, and in terms of institutional status development, through the generalisation of Corsican language education and bilingual education. As for attitudes to what a *language* is, as we saw, the education system now very largely promotes a plural, sociolinguistic approach to and reflection about the definition of language and the complex, multifaceted nature of the language-identity link. If this strategy succeeds, and if the education system manages to undermine essentialist ideologies, in the medium or long-term, Corsica might pave the way to the recognition of new, genuinely post-modern, conceptualisations of language(s) and its/their relation(s) to identity/identities that could be exported to other RML contexts where similar issues are salient, e.g. Occitany?

At the national level, especially in France, language issues remain extremely divisive and participants in language debates, when these arise, are extremely antagonistic and polarised. As a result, it is unlikely that the general movement of officialisation of

RMLs in numerous other nation-state contexts in Western Europe will inspire similar evolutions in France in the near future, notably because conservative ideologies are well represented in society, both among elites and the population, and language hierarchies are strongly supported by the legal and state institutions, and to some extent, civil institutions.

At supranational level, the limited extent to which identity issues are tackled and the limited scope of the legal protection of language diversity is clear. Notwithstanding, several chapters of this study showed that changes in RML status are not always planned and that changes in political environments can trigger changes in RML status in an unplanned fashion. The EU is currently undergoing drastic political and legal change coming from two connected directions: on the one hand, the Draft Constitution and its inclusion for the first time of provisions for minority rights in primary legislation and, on the other, the emergence since the 1990s of new forms of political conditionality for EU accession including minority language provisions. I will conclude by looking at ways in which these current developments may have an influence on future RML-oriented debates and developments, which may cascade down to lower levels of society.

Within the context of the 2004 negotiations in relation to the Draft Constitution for Europe (and in particular having regard to the commitment made in the Final Act of the June 2004 IGC to pay 'special attention' to 'regional' official languages), recent moves have been made by national governments to have certain 'RMLs' granted some official status at EU level, e.g. Irish (July 2004), Welsh (August 2004) and Catalan, Basque and Galician (September 2004), which would make them Treaty languages and languages of communication between the EU, regions and citizens. The outcomes of such motions are still to be established, but if they lead to a situation in which these languages gain a new status in the EU this will imply a radical reconfiguration of the current EU sociolinguistic regime.

For RMLs non-official in their state, moreover, this 'special attention' might also come from the implementation of Article II of the Draft Constitution. The draft Constitution, indeed, now implicitly includes minority rights, which could include RML rights, under the category of human right:

*The union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States [...] [TEU Article 6(1); Emphasis reflecting the new formulation in the Draft Constitution, Article II]*

This provision, if it finally goes through, might open new doors for RML lobbying but the consequences of this linkage must be fully assessed in the light of existing critical evaluation of the Linguistic Human Rights approach (e.g. May, 2000 and 2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004).

Finally, more glottopolitical change may come from the recent enlargement wave of 2004, with drastic consequences for the RML network and future RML policy measures. In Chapter 4, I mentioned the relationship between Enlargement and linguistic rights in the EU. In my treatment of parliamentary questions, I merely evoked the ‘double standard’ existing today, and denounced by MEPs, between provisions for RML rights in current member states and the demands made on candidate countries with respect to linguistic rights: France is a case in point. My contention is that in the enlarged EU this ‘double standard’ may not be sustainable.

From the new member states’ viewpoint, having had to adopt some RML-supporting measures in their domestic contexts, they may well seek to redouble their efforts to obtain EU-funding to sustain the costly language policies entailed by EU demands in their application pre-requisites. On the other hand, they may well seek to guarantee that their national languages receive equal treatment as working languages, as other official languages do. In that scenario, the cause for RMLs could well be deemed of secondary importance, especially where a significant number of minority languages in applicant countries are ‘majority’ languages in neighbouring countries and do not need the same support as unique regional or ‘indigenous’ languages. In yet another scenario, they may also resist granting linguistic rights to their minorities, especially where their current minorities are sometimes yesterday’s ‘colonial oppressors’ (e.g. the Russian minority in Latvia) (Poleshchuk, 2001, 2002, 2003; Adrey, 2005). Considering that there exists as much a variety of minority contexts in recent member states and candidate countries as in Western Europe, the sort of ethnocentrism that has

underlain academic research on Western RML activism might be at odds with Eastern and Central European majority-minority relations, and their concomitant glottopolitical expectations and priorities. Academic research in that 'enlarged field' is still budding. The unprecedented, recent EU Enlargement will undoubtedly precipitate its growth.

As can be seen, there is considerable uncertainty as to what will happen to the sociolinguistic regimes of the EU after enlargement and its concomitant RML network and policy change. What is not in doubt is that RML activists will need to adapt to a newer 'New Europe' with re-shaped patterns of multi-level and multi-actor governance and that developments in this newer Europe may catalyse sociolinguistic developments at national and sub-national levels in ways that remain to be explored.

# Annex 1

**Table 1: The phases leading to the textual production of the Preamble of Decision 1934/2000/EC: Intertextuality, Authorship and Thematic/Discursive Content**

Paragraphs/Clauses (the emphases are added)	Inter/Intra- textual References	Author/ Initiator	Functional Content	Value/Thematic
1. In the preamble to the Treaty, it is stated that <i>the Member States are: "Determined to promote the development of the highest possible level of knowledge for their peoples through a wide access to education and through its continuous updating.</i>	Preamble of the Treaty	Commission	Language as contributing to developing the level of knowledge of the peoples.	
2. Article 18 of the Treaty establishes the right of every citizen of the European Union <i>"to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States". The ability to use foreign languages is essential in order in practice fully to exercise that right.</i>	Article 18	Commission	Language as a condition for free mobility.	
3. Article 151 of the Treaty states that the Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity, and shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaty. <i>Among the cultural aspects, matters pertaining to languages are of great importance.</i>	Article 151	EP Opinion	Language as an important aspect of cultural diversity.	
4. <i>All the European languages, in their spoken and written forms, are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point of view and form an integral part of</i>	None explicit	EP Opinion	Language equality	

European cultures and civilisation.			
5. <i>The languages question is a challenge that must be tackled as part of the European integration process and the European Year of Languages may therefore prove to be highly instructive as far as the formulation of measures to encourage cultural and linguistic diversity is concerned.</i>	None explicit	EP Opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Language questions as a legitimate domain of supranational commitment.</li> <li>- the EYL as a pilot experience to design future EU language plans.</li> </ul>
6. Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Article 6</li> <li>- Council of Europe's <i>European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.</i> (Rome, November 4<sup>th</sup> 1950).</li> </ul>	EP Opinion	Language discrimination as against EU law.
7. Access to the vast literary heritage in the languages in which it was originally produced would contribute to developing mutual understanding and giving <i>a tangible content to the concept of European citizenship.</i>	None explicit	EP Opinion	Access to literature in the original languages as a means to enhance European citizenship.
8. It is important to <i>learn languages</i> as it enhances awareness of cultural diversity and helps <i>eradicate xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism and intolerance.</i>	None explicit	CoR's Opinion, then taken up by EP	Language learning as a means to enhance cultural diversity to combat racism.
9. In addition to the human, cultural and political advantages, <i>learning languages is also of considerable potential economic benefit.</i>	None explicit	EP Opinion	Language diversity as a source of economic benefit.
10. A command of the respective mother tongue and knowledge of the classical languages, in particular Latin and Greek, can make it easier to learn other languages.	None explicit	EP Opinion	Latin and Greek as facilitators of language learning.
11. It is important to raise	None explicit	EP Opinion	Community objectives to

awareness among public and private decision-makers of the importance of easy access to language learning facilities.			facilitate access to language learning.
12. The Council Conclusions of 12 June 1995 on linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the European Union emphasised that <i>linguistic diversity must be preserved and multilingualism promoted in the Union, with equal respect for the languages of the Union</i> and with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity. Decision No 2493/95/EC of the European Parliament and Council <sup>241</sup> of 23 October 1995 establishing 1996 as the "European Year of Lifelong Learning" highlighted the importance of the role of lifelong learning in developing competencies, including linguistic, throughout an individual's lifetime.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Council Conclusions of June 12<sup>th</sup> 1995 on linguistic diversity and multilingualism.</li> <li>- Decision 2493/95/EC establishing the European Year of Lifelong Learning. (see also paragraph 1 above)</li> </ul>	Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economic and cultural value of language diversity; Language equality.</li> <li>- Language as a major dimension of lifelong learning.</li> </ul>
13. The Commission's 1995 White Paper "Education, training, research: Teaching and learning: towards a learning society" established as its Objective Four <i>proficiency for all in three Community languages</i> . The Commission's 1996 Green Paper "Education, Training, Research: The obstacles to transnational mobility" concluded that "learning at least two Community languages has become a precondition if citizens of the European Union are to benefit from occupational and personal opportunities open to them in the single market".	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Commission's 1995 White Paper on the Learning Society.</li> <li>- Commission's 1996 Green Paper on mobility</li> </ul>	Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community Objective of individual trilingualism.</li> <li>- Multilingualism as a precondition for economic competitiveness.</li> </ul>
14. Council Resolution of 31 March 1995 on improving and diversifying language learning and teaching within the	Council Resolution of March 31 <sup>st</sup> 1995 (responding to	EP Opinion	- Community Objective of individual trilingualism

<sup>241</sup> OJ L 256, 26.10.1995, p.45.



education systems of the European Union <sup>242</sup> states that pupils should as a general rule have the opportunity of learning two languages of the European Union other than their mother tongue(s) for a minimum of two consecutive years during compulsory schooling and if possible for a longer period.	Commission White Paper; see paragraph 13)		
15. The measures in the Lingua programme, adopted by Council Decision 89/489/EEC <sup>243</sup> , were reinforced and partially integrated as horizontal measures into the Socrates programme adopted by Decision 819/95/EC of the European Parliament and the Council(8). <i>Those measures have promoted the improvement of knowledge of the languages of the Union and have thus contributed to greater understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the Union.</i> The European Parliament and Council in their Decision No 253/2000/EC <sup>244</sup> propose that those measures be further developed and reinforced in the second phase of the Socrates programme.	The Lingua Programme (= education in the 11 EU Official Languages)	Commission	Multilingual education and multilingualism as a means of <i>understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the Union.</i>
16. The Leonardo da Vinci programme, adopted by Decision 94/819/EC <sup>245</sup> of the European Parliament and the Council, has, building on the results achieved under the Lingua programme, supported activities aimed at developing linguistic skills as part of vocational training measures. That support will be further developed and reinforced in the second phase of the Leonardo da Vinci programme,	The Leonardo da Vinci Programme (= vocational training; legal basis: TEU article 127)	Commission	Language skills as part of vocational training measures.

<sup>242</sup> OJ C 207, 12.8.1995, p.1.

<sup>243</sup> OJ L 239, 16.8.1989, p.24.

<sup>244</sup> OJ L 28, 3.2.2000, p.1.

<sup>245</sup> OJ L 340, 29.12.1994, p. 8.

adopted by Council Decision 1999/382/EC <sup>246</sup> .			
17. The Culture 2000 programme adopted by Decision No 508/2000/EC <sup>247</sup> also contributes to improving mutual understanding of the cultural achievements of the European peoples, especially by highlighting cultural diversity and multilingualism.	The Programme Culture 2000	EP Opinion	Cultural Diversity and Multilingualism as a means of improving mutual understanding between the European peoples.
18. A multi-annual programme to promote the linguistic diversity of the Community in the information society was established by Council Decision 96/664/EC. <sup>248</sup>	Council Decision of November 28 <sup>th</sup> 1996 on Linguistic Diversity in the Information Society	Commission	Multilingualism as an economic asset in a modernising, increasingly computer-ruled world.
19. The Report of the High Level Panel on the Free Movement of Persons presented to the Commission on 18 March 1997, considered "the multiplicity of European languages [to be] ... a treasure to be safeguarded" and suggested measures to foster language training and the use of languages in the Community.	Expert Report on the Free Movement of Persons (see also Treaty Article 18).	Commission	- Language as a condition for free mobility. - language Diversity as a treasure to be safeguarded.
20. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 5 of the Treaty, the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, inter alia because of the need for a coherent Community-wide information campaign avoiding duplication and achieving economies of scale. Those objectives can be better achieved by the Community, owing to the transnational dimension of Community actions and	Treaty Article 5 on Subsidiarity	Commission	Legitimatization of Community Action in Language Promotion on account of the principle of subsidiarity to guarantee optimal efficiency.

<sup>246</sup> OJ L 146, 11.6.1999, p. 33.

<sup>247</sup> OJ L 63, 10.3.2000, p.1.

<sup>248</sup> OJ L 306, 28.11.1996, p. 40.

<i>measures</i> . This Decision does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.			
21. However, it is also important that there should be close cooperation and coordination between the Commission and the Member States, so as to ensure that measures undertaken at European level are underpinned by small-scale measures undertaken at local, regional and national level which are likely to be more suited to the needs of target groups and specific situations, and that cultural diversity is strengthened as a result.	Intra-textual reference to paragraph 20.	CoR Opinion, taken up in the EP Opinion	Legitimatization of Community Action in Language Promotion on account of the principle of subsidiarity to guarantee optimal efficiency (Commission/Member States cooperation)
22. It is important to develop appropriate cooperation between the European Community and the Council of Europe so as to ensure consistency between measures undertaken at Community level and those undertaken by the Council of Europe, and such cooperation is expressly mentioned in Article 149 of the Treaty.	Article 149, paragraph 4.	Commission	Legitimatization of Community Action in Language Promotion on account of the principle of subsidiarity to guarantee optimal efficiency (EU/Council of Europe cooperation)
23. It is important to take into account the fact that the European Year of Languages will take place against the background of preparations for the enlargement of the Union.	None Explicit	EP Opinion	Multilingualism and Enlargement: EYL as a pilot experience to build on in preparation for enlargement.
24. This Decision lays down for the entire duration of the programme, a financial framework constituting the prime reference, within the meaning of point 33 of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission <sup>249</sup> , for the budgetary authority, during the annual budgetary procedure.	Inter-institutional agreement on budgetary authority	Commission	Budgetary Authority

<sup>249</sup> OJ C 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1.

25. The Joint Declaration of 4 May 1999 by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission <sup>250</sup> sets out the arrangements for the implementation of the co-decision procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty.	Joint Declaration of May 4 <sup>th</sup> 1999 on the implementation of Treaty Article 251.	Commission	Co-Decision Procedure.
26. The measures necessary for the implementation of this decision should be adopted in accordance with the Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission <sup>251</sup>	Council Decision of June 28 <sup>th</sup> 1999 on the Commission's implementing powers.	Commission	Implementation Procedure

<sup>250</sup> OJ C 148, 28.5.1999, p. 1.

<sup>251</sup> OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p.23.

**Table 2: Evolution of Article 1 through the legislative process: Language covered by the EYL.**

Commission Proposal (October 1999)	CoR Opinion (February 2000)	EP Opinion (April 2000)	Council/EP Decision (July 2000)
1.2. These measures will cover the Official language of the Community, together with Irish and Letzeburgesch, <b>and other languages recognised by the Member States.</b> (emphasis added)	3.3.1 In line with the principle of the equal value of the languages, Article 1 of the draft decision states that the European year will cover all the official community languages, plus Irish, Letzeburgesch and <b>other languages recognised by the Member States.</b> 3.3.2 The Committee is pleased that Member States will be free to decide for themselves which languages to involve. 3.3.3 The Decision to make 2001 European Year of Languages is welcome for the contribution it will make to protect linguistic minorities...	1.2. These measures will cover the Official languages of the Community, together with Irish and Letzeburgesch, <b>and other languages as identified by the Member States for the purpose of implementing this Decision.</b> (emphasis added)	1.2. These measures will cover the Official languages of the Community, together with Irish and Letzeburgesch, <b>and other languages in line with those identified by the Member States for the purposes of implementing this Decision.</b> (emphasis added)

## Annex 2

# LOI n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française

L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat ont adopté,  
Vu la décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 94-345 DC en date du 29 juillet 1994.  
Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :

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Cette version tient compte des modifications apportées par la  
décision du Conseil constitutionnel du 29 juillet 1994  
ainsi que de la modification introduite au deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 par  
la loi n° 96-597 du 2 juillet 1996 de modernisation des activités financières.

### Art. 1er. -

Langue de la République en vertu de la Constitution, la langue française est un élément fondamental de la personnalité et du patrimoine de la France.  
Elle est la langue de l'enseignement, du travail, des échanges et des services publics.  
Elle est le lien privilégié des États constituant la communauté de la francophonie.

### Art. 2. -

Dans la désignation, l'offre, la présentation, le mode d'emploi ou d'utilisation, la description de l'étendue et des conditions de garantie d'un bien, d'un produit ou d'un service, ainsi que dans les factures et quittances, l'emploi de la langue française est obligatoire.

Les mêmes dispositions s'appliquent à toute publicité écrite, parlée ou audiovisuelle.  
Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables à la dénomination des produits typiques et spécialités d'appellation étrangère connus du plus large public.  
La législation sur les marques ne fait pas obstacle à l'application des premier et troisième alinéas du présent article aux mentions et messages enregistrés avec la marque.

### Art. 3. -

Toute inscription ou annonce apposée ou faite sur la voie publique, dans un lieu ouvert au public ou dans un moyen de transport en commun et destinée à l'information du public doit être formulée en langue française.

Si l'inscription rédigée en violation des dispositions qui précèdent est apposée par un tiers utilisateur sur un bien appartenant à une personne morale de droit public, celle-ci doit mettre l'utilisateur en demeure de faire cesser, à ses frais et dans le délai fixé par elle, l'irrégularité constatée.

Si la mise en demeure n'est pas suivie d'effet, l'usage du bien peut, en tenant compte de la gravité du manquement, être retiré au contrevenant, quels que soient les stipulations du contrat ou les termes de l'autorisation qui lui avait été accordée.

#### **Art. 4. -**

Lorsque des inscriptions ou annonces visées à l'article précédent, apposées ou faites par des personnes morales de droit public ou des personnes privées exerçant une mission de service public font l'objet de traductions, celles-ci sont au moins au nombre de deux.

Dans tous les cas où les mentions, annonces et inscriptions prévues aux articles 2 et 3 de la présente loi sont complétées d'une ou plusieurs traductions, la présentation en français doit être aussi lisible, audible ou intelligible que la présentation en langues étrangères.

Un décret en Conseil d'État précise les cas et les conditions dans lesquels il peut être dérogé aux dispositions du présent article dans le domaine des transports internationaux.

#### **Art. 5. -**

Quels qu'en soient l'objet et les formes, les contrats auxquels une personne morale de droit public ou une personne privée exécutant une mission de service public sont parties sont rédigés en langue française. Ils ne peuvent contenir ni expression ni terme étrangers lorsqu'il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens approuvés dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à l'enrichissement de la langue française.

Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux contrats conclus par une personne morale de droit public gérant des activités à caractère industriel et commercial, la Banque de France ou la Caisse des dépôts et consignations et à exécuter intégralement hors du territoire national. Pour l'application du présent alinéa, sont réputés exécutés intégralement hors de France les emprunts émis sous le bénéfice de l'article 131 quater du code général des impôts ainsi que les contrats portant sur la fourniture de services d'investissement au sens de l'article 4 de la loi n° 96-597 du 2 juillet 1996 de modernisation des activités financières et qui relèvent, pour leur exécution, d'une juridiction étrangère.

Les contrats visés au présent article conclus avec un ou plusieurs cocontractants étrangers peuvent comporter, outre la rédaction en français, une ou plusieurs versions en langue étrangère pouvant également faire foi.

Une partie à un contrat conclu en violation du premier alinéa ne pourra se prévaloir d'une disposition en langue étrangère qui porterait préjudice à la partie à laquelle elle est opposée.

#### **Art. 6. -**

Tout participant à une manifestation, un colloque ou un congrès organisé en France par des personnes physiques ou morales de nationalité française a le droit de s'exprimer en français.

Les documents distribués aux participants avant et pendant la réunion pour en présenter le programme doivent être rédigés en français et peuvent comporter des traductions en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères.

Lorsqu'une manifestation, un colloque ou un congrès donne lieu à la distribution aux participants de documents préparatoires ou de documents de travail, ou à la publication d'actes ou de comptes rendus de travaux, les textes ou interventions présentés en langue étrangère doivent être accompagnés au moins d'un résumé en

français.

Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux manifestations, colloques ou congrès qui ne concernent que des étrangers, ni aux manifestations de promotion du commerce extérieur de la France.

Lorsqu'une personne morale de droit public ou une personne morale de droit privé chargée d'une mission de service public a l'initiative des manifestations visées au présent article, un dispositif de traduction doit être mis en place.

## **Art. 7. -**

Les publications, revues et communications diffusées en France et qui émanent d'une personne morale de droit public, d'une personne privée exerçant une mission de service public ou d'une personne privée bénéficiant d'une subvention publique doivent, lorsqu'elles sont rédigées en langue étrangère, comporter au moins un résumé en français.

## **Art. 8. -**

Les trois derniers alinéas de l'article L. 121-1 du code du travail sont remplacés par quatre alinéas ainsi rédigés : "Le contrat de travail constaté par écrit est rédigé en français.

"Lorsque l'emploi qui fait l'objet du contrat ne peut être désigné que par un terme étranger sans correspondant en français, le contrat de travail doit comporter une explication en français du terme étranger.

"Lorsque le salarié est étranger et le contrat constaté par écrit, une traduction du contrat est rédigée, à la demande du salarié, dans la langue de ce dernier. Les deux textes font également foi en justice.

En cas de discordance entre les deux textes, seul le texte rédigé dans la langue du salarié étranger peut être invoqué contre ce dernier.

"L'employeur ne pourra se prévaloir à l'encontre du salarié auquel elles feraient grief des clauses d'un contrat de travail conclu en violation du présent article."

## **Art. 9. -**

### **I. -**

L'article L. 122-35 du code du travail est complété par un alinéa ainsi rédigé :

"Le règlement intérieur est rédigé en français. Il peut être accompagné de traductions en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères."

### **II. -**

Il est inséré, après l'article L. 122-39 du code du travail, un article L. 122-39-1 ainsi rédigé :

"Art. L. 122-39-1. - Tout document comportant des obligations pour le salarié ou des dispositions dont la connaissance est nécessaire à celui-ci pour l'exécution de son travail doit être rédigé en français.

Il peut être accompagné de traductions en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères.

"Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux documents reçus de l'étranger ou destinés à des étrangers."



### **III. -**

Aux premier et troisième alinéas de l'article L. 122-37 du code du travail, les mots :  
"articles L. 122-34 et L. 122-35" sont remplacés par les mots :  
"articles L. 122-34, L. 122-35 et L. 122-39-1". IV. -

### **IV. -**

Il est inséré, après l'article L. 132-2 du code du travail, un article L. 132-2-1 ainsi rédigé :

"Art. L. 132-2-1. - Les conventions et accords collectifs de travail et les conventions d'entreprise ou d'établissement doivent être rédigés en français. Toute disposition rédigée en langue étrangère est inopposable au salarié à qui elle ferait grief."

### **Art. 10. -**

Le 3° de l'article L. 311-4 du code du travail est ainsi rédigé :

"3° Un texte rédigé en langue étrangère

"Lorsque l'emploi ou le travail offert ne peut être désigné que par un terme étranger sans correspondant en français, le texte français doit en comporter une description suffisamment détaillée pour ne pas induire en erreur au sens du 2° ci-dessus.

"Les prescriptions des deux alinéas précédents s'appliquent aux services à exécuter sur le territoire français, quelle que soit la nationalité de l'auteur de l'offre ou de l'employeur, et aux services à exécuter hors du territoire français lorsque l'auteur de l'offre ou l'employeur est français, alors même que la parfaite connaissance d'une langue étrangère serait une des conditions requises pour tenir l'emploi proposé. Toutefois, les directeurs de publications rédigées, en tout ou partie, en langue étrangère peuvent, en France, recevoir des offres d'emploi rédigées dans cette langue."

### **Art. 11. -**

#### **I. -**

La langue de l'enseignement, des examens et concours, ainsi que des thèses et mémoires dans les établissements publics et privés d'enseignement est le français, sauf exceptions justifiées par les nécessités de l'enseignement des langues et cultures régionales ou étrangères ou lorsque les enseignants sont des professeurs associés ou invités étrangers.

Les écoles étrangères ou spécialement ouvertes pour accueillir des élèves de nationalité étrangère, ainsi que les établissements dispensant un enseignement à caractère international, ne sont pas soumis à cette obligation.

#### **II. -**

Il est inséré, après le deuxième alinéa de l'article 1er de la loi n 89-486 du 10 juillet 1989 d'orientation sur l'éducation, un alinéa ainsi rédigé :

"La maîtrise de la langue française et la connaissance de deux autres langues font partie des objectifs fondamentaux de l'enseignement."

## **Art. 12. -**

Avant le chapitre Ier du titre II de la loi n 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la liberté de communication, il est inséré un article 20-1 ainsi rédigé :

"Art. 20-1. - L'emploi du français est obligatoire dans l'ensemble des émissions et des messages publicitaires des organismes et services de radiodiffusion sonore ou télévisuelle, quel que soit leur mode de diffusion ou de distribution, à l'exception des oeuvres cinématographiques et audiovisuelles en version originale.

"Sous réserve des dispositions du 2 bis de l'article 28 de la présente loi, l'alinéa précédent ne s'applique pas aux oeuvres musicales dont le texte est, en tout ou partie, rédigé en langue étrangère.

"L'obligation prévue au premier alinéa n'est pas applicable aux programmes, parties de programme ou publicités incluses dans ces derniers qui sont conçus pour être intégralement diffusés en langue étrangère ou dont la finalité est l'apprentissage d'une langue, ni aux retransmissions de cérémonies culturelles.

"Lorsque les émissions ou les messages publicitaires visés au premier alinéa du présent article sont accompagnés de traductions en langues étrangères, la présentation en français doit être aussi lisible, audible ou intelligible que la présentation en langue étrangère."

## **Art. 13. -**

La loi n 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 précitée est ainsi modifiée :

### **I. -**

Après le sixième alinéa du II de l'article 24, il est inséré un alinéa ainsi rédigé :

"- le respect de la langue française et le rayonnement de la francophonie."

### **II. -**

À l'article 28, il est inséré, après le 4 , un 4 bis ainsi rédigé :

"4 bis. Les dispositions propres à assurer le respect de la langue française et le rayonnement de la francophonie ;".

### **III. -**

À l'article 33, il est inséré, après le 2 , un 2 bis ainsi rédigé :

"2 bis. Les dispositions propres à assurer le respect de la langue française et le rayonnement de la francophonie ;".

## **Art. 14. -**

### **I. -**

L'emploi d'une marque de fabrique, de commerce ou de service constituée d'une expression ou d'un terme étrangers est interdit aux personnes morales de droit public dès lors qu'il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens approuvés dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à l'enrichissement de la langue française.

Cette interdiction s'applique aux personnes morales de droit privé chargées d'une mission de service public, dans l'exécution de celle-ci.

## **II. -**

Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables aux marques utilisées pour la première fois avant l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.

### **Art. 15. -**

L'octroi, par les collectivités et les établissements publics, de subventions de toute nature est subordonné au respect par les bénéficiaires des dispositions de la présente loi.

Tout manquement à ce respect peut, après que l'intéressé a été mis à même de présenter ses observations, entraîner la restitution totale ou partielle de la subvention.

### **Art. 16. -**

Outre les officiers et agents de police judiciaire agissant conformément aux dispositions du code de procédure pénale, les agents énumérés aux 1, 3 et 4 de l'article L. 215-1 du code de la consommation sont habilités à rechercher et constater les infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application de l'article 2 de la présente loi.

A cet effet, les agents peuvent pénétrer de jour dans les lieux et véhicules énumérés au premier alinéa de l'article L. 213-4 du même code et dans ceux où s'exercent les activités mentionnées à l'article L. 216-1, à l'exception des lieux qui sont également à usage d'habitation.

Ils peuvent demander à consulter les documents nécessaires à l'accomplissement de leur mission, en prendre copie et recueillir sur convocation ou sur place les renseignements et justifications propres à l'accomplissement de leur mission.

Ils peuvent également prélever un exemplaire des biens ou produits mis en cause dans les conditions prévues par décret en Conseil d'État.

### **Art. 17. -**

Quiconque entrave de façon directe ou indirecte l'accomplissement des missions des agents mentionnés au premier alinéa de l'article 16 ou ne met pas à leur disposition tous les moyens nécessaires à cette fin est passible des peines prévues au second alinéa de l'article 433-5 du code pénal.

### **Art. 18. -**

Les infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application de la présente loi sont constatées par des procès-verbaux, qui font foi jusqu'à preuve du contraire.

Les procès-verbaux doivent, sous peine de nullité, être adressés dans les cinq jours qui suivent leur clôture au procureur de la République. Une copie en est également remise, dans le même délai, à l'intéressé.

## **Art. 19. -**

Après l'article 2-13 du code de procédure pénale, il est inséré un article 2-14 ainsi rédigé :

"Art. 2-14. - Toute association régulièrement déclarée se proposant par ses statuts la défense de la langue française et agréée dans les conditions fixées par décret en Conseil d'État peut exercer les droits reconnus à la partie civile en ce qui concerne les infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application des articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 et 10 de la loi n 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française."

## **Art. 20. -**

La présente loi est d'ordre public.

Elle s'applique aux contrats conclus postérieurement à son entrée en vigueur.

## **Art. 21. -**

Les dispositions de la présente loi s'appliquent sans préjudice de la législation et de la réglementation relatives aux langues régionales de France et ne s'opposent pas à leur usage.

## **Art. 22. -**

Chaque année, le Gouvernement communique aux assemblées, avant le 15 septembre, un rapport sur l'application de la présente loi et des dispositions des conventions ou traités internationaux relatives au statut de la langue française dans les institutions internationales.

## **Art. 23. -**

Les dispositions de l'article 2 entreront en vigueur à la date de publication du décret en Conseil d'État définissant les infractions aux dispositions de cet article, et au plus tard douze mois après la publication de la présente loi au Journal officiel.

Les dispositions des articles 3 et 4 de la présente loi entreront en vigueur six mois après l'entrée en vigueur de l'article 2.

## **Art. 24. -**

La loi n 75-1349 du 31 décembre 1975 relative à l'emploi de la langue française est abrogée, à l'exception de ses articles 1er à 3 qui seront abrogés à compter de l'entrée en vigueur de l'article 2 de la présente loi et de son article 6 qui sera abrogé à la date d'entrée en vigueur de l'article 3 de la présente loi.

La présente loi sera exécutée comme loi de l'État.

Fait à Paris, le 4 août 1994.

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
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I hereby certify that the work contained in this study is substantially my own work.

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